

Socialist Dissidents: “Last True Believers”

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“Today we know that the romantic revolutionary passions which we recalled so many times with such sweet sorrow degenerated. ... Our dreams and ideals of that time turned gradually into dismal doctrine or shameless falsification. But still I think that the time was alive and bursting with youth. Not only with my own tender youth [but also] with the youth of the century. ... [It was] the morning of an era. ... Still young were the hopes of millions of people. ... Young, too, were the poets, artists and musicians who proclaimed the beginning of new times and new worlds (Kopelev 1978:ix).”

Above are the words of Lev Kopelev who was remembering the late 1920s and early 1930s when he was in the middle of the stormy process of Soviet collectivization and its “grain front.” Along with the so-called “25000ers” (Viola 1987),¹⁾ Kopelev carried out “undisputed confiscation” that took not only hidden grains but also virtually everything valuable from the Russian peasants. As starving peasants and their children wailed and screamed, “it was excruciating to see and hear all this ... even worse to take part in it.” Nonetheless, “I persuaded myself, explained to myself ... I mustn’t give into debilitating pity.” Instead, it was time “to clench your teeth, clench your heart and carry out everything” that was necessary to build socialism (Kopelev 1978:234-235).

Decades later, when all the terrible crimes of Stalin were revealed after the “Secret Speech” of Khrushchev in 1956, Kopelev became one of “those

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who thought differently (*инакомыслящие*)” in the 1960s and 1970s; that is, a “socialist dissident.” In a sense, the coming of socialist dissidents was, to use Kopelev’s words, the arrival of the last breed of “true believers” in Soviet society. Although there were many loyal supporters of the Soviet system, such as members of the Communist Party and high-ranking officials of the government, one could not call them “true believers” because they had an interest in defending the system as its main beneficiaries. By contrast, socialist dissidents were not part of the privileged ruling class of Soviet society. Instead, they were persecuted by the ruthless regime because of their undying belief in socialist ideals. They were willing to go to prisons, labor camps, and mental hospitals in their relentless fight for “genuine” socialist ideals. In this sense, they were the last true believers in a country that proclaimed itself “the first socialist country on earth.”

The main goal of this paper is to trace the rise and fall of socialist dissidents as the last true believers in the Soviet experiment. After providing a brief presentation of data in the next section, we will investigate the main theme of socialist dissidents in the second section; that is, Leninism without Stalinism was possible. An attempt is then made in the third section to analyze how socialist dissidents tried to explain the Stalinist degeneration; that is, “What went wrong?” If the noble ideal of the October Revolution was betrayed by Stalin, was there a “way out” of the Stalinist degeneration? This question is discussed in the fourth section. While many believed that it was possible to go back to earlier revolutionary ideals, not all socialist dissidents were optimistic that it would be feasible to revive “genuine” socialism after decades of Stalinist degeneration. In the fifth section, we will analyze the pessimistic views of those who believed that there was no way out. In the sixth section, we will then investigate how socialist dissidents, who led the politicization of samizdat and the heroic struggle against the ruthless regime, gradually disappeared, eventually replaced by “democrats” in the Soviet dissident movement. Finally, we will discuss the historical importance of socialist

dissidents in the conclusion.

I. Data: Samizdat

As mentioned elsewhere (Joo 2004:573–574), the best source for the ideas of socialist dissidents is samizdat (an uncensored underground publication). When the literary principle of “socialist realism” was established in the mid 1930s,²⁾ it emerged as the orthodox doctrine for producing the officially sanctioned culture that was “constructed, promoted, and even financed by the state” (Stites 1992:5). Any literary, cultural, or ideological works that were thought to be outside of the permissible official boundaries could not be written, published, or read through normal channels. What was crucial in this process was the role of the Glavlit (Chief Administration of Literary Affairs), which censored “even labels on matchboxes” (*Arkhiv Samizdata*, Doc No. 4451). Many writers who refused to follow the official doctrine were disgraced or expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers. In practice, this meant that they could not publish anything in the Soviet Union since “there [was] only one publisher, the state” (Lyons 1967:311).

Under such circumstances, individuals responded by developing samizdat. The term describes the phenomenon of widely circulated clandestine publications that were not censored by the government. These secret publications were produced, reproduced, and circulated “through self-generated, improvised networks” (Di Palma 1991:71). The author usually typed his uncensored work along with several carbon copies (Telesin 1973:30). He then passed those copies out to other people in his samizdat group. If others found his work interesting, they repeated the same process. Through this process of “snowballing,” samizdat spread

2) For studies on socialist realism, see Clark(2000), Fast(1999), Gutkin(1999), Lahusen(1997), Robin(1992), Valkenier(1989), Bisztray(1978), and James(1973).

even to remote regions (Feldbrugge 1975:3). Like an ever-widening ripple, the publication traveled over space and time as long as the material found eager readers who would continue the “ripple.” In this way, individual typewriters “overcame Gutenberg” (*Arkhiv Samizdata*, Doc. No. 388).

The best collection of samizdat materials is the *Arkhiv Samizdata*. Funded by the U.S. Congress, Radio Liberty in Munich began to collect samizdat materials from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s when the phenomenon first became known to the West. The collection continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are a total of 6,607 articles in the *Arkhiv Samizdata*. An original copy of each article is now preserved at the Open Society Archive in Budapest. As a rule, documents collected from 1972 to 1974 were catalogued under the name *Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata* (Collection of Samizdat Documents), while those materials collected after 1974 were catalogued under the name *Materialy Samizdata* (Samizdat Materials). In this article, they are referred to as *Arkhiv Samizdata* with their corresponding document numbers.³⁾

In total, there are 6,607 samizdat texts in the *Arkhiv Samizdata*. Among them, 5,400 texts were written in the pre-Gorbachev period. Of these, 153 articles were hard to categorize for various reasons. Excluding them as “missing values,” the remaining texts could be divided into four groups based on their content: literary (1.4%), nationalistic (17%), religious (20%), and political (62%). As one can see, the largest and most dominant category of the samizdat was political. There were 3,284 political items, the vast majority (2,830) of which consisted of personal statements,

3) Though copies of the *Arkhiv Samizdata* are available in major U.S. institutions and libraries, some documents are missing because the original material is either too long or of such poor quality as to be unreadable. In locating these “missing” documents, I was greatly assisted by Paul Goble, director of communication of the RFE/RL, and Virgis Piktuma at the Information Service of the RFE/RL. With their help, I was able to contact Natasha Zanegina, senior archivist at the Open Archive Association in Budapest, who arranged for me to get access to the “missing” documents. I am greatly indebted to them for their invaluable assistance.

appeals, complaints, protests, or information about arrests, trials, and so on. The remaining 454 items were systematic analyses of contemporary crises and proposed alternatives to the failing Soviet system. These remaining materials can be divided into three groups according to their ideological program: socialist dissidents, democrats, and Slavophiles. There were 143 (31.5%) socialist texts, 215 (47.4%) democratic articles, and 83 (18.3%) Slavophile texts (Joo 2005, pp. 47-48). Using these samizdat materials of socialist dissidents, we will analyze the ideas of “those who thought differently” in this paper.

II. “Orthodox” Dissidents: “Leninism Yes, Stalinism No!”

Without doubt, Roi Medvedev was the most “orthodox” oppositionist in the Soviet dissident movement. From 1964 to 1970, Medvedev – a Marxist historian – published articles later known as the Political Diary in the West. In so doing, Medvedev became the best-known representative of “socialist” dissidents. Since “socialists” were practically the only trend at the time, many dissidents who would eventually discard their faith in socialism shared the view of the Medvedev circle. For instance, Sakharov was significantly influenced by Medvedev in his early dissident years, even co-authoring some samizdat articles from a “socialist” viewpoint (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 360). Also, the early works of Solzhenitsyn were often described as “ethical socialism” (Medvedev 1977:74).

Medvedev wrote two lengthy books that were widely circulated in samizdat as the exemplary work of a “loyal” oppositionist: *Let History Judge*(1971) and *On Socialist Democracy*(1977).⁴⁾ According to his

4) In the collection of *Arkhiv Samizdata*, *Let History Judge* is listed as Doc. No. 1060 and *On Socialist Democracy* as Doc. No. 1170. In addition, Medvedev wrote numerous articles. To name a few important ones, he wrote about the rehabilitation of Stalin (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 131), the Jewish Q Qstion (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 496) and the imlure of *détente* (*Arkhiv Samizdata*

“orthodox” view, the October Revolution had laid down a solid socialist foundation. “The proletariat ... not only seized state power ... but also expropriated all the basic means of production” (Medvedev 1971:30). Such a view – “Great October” or “Great Lenin” – was widely shared by other socialist dissidents at the time (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 15 & 132).⁵⁾ In

Doc. No. 2052). After his brother Z déDocMedvedev was imprisoned in a mental hospital, he also To usste abouissue of fdéQsti dspitalization of dissidents (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 658, 1016 & 1265). Medvedev also wrote s iral r iews of *The Gulag Archipelago* (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 1590, 1998 & 2669). Probably most interesting was his f ftic, heof “democrats” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1500). In an ensuing debate, Medvedev found to his surprise and frustration that he was Democracy as Do c. Noone defl17ing “socialist” idealote ile most of his fdémer colleaguDoc moved to s Do “democrat” camp. Five years surr, Medvedev again raised a deiQs against the “ ilse viluDo” of democrats but found out that few shared his opinions er Z déDocMedvedev was impi405). It was quite obvious by then that there were very few socialists left in the Soviet dissident movement.

- 5) The consultative conference of communist parties was held in Budapest from February 26 to March 5 in 1968. The goal of the conference was to prepare a larger meeting later in Moscow in order to censure China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. To the surprise of the Soviet regime, some “socialist” dissidents sent their own statement to the Budapest conference (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 15). In a letter, P. Grigorenko, who co-authored the statement above, laid down the basic tenets of “socialist” dissidents – namely, that the October Revolution led by “Great Lenin” had initiated a healthy course of history (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132). As a retired general, Petr Grigorenko was one of the most active “socialists.” On May 7, 1969, Grigorenko was arrested in Tashkent (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 269, 342, 343, 344 & 345) and sentenced for five years in a mental hospital after he was declared “insane” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 239, 329 494, 559, 560, 1243 & 1683). After his release, he became one of the founding members of the Helsinki Group on May 12, 1976 (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 2542). A year later, Grigorenko also joined the Working Commission on Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes that had been announced on January 5, 1977 (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 2860 & 2861). Like other “socialists,” he eventually transformed himself into a “democrat” by the mid 1970s. For his brief biography, see *Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 271. For his autobiography, see Grigorenko(1982).

spite of its initial success, the harsh years of the Civil War(1917-1921) had imposed substantial limitations on freedom and democracy. Importantly, Lenin had understood that these restrictions were "temporary" (Medvedev 1977:31). As a result, Lenin warned on his deathbed that he was leaving "the Soviet power with bureaucratic distortions" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132).

Unfortunately, Stalin took temporary measures as permanent ones and his centralization of power was not matched by an increase in control from below. In addition, the Bolshevik Party, once the conscience in the revolution, was swamped by "petty-bourgeois and careerist elements" (Medvedev 1971:413-414). These Stalinists never understood Marxism but rather paid lip service to it to such a degree that "Lenin would flinch in his grave." As a result, "distortions" grew (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132). In Stalin's time this was accomplished by annihilating "the best sons" in the Bolshevik Party (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 81). After the death of Stalin, arbitrary persecution continued through "illegal dismissal from a job, summons from the KGB, both, as of arrest, and the most shocking of all, forced labor in mental hospitals" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132). In fact, the persecution took the form of "Orwellian" inhumane labor, arbitrary political trials and the most shocking of all, "thucadeat" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 28a). In this way, the first socialist theory turned into a cold and brutal system where there was "not one general political amnesty" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 2946).

Under such circumstances, genuine "socialists" should return to the original ideals of Marxism-Leninism after "a complete cleansing from the dirt of Stalinism" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132). The noble ideals of communism that Lenin had envisioned were disfigured by Stalinists who disguised themselves as its legitimate descendants. In reality, however, Stalinism was a mockery of communism. As a result, "orthodox" socialists vehemently opposed the idea that there was something inherent in Leninism that led to Stalinism – the idea that Stalinism was a legitimate, almost inevitable, result of the October Revolution. Instead, Medvedev

argued that “different possibilities of development exist in almost every political system” (Medvedev 1971:359). That is, the rise of Stalinism was by no means inevitable. It was only “an historical accident” that “Stalin, the embodiment of all the worst elements in the Russian revolutionary movement, came to power after Lenin, the embodiment of all that was best” (Medvedev, 1971:360-362).⁶⁾ To rectify this “accident,” it was necessary to return to the early revolutionary ideals of Lenin. As a result, the famous phrase – “Leninism Yes, Stalinism No!” – best represented the belief system of orthodox socialist dissidents (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 79).

III. The Burden of Proof: Stalinism

Unlike democrats and Slavophiles who completely rejected the socialist project, “socialist” dissidents bore the burden of proof of showing that there was still hope in socialism. That is, socialism without Stalinism was not only desirable but also possible. What was the origin of Stalinism? The Stalinist past was often explained on the basis of ignorance. As L. Kopelev pointed out, even a conscientious person could “believe in the

6) There is an interesting episode regarding Roi Medvedev. In 1968, an article titled “The truth about the present day” was circulated under the name of Medvedev (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 306). In a personal letter to *Posev* on March 25, 1970, however, Medvedev denied his authorship. In fact, a close reading of the article reveals that it was not written by Medvedev though it reflected some of his principles such as attacking Stalinism and calling for a return to Marxism. In spite of such similarities, there were some crucial arguments that directly contradicted Medvedev’s ideas. Most important of all, the October Revolution - the Holy Grail for Medvedev - was devalued as “a bourgeois revolution” that produced “a state capitalism” in the Soviet Union. Instead, the grass-roots democracy of “the Paris Commune” was regarded as its ideal in all spheres of life, including even the army and the police. At this point, the divergence from Medvedev was quite obvious (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 306).

wisdom of Stalin" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 124).⁷⁾ In this way, "truth was lost" behind "the wall of haze [and] thick fog" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 116). In addition to ignorance, some argued that there was a historical necessity for Stalinism. In the face of the menacing Nazi threat, it was imperative to shout "For the Fatherland, For Stalin." After all, "For Stalin" at that time meant "Against Hitler" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 547). In the post-Stalin era, neither ignorance nor historical necessity could be used as an excuse. The Khrushchev speech demystified "the Stalinist cult" once and for all (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 124). Moreover, since "Hitler is kaput," there were no more reasons to legitimize Stalinism (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 547).

What was Stalinism? Socialists came up with different understandings of the phenomenon, focusing on its principles, personal characteristics, social conditions, and impersonal "machine" qualities. First, some dissidents like L. Kopelev argued that the Soviet tragedy originated from the fanatic "principles of Stalinism: that is, the Jesuit belief that the end justifies the means. By committing the most heinous crimes in the name of the revolution, the loose coalition of anti-Soviet became "an insatiable bottomless pie sucking millions of human lives without a thought, some say 'justice causes suffering.'" In this way, they failed to grasp the fact that "the very means of Stalinism constituted

7) To use his own term, Lev Kopelev was a "true believer" in his youth. Though he was briefly associated with the Left Opposition in the 1920s, Kopelev was later deeply involved in the forced grain collection that led to the Great Famine (1932-1933) with millions of victims. Only after the "secret speech" of Khrushchev did Kopelev come to regret his earlier activities under Stalin. After "the awakening," he had become one of the most committed and respected dissidents. Kopelev wrote many *samizdat* articles on various topics such as the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 73), re-Stalinization (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 124), and the underground journal *Pamiat* (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3657). Kopelev also noted the social phenomenon of "a new Russian emigration" as many dissidents left the country: some by force, others voluntarily (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 2490). For more information about Kopelev, see his autobiography (Kopelev, 1978).

the negation of the end itself” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 124).

Second, there were other socialists like P. Grigorenko who emphasized that it was not wrong principles but certain “personal” characteristics that constituted the main pillars of Stalinism. Instead of being creative and critical, these bureaucrats were accustomed “to applauding, shouting ‘Hurrah,’ blindly idolizing, enduring mockery with few complaints, grunting with satisfaction as long as a little more or better slops were poured into their trough” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 109). Though they often spoke in socialist terms, Stalinists displayed neither serious understanding of nor faithful commitment to the genuine ideals of socialism (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 132). While the Stalinist rule required and recruited these types of people, the latter also constituted and reproduced Stalinism.

Third, some socialist dissidents thought that there were deep “social conditions” behind Stalinism. In particular, they pointed out that the Russian past had been so deeply shaped by the Mongolian autocratic control that it left “a significantly imposing tradition of subservience” among the people. Though the October Revolution shook these social conditions, its revolutionary impact turned out to be temporary. In fact, the masses did not fully understand the progressive ideology of socialism and thus clung to their old habits: that is, they wanted a “master.” Such was “Stalin’s mandate.” As a result, though Stalin might have violated the spirit of the revolution on his road to supremacy, he clearly understood and followed “the unwritten mandates carried in the air” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 547).

Finally, some dissidents noted that numerous people were involved in Stalinism as its supporters, propagandists and official mouthpiece. Clearly, it could not be that all of them were men with degenerate “personal” qualities.⁸⁾ After all, they were sons and daughters of Russia who

8) As a writer, Lidia Chukovskaia wrote a letter against the rehabilitation of Stalin (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 116) and the Siniavskii-Daniel Trial (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1018). She was also active in supporting other persecuted dissidents, including A. Sakharov (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 1480

participated in inhumane crimes with "a clear conscience." Moreover, they did not display "the slightest remorse." In fact, why should they? They were just carrying out "orders" from above, "doing their duty" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 109). As L. Chukovskaia pointed out, they were just tiny cogs in a gigantic "machine" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 116). As a result, the main characteristic of Stalinism was the impersonal quality of "the terrible, cruel and heartless machine" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 109).

As shown thus far, "socialists" struggled to explain the origins and main characteristics of Stalinism. To demonstrate the validity of the socialist project, they could not simply ask people to forget the dark past. To do so would be similar to the senseless announcement of Nicholas I regarding the complaint of an aristocrat that his daughter had gotten married against his will: "The marriage is to be annulled and the daughter is to be considered a virgin" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 547). In their efforts to deal with the dark past, some socialists emphasized "ignorance" while others focused on "historical necessity." In addition, some pointed out "personal" qualities of Stalinists while others emphasized "impersonal" characteristics of Stalinism. Also, some true believers blamed faulty "principles" while others thought that it was predicated upon "social conditions." In spite of such diverse views, most "socialists" shared the view that the Stalinist past should be expunged to return to Leninist ideals. As a result, a bust of Stalin should "never stand near the mausoleum of Lenin" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 418).

& 4382), A. Solzhenitsyn (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 117 & 1586), Ar. Dzhemilev (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 2526), AT. Velikanova (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4556), and so on. As a result of these activities, Chukovskaia was expelled from the Union of Writers in 1974. For more information on her expulsion, see *Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 1544, 1592 and 1592.

IV. A Way Out?

There was a general consensus among socialists that “democratization” was the only way to return to Leninist ideals. What specific programs could achieve this? Some believed that it was necessary to give up the proletarian dictatorship and allow oppositional parties. Others did not put much faith in institutional reforms. Instead, they argued that hope, if there was any, should be placed on the “simple people.” Finally, there were also some radicals who considered a new revolution against the Soviet regime. In this section, we analyze three alternative programs: an oppositional party, the “simple people” and a revolution.

1. An Oppositional Party

The most orthodox means of struggle was “criticism and self-criticism” within the existing system. This was, however, unlikely to be effective because the CPSU was riddled with vestiges of Stalinism. Though Stalin had committed numerous crimes, the most serious one was “the destruction of the Leninist party.” Instead, it was now swamped by “careerists, rascals [and] henchmen.” As a result, the CPSU degenerated into “the former (byvshaia) Bolshevik Party.” Under such circumstances, to expect the Party to lead a major reform “would be like letting a cat guard bacon” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1198). Instead, one should pursue a “truly Bolshevik” mission, even working outside and against Party lines (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 62 & 79). As a result, it was necessary to introduce “an oppositional party” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1198).

Obviously, the notion of an oppositional party was a refreshing idea when even “factions” within the CPSU were forbidden. Not surprisingly, there were debates among socialist dissidents, not all of whom believed in the necessity of a multi-party system (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 553).⁹⁾

9) This document was written by an anonymous author with the pseudonym

In particular, the idea was vehemently attacked by "loyal" dissidents like R. Medvedev, who argued that the duty of genuine socialists was to work with or within the Party for its major reform. Reform-minded socialists, he argued, should take into consideration that there were party officials "who in different circumstances...would be an important source" of reform efforts. As a result, it would be a grave mistake to exclude a potential "alliance" with progressive elements of the Party. At an opportune moment, this "alliance" could work together for a major socialist reform. From this perspective, an oppositional party was neither necessary nor desirable (Medvedev 1977:50-58).

In contrast, the most enthusiastic support for the idea of an oppositional party came from a socialist underground journal called *Seiatal* (Sower or Disseminator). In the early 1970s, three issues of *Seiatal* appeared (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 1138, 1139 & 1174). In its first issue, *Seiatal* expressed somewhat unorthodox views by arguing that the October Revolution was not a socialist revolution because it had established "state capitalism." The "state capitalism" argument, although not a dominant view, was advocated by a number of socialists. For instance, the so-called "pseudo-Medvedev"¹⁰ described the October Revolution as a bourgeois event that established a state bureaucratic phase of capitalism (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 306). Also, S. Zorin and N. Alekseev analyzed the Soviet system from the viewpoint of "state capitalism" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 368).¹¹

"Volgin." It first appeared in the *samizdat* journal *Kolokol* (Bell) No. 4 (May, 1965). *Kolokol* was the journal of an underground Bolshevik group called the Union of Communards. Regarding the 1871 Paris Commune as its ideal, the group was based at the Leningrad Institute of Technology. Unfortunately, *Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 553 is the only available document from *Kolokol*.

10) It was F. J. M. Feldbrugge who aptly named this anonymous author "pseudo-Medvedev." See (Feldbrugge 1975), p. 59. For the main arguments of this article, see footnote 4.

11) S. Zorin and N. Alekseev emphasized that the chief evil of the Soviet system was its bureaucratic monopoly of state capitalism and argued that only

While the first issue contained some interesting points, it was the second issue of *Seiatel* that truly stood out from other material (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1139). In fact, it is one of the best samizdat works along with “In Place of Final Statement” by V. Moroz (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1041). *Seiatel* opened its second issue “Entrance Into Politics” by problematizing with some dissidents who refused to get involved in political activities. Two explanations were offered for their political inactivity. First, the very idea of engaging in politics was sneered at as “childish naivety” by Moroz. “Immature romanticism.” Second, it was also argued that a “moral” transformation of the people was more needed to overcome contemporary crises.

These “apolitical” views were rejected by *Seiatel* (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1139). Any efforts to bring about a new society “by changing men” could proceed outside the political sphere “only up to a certain point.” However apolitical it might be initially, the so-called “self-perfection” of individuals through literature, art, science or religion would eventually demand a similar “perfection” of the system. That is, people, culturally and morally transformed, would demand a corresponding system. As a result, moralizing alone was “senseless as long as the system itself remained immoral.” In the end, all things would boil down to the progressive reform of the Soviet system. Such a reform, however, was a political matter because it was bound to “collide with the privileges of those in power.” As a result, “entrance into politics” was “not a childish dream but a harsh necessity.”

To deny this “unavoidable” conclusion was dangerous in the face of

democratization could improve the situation by checking the monopolistic Soviet bureaucracy (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 368). This is the only material written by S. Zorin in the collection of *Arkhiv Samizdata*. N. Alekseev, a worker living in Moscow, wrote another short essay “A note of a worker” in the early 1980s to express his sympathy with the Solidarity Movement in Poland (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4413).

"widespread dissatisfaction" among the ordinary people. "Some were irritated by long lines in stores, some by crowded transportation, others by inattentive doctors." In spite of this, dissidents regarded "the grumbles in a line as trivial." In so doing, however, they were missing a great opportunity. That is, those "superficial trivia," when multiplied by a billion times or more, were substantially lowering "the threshold of system stability." As a result, though "the system is collapsing right before our eyes," no one was paying attention to its everyday symptoms. Under such circumstances, a moment of surprise would eventually come:

"A moment will come - a moment of accidental and temporary weakening of the system, a moment of sharp intensification of crises - when dissatisfaction will suddenly surface with its full dimension. ... This will be the end."

To make matters worse, "the moment" would be more than a lost opportunity. Though essentially a healthy trend, widespread discontent could "take a destructive turn" when it was not properly channeled. At the moment, however, "socialists" tended to be "apolitical" and remained isolated from the common people. As a result, widespread discontent, when they finally exploded, was likely to consolidate around other available platforms such as "Stalinism, anti-Semitism and all sorts of chauvinism." Eagerly filling in "an ideological vacuum," the "Black Hundreds" would raise fatal questions like "Who is guilty?" and demand destructive answers like "Kill Jews, communists and the intelligentsia!" To avoid such a disaster, it was necessary "to channel growing public discontent properly." In particular, it was essential to develop "a progressive program." Since the main defect of the Soviet system was the monopolistic power of the Party, the progressive platform of socialists should be "a principle of separation of power." As a result, Seiatel supported the idea of "an oppositional party." The main role of such a party was to "sow and spread (seiat)" proper understanding of contemporary among the ordinary

people. In this way, it could channel widespread public resentment into a “constructive” transformation of the system (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1139).

2. Go to the “people”

For some socialists, institutional reforms such as a multi-party system, though important, were not sufficient or even essential for a better future. Instead, reform should be based on “men on the street” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1480). I. Iakhimovich pointed out that the Soviet Union had emerged victorious from the Nazi invasion even though “we were naked, hungry and poor.” The victory was possible because the Soviet people, unconscious of the genuine magnitude of Stalinist crimes, believed in and fought for socialism. “In spite of our rockets and nuclear weapons,” however, it was possible to lose everything if the common people lost faith in socialism (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 11).¹²⁾ As a result, everything eventually depended on “people.” That is, there was “one lord, one sovereign – people” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 102).

Though the Brezhnev leadership tried to rehabilitate Stalin, such efforts failed to appeal to the people (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 763) because “an irreversible process of self-awareness was going on.” Though they had never protested against the regime, the people did not believe official propaganda “in the depths of their hearts.” In this sense, the voice of

12) When he wrote this *samizdat* piece, Ivan Iakhimovich was a young collective farm chairman in Latvia. The case of Iakhimovich was impressive in that he was once praised by *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (October 1964) as a dedicated communist who successfully managed a collective farm. Before he was arrested on March 25, 1969, Iakhimovich wrote several underground articles about the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 11) and his impending arrest (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 102). He also wrote the famous article that summarized the ideological position of socialist dissidents at the time: that is, “Leninism Yes, Stalinism No!” See *Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 79.

socialist dissidents resonated "the thoughts, opinions, [and] feelings" feeling people (Kironika No. 43, 1976.12.31).¹³⁾ As R. Lert pointed out, this was the main power of socialist dissidents.¹⁴⁾ In particular, she should be placed on the line that resonated "the future belonged to 'them. I 'toadies, yes-men or mama's boys" who would do as the future of Soviet society. Instead, those who rebelled against the injustice of the system represented the best of the next generation. As a result, persecution of young dissidents was equivalent to "self-strangulation" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 11).

Similarly, L. Chukovskaia remembered "the anger of the people" against Pasternak when there was an official campaign against him in 1958. Fifteen years later, she witnessed a similar phenomenon, "this time against our two remarkable minds: Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn." In particular, she

13) Boris Talantov was a mathematics teacher in Kirov whose father, a priest, had died in a labor camp during the Stalin years. Though his political ideal was close to "socialism with a human face" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 752 & 763), Talantov also wrote many articles about the persecution of the Orthodox church in the Soviet Union (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 745 & 748). He was arrested in the late 1960s and, like his father, died in a prison camp on January 4, 1971. Right before his death, Talantov managed to write his last letter from the prison camp (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 753).

14) Raisa Lert, who had been a Party member since 1926, was one of the leading socialist dissidents in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, however, she along with other prominent socialists like A. Sakharov, P. Grigorenko, P. Abovin-Egides and V. Turchin had moved to the camp of "democrats." The split with socialists was apparent in the dispute with Roi Medvedev who kept his faith in socialism to the end (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3405). After joining the "democrats," R. Lert also became one of the editors of the *samizdat* journal *Poiski* (Search) in the late 1970s (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4094). In spite of her objections to the regime, Lert never assumed an extreme position. In fact, she emphasized that a constant dialogue between dissidents and the regime was "unavoidable" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3718). In spite of this, she was expelled from the Party on March 21, 1979. For her various activities in *samizdat*, see *Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 1181, 3124, 4042 and 4739.

recollected her conversation with a 19-year-old cab driver who had accepted the official campaign at face value. Though there were only newspapers between the driver and her, Chukovskaia felt as if there were a concrete wall. “Men on the street” just accepted what was written in newspapers. As a result, the word “dissidents” (those who think differently) was misleading. “To think differently, there should be some thoughts from which you distinguish yourself.” The common people, however, do not think at all. In this sense, though it was often translated as “the common people” or “the ordinary people,” the phrase *prostoi narod* could be better translated with its literal meaning that is, the “single” people *better translated with its* (480). A bright socialist future was unimaginable with such a result, “Russia is waiting for new people!” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 80).¹⁵⁾

3. Another Revolution?

Though rare, there were some socialists who believed that Russia was waiting for neither institutional reforms nor new people. Instead, “a new revolution” was necessary. The call for a revolutionary struggle could be divided into two groups, depending on whether its participants believed in the Bolshevik Revolution or not. On the one hand, most radicals such as the “People’s Committee” believed that the Soviet experiment was initially a healthy process. In spite of this, there was no socialism in our country” due to the Stalinist degeneration. Instead, the Soviet leaders and its toadies

15) The last phrase - “Russia is waiting for new people!” - was written by Gennadii Gavrilov under the pseudonym of Gennadii Alekscev. While serving as a naval officer of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, Gavrilov, along with other officers like G. Paramonov and A. Kosyrev, formed a secret organization called the Union of Struggle for Democratic Rights. He also established contact with a well-known democrat Sergei Soldatov in Tallinn. In spite of his collaboration with democrats, Gavrilov remained a “socialist” until his arrest in 1969. At the trial, Gavrilov was sentenced to six years in prison. For more information on the Baltic Fleet case, see *Khronika* No. 10 (1969.10.31).

led luxurious lives with "villas and limousines." As a result, it was time to go out to the streets for "strikes and demonstrations" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1129). A similar, yet more radical, view was expressed by the "Young Opposition in Leningrad." Also called the Leningrad School, this group found its ideal program in "socialism with a human face." After the brutal crush of the Prague Spring, however, the Young Opposition found it essential to depose Stalinists through "a new revolution" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3636).

On the other hand, some socialists questioned the very foundation of the Soviet system. For instance, an anonymous article called the "Program of Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDP)" appeared in 1984 (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 5543). According to this program, the October Revolution did not bring a socialist order. Instead, it established "a group of bourgeois exploiters." In light of these events, "the RSDP declares a revolutionary struggle against the CPSU." After "a violent elimination of usurpers," the RSDP "would not make claims to a dominating position" in the country. "Likewise, it does not allow any other parties to do so." Instead, the goal of the RSDP was to form "a coalitional government elected by the people." In addition, there should be a radical form of democracy parallel to the Paris Commune. For instance, the RSDP promised to abolish the army and the police, transferring their functions to locally elected soviets. For this, "weapons should be distributed to the masses" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 5543).

Unlike these "radical" voices, there was widespread agreement among socialists that any struggle for their ideals should adopt only peaceful means. In this respect, the articles in "Socialists - 82," collected by M. Bolkhovskoi (pseudonym), were exemplary (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4769). After a careful analysis of "ideas of non-violence" like those of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, "Socialists - 82" raised a crucial question. That is, "is there anything in common between the idea of non-violence and socialism?" Without doubt, "socialists in the 19th century agreed that violence was necessary." After the Soviet experience, however, it was

obvious that “a higher way is represented by Gandhi and King.” As a result, violence was no more to be the midwife of history (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4769).

V. No Way Out

As shown in the previous section, socialist dissidents considered various means of overcoming contemporary crises, including institutional reforms of a multi-party system, a moral and cultural transformation to create “new people,” or a new “socialist” revolution. Obviously, not everyone shared the rosy belief that there was a way out from the failing system. In fact, dark pessimism was gaining momentum after the brutal repression of the Prague Spring. In this respect, the “Varga Testament” reflected the weary spirit of declining socialists who saw no way out from the gloomy reality. Shortly before his death in 1964, E. Varga wrote an article titled “The Russian path of transition to socialism and its consequences” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 166).¹⁶⁾ In spite of the title, the work was widely known as “the Varga Testament.” According to F. J. M. Feldbrugge, it was “the oldest, the longest and one of the most thorough analyses from

16) Evgenii S. Varga, known as Eugene Varga in the West, was born in Hungary in 1879. After briefly working in the Hungarian communist government, he became a member of the CPSU when he came to Moscow in 1920. Recognized for his expertise in economics, Varga became the Chief of the Institute of World Economy & Politics in 1927 and a member of the Academy of Science in 1939. In the final years of Stalin, however, Varga was disgraced for his “non-Marxist” views. Under the Khrushchev administration, Varga’s fortunes were reversed as he received the Order of Lenin in 1954. In spite of this, Varga kept developing his “heretic” views. For his earlier works, see (Varga, 1935) and (Varga, 1939). For his later works, see (Varga, 1962) and (Varga, 1968). The so-called “Varga Testament” was his last piece written for *samizdat* just before he died in 1964. It was published in the underground journal *Phoenix-66* which was edited by Iu. Galanskov (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 25).

an orthodox Marxist-Leninist point of view" (Feldbrugge 1975:78). There is no doubt that the material was one of the "oldest and longest" samizdat. The Varga Testament, however, was not an orthodox work. In fact, it stood out for its "unorthodox" views.

Varga believed that there was something wrong with the October Revolution. In fact, its inherent flaw came from the imperial past when the bourgeoisie were few and weak. Also, the nobility leaned on the autocracy in fear of peasant revolts. Under such circumstances, Lenin relied on the peasantry for revolutionary forces by promising them free land. This was "the pathos of the Agrarian program." After the revolution, however, the promise haunted the Bolshevik regime when peasants were determined to keep their newly acquired lands. This problem was all the more serious because the rural longing for private property could "deflate (or strictly speaking, stifle) [uspokoit (ili, proshche govoria, pridushit)]" the revolutionary will of the proletariat. As a result, the October Revolution was "only a partly socialist revolution" in which "a landed-bourgeois revolution occurred under the banner of socialism." Obviously, this was a very different understanding than that of typical socialist dissidents who sanctified the "Great October."

Moreover, "already in the early 1920s under Lenin," the party-bureaucratic trend began to prevail in all spheres of life. Although he raised angry voices against bureaucratization, it was Lenin himself who set the tone for it. The Stalinist degeneration has to be understood in light of this background. That is, it all began with Lenin. Again, this differed greatly from the typical ideas of socialist dissidents who believed "Good Lenin, Bad Stalin" or "Leninism Yes, Stalinism No." The unorthodox view of Varga went a step further on this subject though. According to Varga, Stalin possessed "the ability to truly estimate a world situation." That is, "if the Soviet Union had not developed heavy and defense industries [to produce] tanks and planes, ... the Germans would have reached the Urals and finished off the Red Army." As a result, Stalinist industrialization "had a decidedly progressive value." Such a sympathetic evaluation of Stalin

was very rare among socialist dissidents, who typically regarded him as a sort of evil.

Finally, Varga had a deeply pessimistic view regarding the future of Soviet society. The tragic pessimism originated from the perversion of communism into an undisputable dogma. “From the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, only those parts that could justify existing situations are quoted but the rest are ignored.” Over decades, these distortions caused “indifference, ... skepticism and sometimes even cynicism” among the people. That is, there had been a “de-ideologization (deideologizatsii)” process. This was a serious problem because the ideological status of society “fundamentally determined its moral condition.” In fact, there had been a rise of “immorality” to such a degree that “there were no social forces that could overcome” it. At the moment, the ruling class exhibited “only complacency, arrogance and corruption.” Also, poor living conditions of the ordinary people – workers and peasants – had brought an increase in “theft, moral decay, alcoholism, domestic abuse, shirking at one’s workplace, hooliganism and frequently senseless crimes.” Certainly, there were some who remained true to themselves. The noble few, however, were like “oases in an overall desert of moral indifference.” Under such circumstances, “only a parody of communism was possible.” As a result, the only thing Varga could see at the end of his life was the miserable past, the gloomy present, and a troubled future with “no way out.”

VI. Socialists in the Twilight

After the Prague Spring, the majority of socialist dissidents, including R. Lert, A. Sakharov, V. Turchin, P. Abovin-Egides and P. Grigorenko, gave up any hope of a major socialist reform. Instead, socialists of yesterday became democrats who now constituted the most prominent trend in samizdat. In spite of this, it would be a grave exaggeration to argue that

socialists were extinct. There were still some prominent figures like R. Medvedev who kept their faith in socialism. In addition, new faces began to appear in the early 1980s. Their renewed hopes, however, were significantly different from those of earlier years. In particular, they pursued non-Bolshevik ideals. That is, it was no more the case of "Leninism Yes, Stalinism No." Instead, it was time to say "no" to Leninism itself.

To be sure, there were some dissidents even in the 1960s who deeply detested Lenin. For instance, an anonymous writer called "X. Y." expressed his relief that Lenin – "the sinister dictator" – could no longer rule since history had relegated him to the role of "a museum mummy" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1036). There were also others who rejected Leninism in favor of "the vision of Karl Kautsky" (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 741). These anti-Leninist visions, however, were exceptional among early socialist dissidents. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, what was once exceptional became a popular view. They believed that the Soviet tragedy began with Lenin, not Stalin. For instance, an article circulated in the early 1980s, entitled "Russian Social Democrats and Future Russia." As far as the title was concerned, there was nothing unique about this item because many socialist dissidents called themselves "social democrats." A close reading of the article, however, revealed a significant difference, even a thrill. The article began with a provocative statement. That is, "the dispute which arose among Russian socialists at the beginning of the 20th century is still going on – the dispute between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks." What did that have to do with "social democrats"? "Ignoring various factions, we will call Mensheviks social democrats." That is, the article gave voice to the view of the "Mensheviks" who had disappeared in the early 1920s. After almost 60 years of silence, "Mensheviks" were announcing their revival in the Soviet Union, throwing down the gauntlet to the CPSU one more time. As a result, "the dispute" was still on (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4451).

The new generation of socialists also adopted a more updated rejection

of Leninism. According to T. Samsonova, genuine socialism should give up the notion of “the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Otherwise, its “humanitarian foundation” would be lost because any dictatorship, regardless of its allegedly noble intention, would destroy democratic practices and institutions (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3635). In this sense, the early ideal of socialists – that is, “Leninism Yes, Stalinism No” – was seriously flawed because it fostered the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the series of disappointments that hadhatsued, however, it was tiini to learn that any struggle fthesocialist ideals should b thonducted within a constitutional framewthk. That is, the vision of “Euro-communism,” in which revolution was no longer seen as a viable option, should serve as the guiding light for socialists in the 1980s (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4769). As one put it, the only way for socialism to survive as a significant social voice depended on its ability to learn to be a part of “pluralism.” That is, socialism was to be an ideology, instead of the ideology (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 3635).¹⁷⁾

VII. Conclusion

Initially a literary phenomenon, samizdat was soon politicized as it was persecuted by the Soviet regime. In this process, dissidents with political visions were born. Literally, the word “dissidents (inakomysliashchie)” means “those who think differently.” From what standard were their

17) In addition to these non-Leninist ideals, a “new breed” of socialists appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 3680 & 4130). Unlike their predecessors, these “new” socialists were interested not so much in grand social reforms as in “specific” rights of the proletariat. For instance, the Marxist 69-80 Group focused on “electoral” rights of the workers (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 5112). Also, *SMOT* (Free Inter-Trade Union of Workers) demanded economic rights for “free trade unions” in order to improve the material well-being of the proletariat (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. Nos. 3512, 3513, 3516, 3674, 3842, 3911, 3935 & 4780).

⁴ Frghs jrd“td to be different? Obviously, the official ideology constituted the standardogy ca resrot, it was the official ideology that was qrestionsd, criticized, and ev whrerecroed by “those who think differently.” In spite of th born. Ldegree as well as the dimenerally, tfree” thinking was somewhat limited in the beginning because it was the Marxist tradition that set the tonstfor the politicization of samizdat. In a sense, this wfficinat thi processialnresfor decades the Soviet peopiffh asknown littiffelse than Marxism. As a result, earlier efforts to search for alternatives to the failing system had been largely conducted within the Marxist-Leninist framework.

In spite of their differences, the predominant majority of socialist dissidents welcomed the Dubček experiment with sympathy and enthusiasm. In their minds, the Prague Spring for “socialism with a human face” was the litmus test for the viability of a major socialist reform in the Soviet Union. As one put it, the Czechoslovakia case was “a reference point for their own hopes and aspirations for reforms” (Feldbrugge 1975, p. 94). In this sense, the rumble of tanks on the streets of Prague marked the moment of a rude awakening, carrying a tragic message to socialist dissidents back in the Soviet Union. Apparently, socialism in the Soviet sense would not have “a human face” even abroad. In response, dissidents began to walk away from socialist ideals, disillusioned and outraged. As a result, there was a gradual withering away of “socialist” ideals throughout the 1970s.

“A considerable part of the samizdat material is written from a basically loyal Marxist viewpoint” (Feldbrugge 1975, p. 57). Writing in the early 1970s, Feldbrugge could make such an observation. Indeed, socialists dominated samizdat until the late 1960s. A decade later, however, one of the few remaining socialists made the opposite observation. That is, socialists in the 1980s were “dissidents among dissidents” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4769). Indeed, the history of socialists was one of a progressive withdrawal from socialist ideals. Their ideals changed over time with increasing doubts and skepticism: first “socialism without

Stalinism,” then “socialism without Leninism,” and finally “no more socialism.” Though there were few Eurocommunists and Mensheviks in the 1980s, they attracted our attention due to their “novel” status. After all, “in the 1980s people ceased to talk about progress toward communism” (Alexeyeva 1985, p. 390).

“Socialists” had a heroic, yet tragic, fate. It was they who opened the era of dissidents with political visions. They waged a heroic fight against the Stalinist dragon, reminding people of the early revolutionary ideals that “a Party card” was a symbol of duty and sacrifice, not privilege. They were deeply ashamed of the parody of communism under the “former (byvshaia)” Bolshevik Party. In spite of their heroic struggle, time only deepened the contrast between “what we had fought for and what we had run into” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 1198). Perhaps there was a good reason why socialists turned to the Dubček experiment with warm hearts and high hopes. In a sense, they – especially the “loyal” oppositionists – were waiting for the arrival of a Soviet Dubček. The tragedy of “socialists” was, however, that a Soviet Dubček – that is, Gorbachev – would eventually come but too late. The temporal lapse of two decades between socialist dissidents and the long waited leader turned out to be critical. Without a Soviet Dubček, socialists were destined for gulags, mental hospitals and the eternity of oblivion. As a result, when Gorbachev finally arrived, socialists in their twilight carried no more social weight. After all, they were like an evolutionary novelty that “somehow stopped evolving” (*Arkhiv Samizdata* Doc. No. 4769). In this way, a great opportunity was lost. When the regime – or, a part of it – was finally ready to hear social voices, the most sympathetic of them were already gone, leaving little echo behind.

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초록

소련시대 “사회주의 반체제운동” 연구

주 형 민

성냥곽의 문구까지도 김열한다는 소련의 문화정책에 맞서 사상과 표현의 자유를 찾고자 1950년대부터 시작된 불법지하출판운동(Samizdat)은 초기에 문학적 내용이 주를 이루었으나 소련정부의 탄압이 심해짐에 따라 점차 정치적 색채를 띠게 되었다. 이 과정에서 1960년대 불법지하출판운동의 정치화 과정은 주도했던 “사회주의 반체제인사 (Socialist Dissidents)”들은 소련사회에서 독특한 이념적 위치를 차지하고 있었다. 한편으로, 소련의 현실을 사회주의의 실현이라 보고 체제유지를 위해 노력했던 공산당이나 소련정부와 달리 사회주의 반체제인사들은 이두운 소련의 현실을 비판하면서 10월 혁명 본래의 이상으로 되돌아가고자 하였다. 다른 한편으로, 사회주의자들은 공산주의 자체를 부정하고 서구식 민주주의와 시장경제를 꿈꾸며 1970년대부터 등장한 “민주주의 반체제인사 (Democrats)”들과의 계속된 사상적 투쟁을 통해 소련의 암울한 현실이 공산주의의 돌이킬 수 없는 실패라기보다는 일시적인 일탈 상태로 보아야한다고 주장하며 공산주의 안에서의 개혁을 강조함으로써 “사회주의 최후의 신봉자 (Last True Believers)”라고 불리기도 하였다.

본 논문은 소련 반체제운동사에 있어서 사회주의자 (Socialist Dissidents)들의 등장과 몰락 및 그 사상적 성향을 분석하고자 한다. 논문의 1장에서 자료에 대한 간단한 설명을 한 후, 2장에서는 사회주의 반체제인사들의 핵심주장인 스탈린주의 비판과 레닌주의로의 회귀를 분석한다. 마르크스-레닌주의를 사상의 축으로 삼은 사회주의 반체제인사들에게 있어서 스탈린주의 비판은 일그러지가는 소련사회의 현실을 설명할 수 있는 중요한 도구가 되었지만, 다른 한편으로는 그들이 지향하는 레닌주의가 왜 스탈린주의로 변질되었는지에 대한 설명을 필요로 했다. 논문의 3장에서는 레닌주의로부터 스탈린주의로의 변질을 설명하려는 사회주의 반체제인사들의 다양한 이론적 노력을 분석한다. 암울한 소련의 현실을 공산주의의 번질로 본 사회주의 반체제인사들에게 가장 중요한 과제는 10월 혁명 본연의 “순수한” 이상으로 돌아가는 방법을 모

색하는 것이었다. 논문의 4장에서는 스탈린주의를 탈피해 공산주의 본래의 이상으로 되돌아가기 위한 사회주의 반체제인사들의 다양한 노력을 분석한다. 많은 사회주의 반체제인사들이 스탈린주의 탈피가능성에 대해 낙관적이었던 것과는 달리, 일부는 소련사회 구석구석에 스탈린주의의 폐해가 뿌리 깊게 남아있어 이로부터의 탈피는 불가능하다고 보았다. 즉, 소련의 공산주의 실험은 스탈린주의의 변질이후 돌이킬 수 없는 절망에 처해있다는 견해였다. 논문의 5장에서는 이같은 “비관적” 사회주의 반체제인사들의 주장을 분석한다. 공산주의의 틀 안에서 소련을 개혁하고자 했던 사회주의 반체제운동은 1968년 프라하의 봄이 실패함과 동시에 급격한 쇠퇴를 맞게 된다. 즉, “인간다운 사회주의 (Socialism with Human Face)”를 지양했던 프라하의 실험이 소련의 탱크 앞에 무참히 짓밟히는 현실을 보며 공산주의의 자체 개혁가능성을 믿었던 사회주의 반체제인사들은 점차 “민주주의 반체제인사 (Democrats)”들에게 주도권을 빼앗기며 역사의 뒤안길로 사라지게 된다. 논문의 6장에서는 1970년대에 진행된 사회주의자 반체제운동의 몰락을 분석한 후 이것이 소련사회에서 갖는 역사적 중요성에 대해 논문의 결론에서 다룬다.

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