

# Russian modal predicates: personal vs. impersonal construction\*

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## I . Introduction: problems

In Russian there are a small number of predicates occurring with the infinitive form, which express what has been referred to as 'modality': *moč'*, *smoč'*, *dolžen*, *možno*, *nel'zja*, *nado*, and *nužno*. Thus, in the following Russian sentences,

- (1) a. On *možet* *exat'* *domoj*  
'He can go home'  
b. *Ej* *nado* *exat'* *domoj*  
'She must go home' or 'It is necessary for her to go home'

*možet* and *nado*, which occur with the infinitival complement *exat'* *domoj*, express what the corresponding English 'modals' would express: 'can, may' or 'must, have to', respectively. Although it seems fairly clear that they all denote a certain kind of grammatical concept, it is not an easy task to give an explicit characterization of the latter. And the reason why they have attracted a number of linguists' attention seems to lie partly in the difficulty of conceptualization.<sup>11</sup> In this paper, however, I will not discuss

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the notional characteristics of 'modality', assuming that all of these predicates express a certain 'modal' concept, although for the sake of reference I will briefly provide the constituency of the notional field of 'modality'. Nor will I discuss semantics and usage of these predicates, but rather, will focus mainly on their formal features (cf. section 3). It is certainly true that these predicates are morphologically highly heterogeneous,<sup>2)</sup> but a corpus-based analysis<sup>3)</sup> reveals that they share several morpho-syntactic properties which serve to distinguish them from non-modal predicates. It is these formal properties, which have never been reported in the previous literature, that make them enter into the independent grammatical (sub)system of 'modality'. One of the goals in this paper is to present and discuss these properties.

Another aspect to be considered in this paper is that Russian shows two structurally different constructions which however appear to be semantically similar: the so-called 'personal' and 'impersonal' modal predicates. A personal modal predicate has as its grammatical subject a (usually) nominative noun phrase and agrees in number and person/gender with it (cf. (3a, b)), whereas an impersonal modal has a dative NP and so does not show agreement (cf. (4a, b, c, d)).

- (3) a. On možet obedat' doma. 'He can have dinner at home.'  
 b. Ona dolžna obedat' doma. 'She must have dinner at home.'  
 (4) a. Emu možno obedat' doma. 'It is possible for him to have dinner at home.'

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1) See Vinogradov (1950), Zolotova (1962), Perkins (1983), Palmer (1986), Vaulina (1988), Bondarko et al. (1990), Sweetser (1990), among others.

2) *moč'* and *smoč'* are verbs, *dolžen* is a predicative adjective, and the rest are what has been called 'predicative(predikativ)' (Isačenko 1965[2nd ed.]).

3) My research methodology is as follows: first I gathered as many examples with modal predicates as possible, and secondly, hypothesized the (formal) constraints on the basis of the corpus, and thirdly, verified them with the help of a few native speakers available to me. Examples are adduced from a variety of contemporary Russian texts, which yielded approximately 4, 400 raw examples.

- b. Emu nel'zja obedat' doma. 'It is impossible for him to have dinner at home.'
- c. Tebe nužno obedat' doma. 'You have to have dinner at home.'
- d. Tebe ne nado obedat' doma. 'You don't have to have dinner at home.'

Although these two types of modal constructions have been well recognized in the previous literature, Russian linguists' treatment of them is not satisfactory in various aspects. Aside from the aforementioned differences between these two types, there are a number of differences in their morphosyntactic behavior and semantic representation. For instance, the passivized form cannot occur with the impersonal modal predicates. Moreover, a semantic consideration makes it clear that these two types of modals are not synonymous, which has been commonly assumed in traditional descriptions. As I will argue in section 4, the component of 'modal experiencer' is always present in the semantic representation of a sentence with impersonal modals, whereas a sentence with personal modals does not have such a component.

In section 5, on the basis of my findings, I will claim that there is a markedness relationship between these two constructions; that is, personal modal predicates are unmarked member in relation to impersonal modals, which are marked. This will highlight the fact that there is a fundamental isomorphism between content side and expression side of linguistic units.<sup>4)</sup>

## II. Some preliminary remarks

Without going into detail on the notional field of 'modality', here I will mention briefly some terms which are relevant to the subsequent

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4) The isomorphic or diagrammatic nature of linguistic signs was expressly emphasized in Jakobson's seminal paper (1965/1971) and extensively documented in Haiman (1980), Andersen (1980), and Shapiro (1983).

discussion. The term 'epistemic modality' has to do with such notions as CONFIDENT INFERENCE and TENTATIVE INFERENCE, while 'non-epistemic' modality, which has been often referred to as 'root modality', is used to subsume two sub-modalities, i.e. 'deontic' and 'dynamic' modalities; in the former are included such notions as PERMISSION and OBLIGATION (cf. Lyons 1977, Perkins 1983, Palmer 1986). 'Dynamic' modality can be further classified into 'external-situational' and 'internal personal' modality; the 'external-situational' modality has to do with physical circumstances and includes such notions as INEVITABILITY and DISPOSITION, whereas the 'internal-personal' modality comprising such notions as ABILITY and NEED is concerned with the physical or mental states intrinsic to a person. The hierarchical structure of the field of modality can be shown schematically as follows.

	Epistemic	Non-epistemic (Root)		
		Deontic	Dynamic	
			Situational	Personal
Possibility	TENTATIVE INFERENCE	PERMISSION	DISPOSITION	ABILITY
Necessity	CONFIDENT INFERENCE	OBLIGATION	INEVITABILITY	NEED

It is only important for our discussion to distinguish two global modalities, namely epistemic vs. non epistemic modality.

While this classification is based on what aspect of reality the modality concerned reflects, i.e. on the kind of modality, there is another possibility of classifying the modal domain, as indicated in the leftmost column of the above scheme: 'possibility' vs. 'necessity'. Since I characterize 'modality' as having to do with a certain 'conditional' relation between states of affairs,<sup>5)</sup> these two terms are defined accordingly. An expression for

5) For a detailed discussion of the definition of modality introduced here, see Choi (1994: ch. 2). The terms 'necessity' and 'possibility' should not be understood in the ordinary sense of the words, but as are defined here.

'possibility' is defined semantically as signaling the 'existence of SOME preconditions' for a dictal state of affairs to be actualized, while an expression for 'necessity' as signaling the 'existence of ALL preconditions' for a dictal state of affairs to be actualized.

Further, the terms 'modal situation' and 'dictal situation' will be used in this paper in order to designate what a modal predicate represents and what an infinitival complement represents, respectively. For example, in (3a) the modal predicate *možet* is said to represent a 'modal situation', i.e., a situation where the modal relation 'possibility' holds, whereas the infinitival complement *obedat' doma* is said to represent a 'dictal situation', i.e., the situation of 'his having dinner at home'.

### III. Formal properties of modal predicates

Now let us discuss several formal properties which all modal predicates enumerated above share.

#### 3.1 Modal predicates as main predicates

Modal predicates are used syntactically exclusively as main predicates, and cannot be embedded under other main predicates. Thus, the following sentences are all ungrammatical.

- (5) a. \**On ljubil moč' rabotat'*. 'He loved to be able to work.'  
 b. \**On obeščal dolžen byt' rabotat'*. 'He promised to have to work.'  
 c. \**Ona rada moč' exat' domoj*. 'She is glad to be able to go home.'  
 d. \**Emu xočetsja byt' možno rabotat'*. 'He wants to be able to work.'  
 e. \**Ej trudno nel'zja byt' rabotat'*. 'It is difficult for her not to

have to work.'

Some verbs which appear to be modal predicates are excluded from this class because of this property and others to be discussed below. For example, *smet'*/*posmet'* can be embedded under a matrix predicate, as demonstrated in the following sentence.

(6) *On načal smet' èto sdelat'.* 'He started to dare to do this.'

Further, this verb can be embedded in the form of infinitive under another modal predicate.

(7) *Vse mogli znat', podozrevat' èto, no nikto ne dolžen byl smet' govorit'.* (AK v.1:359)  
 'Everybody could know, and suspect this, but nobody should have dared to say.'

Similarly, such verbs as *ponadobit'sja*, which is similar in meaning to *nado*, are also excluded.

(8) *Na večer i na noč' ostalis' vse, kto mog ponadobit'sja:...* (DA: 19)  
 'Everyone that could be needed remained for the evening and night:...'

### 3.2 The position of *byt'*

*Byt'*, which occurs with some modal predicates such as *dolžen*, *nado*, *nužno*, *možno*, and *nel'zja* and functions as an auxiliary (or, 'tense marker', according to Isačenko (1965: 284-5)), is positioned, as a rule, after a modal predicate, and never receives a full phrasal stress, thus forming a phonological word with the preceding modal.

- (9) a. Mne nel'zjá by'lo prijti. 'I could not come.'  
 b. \*Mne bylo nel'zja/možno/nado/nužno prijti.
- (10) a. On dólžen by'l exat' domoj v 5 časov. 'He had to go home at 5.'  
 b. \*On byl dolžen exat' domoj v 5 časov.  
 c. Nu, v «Angliju», skazal Stepan Arkad'ič, vybrav «Angliju», potomu, čto tam on, v «Anglii», byl bolee dólžen, čem v «Ěrmitaž». (AK v.1: 44)  
 'Well, at the «Anglija», " said Stepan Arkad'ič, having chosen the «Anglija», because there, at the «Anglija», he owed more than at the «Ěrmitaž».'

Compare (10a) where *dolžen* is used as a modal predicate with (10c) where *dolžen* is used as a descriptive predicative adjective, meaning 'owe'; thus *byl* is located before *dolžen*.

Moreover, a copula construction can be transformed into an infinitive form, which is not the case with a modal sentence with *byt'* as an auxiliary; thus *byt' veselym/durakom* is a possible surface form, whereas \**dolžen/nado/ \*nužno/ \*možno/nel'zja byt'* is not. Needless to say, *byt'* in these combinations should not be identified with *byt'* in sentences like *u nego dolžny byt' den'gi*; *nužno byt' kak možno umnee*, where *byt'* is the infinitive form of 'existential' and 'copula' *byt'*, respectively, which function syntactically as main verbs.

### 3.3 No auxiliary except *byt'*.

Impersonal modal predicates and *dolžen* must be used with the past tense forms or the future tense forms of *byt'* in order to express past time or future time, and cannot be used with the so-called finite 'semi-auxiliary verbs (*poluznamenatel'nyj glagol*)'.

- (11) a. Emu nado/nužno/možno/nel'zja bylo/budet exat' domoj.

- b. On dolžen byl/budet exat' domoj.  
 (12) a. \*Emu nado/nužno/možno/nel'zja byvalo/byvaet exat' domoj.  
 b. \*On dolžen stanovilsja/stanovitsja exat' domoj.

### 3.4 The impossibility of the imperative form

Modal predicates are paradigmatically defective, in that they do not occur in the imperative sentence type.

- (13) a. \*Mogi rabotat'! 'Can work!'  
 b. \*Bud' dolžen rabotat'! 'Must work!'  
 c. \*Bud' nado/nužno/možno/nel'zja rabotat'! 'Have to/need/can /can't work!'

For *moč'*, the imperative form is found, but used only with the particle *ne*.<sup>6)</sup> Besides this, it is used only jocularly, meaning 'don't you dare', and is substandard. In contrast with modals under consideration, *smet'*/*posmet'* does have regular imperative form (cf. section 3.1).

- (14) Ty u menja ne smej ostrit', kogda ja ser'ezno razgovarivaju.  
 'You, don't dare to be witty to me, when I talk seriously.'

Further, modal predicates cannot be used in the first person and third person imperative.

- (15) a. \*Možem(te) rabotat'! 'Let's be able to work!'  
 b. \*Pust' on možet rabotat'! 'Let him be able to work!'

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6) See the entry *moč'* in the dictionary *Slovar' russkogo jazyka* (1985), which gives the following example:

Vyxodit, vsju žizn' kolxozu otdaj, Avdot'ja Petrovna Jakutova, a o sebe p odumat' ne mogu.

It turns out, you give your all life to the collective farm, Avdot'ja Petrovna Jakutova, but don't dare to think about yourself.'



- (16) a. \*Budem(te) dolžny rabotat'! 'Let's have to work'  
 b. \*Pust' emu nado rabotat'! 'Let him have to work!'

Impersonal modal predicates, however, can occur with *pust'*, provided that it is used with *budet*.

- (17) *Pust' nado budet exat'*. 'If only it would be necessary to go.'

But, as the English translation would indicate, this sentence does not mean something like 'Let someone have to go', but is used for expressing a 'wish' (AG 1982: 321). Thus it can be paraphrased into the following sentence, which invariably expresses the speaker's wish.

- (18) *Ešli by/Xot' by nado bylo exat'*.  
 'If only it would be necessary to go.'

### 3.5 The impossibility of being used in the independent infinitive construction

In Russian, the infinitive form can be used alone, thus forming an independent sentence. Examples are from AG (1982: 373-4).

- (19) a. *Zdes' ne projti*. 'Here one can't go through.'  
 b. *Molčat'!* 'Silence!'  
 c. *My ljubim drug druga, no svad'be našej ne byt'!*  
 'We love each other, but our wedding is not destined to be.'

The modal predicates cannot be used in a construction of this type.

- (20) a. \**Moč' rabotat'*.  
 b. \**Byt' dolžen rabotat'*.  
 c. \**Byt' nado/nužno/možno/nel'zja rabotat'*.

### 3.6 The impossibility of cooccurrence of two modal predicates

Two modal predicates cannot occur in one and the same sentence unless they are conjoined by the conjunction *i* 'and' and *ili* 'or', in which case each modal is invariably a main predicate. This restriction is coupled partly with the fact that modal predicates cannot be in the infinitive form.

- (21) a. \**On mozet byt' dolžen exat'*. 'He can have to go.'  
 b. \**Ona dolžna moč' exat'*. 'She must be able to go.'  
 c. \**Mne nado možno byt' exat'*. 'I have to be able to go.'

### 3.7. The impossibility of being used in participial and gerundive constructions

Modal predicates cannot stand in participial and gerundive constructions.

- (22) a. \**Mogja čitat' gazetu ...*  
 b. \**Smogši čitat' gazetu ...*  
 c. \**Buduči dolžen/nado/nužno/ložno/nel'zja exat' domoj ...*  
 d. \**Èto kniga, byvšaja dolžen/nado/nužno/nado/nel'zja kupit'*.

The only exceptions are participial forms of *moč'*: *moguščij* and *mogšij*.

- (23) a. ... *v tret'ix, esli nužno, ukazanie na moguščee proizojti nesčast'e dlja syna; ...*(AK v.1: 172)  
 '... thirdly, if necessary, pointing out misfortune which may happen to their son; ...'  
 b. ... *i v osobennosti Levin, bez užasa ne mogšij podumat' o približavšemsja, načinali ...* (AK v.2: 276)  
 '... and particularly Levin, not having been able to think about what would happen, began ...'

### 3.8 Temporal restrictions

When modal predicates are used in the epistemic sense,<sup>7</sup> their past tense forms refer to past time of the dictal situation rather than past time of the modal situation. Thus, in the following sentences where *moč'* and *dolžen* are used epistemically,

- (24) a. *On mog rabotat'* 'He may have worked'  
 b. *On dolžen byl ob ètom znat'* 'He must have known about this'

the past tense forms denote past time of the dictal situations i.e. 'having worked' and 'having known about this' rather than past time of the modal situations, as indicated in the English translations. This disparity between form and meaning can be explained if two facts are considered: i.e., nature of epistemic modality and morphological peculiarity of Russian infinitive.

For one thing, epistemic modality always involves the speaker's judgment made at the present time (of utterance or of narration); the speaker's guess on whether a dictal situation may be true or not is made or 'performed' at the time of utterance. The dictal situation, however, can be in past, present, or future time; there is nothing odd in the fact that one makes an epistemic judgment about a past, present, or future state of affairs, as long as the judgment itself is made at the present time of utterance. Thus, one can say, John must/may have been in Phoenix yesterday, John must/may be in Phoenix now, or John must/may be in Phoenix tomorrow, where the modal predicates receive epistemic sense. This leads us to maintain that an epistemic modal expression always denote present time.<sup>8</sup> For another, in Russian there is no formal means

7) Since in Russian epistemic modality can be expressed only by personal modal predicates (*moč'* and *dolžen*), this restriction applies only to these two predicates. Cf. Choi (1994: ch.4).

8) By contrast, a modal predicate used to express non-epistemic modality can denote past, present, or future time of a modal situation, while the infinitival

available in the infinitival complement to express the distinction between past and non-past tense, which is manifested in finite forms. For example, čitaet 'reads-IMPF' vs. čital 'read-IMPF'. In the infinitive form this tense distinction is formally neutralized. Note the tense distinction in English; for example, may read vs. may have read; must read vs. must have read. This formal neutralization however does not imply the absence of the corresponding semantic (i.e. temporal) distinction in the infinitival complement. In Russian, this temporal distinction is expressed not in the infinitival complement, but in the main predicate, namely in the modal predicate. This consideration then makes it possible to explain the use of the past tense forms illustrated in examples (24a, b); *mog* and *dolžen byl* are results of the 'migration' of past tense morphemes which are supposed to be implemented in the infinitive form. They denote the speaker's present epistemic judgment about the past dictal situations."<sup>9</sup>

### 3.9 Conclusion.

The syntactic and distributional properties, which modal predicates were argued to have in the previous sections, provide sufficient reasons for distinguishing them from non-modal predicates and for recognizing them as an independent grammatical category. Further, from this discussion it follows that in Russian the grammatical concept of modality is expressed lexico-syntactically; it is expressed by means of a few lexical items which function syntactically as main predicates and occur with an infinitival complement.

As mentioned in section 1, Russian modal predicates are internally complex. That is, in terms of syntactic configuration, they are divided into

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complement receives only non-past temporal interpretation (more specifically, simultaneity or posteriority in relation to the time referred to by the modal predicate). Thus, one can say, John could swim when he was young, John can swim now, or John will be able to swim next year, but never \*John can [in the non-epistemic sense] have swum when he was young.

9) A similar observation is made in Chvany (1972).

two groups: 'personal' and 'impersonal' modal predicates. Although this internal distinction has long been noticed in the previous literature, there have been no attempts to describe semantic and syntactic differences between them, simply assuming that they are synonymous or near-synonymous. See, for example, the following statement by Vinogradov (1950: 54; my emphasis SHC): '[T]akim obrazom, èti soçetanija slov iz kategorii sostojanija [i.e., možno, dólžno, nadobno, nado, nužno, nel'zja SHC] s formoj infinitiva vyražajut modal'nye znaçenija, blizkie k tem, kotorye vstreçajutsja u čisto glagol'nyx slovosočetanij [i.e., moč', umet', smet' plus infinitive SHC]'. Again, '[S]oçetanija slov s modal'nym znaçeniem moč', možno, nel'zja, dolžen, nado, nužno i infinitiva, služušćie dlja vyraženiya vozmožnosti i neobxodimosti, my odnosim k mnogoznačnym modeljam. Pri ètom ličnye formy glagola moč' i predikativ možno rassmatrivajutsja kak varianty, poskol'ku èti formy naxodjatsja v otnošenijax dopolnitel'noj distribucii:...' (Nebykova 1973: 85; my emphasis SHC). However, there are significant differences in their syntax and semantics, to which I will turn in the next section.

## IV. Personal vs. impersonal modal predicates

### 4.1 Syntactic differences

#### 4.1.1 Second predicate.

When *odin* or *sam* is used in the infinitive clause as a second dative, it takes the nominative case form for the personal modals (cf. (25a, b)), and the dative for the impersonals (cf. (26a, b)), in both cases agreeing in gender and number with the nominative NP and dative NP, respectively.

- (25) a. Vanja možet prijti *odin*/\**odnomu*. 'Vanja can come alone.'  
 b. «Telegraf», zaščišćajas' ot napadenij «Literaturnoj gazety», dolžen byl napadat' i *sam*/\**samomu*. (SRJA)

'Defending themselves from an attack by «Literaturnaja gazeta», «Telegraf» itself had to attack, too.'

- (26) a. Mne nužno bylo idti samomu/\*sam. 'I needed to go myself.'  
 b. Ej nado bylo est' samoj/\*sama. 'She had to eat herself.'

However, descriptive adjectives like p'janyj, ugrjumyj, etc., when they are used in the same syntactic environment, can be either in the nominative or in the instrumental for the personal modals (cf. (27a), whereas they must be used in the instrumental for the impersonal modals (cf. (27b)).<sup>10</sup>

- (27) a. On mozet prijti p'janyj/p'janym.  
 b. Emu nel'zja prijti p'janym/\*p'janyj.

#### 4.1.2 Adjectives used predicatively in the infinitival complement

An adjective (and also substantive) used predicatively can be either a short-form or a long-form in the instrumental (and rarely in the nominative) when it is used with personal modals (cf. (28a, b, c)), whereas it must be a long-form in the instrumental when it is used with impersonal modals (cf. (29a, b)).

- (28) a. ... po vsem dannym eta ves'ma privlekatel'naja devuška dolžna byla byt' prekrasnoju ženoj ... (AK v.1: 383)  
 '... according to all the evidence this very attractive girl would certainly become a splendid wife...'  
 b. Skaži emu, čto kogda on pridet k nam v gosti on dolžen byt' veselym. (cited in Nichols (1981: 213)  
 'Tell him that when he comes to visit us he should be pleasant.'  
 c. «Ona dolžna byt' nesčastliva, no ja ne vinovat i potomu ne mogu byt' nesčastliv». (AK v. 1: 333)  
 '«She must be unhappy, but I am not responsible and so can't

10) This is also reported in Nichols (1981: 144ff.).

be unhappy».

- (29) a. Ej ne nado bylo byt' xorošo odetoj(u)/\*odeta  
'She didn't have to be well dressed.'  
b. Nam nel'zja bylo byt' ugrjumymi/\*ugrjumy.  
'We couldn't be gloomy.'

#### 4.1.3 Animacy.

There is no restriction on the nominative NP with respect to animacy; it can be either animate or inanimate. The dative NP in a sentence with impersonal modals must be animate. Compare a-sentences with b-sentences.

- (30) a. Gosudarstvo dolžno byt' mogučim na slučaj vojny ... (DA: 237)  
'The state must be powerful in the event of war ...'  
b. \*Gosudarstvu nado byt' mogučim na slučaj vojny ...  
(31) a. ... èto i dolžno opredeljat' ego oblik. (DA: 189)  
'... this also must define its outlook.'  
b. \*Ètomu i nužno opredeljat' ego oblik.

Due to this constraint, some verbs such as *proizojti*, *slučit'sja*, etc., which take as their subject inanimate nouns, cannot be used with impersonal modal predicates.

- (32) a. Èto dolžno/možet proizojti/slučit'sja.  
'This must/can happen/occur.'  
b. \*Ètomu nado/nužno/možno/nel'zja proizojti/slučit'sja.

4.1.4 The possessive construction in *u*+NP-G: the impersonal construction; the negated existential construction.

These constructions cannot be embedded in a sentence with impersonal modals, while they can occur with personal modals. Examples in (33) show that the possessive construction cannot occur with impersonal modals; examples in (34) illustrate the ungrammaticality when the infinitival

complement takes the impersonal construction; (35) shows the negated existential construction.

- (33) a. U nego dolžen byt' prjamoj provod k sekretarju obkoma.(DA: 157)

'He must have a direct line to the secretary of the obkom.'

- b. \*U nego nado/nužno byt' prjamoj provod k sekretarju obkoma.

- (34) Kak možet/\*možno byt' vam skučno na bale?

Otčego že mne ne možet/\*nel'zja byt' skučno na bale? (AK v.1: 89)

"How can you be bored at the ball?"

"Why can't I be bored at the ball?"

- (36) a. Ego ne možet byt' doma. 'He cannot be at home.'

- b. \*Emu nel'zja byt' doma."

#### 4.1.5 Passive infinitives

When it occurs with the personal modals, the infinitive can be passivized, whether syntactically (byt'+past passive participial form) or morphologically (with -sja), which is not the case for the impersonal modals. See examples (37) and (38).

- (37) a. On znal, što obvinenie dolžno byt' pred"javleno čerez opredelennyj srok.(DA: 95)

'He knew that a charge must be made within a definite time.'

- b. \*On znal, što obvineniju nado byt' pred"javleno čerez opredelennyj srok.

- (38) a. Mal'čik dolžen myt'sja mater'ju.

'The boy must be washed by his mother.'

- b. \*Mal'čiku nužno/nado myt'sja mater'ju.

One might argue that the ungrammaticality of (37b) is due to the

11) This sentence becomes acceptable if it expresses a prohibition of the subject referent's going home.



animacy constraint, but (38b) shows that the 'passive infinitive' constraint is an independent restriction on impersonal modals, since even though the dative NP is animate (here, *mal'čik* 'boy'), (38b) is still ungrammatical. The infinitive with *-sja* can figure in a sentence with impersonal modals, but when this happens, it does not signal 'passivization', but rather 'reflexivity'. Compare (38b) and (39), considering that *myt'sja* can be used either as reflexive form (38b) or as reflexive verb (39). Similarly, *celit'sja* in (40), which does not signal 'passivization', is used with *nado*.

(39) *Emu nado myt'sja mylom.* 'He has to wash himself with soap.'

(40) *I ne nado celit'sja v gologu. Nado bit' v serdce.* (O&S: 616)

'And (you) must not aim at the head. Must hit in the heart.'

#### 4.1.6 Modals with a *čtoby*-complement

With those predicatives such as *nado*, *nužno*, and *nel'zja*, a *čtoby*-complement occurs instead of the infinitive form under certain conditions. This replacement is not possible for the personal *dolžen*. Compare examples (41a) and (41b).

(41) a. *Vam nužno, čtoby bol'noj bol'se ležal.*

'You must let the sick person lie more.'

b. \**Vy dolžny, čtoby bol'noj bol'se ležal.*

At this juncture it would be appropriate to discuss the alternation between infinitival and *čtoby* complements. It has been believed that the replacement of infinitive form by *čtoby* complement takes place when the dative NP is coreferentially not identical with the logical (underlying) subject of the complement.<sup>12</sup> Thus, in the following sentences,

(42) a. *Začem že tebe nužno, čtoby i ja tože umer?* (O&S: 617)

'Why do you need me to die too?'

12) See Bondarko et al. (1990: 156).

- b. Poèтому i nado, čtoby za vorota uxvatilsja samyj sil'nyj iz mal'čikov. (Igra:46)  
 'For this reason (you) must let the strongest boy grab the gate.'

The persons referred by the dative NP (elliptical in (42b)) are not identical with persons referred to by the nominative NPs in the čtoby-complements. This description, however, is incomplete, if not incorrect, as it stands, since a čtoby-complement is used even when two logical subjects are indeed coreferential. See the following sentence.

- (43) Aleksej Aleksandrovič! Čto vam ot menja nužno?  
 Mne nužno, čtob ja ne vstrečal zdes' ètogo čeloveka i čtoby vy veli sebja tak, čtoby ne svet, ni prisluga ne mogli obvnit' vas...  
 (AK v.1: 376)  
 "Aleksej Aleksandrovič! What do you need from me?"  
 "For me it is necessary that I shouldn't see this man here and that you should behave yourself such that neither the outside world, not the servants could accuse you..."

The first instance of čtoby complement in this example clearly shows that an infinitival complement is not used even though the two logical subjects are coreferential *mne* in the main clause and *I* in the čtoby-complement. This observation then forces us to modify the coreferentiality condition which has been regarded as a criterion of the alternation. In response to Anna's question of what he wants her to do, her deceived husband (Aleksej Aleksandrovič) utters the second sentence, who has accidentally seen her lover (Vronskij) in his own house and apparently is upset because of the very fact that Anna meets Vronskij in his own house. In this sentence, as the English translation would indicate, the subject of the čtoby complement, Aleksej Aleksandrovič, is presented not as an agent with the intention performing the action 'seeing Vronskij', but rather as expressing patient- or causee like participant role; what he needs

is not his intention not to see Vronskij, but a situation itself where he comes not to see him. One can easily appreciate the semantic difference in this regard between the following sentence with infinitival complement and the original sentence.

- (43') Mne nužno ne vstrečat' zdes' ètogo čeloveka ...  
'I should not see this man here...'

This sentence would mean that what 'I (=Aleksej Aleksandrovič)' need to do is for myself not to see this man here; and the agenthood of 'I' is made clear.

If our analysis is correct, then we must take into account both coreferentiality and participant role of the logical subject of the dictal situation in order to describe the correct conditions of the alternation between the *čtoby*- and infinitival complement. *Čtoby* is used under the following conditions: first, when two logical subjects are coreferentially non-identical, and second, when the two logical subjects are referentially identical but the participant role of the logical subject of the complement is not an agent. Otherwise, infinitival complement is chosen.

#### 4.2 Semantic and syntactic structure of personal vs. impersonal modal constructions

In view of the observations made in the preceding sections, I propose that there is a semantic component which figures in a sentence with an impersonal modal predicate, but is lacking in a sentence with a personal modal; i.e. 'experiencer of modal situation', which is implemented as a dative NP at the surface level. More specifically, the dative NP, which is a sister NP of the impersonal modal predicate, signals that the referent it refers to is a logical subject who experiences a state of affairs which the impersonal modal expresses and which at the same time is asserted in the sentence; there are two types of such state of affairs: a state of being necessary and a state of being possible.<sup>11</sup> Thus a sentence with an

impersonal modal can be said to express a 'modal' experience of the referent who is referred to by the dative NP, which may be explicit or implicit in the surface sentence. Further, the underlying subject of a dictal situation, which is deleted in the surface via what may be called 'Equi-NP deletion', has the participant role of 'agent'.

By contrast, in a sentence with a personal modal the referent referred to by the nominative NP is a logical subject of a dictal situation, which happens to be a matrix subject; i.e., the nominative NP is a sister NP of the infinitive verb. In addition, the participant role of this logical (underlying) subject of the dictal situation is dependent on the semantics and syntax of the infinitival complement. A sentence with a personal modal, without being able to express the modal experiencer, expresses merely the fact that a certain 'modal' relation between unspecified preconditions and the dictal state of affairs described in the infinitival complement holds in the real world. It asserts a state of being necessary or possible, and nothing else. In short, an impersonal modal invariably involves an experiencer of the modality expressed, whereas a personal modal exclude such a semantic component. See the following chart for the comparison of these two types of construction.

(44) Comparison between 'personal' and 'impersonal' modal constructions

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- 13) Here, the term 'state' is used as a technical term, as opposed to 'action' and 'activity'. It is common practice that in Slavic aspectology verbs can be classified in terms of inherent aspectual properties of the situations they refer to, i.e., [stateness] and [telicity], first, into verbs denoting 'state ([+state])' and verbs denoting 'activity ([-telic])' and 'action ([+telic])'. For a new theory of Russian aspect based on this classification, see Durst-Andersen (1992). The fact that modal predicates belong to the situation type of 'state' can be seen easily in our characterization; i.e., they express 'existence of some/all preconditions' for a dictal state of affairs to be actualized, and, clearly enough, 'existence' belongs to 'state'. In view of this, it would not be surprising that they do not have passive counterparts (\*mogus', \*smožen), which is intuitively obvious, but nonetheless has been in need of an explanation.

	Personal	Impersonal
(1) Case form of matrix NP	(usually) nominative	dative
(2) Case assignment	in infinitival complement	in matrix sentence
(3) Syntactic status of NP	sister NP of infinitive verb	sister NP of modal predicate
(4) Underlying subject of infinitive verb	surface subject	deleted
(5) Rule	'Subject-raising'	'Equi-NP deletion'
(6) Participant role of underlying subject of infinitive verb	dependent on semantics and syntax of infinitival complement	agent
(7) Participant role of dative NP	-----	'modal experiencer'

What should be mentioned in this connection is that the concept of 'modal experiencer' must be kept distinct from that of 'modal evaluator'; the former is a participant denoted by the dative NP in a sentence with an impersonal modal, who experiences the modal situation (a situation where a certain 'modal' relation between states of affairs holds), whereas the latter is (usually) the speaker who recognizes the modal relation itself. It is absence or presence of a modal experiencer, not of a modal evaluator that distinguishes impersonal modals from personal modals. The component of modal evaluator always exists in the semantic representation of a sentence with modal predicates, whether personal or impersonal.<sup>14</sup>

14) In Choi (1994: 94-115), I argued that constructions with such modal adjectives as *vozmožno* and *neobxodimo* are different from those with our modal predicates in this feature; that is, the former construction does not possess the semantic component of 'modal evaluator', whereas the latter

The claim that the dative NP signals 'experiencer' of modal situation can be supported indirectly by the fact that impersonal modal predicates have been often discussed and described with descriptive 'predicatives' such as *stydno*, *tošno*, *sovestno*, *dušno*, etc., under the heading of 'category of state (*kategorija sostojanija*)' in the previous literature. Cf. Peškovskij (1956[7th ed.]), Vinogradov (1972[2nd ed.]), Galkina-Fedoruk (1958), Isačenko (1965), among others. Although it appears that the motivation for grouping these two kinds of predicatives<sup>15</sup> into one and the same category is a syntactic one (i.e., they both are used with dative NPs and, at least for some descriptive predicatives, with infinitival complements), there is a strong indication that the grouping is motivated also semantically. Vinogradov illustrates a semantic difference between descriptive predicatives and corresponding short-/long-form adjectives as follows: '[N]a primer, *zavidnyj zaviden označae: takoj zamačivyj, čto možno pozavidovat'* (*zavidnoe položenie, zavidnaja učast', zavidnaja kar'era, i t. p.*). *Meždu tem bezličnoe zavidno v značenii skazuemogo govorit o čuvstve zavisti, ispytyvaemom kem-nibyď' (mne zavidno)...*' (Vinogradov 1972[2nd ed.]: 324; my emphasis SHC). If one rephrases the second part of the quote by inserting *nado* or *možno* instead of *zavidno*, we get: '*... bezličnoe nado/možno v značenii skazuemogo govorit o neobxodimosti/ vozmožnosti, ispytyvaemoj kem-nibud'.*' The four-volume Academy dictionary defines *zavidno* in the exactly same way: '*O čuvstve zavisti, ispytyvaemom kem-l'.*' While with some of these descriptive predicatives the infinitive is not an obligatory constituent (both *mne zavidno* and *mne zavidno smotret' takoe sčast'e* are possible) whereas modal predicatives require the infinitival (or *čtoby-*) complement (*\*mne nužno/nado/možno/nel'zja*, except when the infinitival complement is elliptical), this syntactic difference between them does not allow any crucial objection to the claim that both classes of predicatives describe a certain state experienced by someone signalled by the dative NP.

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does have it.

15) Isačenko (1965) first introduced the term 'predicative(predikativ)' to designate this class of words.

The proposal that impersonal modals express 'someone's experience of a modal situation' is, however, corroborated not only by the aforementioned rather indirect evidence but also the following syntactic and semantic facts.

First, the split between the experiencer and the logical subject of dictal situation. It was pointed out in section 4.1.6 that for impersonal modals denoting 'necessity' a *čtoby*-complement is used instead of an infinitival complement under certain conditions, while this replacement is impossible with *dolžen*. Compare (45b) and (45c).

- (45) a. *Mne nužno pogovorit' s toboj*  
 b. *Začem že tebe nužno, čtoby i ja tože umer?*  
 c. *\*Začem že ty dolžna, čtoby i ja tože umer?*

This difference in syntactic behavior between personal and impersonal modals can be explained if one appeals to our proposal. That is, the dative NP in the impersonal modal construction is a sister NP governed by the impersonal predicative, not a sister NP of the infinitival complement. This implies that the logical subject of the dictal situation can be different from the referent referred to by the dative NP. And if this happens, the logical subject of the dictal situation must be present in the surface sentence. This explains the grammaticality of (45b) where the modal experiencer is a person referred to by *tebe* 'you-D' and the logical subject of the dictal situation is a person referred to by *ja* 'I-N'.

By contrast, the surface nominative NP occurring with *dolžen* is not the NP governed by *dolžen*, but the underlying logical subject of the dictal situation, which is raised to a surface grammatical subject via 'Subject-raising'. Since the nominative NP signals an underlying subject of the dictal situation, the split, which can occur in the case of the impersonal modal construction, from the outset is blocked. This explains the ungrammaticality of (45c).

Second, the causative interpretation of a sentence with *dolžen*. While the component of 'experiencer of a modal situation' is not included in the semantic representation of a personal sentence with *dolžen*, there may be

instances where a logical subject of the modal situation itself (= modal evaluator) is different from the referent denoted by the nominative NP. In this case, the logical subject to recognize (but, not experience) the 'necessity' state of affairs can be identified only in the surrounding context and cannot be overtly expressed in the surface sentence. This is true particularly, though not exclusively, of sentences with an inanimate subject. Consider the following sentence.

(46) Bor'ba končilas', dolžny isčežnut' i svjazannye s nej krajnosti.

(DA: 92)

'The struggle was over, the extremes associated with it must disappear as well.'

This example has as its grammatical subject an inanimate NP: 'the extremes associated with the struggle'. Note that the referent referred to by the nominative NP cannot be a logical subject of the state denoted by *dolžen*, since the latter (= modal evaluator) must be an animate being. This inanimate NP serves only as a surface grammatical subject and at the same time as a logical subject of the infinitival complement. A rough semantic representation of *dolžen* in this context would be as follows: 'there are all preconditions' for (X to make/cause) the extremes associated with the struggle to disappear. Here 'X', which is not semantically expressed in the sentence (that is why I parenthesized it), is identifiable only in the surrounding context; and the context tells that the X is Stalin. By contrast, this causative sense can never obtain in a sentence with impersonal modal plus infinitive form, but only in a sentence with a *čtoby*-complement (cf. (45a) vs. (45b)). This evidence then can be taken as evidence that the nominative NP in a sentence including *dolžen* is only a surface subject, not a logical subject of the main predicate *dolžen*.

Third, animacy. As demonstrated in section 4.1.3, a dative NP occurring with impersonal modals cannot be an inanimate being. This is so, because the dative NP expresses the experiencer of modal situation, which cannot be inanimate.



Fourth, syntactic restrictions. It was also mentioned that constructions such as the passive construction, the u'NP G construction of 'possession', impersonal constructions and negated existential constructions cannot occur with an impersonal modal in the form of an infinitival complement, but only with a personal modal. Cf. sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5. For the sake of exposition, I will discuss first constructions with a nominative NP and then those constructions with a non-nominative NP.

In the 'personal' constructions, i.e. possessive (cf. (47a)) and passive constructions (cf. (47b, c)), obviously, the participant role of subject NP cannot be an 'agent'.

- (47) a. U menja est' djadja. 'I have an uncle.'  
 b. Mal'čik moetsja mater'ju.  
 'The boy is being washed by his mother.'  
 c. Obvinenie budet pred"javleno čerez opredelennyj srok.  
 'A charge will be made within a definite time.'

In (47a) the surface subject is *djadja*, which is in the nominative; and its participant role is not an agent, but rather 'possessum'. In (47b), which is a sja-passive sentence, the nominative subject plays the participant role of 'patient'. Similarly, (47c), which is a 'syntactic' passive sentence, has as its surface subject an inanimate nominative NP, which obviously is not an agent, but patient. Now, the process of embedding this construction under an impersonal modal predicate in the form of infinitival complement yields ungrammatical sentences, as seen in (47a', b', c').

- (47) a'. \*U menja nado byt' djade.  
 b'. \*Mal'čiku nado myt'sja mater'ju.  
 c'. \*Obvinienu nado byt' pred"javleno čerez opredelennyj srok.

This is easily explained by the fact that the logical subject of the dictal situation in a sentence including an impersonal modal must be construed as expressing the participant role of agent. As claimed, the logical subject of a

dictal state of affairs must be an agent (cf. (44)). For instance, in (47b'), the referent referred to by *mal'čiku* 'boy I' is coreferentially identical with the logical subject of the dictal situation; and in order for the sentence to be grammatical, the logical subject must be an agent. However, the syntax of the infinitival complement prevents the logical subject from signaling the participant role of agent, since the infinitival complement itself is a passive construction and the (underlying) subject NP represents the participant role of patient. The ungrammaticality of (47b') stems precisely from this conflict. Such a conflict does not and cannot arise in a sentence including a personal modal predicate, since the surface subject NP invariably denotes the logical subject of the dictal situation. As expected, examples (47a", b", c") are all grammatical.

- (47) a". *U menja dolžen byt' djadja.*  
 b". *Mal'čik dolžen myt'sja mater'ju.*  
 c". *Obvinenie dolžno byt' pred"javleno čerez opredelennyj srok.*

There are two types of constructions which appear to be counter examples to our proposal. See examples (48) and (49).

- (48) *Emu nado myt'sja mylom.* 'He has to wash himself with soap.'  
 (49) *Žal', čto nel'zja tebe byvat' u menja.*  
*Net, ja priedu.*  
 "It's a pity that you never can be at my place."  
 "No, I'll come."

In example (48) the infinitive verb is *myt'sja*, and structurally looks like (47b'). However, as is well known, there is an important difference between them; *myt'sja* in (48) is not a passive form of its active counterpart *myt'* 'to wash', but is rather a reflexive verb which means 'to wash oneself'. And obviously the instrumental noun *mylom* 'soap-I' has the participant role of 'instrument'. This contrasts with the instrumental form *mater'ju* 'mother-I' figuring in (47b'), which represents the participant role of

'agent'. So, the underlying subject of the infinitival complement in (48) represents 'agent'; i.e., *mal'čik* in (48) is recognized as a logical subject of the infinitival complement whose participant role is agent. In contrast, *mal'čik* in (47b') cannot be interpreted this way; it is a 'patient'. This explains the grammaticality of (48). Now look at example (49). It is obvious that the *u+NP-G* phrase in this example does not express the participant role 'possessor', but rather 'location'. Then the nominative NP cannot be interpreted as 'possessum', but rather 'agent'. This is made clear in the immediately following sentence in (22): *ja priedu*.

Now let us consider 'impersonal' modal sentences which include the infinitival complement, the underlying structure of which requires a non-nominative NP. Obviously, the genitive-subject in (50a) and the 'inverse' dative-subject in (50b) cannot be construed as signaling an agent. Thus, as expected, the corresponding sentences with impersonal modals are ungrammatical (cf. (51a, b)).

(50) a. *Moroza ne čuvstvovalos'*. 'No frost was felt.'

b. *Emu skučno*. 'He is bored.'

(51) a. \**Moroza nado/možno bylo ne čuvstvovat'sja*.

b. \**Emu nado/možno byt' skučno*.

However, these constructions can be embedded under the personal modals, as demonstrated in (52).

(52) a. *Moroza ne moglo čuvstvovat'sja*. 'No frost couldn't be felt.'

b. *Emu dolžno byt' skučno*.<sup>16)</sup> 'He must be bored.'

Again, this can be explained by our claim that a sentence with personal modals does not express the logical subject of modal situation and that its

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16) *Dolžno* is different from *dólžno*; the former is the third person singular form of (*dolž#n*), whereas the latter is impersonal predicative, which in contemporary standard Russian is considered archaic (cf. Galkina-Fedoruk (1958: 308)).

surface subject NP denotes the logical subject of the infinitival complement.

Our claim receives further justification when the data are considered with respect to the case assignment of the surface subject in the sentences with impersonal or negated existential construction as their infinitival complement. The case assignment of the surface grammatical subject in fact is dependent on the syntax and semantics of the infinitival complement. Thus, if the infinitival complement is originally a negated existential sentence with genitive NP, the surface subject must be in the genitive form (cf. (52a)); and if an impersonal sentence with a dative NP is underlying, then the surface subject must be in the dative form (cf. (52b)). Compare the examples in (52) and examples in (53) where nominative NP is used. Cf. also (54a) vs. (54b).

- (53) a. \*?Moroz ne mog čuvstvovat'sja.<sup>17</sup>  
 b. \*On dolžen byt' skučno.  
 (54) a. Ix synu moglo byt' uže dvadcat' let.  
 'Their son could already be 20 years old.'  
 b. \*Ix syn mog byt' uže dvadcat' let.

This observation could not be explained unless one assumes that the subject NP, whether it be in the nominative or in the oblique, is a logical subject of the infinitival complement.<sup>18</sup>

17) This sentence is marginally acceptable by some native speakers. But it seems to me that if this sentence is acceptable then it is underlyingly related with a negated declarative sentence such as *moroz ne čuvstvovalsja* where *moroz-N* denotes a specific and definite referent, not with a negated existential sentence such as *moroz-a ne čuvstvovalos'* where *moroz-a-G* denotes indefinite referents. If this analysis is correct, then the acceptability of (53a) does support our analysis, since the case assignment is dependent on the underlying semantic structure of the infinitival complement. For the distinction between negated declarative and negated existential sentence, see Babby (1980).

18) This analysis is in agreement with the analysis proposed in Chvany (1974). Her analysis, however, lacks substantial syntactic and semantic arguments. For a sentence with *dolžen*, she simply postulates a matrix subject NP node which is empty in the deep structure and then filled in the surface structure

Fifth, difference in usage. Personal modals can be used in the epistemic sense, thus semantically forming a paraphrastic relation (indicated "→") with such 'parenthetic words (vvodnye slova)' as *dolžno byt'*, *možet byt'*, *navernoe*, etc., which are used exclusively epistemically, whereas impersonal modals do not show this use. The latter is used only in the non-epistemic sense (cf. Choi 1994: ch.4).

(55) a. *Ona dolžna byt' nesčastliva, no ja ne vinovat...* (AK v.1: 333)

'She must be unhappy, but I am not guilty ...'

⇒ *Ona, dolžno byt', nesčastliva, no ja ne vinovat...*

b. *Budjaginy i sejčas mogut vypyat' u nee pravdu...* (DA: 106)

'The Budjagins even now may elicit the truth from her...'

⇒ *Budjaginy, možet byt', i sejčas vypyatjut u nee pravdu...*

(56) a. *Pridet vojna, vse budut voevat', a poka nado žit' i rabotat'.*

(DA: 167)

'The war will come, everybody will be in battle, but until then (we) have to live and work.'

⇒ *Pridet vojna, vse budut voevat', a poka, dolžno byt', my živem i rabotaem.*

b. *I možno li gorčičnuju vannu priravnivat' k abortu?* (DA: 111)

'And can one equate a mustard bath with an abortion?'

⇒ *I, možet byt', gorčičnuju vannu priravnivajut k abortu?*

As mentioned briefly in section 2, a modal predicate indicates that a certain 'modal' relation holds in the real world, which is a kind of 'state'. However, there is an important difference between 'epistemic state' and 'non-epistemic state'. The former occurs (or, rather exists) only in the mental world of (usually) the speaker, while the latter only in the socio-physical world. This would seem to suggest that the 'non-epistemic state' can be experienced, but the 'epistemic state' cannot; the latter can be only recognized. Then it becomes understandable that the impersonal modal

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by 'NP preposing'. But she does not provide a reasonable explanation as to why this should be so.

predicate can be used only non-epistemically, since it invariably involves the semantic component of 'modal experiencer'.

Finally, referentiality of the dative NP. It was reported in Chvany (1974: 116) that in such a sentence as *Moej žene nužno byt' kak možno umnee* 'My wife must be as intelligent as possible', the dative NP refers only to an 'existing wife who feels a need to be as intelligent as possible', whereas *moja žena* in *Moja žena dolžna byt' kak možno umnee* may not have a referent in the real world: this sentence is used when said of 'a hypothetical, as yet unfound, wife'. It seems that this difference in terms of referentiality can be explained partly by the fact that an experiencer who undergoes the state of being necessary or possible must exist in the real world. In addition to this, in a declarative sentence which asserts the truth of a state of affairs referred to by the main predicate, the existence of referent referred to by its subject NP is as a rule presupposed.<sup>19)</sup> Similarly, we can argue that an impersonal modal sentence with an inverse dative-subject asserts the state of affairs referred to by the impersonal modal, presupposing the existence of the referent referred to by the inverse subject. In contrast, a personal modal sentence with nominative subject may assert the state of affairs, but the existence of referent referred to by the nominative subject is not guaranteed to be presupposed, since the nominative NP, according to our claim, is underlyingly not part of the matrix sentence, but part of the infinitival complement, which is not asserted.

## V. Conclusion

The discussion up to now makes it possible to conclude that personal

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19) I am aware of two usages of a definite description used in the subject position, which is discussed in Donnellan (1966): referential and attributive use. If a definite description is used attributively, then there is no presupposition of the existence of the referent referred to by the definitive description. For further discussion see also Quine (1953/1980: pp. 139-59).

modal constructions are unmarked in relation to impersonal modal counterparts which are marked. This markedness relation is established both formally and semantically. As claimed, impersonal modals occur in narrowly defined syntactic environments, whereas personal modals do not have such constraints. Semantically, impersonal modals are more complex and thus more informative, in that they have the semantic component of 'modal experiencer', which is absent in personal modals. With respect to the usage, personal modals can express both epistemic and non-epistemic modality, while impersonal modals cannot express epistemic modality. Referentially, the dative NP used with impersonal modals can be only 'actual', while the nominative NP used with personal modals can be either 'actual' or 'hypothetical'. Then it is reasonable to say that personal modals are unmarked in relation to impersonal modals which are marked.<sup>20)</sup>

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20) For a discussion of 'markedness relation' as an organizing principle of grammar, see Jakobson (1931/1971), Andersen (1989), Battistella (1990). Jakobson's understanding of 'markedness' or 'marking' is challenged by Andersen, who views markedness relation as a '(referential) value' relation rather than a 'semantic' or 'formal' relation.

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## Russian Modal Predicates: Personal vs. Impersonal Construction

Sung-ho Choi

The formal distinction between 'personal' and 'impersonal' modal predicates has been well-recognized in the previous literature, but the exact nature of the difference seems not to have been captured. This investigation attempts to describe the morphosyntactic differences and to pinpoint the semantic difference between them in terms of absence / presence of 'modal experiencer' as well. The 'personal' modal predicates are in every respect an unmarked category with relation to the 'impersonal' modal predicates, which is marked counterpart. This assignment of markedness value is justified

both semantically and syntactico-distributionally. Semantically, the 'personal' modal predicates lack the semantic component of 'modal experiencer', which is present in the meaning of the 'impersonal' counterparts; thus, the opposition is contradictory (A vs. non-A). As far as usage is concerned, the former express both epistemic and root modality, whereas the latter express only root modality. Further, the modal predicatives structurally are highly restricted: they cannot occur with infinitival complements as the u+NP-G construction of 'possession', impersonal constructions, passive constructions, and existential constructions. There are no such syntactic constraints on the personal modal predicates. This formal constraint is closely related to, or derived from, the semantic constraint, which dictates that when the underlying subject of the infinitival complement represents non-agent, the infinitival complement must occur with personal modal predicates; and note that all the subject NPs of the above mentioned constructions are not agent. Thus, a sja-construction which is used reflexively (not but in the passive sense) can occur with impersonal modals, since the sja- verb in this sense has the valency structure, which includes an NP-subject whose participant role is agent. In addition, a construction with u+NP-G where the nominative subject represents not possessee but agent can occur with the impersonal modals. Again the personal modal predicates have no such semantic constraint. These semantic and syntactic considerations prove our assignment of markedness value to two classes of modal predicates: the personal modal is unmarked in relation to the impersonal modal which is marked.