

The ‘Universal Nomos’ of the Versailles Peace System and the Different Dreams of Korea and Japan: National Self-Determination and Racial Equality*

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This study deals with Korea’s pursuit of national self-determination during the time the Versailles Peace System was being made and how their pursuit was obstructed. In addition, this study illustrates how the Covenant of the League of Nations within the Versailles Peace System was an obstacle to Japan’s pursuit of racial equality. The conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, the Versailles Peace System attempted to establish a ‘universal nomos.’ However, the principle of national self-determination was only applied to the European sphere, while Korean national self-determination was not accepted within the Versailles Peace System; instead, the Japanese Asian Monroe Doctrine was implemented. In this framework, Korea was considered only as part of Japan. Second, as a member of the victorious ‘Big Five’, Japan attempted to insert a racial equality provision into the preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations, without success. This frustration led to an increased skepticism on the universality of the nomos of the Versailles Peace System and further nourished Japan’s war ideology of Greater East Asia (Daitoa, 大東亞).

Keywords: Versailles Peace System, nomos, national self-determination, League of Nations, racial equality, Asian solidarity

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Versailles Peace System, which eventually sealed the end of the First World War, was based on the five following peace treaties, in chronological order:¹ 1) the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919, Defeated nation: Germany), 2) the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (September 10, 1919, Defeated nation: Austria), 3) the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919, Defeated nation: Bulgaria), 4) the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920, Defeated nation: Hungary), and 5) the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920, Defeated nation: the Osman Turk Empire) (Y.K. Kim 2006, 624).² The Versailles Peace System satisfied the intense aspiration for universal peace in that era, but it has become a cause of other wars in the 20th century, foremost the Second World War, thereby earning the title of “A Peace to End All Peace”.³

Regarding the Versailles Peace System as an ‘International System’ comprised of ideational, materialistic, and institutional dimensions (Rosenau 1992, 14), it was the ideational dimension, namely, the setting of a ‘universal nomos’ that functioned as the source of legitimacy for the establishment of a new world order after the First World War. For instance, the Armenian massacre, carried out by the Turks during the war, was defined as a “new

¹ The Versailles Peace Treaty included punitive damages and compensation against Germany. The Paris Peace Conference was normally overseen by the French foreign affairs ministry. The reason why they chose the Palace of Versailles to sign the treaty was because after the Franco-Prussian War, Wilhelm I proclaimed a unified Germany and the German Empire in the Palace of Versailles. Furthermore, the Paris Peace Conference was held on January 18, the same day as the unification of Germany. Article 227 prescribed the indictment of Wilhelm II, which was the first time that the concept of holding a supreme ruler liable, thus changing the international outlook on war. In addition to stipulating punishment in Part VII (Penalties), Part VIII (Reparation) of the Versailles Peace Treaty prescribed the notions of ‘reparation’ and ‘compensation’.

² The Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Lausanne Peace Treaty on July 24, 1923.

³ This is the title of a book dealing with the Treaty of Sèvres, which constituted a part of the Versailles Peace System (Fromkin 2001). Though replaced by the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres became a cause of the current conflicts in both the Middle East and Near East.

crime against humanity and civilization” by France, Great Britain, and Russia on May 18, 1915, which led to the initial establishment of a ‘universal nomos’ for ‘crimes against humanity’ (Courtois 1997, 16).

Was the nomos of the Versailles Peace System indeed sufficient to embody a robust and stable basis for the legitimacy of the new post-war world order? This study conducts a comparative analysis between Korea’s ideal for national independence and its frustration regarding the principle of national self-determination of the Versailles Peace System on the one hand, and Japan’s ideal and defeat in its effort to incorporate the principle of racial equality within the system on the other. Through this comparison, this study sheds light on a vital limit pertaining to the ‘universality’ of the Versailles Peace System, for which the system allegedly proclaimed. This analysis is expected to contribute to the historical understanding of many current political phenomena, in which global, regional, and national standards are intertwined in a complex web. The methodology of this study adheres to a historico-theoretical method⁴ based on historical raw materials such as, press editorials, memoirs of that time, and previous studies of that historical context.

II. QUEST FOR A NEW UNIVERSAL NOMOS AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Prior to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the European continent was in full praise of the ‘*Belle Époque*’. The First World War, which definitely ended Europe’s ‘*Belle Époque*’, could also be called ‘the European War’ for its European origin. Nevertheless, this war eventually mobilized the various African and Asian countries under European colonial domination, the United States and Canada as a former colonies of Europe, and the Russian Empire, which is geographically situated in both Europe and Asia, thus truly making this a ‘World War’.

The geographical dimensions under the control of the European Empire was much larger than today. In 1900, European powers had transformed

⁴ Refer to the following literature related to such research methodology (Mahoney and Rueshemeyer 2003; Finney 2005; Trachtenberg 2006; May 2010).

90.4% of Africa, 98.9% of Polynesia, 56.6% of Asia, 100% of Australia, and 27.2% of North and South America into colonies. Furthermore, a few thousand British colonial bureaucrats dominated the vast Indian population, which amounted to 350 million people at the time. For this reason, the human and material resources of these colonies were the main fodder for Europeans to implement and sustain the war (Lenin 1970, 254; Overy 1996, 18). Borrowing the words of Hobsbawm (1989) in order to succinctly describe the time before the First World War, it truly was “the Age of the Empire”. Before the First World War, the United States, which had gained its independence from Europe in the late 18th century, was beginning to settle into their position as a new colonial power, such that the territory under the possession of Western powers in 1914 amounted to roughly 85% of the overall globe (Arrighi 1994, 53). The war seemingly led by the European nations was therefore not simply a European war, but a world war, and initiated a violent global collision with the concept of a ‘universal nomos.’⁵ Japan had first described this war as a ‘European War (歐洲戰爭)’; but as Japan also became involved, the terms ‘world war’ and ‘universal’ were frequently used (Unno 1972, 7). When another World War broke out later, this war was then called the ‘First World War’ in order to distinguish it from the ‘Second World War’.

The First World War began on July 28, 1914 and expanded under its grand cause ‘a War to End All Wars.’ The war finally ceased on November 11, 1918 at 11 a.m., by the armistice agreement signed in a railroad carriage at Compiègne at 5 a.m. on the same day. The number of deaths among the soldiers and civilians in the First World War reached over 16,000,000; adding over 21,000,000 wounded to the death toll, the total included over 37,000,000 casualties.⁶ The shock brought about by this war led people to rethink their arrogance and the unchallenged confidence of their previous optimism that the progress of history was moving forward and not backward. *The Decline*

⁵ The concept of ‘universal nomos’ in this paper is similar to the meaning of nomos and standards. Preceding studies that analyzed international politics focusing on the concept of standards include the following (Schmitt 2006; Gong 1984; M.S. Kim 2001). For a perspective that sees the Korean Peninsula as a clashpoint of various civilizational standards, refer to the following research (Kim and Hodges 2008).

⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties

of the West (Der Untergang des Abendlandes) written by Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) and published in the summer of 1918, reflects the rethinking of the atmosphere of that era (Spengler 1991).

In order to build a new post-war order that would save the world from further massacre, destruction, and despair incurred by the First World War, a 'universal nomos' was considered a prerequisite. The 'universal nomos', of which the Versailles Peace System⁷ claimed to stand for, was based on the 'Fourteen Points' enunciated by the president of the United States Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) during his State of the Union Address on January 8, 1918.⁸ Wilson played a pivotal role in the Paris Peace Conference, which opened on January 18, 1919 to deal with all issues related to post-war adjustments.⁹

The principle of national self-determination, which Wilson advocated for as the new 'universal nomos', was formulated under the heavy intellectual influence of Tomáš Masaryk (1850–1937).¹⁰ Masaryk succeeded, on May 31, 1918, in getting the Pittsburgh Agreement signed by 29 Czech and Slovak representatives in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This agreement declared the intent of the representatives of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, and Czech Silesia to create an independent nation-state to be known as Czecho-Slovakia. At the Independence Hall of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Masaryk declared the agreement valid on October 18 of the same year.¹¹

⁷ Peace System is formed based on the central axis of peace treaties that officially ends wars.

⁸ The leadership of the United States also appeared in the documents and language. The Paris Peace Conference was normally carried out in English and the results of the conference, which was the Versailles Peace Treaty, was also written in both French and English. Following the Rastatt Peace Treaty that concluded the War of the Spanish Succession, it was customary to use French as the standard language for official documents. However, the Versailles Peace Treaty prescribed both languages as the language of official documents (Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles).

⁹ During the Paris Peace Conference, Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) said, "God himself was content with ten commandments. Wilson modestly inflicted fourteen points on us." (MacMillan 2002).

¹⁰ Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk became the first president of Czechoslovakia that was founded after the First World War.

¹¹ The study of Ronen analyzed the development processes of national self-determination

The principle of national self-determination was also intended to counter the Communists' theory of 'nation' (Mayer 1971). In 1914, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) stated that the self-determination of nations meant “the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state” (Tucker 1975, 154). The ‘Decree on Peace’ proclaimed by Lenin in 1917 also held principles of non-reparation and non-annexation, along with the self-determination of nations.¹² It was thus this competitive relation with Lenin to shape an important backdrop of Wilson’s suggestion of national self-determination as the ‘universal nomos’ of the Versailles Peace System.¹³

The term ‘self’ in Wilson’s self-determination principle certainly related to each nation. Yet some unresolved questions remained. How was a nation to prove its national identity such that it would legitimately be recognized as an independent unit? For instance, why couldn’t the Southern states in the United States during the Civil War be considered an independent unit that would have been able to establish their own policies on slavery? Why did the entire United States have to be considered as a single independent self? Indeed, the principle of self-determination had much ambiguity lying within, including more risks that would ultimately lead to another war among many independent units of ‘self’ that would suddenly see themselves being recognized as international independent entities.

The potential risk of the principle of national self-determination, as mentioned above, should be supplemented by the concept of collective security. Therefore, in order to prevent an expected situation of war that

(Ronen 1979).

¹² In 1917, during the First World War, the Kerensky regime that appeared through the Russian February Revolution, and the Bolshevik regime that appeared after toppling the Kerensky regime, had a huge global significance. There were many opinions about this in the United States and there was also some optimism that Russia would develop into a democratic state. The Russian issue was also discussed at the Paris Peace Conference, but it was naturally secondary to the defeated German issue (MacMillan 2002, 65–68).

¹³ Tomas J. Knock claimed that Wilson’s Fourteen Points was not a response to the national self-determination principles of the Bolsheviks, but was planned out before then (Knock 1992, 144–145).

could be caused among all these independent units of 'self' simultaneously and rashly claiming the right of 'determination,' most nation-states recognized the need for a collective security system, which eventually led to the birth of the League of Nations (Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser 1998). In addition to this logical necessity, Wilson further developed the design promoted by the British Foreign Minister Edward Grey (1862–1933) to establish the League of Nations. Grey's design was an extension of the ideas advanced at the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.¹⁴ And the ideological origins of the Hague Peace Conferences go back as far as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In this context, we could argue that the League of Nations proposed by Wilson was another incarnation of the Hague Conference under a different name, in the sense that the third conference, originally planned to convene in 1915, was annulled by the war.¹⁵ Based on this spirit, Wilson, in the 14th of his Fourteen Points, suggested the formation of "a general association of nations" for the purpose of "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."¹⁶

In September 1919, Wilson asserted that "while the balance of power is a German system and depends on the power of oneself, a collective security system gathers all countries of the world and stands on an international perspective" (National Assembly Library Legislative Research Bureau 1964).

¹⁴ Walther Schücking went so far as to call this the "Hague Confederation of States" instead of the Hague Conventions.

¹⁵ In 1795, Immanuel Kant argued that in order to estrange people, nature uses linguistic differences and religious differences, as such differences provide the source for mutual hostility and war. Kant hoped that with the passage of time, the "progress of civilization" would lead to a peaceful harmony of all things. His plans for "perpetual peace" were focused on the concept that all states must unite to organize an "*assemblée des peuples*" to protect peace (Kennedy 1993, 133). A history of Internationalism is as follows (Lange 1919; Ruyssen 1954; 1958; 1961).

¹⁶ In Korea, Hyun-Sook Park analyzed Wilson's speeches and explained the background for the birth of his national self-determination principle, while also summing up the idealism/realism arguments of Wilson's beliefs in the United States (H.S. Park 2010; 2011). However, as pointed out by Dov Ronen, the concept of Wilson's national self-determination was not clear. Wilson never talked about his ideas in a comprehensive and consistent method; those who tried to explain his definition of national self-determination were scholars that followed after (Ronen 1979, 31).

The collective security system Wilson had in mind to preserve peace was a system of collaboration among countries on a global level. The Covenant of the League of Nations included in the Versailles Peace Treaty was adopted in April 1919, five months after the armistice between Germany and the Allied Forces was signed on November 11, 1918. The Covenant was composed of 26 provisions and provided for the creation of an international organization, a permanent secretariat, a court of international justice, arms reductions, sanctions against aggressor nations, mandates, and the socio-economic role of the League of Nations.

The core premise of the Covenant of the League, however, was the concept of collective security based on the principle of equality among the nations (Cobban 1969, 74–84).¹⁷ The collective security system stipulated that in the case of an act of war perpetuated by a specific state, the nation-state members of the League of Nations should entrust their security to the hands of the League and subject the aggressor to economic sanctions, instead of referring to a rule based on alliances or on the principle of balance of power (Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations). Article 10, stipulating the gist of the collective security system was the core of the Covenant.

Article 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.¹⁸

The second sentence in Article 10 directly refers to collective security, and became the main reason why the United States Congress did not ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty. The League of Nations was founded on January 10, 1920, albeit with the inherent limit that it had not been ratified by the United States, which later became the fatal weakness of the Versailles Peace System. Ultimately, the League of Nations failed to prevent Japan's Manchurian

¹⁷ However, from the viewpoint of a nation that realized self-determination, it can be viewed as 'supplementing' rather than 'substituting'.

¹⁸ This provision is similar to XIV in Wilson's Fourteen Points.

Incident (1931), Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935), and Germany's invasion of Poland (1939), and only remained as a titular organization until it was replaced by the United Nations, which came into existence on October 24, 1945.

III. KOREA'S IDEALS AND FRUSTRATION ON NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

The principle of national self-determination, suggested as a new nomos for the Versailles Peace System, functioned as the principle of settlement over the following issues: 1) dismantlement of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 2) the Eastern Question, and 3) the new adjustment of the perennial issue on sovereignty originated from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Specifically, Wilson's statement that "absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" elicited enthusiastic responses on a global scale, notably from nations currently under political repression from other powers.

The principle of national self-determination was also conveyed to the Korean population, especially among the leadership, who had been in the midst of efforts to redefine the concept of 'nation' (Y.H. Chung 2004, 49),¹⁹ and became the main backdrop of the March First (*Samil*) Independence Movement.²⁰ Kim Ku (金九, 1876–1949), who later became the president

¹⁹ While the dissemination and establishment of racial concepts was between 1895 and 1904 in Korea, due to the imperialism of Japan that had the same race, the concept of Minjok (民族) gained absolute superiority in Korea (D.K. Kang 2005, 13–17). The concept of Minjok in Japan was established between the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War and was based on Kokutai (國體), an ideology that justified domination of countries under modern imperialism (K.C. Yun 1997, 111–117), and this terminology was imprinted on the Japanese people. However, after the proclamation of Wilson's national self-determination policy, the Asian nationalism issue appeared in the form of independence movements and movements to restore national sovereignty. Therefore, Japan avoided the use of the term 'nation'. As a solution to this, in circa 1930, Japan started to proclaim 'Minzoku Kyowa (民族協和)' in the perspective of integrating Asia (Yamamuro 2006, 120).

²⁰ According to Gondo Shirotsuke (權藤四郎介), a Japanese official who worked at Changdeokgung from 1907 to 1920, the Korean people waved flags with words

of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, testified that the March First Movement was influenced by Wilson's principle of national self-determination (K. Kim 2008, 457). The efforts of Kim Kyu-sik (金奎植, 1881–1950), who had gone to Paris in an attempt to obtain recognition of Korea's independence from Western powers, based his position on the principle of national self-determination. His diplomatic activity was directly connected to Wilson's principle at the stage of diplomacy and the March First Movement in Korea (C.S. Lee 2008, 165–171). The dispatch of Kim Kyu-sik to Paris originated from a meeting between Lyuh Woon-hyung (呂運亨, 1886–1947) and Charles Richard Crane, (1858–1939), Wilson's Special Diplomatic Commissioner, in Shanghai. Dongje-sa (同濟社), a Korean Anti-Japanese Independence Movement Group, which was established in 1912 under the leadership of Shin Kyu-shik (申圭植, 1879–1922) was active in a nationalist movement in Shanghai at that time. Lyuh Woon-hyung organized the New Korean Youth Party (新韓青年黨) with Chang Duk-soo (張德秀, 1895–1947), a member of the youth movement, and as the leader of the new party, he planned for the participation of Kim Kyu-sik at the Paris Peace Conference (B.J. Jung 1995, 29–30). As the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was later established in Shanghai, Kim Kyu-sik no longer remained the leader of the New Korean Youth Party, but became one of the leaders of the Provisional Government itself.

Koreans wanted to take advantage of the timely attendance of Kim Kyu-sik at the Paris Peace Conference to convey to the world their aspiration, as incarnated by the March First Movement, that Korea was another, independent, 'self' to be distinguished from Japan. The 'Korean Declaration

saying 'Korean Independence', 'Korean Independence Manse', 'Mourn the Korean Emperor', 'National Self-Determination', and 'World Peace' on March 1 (Gondo 1926, 191). The preceding studies pertaining to Korea and its correlation with Wilson's Fourteen Points' are as follows (S.S. Jeon 2004; 2009). As pointed out by Sang-Sook Jeon (2009), Baldwin's research can be considered one of the best empirical studies on the correlation of Wilson's national self-determination and the March 1 Movement (Baldwin 1969). Research by Akifumi Nagata (2008) focuses on Korea's response to the Paris Peace Conference and the perspective and roles of the United States; Erez Manela's (2007) study deals with the trends of non-European regions and countries according to Wilsonianism.

of Independence' proclaimed "We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people." The leaders of the Movement, Son Byong-hee (孫秉熙, 1861–1922), Kwon Dong-jin (權東鎭, 1861–1947), Hong Byung-ki (洪秉箕, 1869–1949), Yi Seung-hun (李昇薰, 1864–1930), Yi Myong-yong (李明龍, 1872–1956), and Han Yong-woon (韓龍雲, 1879–1944) confessed during their interrogation that they had been inspired by the principle of self-determination advocated by Wilson. Choe Rin (崔麟, 1878–1958), who had encouraged Choe Nam-seon (崔南善, 1890–1957) to draft the 'Korean Declaration of Independence', professed the following in his interrogation on March 5, 1919.

My motivation for participating in the Independence Movement was, first, to make sure the right to live of the Korean people, and second, to make the Japanese government repent for their policies in the domination of Korea, and third, to take advantage of the peace conference and their talk of world peace so that the Western powers would take notice of the plight of the Korean people. I had the self-determination of the Korean people and Korea's independence in mind and joined the Independence Movement to achieve these objectives (Ichikawa 1983, 120).²¹

General Utsunomiya Tarō (宇都宮太郎, 1861–1922), the commander of Japanese Forces in Korea, wrote in his diary that the main powers behind the March First Movement were the new class of Koreans that were comprised of the believers of Cheondogyo (天道教), Christians, and students. He believed they were being sponsored by foreign missionaries. Furthermore, he viewed the cause of this movement as being the "overly forceful annexation" and the discrimination against Koreans that ensued (Utsunomiya 2007, 220–221). On the other hand, Hara Takashi (原敬, 1856–1921) stated on March 2 that the March First Movement had its roots in "national self-determination" and "other causes" (Hara 1950, 169–170). In *The Outline of the Disturbance in Joseon* (朝鮮騷擾經過概要) published in September 1919 as the official statement of the Japanese War Ministry (陸軍省), the analysis included

²¹ Minjok representatives answered interrogations in Korean. An interpreter recorded responses in shorthand in Japanese, which was re-translated into Korean at a later date (K.S. Park 1970, 2).

statements to the effect that the national movements in Europe influenced the Korean March First Movement, and furthered the concept of Korean self-determination (Sakatani 1964, 19).²²

As a result of the March First Movement, several forms of provisional government were constructed: the Korean National Council, the Provisional Government of Joseon, the Provisional Government in Shanghai, the Government of the New Korean Republic, and the Hanseong Provisional Government (D.W. Yun 2006, 30). The establishment of these provisional governments led to the birth of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, located within the French settlement in Shanghai, after a five-month long integrated process. Each provisional government possessed a temporary charter, and the charter of the Provisional Government in Shanghai (April 1919), which was rather explicitly characterized by democratic republicanism, is the one that reflects most clearly the ‘universal nomos’ of the Versailles Peace System (J.H. Koo 2000, 35–37).

Article 7 of the provisional charter of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea compared Japan to an ‘Oriental Germany’ and stated that “The Republic of Korea shall demonstrate to the world its spirit of foundation based on divine intent and shall join the international society to contribute to the determination and distribution of civilization,” emphasizing its willingness to become affiliated with the League of Nations, and in Article 1 of the political platform stated its objective as “the proclamation of the cause for equal national, equal government and equal humanity.” Cho So-ang (趙素昂, 1887–1958), who drafted the provisional charter around February 1919, based the cause for the establishment of the Provisional Government not on the Declaration for Korean Independence,²³ but on the March First Movement (G.S. Kim 2010, 169).

The principle of national self-determination bearing all of Korea’s hope

²² Documents that viewed the relationship with Wilson’s national self-determination as the decisive reason for the March First Movement can be found in the following references (Kato 1990; Aoyanagi 1921; Legal Affairs Bureau of Governor-General of Joseon 1986).

²³ The ‘Declaration for Korean Independence’ was used to declare the independence of Korea to the international community, such as at the Paris Peace Conference (G.S. Kim 2003, 182–184).

was in direct conflict with the Asian Monroe Doctrine that was pursued by Japan. The conceptual burrowing from the American Monroe Doctrine was put into place as the Asian Monroe Doctrine by the Japanese government during the Russo-Japanese War. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Kaneko Kentarō (金子賢太郎, 1853–1942), the acting honorary ambassador sent to the United States under the orders of Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文, 1841–1909), was advised to adopt an Asian Monroe Doctrine from Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) himself during a meeting with him on July 7, 1905.²⁴ Roosevelt had already expressed his desire “to see Korea in the possession of Japan” (K.J. Kim 2003, 172) in 1900, and in 1904, announced the Roosevelt Corollary, which, in pursuit of the Monroe Doctrine, articulated that the United States would intervene in conflicts between European nations and Latin American countries to enforce legitimate claims of the European powers.

I encouraged Japan to pursue the same path and follow the Monroe Doctrine in Asia. With this doctrine in place, Japan will be able to restrain any possible invasion from Europe to Asia in the future and will also become the leader of the Asian continent and thus realize its dream of becoming a rising nation in the continent. I wanted Japan to apply it in Asia, the continent east of the Suez Canal, following the footsteps of the American continent. However to do so, Japan is forced to acknowledge the vested rights of other foreign countries within Asia. In order for Japan to pursue these policies, I will fully support the cooperation with the Japanese government, during my term and afterwards as well.²⁵ (Underline added)

²⁴ Kaneko joined the Iwakura Mission in 1871 and met with Roosevelt while studying at Harvard. After returning to Japan, he became a key member for drafting the Meiji Constitution. In 1890, Kaneko translated part of Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* published in the United States, and recommended it to the Japanese Navy. Because he knew Roosevelt, he visited the United States in 1904 and he was in charge of promoting Japan's justification for the Russo-Japanese War to Roosevelt and influencing American opinion.

²⁵ This is a report submitted by Kaneko to the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry in July 1907 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1960, 742). Kaneko (1932) described the contents of his meetings with Roosevelt in more detail in “A ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’ and Manchuria”.

Roosevelt was friendly to Japan and while he strongly stood for the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine in Western hemisphere, he also valued the significance of the balance of power on an international level.²⁶ Considering Kaneko's perspective and status within the Japanese government, the direct encouragement from the president of the United States, and the fact that one of the major issues in the Russo-Japanese war was the fate of Korea, the emergence of the Asian Monroe Doctrine since this time was indeed quite significant.

In May 1915, in the midst of the First World War, Japan concluded the Twenty-one Demands with Yuan Shikai (袁世凱, 1859–1916), the president of China, a former bureaucrat of the Qing Empire, and aspired to include Manchuria, the birthplace of the Qing Empire, within the Japanese Empire through this demand. On November 2, 1917, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was concluded in Washington D.C. through an exchange of notes between Ishii Kikujirō (石井菊次郎, 1866–1945), the special envoy of Japan and Robert Lansing (1864–1928), the Secretary of State of the United States. In his letter to Ishii, Lansing wrote, “the governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.” He further wrote, “they not only contain a reaffirmation of the open door policy, but introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace [...] and which is the very foundation also of Pan Americanism as interpreted by this government.”²⁷

This agreement, concluded while the rest of the world was still paying attention to the First World War, had a mixed political outcome. It represented, on one hand, the United States' desire to approve Japan's involvement in the war, while checking Japan's further expansionism at the same time, and on the other hand, Japan's intention to draw the recognition of

²⁶ Kissinger's research compares Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson (Kissinger 1994).

²⁷ Lansing-Ishii Agreement (<http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7//wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm>).

the United States to its geopolitical interest in regions such as Manchuria and Mongolia. However, China proclaimed on April 14, 1917 that they would not be restricted by diplomatic documents exchanged between foreign countries. Hence, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement that was concluded on February 6, 1922, was subsequently discarded on April 14, 1923 as part of the Nine-Power Treaty, which affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

The ultimate realization of the principle of self-determination was quite compromised. The victorious powers of the First World War actually weakened the principle by placing former colonies of Germany under the mandate of the Allied powers (Articles 119–127), rather than granting immediate independence in accordance with the principle. The fact that Japan became one of the signers of the Versailles Peace Treaty meant that the Treaty recognized Japanese exclusive right on regions expressed as Japanese territories (Taiwan, Korea, the South Pacific) in the map attached to the Treaty. This, however, could well be interpreted as giving international acknowledgement to Japan's occupation of Korea and promising not to interfere with Japan's territorial matters.

Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, further derived from Article 10, showed a trace of the Monroe Doctrine, which represented a mutual recognition of certain geopolitical interests, in the sense that it restricted the effect of the Covenant on 'regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine.'

Article 21

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. (Underline added)

Therefore, the United States could keep to their plan to expand its regional hegemony in Central and South America based on the Monroe Doctrine. Similarly, Japan was able to find a ground in this settlement to proclaim the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, or the Asian Monroe Doctrine in the Asian continent. Wellington Koo (顧維鈞, 1887–1985), the delegate of China, was vigilant against Japan's strong desire to expand its sphere of influence,

and David H. Miller (1875–1961), the legal consultant to the United States delegation, clearly assumed that although Japan may not use the exact term “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine”, it would argue for the same effects (Miller 1928a, 453). The reason why the Japanese government had not raised any particular opposition to the provision for the Monroe Doctrine, and actually agreed to it, lay in Japan’s intention to imitate and apply the doctrine over Asia. Some Japanese media published articles that justified Japan’s advocacy for the Monroe Doctrine. For instance, an editorial of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* argued that Japan should be alert to the increasing influence of Western powers upon Joseon (Korea) and maintained that Japan was the most superior nation in Asia and had the legitimacy to resist the expansion of the American Monroe Doctrine by using its “Asian Monroe Doctrine.”²⁸

In view of this, Article 21 was drafted for the benefit of the United States, but according to its statutory interpretation, it could also give an important authorization to Japan’s sphere of influence. Tachi Sakutarō (立作太郎, 1874–1943), a legal consultant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who participated at the peace conference as a Japan’s delegate, saw Article 21 as being applicable not only to the United States, but to all the signatory countries, and thus inferred the possibility of an Asian Monroe Doctrine by Japan (Tachi 1932, 321–326). As most European powers had increasingly confined their attention to the European continent since the First World War, the geopolitical situation of Asia was transformed into one favorable to Japan’s claim of superiority, with many Japanese politicians, army leaders, and diplomats now more explicitly beginning to raise the slogan of the Asian Monroe Doctrine (Kobayashi 1994, 2–7).

This swelling of discourse on the Asian Monroe Doctrine, accompanying the many real steps of Japan’s expansionism, was ominous for the application of the principle of national self-determination by Korea. An apprehensive reflection on this issue can be well perceived in the petition Lyuh Woon-hyung delivered to Crane.

Japan is already calling itself the overlord of Asia and intending to hoist its flag within Chinese territory. Manchuria has already fallen into its hands and

²⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17 April, 1919.

Mongolia also remains under Japan's influence. Japan is trying to misuse the Monroe Doctrine in Asia. What is the real intention behind the Twenty-one Demands and the US-Japan Joint Declaration carried by Ishii, both of which were completed while the Western powers were still confused by the turmoil of the world war? [...] Korea is a small peninsula extending to the Pacific Ocean from the Asian continent, but located in a very significant position in the region. It is even called 'Asia's Balkan' and the occupation of this region will make the invasion of the rest of the Asian continent much easier. Furthermore, Korea could function as a checking point to Japan in many ways, therefore, without Korea, Japan's navy and army will not be able to exert their full potential, which has been proven by the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. (C.S. Lee et al. 2007, 183-188). (Underline added)

According to the activities of Nitobe Inazō (新渡戸稲造, 1862–1933),²⁹ who worked at the League of Nations as an under-secretary general of the League of Nations from 1919 until 1926, the main outcome of the Versailles Peace Treaty is clear evidence of Japan's perspective being strongly rooted in the Asian Monroe Doctrine. He gave a lecture on December 11, 1919 titled "Japanese Colonization" at the Japanese Association held in London, and his speech included these words in relation to Korea's national self-determination.

We do not hear of self-determination there (Formosa). It is quite otherwise with Korea. [...] And as long as Korea remains a really independent country, strong and well governed, it may well be a buffer State; but when it is now under China, and now under Russia, there can be no security for peace in the Far East nor safety for Japan (The Edition Committee of Nitobe Inazō 1987, 487–488). (Underline added)

Acknowledging that forces for self-determination were rising in Korea, Nitobe was keener to emphasize Japan's safety and security in relation to Korea's geopolitical location. In a speech to the British people, who were also concerned about the same principle of self-determination regarding

²⁹ Nitobe was the author of *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, which was reported to have influenced Theodore Roosevelt, and in 1908, he was appointed as the first head of the Colonial Studies Department installed in Tokyo Imperial University.

their colonial issues, Nitobe justified Japan's occupation over Korea with the following statement: "To an English School student of colonization, it will be highly interesting to watch the development of Korea to a Wales or—to an Ireland" (The Edition Committee of Nitobe Inazō 1987, 120).³⁰

As the principle of self-determination failed to apply to Korea, the alleged 'universal nomos', a few Korean leaders, including Kim Kyu-sik, appeared to slide into the solution Lenin proposed. For example, Kim Kyu-sik participated in the First Congress of Toilers of the Far East, organized by the Comintern in Moscow in 1922, along with 50 other deputies, including Lyuh Woon-hyung, and wrote an English article that was published in the Comintern journal. His frustration and resentment was well expressed.

Even the great republic of America, which has made so much ado about its "altruistic" pretenses and its worldwide "democratic" principles, threw off its mask at the Washington Conference when it formed the hideous Quadruple Agreement with the three notorious bloodsucker nations--England, France, and Japan. [...] The Korean people have been forced to become revolutionary, radically revolutionary, because they have no other course. ... One need not argue at length to show that the revolutionary movement in the Far East cannot be quickly and properly achieved without making use of the very spark that causes the ignition—that is, the Korean revolutionary element (K.S. Kim, D.S. Suh ed. 1970, 91–105).

Cho So-ang also arrived in Paris by the end of June, after the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed, and saw that the Korean issue had not been discussed. Around 1922, he later professed his disappointment that "Wilson's national

³⁰ Nitobe, who was a classmate of Wilson's, appears not to have criticized the anti-racial equality of the United States in 1919. Observing that the racial issue was discussed in the Paris Peace Conference, he said, "Human beings are equal in front of God" (The Edition Committee of Nitobe Inazō 1969, 532–537). Nitobe was shocked by the 'Immigration Act of 1924' that was passed in the United States, he continuously claimed that "race is no issue and all human beings are equal" from a Christian perspective in his book (published in 1927). He pointed out the possibility of harmony between Western and Eastern civilizations, including the Japanese (The Edition Committee of Nitobe Inazō 1985, 571–572). As a person having an outlook on Christian civilization, his perception of Korea was that Japan's mission was an evangelist of civilization.

self-determination was simply a blank gospel” (S.J. Han 1984, 154).

Nevertheless, Korea’s fight for independence did not completely steer away from the universal nomos of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Taking into account the victorious status of Japan in the Versailles Peace System, Syngman Rhee (李承晩, 1875–1965) expressed a somewhat skeptical view of the limits of the resolution pertaining to the Korean issue at the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 (B.J. Jung 2005, 155–156), and tried to directly appeal to Wilson to grant an international mandatory rule over Korea on March 3, as the second best solution. However, this petition on the international mandatory rule raised a very intense controversy among Korean leaders of the independence movement at that time, an issue that incurred a tenacious political burden on Rhee.³¹ But Rhee firmly continued his appeal for Korea’s independence on the international stage, such as to Wilson himself or at the Paris Peace Conference, and kept adhering to the principle of national self-determination. He wrote ‘An Appeal to America’ for the First Korean Congress that took place in Philadelphia on April 14–16, 1919. In this appeal, Rhee continually articulated the validity of the United States-Korea Treaty of 1882, the affinity between Korea and the United States on the basis of democratic and Christian values, and his hopes for the realization of the principles of the League of Nations. Despite of the failure to attain independence through the Versailles Peace Treaty in June 1919, Rhee published the ‘Proclamation and Demand for the Continued Independence of the Korean Nation’ with Kim Kyu-sik on August 27, 1919, and further emphasized the continuation of Korea’s fight for independence based on democracy, liberalism, and self-determination. He argued that national self-determination would bring wealth and prosperity all over the world (Y.I. Lew et al. 2009, 87–93).

Cho So-ang, who drafted the 1941 ‘Korean Platform for the Establishment

³¹ However, Syngman Rhee, who was in the United States at the time, learned of the March First Movement after March 9 (B.J. Jung 2005, 161). There have been many studies on Rhee’s petition for this mandate. Yong-Pyo Hong’s study examined the petition from the perspective of Rhee’s international law and studied the meaning of the United States-Korea Treaty of 1882 and the independence diplomacy of Rhee using international law (Y.P. Hong 2010).

of the Korean Nation,’³² and thus contributed to the foundation of the legal system of the provisional government, asserted the following statement in 1942 in the ‘Objectives and Duties of the Provisional Government.’

The beginning part of the Korean Declaration of Independence holds the following as its proud entry comment: “We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people.” This is indeed the first solemn act by the Korean people implementing their self-determination. The principle of national self-determination grants three rights of decision to each nations, 1) the right to secession on the basis of free decision or the right to secession based on free choice, 2) the right for the seceded subject to found a country on free choice, and 3) the right for the seceded subject to establish its own political, diplomatic, and military doctrine over the founding and never again to belong to another country. The right to have and act on these three kinds of free decision and free action represents the core of national self-determination. [...] The Declaration of Independence is therefore a Declaration of Self-Determination (M.G. Kang 1982, 170–171). (Underline added)

Cho So-ang’s insight, as shown above, is representative proof of an intellectual trajectory that accepted the universal nomos and rendered it into the idea of Korean national self-determination, while recognizing the gap between ideal and reality.

Another case of this trajectory was Kim Ku, who became the head of the Provisional Government. Before the advent of the Atlantic Charter that combined the principle of national self-determination and post-war designs in 1941, Kim Ku sent a petition to Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) and asked that: 1) the issue of Korean independence be discussed at the peace talks that would take place at the end of the Second World War, that 2) a Korean delegation be allowed to participate in the talks, and that 3) Korea be allowed to participate in the establishment of a new international organization (Baik Bum Academy 2005, 95). In addition to this appeal, Kim Ku evaluated

³² Though the ‘Korean Platform for the Establishment of the Korean Nation’ was not a constitutional document, but rather in preparation for future constitution, it has had a considerable impact on various constitutional drafts since independence was attained (W.C. Shin 2008, 434-438).

the history of the Provisional Government in 1942, in the middle of the Asia-Pacific War, and this appraisal clearly shows Korea's persistent advocacy for national self-determination. It accepted the principle's universality despite its immediate application to the case of Korea.

On March 1, 1919, we professed, through our revolutionary movement, our wish that President Wilson's advocacy for national self-determination should be applied to all oppressed nations in the world. Since then, we have established a revolutionary political entity following the most advanced ideals of democracy, which resulted in our current Provisional Government. [...] We, the Korean nation, possess our right to self-determination and therefore refuse to be forced under the oppressed rule of another country and will not compromise with any plan that will violate our sovereignty or independence (Baik Bum Academy 2005, 161-162). (Underline added)

IV. JAPAN'S IDEALS AND FRUSTRATION ON RACIAL EQUALITY

Japan participated in the First World War in 1914, following the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Although Japan was involved in three subsequent wars in only two decades, the gravity of the First World War and its repercussions were not sufficiently felt by the Japanese (Unno 1972, 7). After the end of the war, Japan participated in the Paris Peace Conference as one of the victorious 'Big Five', but it was often perceived as a 'silent partner.' Many agenda points having 'real' significance were often discussed among the Council of Four (the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy), and later, among the Council of Three (the United States, Great Britain, and France) after Italy's withdrawal.

Hence, unlike Europe, Japan did not have sufficient knowledge and facts about the background during the establishment of the new peace system. Furthermore, contrary to other countries whose heads of state participated, such as the president or the prime minister, the 19th Japanese Prime Minister Hara Takashi nor Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (内田康哉, 1865–1936, elected as Foreign Minister 1911–12, 1918–23, 1932–33) joined the talks. Instead, Japan sent a delegation of more than 60 members, with Prince Saionji

Kinmochi (西園寺公望, 1849–1940) as the head of the delegation, who would consecutively occupy the posts of the 12th and 14th Prime Minister, and Count Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顯, 1861–1949) as the second in charge.³³ Saionji was the official head of the delegation, but Makino is the one that actually played the role.³⁴ Makino was responsible for conveying Japan's views to the Paris Peace Conference through his contact with the Diplomatic Investigation Group (外交調査會), which was established in 1917 to inquire and review diplomatic issues.³⁵ Viscount Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳, 1857–1929),³⁶ the ambassador plenipotentiary in Great Britain, Matsui Keishirō (松井慶四郎, 1868–1946), the ambassador plenipotentiary in France, and Ijuin Hikokichi (伊集院彦吉, 1864–1924) the ambassador plenipotentiary in Italy joined in Paris to take part in the Japanese delegation.³⁷

³³ The appointment of Saionji was related to his experience with Clemenceau whom he met while studying at Sorbonne University (Saionji 2005, 62–63, 168–169).

³⁴ Though Makino approved joining the League of Nations, he also showed his concerns that the establishment of the League of Nations would restrict the sovereignty of Japan (Makino 1940, 179).

³⁵ This group was an auxiliary institute under the Emperor of Japan and was composed of all forces within the government. Initially, members of the group did not reach a unilateral opinion at the Paris Peace Conference. Hara and Makino advocated cooperation and to work with the United States and Great Britain. Ito, who was deeply involved in diplomatic policies, was skeptical about the establishment of the League of Nations and Japan's membership in it.

³⁶ He studied at Indiana Asbury-DePaul University.

³⁷ Other members with the Japanese envoy included Matsuoka Yōsuke (松岡洋右, 1880–1946) who led later the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy; Saburi Sadao (佐分利貞男, 1879–1929) who was the diplomatic minister to China and a key figure in the November 1929 incident; Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂, 1878–1967) who served as the Prime Minister from 1946–1947 and from 1948–1954; Arita Hachirō (有田八郎, 1884–1965) who became the minister of foreign affairs and advocated Pan-Asianism; Saitō Hiroshi (齋藤博, 1886–1939) who became the ambassador to the United States and died soon after solving the Panay incident; Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵, 1887–1957) who served as the ambassador to Great Britain and then in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1943, Daitōashō (大東亞省) in 1944, and had one leg injured by a bomb thrown by Yun Bong-gil (尹奉吉, 1908–1932) in 1932 in Shanghai, who was also present in the signing of Japan's surrender on the USS Missouri (BB-63); Ashida Hitoshi (芦田均, 1887–1959) who became the 47th Prime Minister after the Second World War; Nomura Kichisaburō (野村吉三郎, 1877–1964) who was in charge of

The main objectives of the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference were twofold: 1) succeed to the rights that Germany previously had in the Shantung peninsula (山東半島), and 2) succeed to the rights of Germany's dominium in the South Seas, including the Caroline archipelago, the Mariana archipelago, and the Marshall archipelago. In addition to gaining the rights to these territories, the delegation aimed at implanting the concept of racial equality as a part of the universal nomos of the post-war world.³⁸ With the success of attaching a map, which demonstrated Japan's territorial claim, including Korea as *a fait accompli*, to the Versailles Peace Treaty, Japan achieved a diplomatic victory that led to the rise of a great Asia-Pacific empire that would cover the South Sea Islands.³⁹

However, Japan's diplomatic efforts on the insertion of the provision of racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations encountered certain difficulties. Initially, there was a green light on this issue. In July 1918, Edward M. House (1858–1938) conveyed a message to Ishii Kikujirō, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, that the League of Nations, which was to be established through the Paris Peace Conference, would indeed take the necessary measures about racial equality (Takahara 2006, 265). This issue, however, encountered strong opposition from Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries. The British delegates Alfred Balfour (1848–

Japan-US negotiations right before the start of the Pacific War; and Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿, 1891–1945) who served as the 34th, 38th and 39th Prime Minister, for a total of 68 people.

³⁸ There are quite a few studies on racial issues in Japan (Ikei 1962; Onuma 1987). Naoko Shimazu explained the process behind Japan submitting a bill on racial equality and their perception structure. Japan was not isolated from the international community but had a sense of inferiority in that Japan isolated itself (Shimazu 2009).

³⁹ The Asian issues that were unresolved at the Paris Conference began in November 1921 and were again discussed at the Washington Conference that ended in February 1922. After three months of meetings, with the attendance of nine countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, China, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and Japan), seven treaties were made (including: the treaty on restricting naval armament, the Nine-Power Treaty on China, and the Four-Power Treaty on the Pacific). As a result, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abolished and Japan had to return the rights to Shandong Province back to China, which they had received from Germany (Iriye 1967, 143–145).

1930) and Robert Cecil (1864–1958) had a slightly different perspective on this matter of racial equality. They were concerned about the possible repercussions of this provision to the people of the British colonies. Australia's opposition based on the White Australia Policy was also most assertive and strong. In addition, Wilson was just as concerned about the possible ripple effects of this issue in the United States, mainly with regards to the Southern states, which were particularly sensitive when it came to racial issues, and the state of California, which had enacted the California Alien Land Law of 1913 against Japanese immigrants.

Wilson had originally held a certain hostility against Japan's Twenty-one Demands to China and its dispatch of troops to Siberia. These concerns caused him to hesitate about welcoming Japan as a superpower. Wilson finally approved Japan as one of five member powers due to the vital influence of Jan Smuts (1870–1950), a distinguished figure of the Commonwealth, who also influences Wilson's acceptance to the idea of the mandatory system.⁴⁰ Smuts respected Japan as one of Great Britain's allies and hoped it would represent a leading country of Asia in the League of Nations. With this arrangement, he envisioned the League as a truly international organization (Shinohara 2010, 63–64).

The Diplomacy Investigation Group of Japan announced the following seven clauses, representing the policies of the Japanese government in relation to Wilson's Fourteen Points on November 13, 1918: 1) abolition of secret diplomacy, 2) freedom of the sea, 3) abolition of economic barriers, 4) limitations on armament, 5) disposition of German colonies in the South Sea Islands, 6) the European issue, and 7) the League of the Nations issue. All the while being cautious about the Fourteen Points, Japan displayed a kind of "me-tooism", abiding by the overall direction of the United States and Great Britain (Gaimushō Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai 1969, 702–704).⁴¹ The fact

⁴⁰ The mandatory system prescribed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was carried out under the guise of 'civilization'. The mandate for Africa and Asia Pacific was in the form of direct rule via the interwar period (MacMillan 2002, 106).

⁴¹ Japanese Foreign Affairs minister Uchida Kosai said that the racial discrimination abolition bill derived from the League of Nations was advocated by Wilson (Uchida 1969, 233).

that Japan set the issue of the League of the Nations as the last clause is a clear display of Japan's strategy.

Japan realized that the establishment of the League of Nations was a significant matter and had planned to include a clause on racial equality in the Covenant, within the following context. First, Japan's desire to secure the principle of racial equality was a reflection of the internal demands of the Japanese society. Observing the process of the birth of an international organization based on Wilson's idealism, the Japanese media and people naturally expected racial equality to be accepted as a clause (Oka 1959, 288–291).

Second, the principle of racial equality had the potential of elevating the status of the Versailles Peace System and being included in the universal nomos alongside the principle of national self-determination. Wilson's second draft and the Paris supplemental rules on the draft of Article 6 presented on January 10, 1919 included the following.

The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of their people (Miller 1928b, 65). (Underline added)

Wilson's understanding of allowing the same rights to all racial or national minorities is also present in 'Wilson's Third Draft and Paris Second Draft' (January 20, 1919), and 'Wilson's Fourth Draft and Paris Third Draft' (February 2, 1919). However, this initiative was rendered null due to Great Britain's opposition, Wilson's innermost or deep-seated perception that races should be controlled, a possible effect on the issue of African Americans rights in the United States at that time, and other various immigration issues.⁴²

⁴² On February 15, 1919 Wilson returned to the United States and spent a month and was opposed greatly on the racial issue. The issue of African Americans in the United States existed even before the First World War, but movements to reflect the demands of African Americans in politics heightened during the war. William Edward B.

Third, on February 13, 1919 Japan attempted to connect the principle of racial equality with the religious freedom principle in Article 21 of the first draft of the Covenant. This article was eventually eliminated in the Covenant, but Japan pursued negotiations by making racial equality and religious freedom parallel (Makino 1940, 227–228; Gaimushō Hyakunenshi Hensan Inkaishi 1969, 718).

Fourth, Australia and the United States were concerned that Japan's argument for racial equality would lead to racial issues within their own countries. Japan had originally argued for this principle because of the issue of Japanese immigration. Specifically, William Morris Hughes (1862–1952), the Prime Minister of Australia, maintained a strong opposition against Japan's position, by advocating the cause of White Australian Supremacy, because he had reservations about a flow of immigration from Japan to Australia, in addition to the concern over inherent racial conflicts with the aborigine population in Australia.⁴³ On March 21, 1919 Japan removed the term 'racial' from 'racial equality' and corrected its argument to demanding the "equality of all nationals of State members of the League" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1971, 483–485). Japan used the terms 'nationals' and 'states,' because the California Alien Land Law of 1913 prohibited land ownership to immigrants without American citizenship and a lease of over three years.⁴⁴

On April 11, 1919, Makino suggested the insertion of the phrase "principle of equality between States and just treatment of their nationals" instead of 'racial' in the preface to the Covenant. This technical correction represented

DuBois (1868-1963) hosted the first Pan-African Congress based on racial issues in Paris and strived to overcome the color line.

⁴³ The White Australia Policy was a popular ideology that appeared based on the 19th century Australian society (Palfreeman 1995, 1–4). While it mainly targeted the Chinese in the 19th century, the 'Immigration Restriction Act of 1901' also took into consideration the future immigration of Japanese. The racial animosity of Australia also took into concern the Russo-Japanese War and that Japan could be a threat to the security of Australia (Meaney 1976, 122-125).

⁴⁴ Japan's complaints about immigration issues started with the 'Board Incident of 1906'. Prior to the 'California Alien Land Law of 1913', Democratic presidential candidate Wilson did not oppose this bill based on the tradition of the Democratic party, which does not interfere with state authorities.

a step back from the racial issue, which had a more universal implication, and shifted the focus to the legal aspect of immigration. This suggestion did not follow the traditional rule of the majority, but was rejected to the sudden introduction of a unanimity vote.⁴⁵ Wilson was against the insertion of the principle of racial equality, in spite of making peace by handing the Shantung peninsula over to Japan, because he was wary of the principle's ripple effects.⁴⁶ Ultimately, the phrase "just and honorable relations between nations" included in the preface of the Covenant only represented the equal status between member states of the League of Nations, and the clause on racial equality was not included in the Covenant. With the sudden change of voting method mentioned above, one has to overlook the fact that Wilson was a man of racial prejudice from his earlier days.⁴⁷

Some Japanese such as Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造, 1878–1933) tried to understand the ideal of racial equality in connection with Korea's ideal of national self-determination. Through interactions with Korean students studying abroad and Lyuh Woon-hyung, Yoshino became involved in the Korean issue and eventually voiced his criticism towards Japan's cruel rule. He pointed out the sheer discrepancy between Japan's crying out for justice

⁴⁵ The voting results are as follows. 11 in favor: France, Italy, Japan (2 each), China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, Czechoslovakia (1 each). 5 against: Great Britain, United States, Poland, Rumania, Brazil (1 each). The fact that China, which was in a conflict against Japan, was in favor with Japan's racial equality policies showed a solidarity-type character that opposes racism. The first Asians to be ostracized in the United States and Australia in the 19th century were Chinese.

⁴⁶ There are claims that Japan stood fast to the racial equality policy as a bargaining chip to acquire the Shandong Peninsula (J.I. Lee 2011). While this impression can be supported, there are yet no primary materials of Japan that can confirm this, and the Shandong Peninsula issue was resolved even after failing to pass the bill on racial discrimination abolition. It would be more feasible to think that the United States had the impression that Japan used the racial issue as a bargaining chip due to the response and interpretation of the United States.

⁴⁷ The following statement in Wilson's book *A History of the American People* was cited in the silent film, 'The Birth of a Nation' that was highly successful in 1915. "The white men were roused by a mere instinct of self-preservation ... until at last there had sprung into existence a great Ku Klux Klan, a veritable empire of the South, to protect the Southern country. The studies of Wilson's outlook on races can be seen in the following (Lauren 1988, 83–84; Ambrosius 2007, 689–718).

on the matter of Japanese immigrants in the United States, while treating Korean people harshly and unfairly (Yosino 1996, 26–31). Nevertheless, his support for the self-determination of Korea was only limited to a demand for educational reform, abolition of the Military Colonial Rule, and criticism against the Policy of Assimilating Koreans (Reimeikai 1990, 541–542).

Following Yoshino, Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山, 1884–1973) also argued that Japan did not have a right to claim for racial equality to the Western world as long as they were discriminating against the Korean people (Masuda 1984, 45–47). By pointing out the similarities with India and Egypt's hostility towards Great Britain and with Ireland's fight for independence, he pointed out the conditions of the Korean people. He suggested the necessity of Korean autonomy as a way to assuage the Koreans' resistance (Matsuo 1984, 86–90). In short, there were some Japanese who were supportive of Korea's self-determination in their consideration over the consistency of Japan's attitude to racial equality against the West. But the extent of their support did not go beyond granting autonomy to Korea.⁴⁸

Wilson's principle of national self-determination initially had the potential of going further, as far as to a universal principle embedding both nations and races. However, with the principle of racial equality being dismissed from the final Covenant of the League of Nations, Japan's mistrust towards the West only increased further. Japan's reservations towards the issue of race had grown since the times of the Meiji Revolution (明治維新), and most Asian thoughts were in favor of Japan's leading position. Japan's perception on race was thus a combination of a sense of inferiority to the white race, and a sense of superiority to the peoples of Asia (I.S. Jang 2000). As it failed to insert the clause on racial equality in the Covenant, Japan looked back on the 'Dissociate from Asia, Enter the West (脫亞入歐)' with a critical eye. In a somewhat strange way, Japan's frustration reminded themselves of their Asian identity and that awakening led to elevate their interest in Asia (M.S. Kim 2005, 272–274).

⁴⁸ Yoshino claimed the solidarity of the Japanese and Korean as different peoples through mutual approval. However, because this is in the form of revealing cooperation and partnerships with Japan, there are some who claim that it was no more than claims on the modification of Imperial Japan.

The Japanese, who, ever since the Meiji Era and until the First World War, had been mostly cooperative with Western states, with the sole exception of Russia, were completely taken aback by the omission of the racial equality clause. This incident made them painfully realize the sheer wall of the white race's sense of supremacy, along with the racial complex they already had. Konoe Fumimaro, who had attended the Paris Peace Conference as a delegate, published his essay "Abolish the Anglo-Saxon Based Peace" (1918) before leaving for Paris (Konoe 1918).⁴⁹ In this essay, Konoe criticizes Anglo-American economic imperialism and argues for the abolition of racial discrimination. His criticism on the West had a family pedigree. Konoe Fumimaro was the son of Konoe Atsumaro (近衛篤磨, 1863–1904), who had preached for the "Theory on Asian Preservation" from early on and led the East Asia Common Culture Society (東亞同文會). Having studied in Germany and Austria, Konoe Atsumaro was a dominating figure in promoting the Pan-Asian Movement, standing up against Russia's southward advance before the Russo-Japanese War. In 1898, he established the East Asia Common Culture Society by combining the East Asia Society and the East Asia Culture Society. Article 1 of the creed of this society articulated the necessity of the preservation of China, and Article 2 demanded the attempt to encourage the reformation of China and Joseon (Korea). Their vigilant perspective on the situation of international politics was reflected in the words of the platform of the society: "The superpowers are watching for the opportune moment while the brothers are fighting against each other, the state of affairs is becoming more and more difficult." Based on such ideas, the East Asia Common Culture Society established the East Asia Common Cultural College, with the purpose of gathering and educating the youth of Asia (Dower 1979, 28; Takeuchi 2004, 360–362).

Konoe Fumimaro refused to perceive the First World War as a confrontation between good and evil based on a Christian outlook of the world, and instead saw it as "a war between nations promoting the *status-*

⁴⁹ After seeing the tragedies of war and the Paris Peace Conference in Europe, he returned to Japan and made a favorable assessment of Wilson's personal idealism and the establishment of the League of Nations in his book. However, he expressed discontent on the racial discrimination abolition bill proposed by Japan that was not passed (Konoe 2006, 35-37 and 48).

quo and nations trying to overthrow the *status-quo*”.⁵⁰ According to him the countries in the first category already “had a monopoly over a large amount of capital and abundant natural resources” and were in hold of the international standards purporting ‘pacifism’ without force, which actually was ‘economic imperialism’ in disguise. In contrast, Japan, had a “smaller territory and population, and thus with a smaller and weaker manufacturing market,” and could therefore not follow the Anglo-American-centered peace agreement. In order to achieve real peace, Japan was to overthrow the economic imperialism with other ‘developing nations’, and agitated them, especially to demand for the “abolition of racial discrimination against Asians” at Versailles. Konoe predicted that should this measure fail to be accomplished, Japan would “take action against preserving the status quo for its own survival, like Germany before the war”.⁵¹

A new interest in Asian roots represented a renewed interest in the principle of the Japanese spirit and Western techniques (*Wakon-yōsai*, 和魂洋材), as a kind of self-reflection from Japan’s part for its tendentious focus on catching up with the West, according to Fukuzawa Yukichi’s (福澤諭吉, 1835-1901) ‘Dissociate from Asia Theory’ (*Datsua-ron*, 脫亞論) ever since the Meiji era. Resulting from this shift in perspective, Okakura Tenshin (岡倉天心,

⁵⁰ Konoe’s claim is similar to the analysis of Paul Kennedy who sought after the cause of the First World War. “As far as the Great Britain and German governments were concerned, the 1914-18 conflict was essentially entered into because the former power wished to preserve the existing status quo whereas the latter, for a mixture of offensive and defensive motives, was taking steps to alter it” (Kennedy 1980, 470).

⁵¹ Such forewarning appeared to foreshadow the destiny of Japan, in that it would enter war and his fate that he would end by shooting himself with a pistol in 1945. Konoe Fumimaro, who had lineage with Japanese royalty, strived for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere together with leftists who claimed that it was Japan’s duty to support the Chinese communist revolution in the future. After serving as the chair of the royal congress, he held the office of Prime Minister from 1938–1941, where he opposed war against the United States. After the Second World War, Fumimaro’s son Konoe Michitaka (近衛通隆, 1922–2011) served as the chairperson of the Kazankai Foundation (named after the pseudonym of Konoe Atsumaro, Kazan (霞山) in 1958) who succeeded the East Asia Common Culture Society (東亞同文會). The political position of the Konoe family continued through his descendent and the leader of Japanese political reforms in 1993, Hosokawa Morihiro (細川護熙, 1938-) (Godement 1996, 66).

1863-1913), who published *The Ideals of the East* in London in 1903, and *The Awakening of Japan* in New York in 1904, suddenly gathered many more readers. *The Ideals of Asia* had already introduced the sentence "Asia is One". In *The Awakening of Japan*, the author was considering preventing "Europe's glory to become Asia's degradation" as an utmost priority.

A possible logical conclusion that could be derived from the two previous premises was that "Asia is one in its humiliation" (Takeuchi 2004, 319). Whereas Japan, rising as a new world superpower through the First World War, began emanating a revisionist position towards the Western-centered world order, and the United States immigration policy further prompted contempt from the Japanese. The 1924 Immigration Law was clearly based on a racially biased view; the Law privileged immigrants from Northern or Western Europe, discriminated against those from Eastern or Southern Europe, and completely blocked any immigration movement from Asia (Iriye 1999, 109).

Concurrently, other Asian countries also began considering the nascent Asian-centered interest from a more positive view, similar to that of Japan. Sun Yat-sen (孫文, 1866–1925) proclaimed the following in his speech made in Kobe, on November 28, 1924.

Asia welcomed a new turning point when its decline reached its peak. This turning point is the new beginning to construct a new Asia. [...] With Japan becoming an independent state in the Far East, all nations and states have gained hope for their own independence. [...] There are currently only two independent states in Asia, one is Japan, in the East, and the other is Turkey, in the West. Japan and Turkey are the walls of Asia, standing on the east and west of the continent" (Sun 1924).

Japan's expansive Pan-Asianism led to the doctrine 'Harmony of the Five Races (*Gozoku Kyowa*, 五族協和)', which included the Manchurians and Mongolians. Disappointed in the Versailles Peace System, Japan argued for solidarity among Asians against the West, but its real intentions were to have the other Asian nations be submissive to Japan.⁵²

⁵² The following study focuses on the position of Japan's establishment of Manchuria in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Sekiguchi 1944, 176-184). According

The appeal of Pan-Asianism based on the principle of racial equality was quite strong to Asians. As mentioned above, even Lyuh Woon-hyung, who had forcefully and clearly pointed out that Japan's Asian Monroe Doctrine and national self-determination were not compatible, had exchanges with scholars advocating for Pan-Asianism, including with Ōkawa Shūmei (大川周明, 1886–1957) and Konoe Fumimaro (D.S. Kang 1997). The Pan-Asianism promoted by Japan developed into a trend that advocated for Asian unity centered on Japan to stand against Western imperialism (Takeuchi 2004, 236–238).⁵³ This concept constituted the theoretical grounds that eventually led to the 'Greater East Asia (大東亞) thought',⁵⁴ symbolized by the Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia (*Daitoa-kyodo-sengen*, 大東亞共同宣言).⁵⁵

to Dickinson, Katō Takaaki(加藤 高明, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1900-1901, 1906, 1913, 1914-1915; Prime Minister, 1924-1926) was an imperialist, not a pan-Asianist. Being Japan's most prominent Anglophile and the icon of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he almost single-handedly decided upon Japanese participation in the Great War. On the other hand, Katō's greatest political rivals in the faction of Yamagata Aritomo (PM, 1889-1891, 1898-1900; President of the Privy Council [枢密院], 1905-1909, 1909-1922), troubled by the apparent limitations of associating with the imperialist West, created a vision of cultural distinctiveness that precluded genuine Japanese cooperation with the West (Dickinson 1999, 36-38, 250).

⁵³ Yoshimi Takeuchi stated that Asianism was a type of psychological atmosphere and that because various trends are in Asianism, attempts to fix it within a specific range were likely to fail.

⁵⁴ In 1943, Japan announced the Greater East Asia Charter for war. Though this is said to be in response to the Atlantic Charter, it was also written by taking the Atlantic Charter into reference (Hatano 1996, 162–164). The Greater East Asia Charter, which advocated cooperation and solidarity of Asian nations for war rather than national self-determination, also stipulated abolishing racial discrimination. According to the Army Military Affairs Director Sato Kenryo (佐藤賢了, 1895–1975), this was the restoration of the clause on racial equality that was to be inserted in the Paris Peace Conference (Sato 1966, 319–321). Shigemitsu Mamoru, who participated in the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the Japanese envoy, installed the 'War Objective Research Association' within the Japanese Foreign Affairs ministry in 1943. His war objective that Japan first understand the nationalism of different nations in Asia, and for Japan to then establish a new international order based on this. This concept conflicted with military authorities, but like Sato, he had the same opinion on racial issues (Shigemitsu 1986, 75–76).

⁵⁵ The following research focuses on the racial thoughts of Japan and the United States

V. CONCLUSION

This article examined the ideals and frustrations the Koreans had in formulating the principle of national self-determination, as well as those of the Japanese in establishing the principle of racial equality, in relation to the universal nomos the Versailles Peace System sought to propound. First, the principle of national self-determination, advocated by the Versailles Peace System as its universal nomos mainly functioned as a principle for the re-demarcation of boundaries in the European theater after the end of the First World War. In Europe, this principle of national self-determination worked as a solution to 1) dismantle the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 2) the Eastern Question, and 3) propose new adjustments for the perennial issue of sovereignty originated from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Various nations across the world who had been politically oppressed, all favorably responded to Wilson's argument of national self-determination, which assured "a fair adjustment to all colonial claims." This was no different for the Korean people, who put their hope in this principle, but it did not work the same way to reorganize boundaries in the East Asian region, which included Korea. Instead, the Asian Monroe Doctrine, which Japan had long pursued, was accepted, and it became a *de facto* endorsement of Japan's geopolitical claim. Korea failed to become a member of the Versailles Peace System and its status as a part of Japan was confirmed by the map attached to the Versailles Peace Treaty. Despite such frustrations, Korea's ideals relative to the universal nomos of self-determination was inherited as the main spirit of the Independence

that appeared in the Asia-Pacific War (Dower 1986). Hirohito (裕仁, 1901–1989), who became the crown prince in 1912, learned ethics from Sugiura Jugō (杉浦重剛, 1855–1924) who was a nationalist. Sugiura's outlook on racism emphasized the clash of the white and yellow races, which influenced Hirohito (Bix 2001, 66–70). In his 1946 memoirs, Hirohito pointed out the lack of the article on racial equality and denial of Japanese immigration in California as the "causes of the Great East Asia War" (Terasaki and Miller 1991, 20–21). This is valuable data since there are almost no testimonial materials by him, but it was probably made to avoid being held responsible for war at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Hujiiwara, Yoshida, Awaya, and Yamada 1991).

Movement for many Korean leaders; this concept was subsequently enshrined in the Charter of the Korean Provisional Government. The fulfillment of the ideals was finally incarnated by the international recognition of the Republic of Korea, which was stipulated in a resolution of the 3rd General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris on December 12, 1948.

Second, Japan failed to insert the clause on racial equality into the Covenant of the League of Nations, although it participated in making the Versailles Peace System as one of the five victors. The issue of racial equality had indeed been advanced as an important one in the talks, but equality among the members of the League of Nations was the only equality that was prescribed in the Covenant as part of the Versailles Peace System. After the clause on racial equality was rejected following Wilson's lopsided voting method, criticism arose in Japan against the universality of the *nomos* upheld by the Versailles Peace System. Meanwhile, interest for Japan-centered Pan-Asianism increased in Japan, nourishing Japan's war ideology for Greater East Asia (*Daitoa*, 大東亞) in the 1930s and 1940s.

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