# STATE
VIOLENCE
IN EAST ASIA

Edited by N. Ganesan
and Sung Chull Kim

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Contents

Note on Romanization

In romanization of Korean sources and Korean names, the McCune-Reischauer system is used; exceptions are some already commonly used spellings. In the Japanese case, the Hepburn system is adopted. In the Chinese case, the Pinyin system is adopted. Following the traditions of these countries, the family name appears first with the given name following; however, the spellings of personal names that appear in works in English are cited as in the originals.

For the Indonesian case, the spelling of personal names, organizations, and publications prevalent at the time under discussion is retained. Sukarno's name was spelled with a *u,* but Soeharto's name was officially spelled with the older *oe.* In the Thai case, the guidelines of the Royal Institute, outlined in "Principles of Romanization for Thai Script by Transcription Method," have been followed. The only exceptions to this are the names of individuals; if there is already a romanized name in use, that one is used in lieu of imposing the Royal Institute guidelines. In the Burmese case, all political groups have official names in both English and Burmese, so their official names are adopted. For personal names, the method used by the government media is followed.

Abbreviations

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines (Philippines)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Baperki	Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan (Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship)
BCP	Burma Communist Party
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia)
BSPP	Burma Socialist Program Party
BTI	Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Front)
CAC	Cabinet Action Committee (Philippines)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CMC	Citizens' Mendiola Commission (Philippines)
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CRPP	Committee Representing People's Parliament (Myanmar)
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command (Thailand)
DLP	Democratic Liberal Party (Korea)
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
EDSA	Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (Philippines)
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutrale, Pacifique, et Coopératif (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)
IATFAR	Inter-Agency Task Force on Agrarian Reform (Philippines)
IPKI	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence)
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command (Thailand)

KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KMP	Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Farmers Movement of the Philippines)
KNU	Karen National Union (Myanmar)
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights)
KOTI	Supreme Operations Command (Indonesia)
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
MPRS	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (People's Consultative Assembly) (Indonesia)
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation (Philippines)
NDF	National Democratic Front (Myanmar)
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NLD	National League for Democracy (Myanmar)
NPA	New People's Army (Philippines)
NSCT	National Student Center of Thailand
NSL	National Security Law (Korea)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)
NUP	National Union Party (Myanmar)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
PRRI	Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
RIT	Rangoon Institute of Technology
RPKAD	Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Kostrad and Army Para Commando Regiment) (Indonesia)
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council (Myanmar)
SNLD	Shan National League for Democracy (Myanmar)
SOC	State of Cambodia
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar)
SPT	Socialist Party of Thailand
SWC	Special Warfare Command (Korea)
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Committee (South Africa)
UF	United Front against Dictatorship (Thailand)
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USCAR	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (Japan)

USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association (Myanmar)
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party (Myanmar)
VOA	Voice of America

Introduction

Conceiving State Violence, Justice, and Transition in East Asia

Sung Chull Kim and N. Ganesan

The collaborative research presented in this volume is about the dark side of political history in East Asian countries. It deals with the worst cases of state violence in East Asia, most of which were underresearched for different reasons. The eight cases examined in this comparative study include the Japanese military's killing of Okinawans (1945), the Indonesian counterrevolutionary massacre (1965–1968), the Phatthalung Red Drum incident in Thailand (1972–1975), the Khmer Rouge's mass killings in Cambodia (1975–1978), the Kwangju incident in Korea (1980), the Mendiola Bridge incident in the Philippines (1987), the suppression of the democratic movement in Myanmar (1988), and the Tiananmen incident in China (1989). The cases chosen here are representative in illustrating victimization of the people by military or authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. (The Okinawan case occurred during the wartime period, but narratives about it were long suppressed because of the Cold War divide.) The cases show that state violence derived from a sense of threat among the ruling elite, who believed that there was a strong conflation between state and regime security. In all cases, the modality of violence was basically exemplary and demonstrative as lessons to challengers, even if combined with an instrumental element in varying degrees. This volume does not include cases of violence targeting specific ethnic

minorities. Although such ethnic violence might be another important research topic, particularly in the multiethnic Southeast Asian context, the state violence examined in this volume targeted regime challengers in general rather than specific ethnic groups.

Since the Cold War period, most countries dealt with in this volume have not been considered globally significant in the political, economic, and cultural realms. For this reason, most cases of state violence in these countries, unlike in Eastern European and Latin American countries, have not received proper public and international attention.[1] Calling attention to a situation that has been ignored for decades, this volume intends to investigate these cases with a measure of empirical rigor. It aims to not only identify the nature of state violence but to analyze the relationship between state violence and the legitimacy of the existent regime and those coming afterward. It is also interested in detailing how individual countries have dealt with past state violence in different ways in order to arrive at a typology of sorts.

It is necessary, above all, to clarify where this study is situated in relation to the study of violence in general. First, this research focuses on *state violence* rather than on political violence in general, which has been a frequently studied subject in the social sciences. *Political violence* is a more inclusive term than *state violence.* The former encompasses all kinds of politically related violence: the political opposition's violent actions, ethnic electoral violence, violent secessionist movements, as well as state-led mass killings. State violence, as a form of political violence, refers to the more narrowly defined aggression that is led by the state in an abstract sense and actually performed by its apparatuses, such as the military, the police, and other security agencies.

The state violence discussed here involved mass killing, the magnitude of which ranged from tens of people (the Mendiola killings in the post-Marcos Philippines) to millions (the mass killings in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge). The individual cases detail how each state possessed a monopoly on the use of force and exercised it brutally. There was no real competing political entity in relation to the use of force, even if there were different perceptions of threat or crisis, case by case, between challengers and detractors. A state, in an ideal situation, has a legitimate monopoly of the use of violence, to use Max Weber's term.[2] But the states and their apparatuses under discussion here, whether they had an authoritarian or military regime or some combination thereof, never

legitimately used violence from the perspective of human rights or international law or even the official legal standards of the perpetrators themselves. The state violence here differs from the violence that originates from civil war and revolution, in which Charles Tilly's notion of multiple sovereigns contending with each other may be relevant.[3] In other words, the state violence examined in this volume refers to the state's utilization of its apparatus—the military, the police, and security agencies—in order to maintain the unilaterally defined order of the society in question.

Second, inasmuch as this volume is concerned with the violence perpetrated on the people the state was formed to protect, there have to be sustained efforts to observe the ramifications of past violence and ways of settling related issues. These analyses are indispensably related to the examination of political transition: that is, how the legitimacy of regimes changes over time; how resolution of violence takes place today; and, if there has been no ostensible change of regime or of the viewpoint of the past, why such a situation has persisted.

Here transitional justice seems a useful tool to examine postviolence resolution. The notion of transitional justice is widely accepted in examining approaches to applying justice to past evils. There are two different approaches to the issue of transitional justice: one focuses on *punitive* legal means of dealing with offenders, and the other stresses *reconciliatory* means of including past wrongdoers in the new society in order to obtain broader peace and stability. Transitional justice is useful in examining cases in which new rules prevail over old regimes and in which an existing regime at least intends to make a compromise in relation to its own past violence. An important question that arises here is what motivates justice, either punitive or reconciliatory, to prevail. There are also related questions. What prevents the process of settlement from beginning? What are the necessary structural requirements for the process to commence?

One may reasonably generalize that the resolution of past violence is closely intertwined with democratization and that resolution and democratization mutually reinforce each other rather than one being a precondition for the other. The Kwangju case in Korea is a model case of the mutually reinforcing relationship between democratization and the resolution of state violence. And little progress in the resolution of state violence, particularly in Myanmar and China, is related to the continued authoritarian nature of the political process in these countries. Con-

versely, however, Thailand is an example of a state where democratization has not addressed past examples of state violence. Similarly, Cambodia presents anther counterintuitive example: the Hun Sen government, whose leaders are accused of having been involved in past state violence, has agreed to prosecute those responsible for past crimes.

Given their different backgrounds, the individual cases may follow different paths of settlement, whereby the state makes amends to the victims of violence. Resolution can begin with something as simple as an apology or ritualistic practices, even without truth-telling exercises and legal verdicts. It can develop into a much more targeted approach, such as reparation to the victims of violence and, where possible, either including them in mainstream society or building a monument in their honor. Or resolution can take place after truth commissions have been held or the legal accountability of those responsible for state violence has been assessed, as in the UN-sponsored tribunal in Cambodia now taking place. What should be noted is that regimes in democratic transition are more likely to admit to state-led violence and to make amends afterward. In instances where efforts toward resolution of violence have not been addressed, it is necessary to identify the major reasons why even a minimal level of state effort to obtain some recognition of past misdeeds and compromise has not been forthcoming.

In connection with the points mentioned above, this volume addresses four overarching questions.

- First, why did the state use violence against a particular group of people?
- Second, how has the violence been treated afterward by the society?
- Third, what has been the path of resolution? Or alternatively, why has the violence not yet become an item on the public agenda?
- Fourth, what is the relationship between political transition and the resolution of violence?

Bringing the Study of State Violence Back In

Despite the brutality of the violence and the illegitimacy of the relevant nondemocratic regimes, most cases in this volume have not been seriously investigated from a comparative perspective. There are a couple of reasons for this seeming neglect. First, the Cold War situation, which sig-

nificantly reified state and national security, impeded the mood of the study of state-led violence. A few scholars, such as Barry Buzan, tried to inspire a new conceptualization of security, differentiating security along a range of various referent objects, from individual to national and international ones.[4] These scholars have also made efforts to redress this imbalance over the past two decades. But the state has long been considered the most important referent object for security in the academic community.

The Khmer Rouge massacre and the Tiananmen incident did draw exceptional international attention. The dreadful mass executions conducted by the Khmer Rouge came to special attention in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, in which the Soviet Union and China competed for respective spheres of influence over Indochina. The Tiananmen incident captured international attention owing in part to the mass media's widespread coverage and to the euphoria associated with the erosion of communism in Eastern Europe. Even such international attention to developments in Cambodia and China, however, was unable to induce systematic research on the ways and means of state involvement in violence and on its aftermath. That is, the dominance of state security, or national security, in the Cold War situation impeded international attention to atrocious violence led by the state.

Second, the lasting underinvestigation of state violence has been associated with the Cold War divide itself. Most cases show that the Cold War situation *justified* state violence for decades. Ideological persuasion, particularly anticommunist sentiment, rendered state violence legitimate in the name of order, at least in the eyes of perpetrators. The Indonesian army's counterrevolutionary operations, which occurred alongside the escalating Vietnam War in the mid-1960s, ruthlessly targeted so-called communists regardless of the reality of their affiliation and sympathies. The Red Drum massacre in Phatthalung in the 1970s was closely related to anticommunist operations in Thailand, while the 1980 Kwangju uprising in Korea, at its initial stage, was depicted in the state-controlled media as a riot instigated by impure elements, meaning procommunists or subversives. In these cases, the regimes were basically authoritarian, but they had external political legitimacy that derived from the Cold War divide. For ideological reasons, the prevailing us-them dichotomy tarred the victims as deserving of their miserable fate after the violence.

The Okinawan case also is true in this respect, no exception to the impact of the Cold War divide on the delay of thorough and objective research. The Japanese army's mass killing of Okinawans occurred at the final stage of the Pacific War, and the postwar democratic regime in Japan might have had a chance to conduct truth-finding work about the incident. The Okinawa incident, however, could not become a public agenda item for a long time during the Cold War. The US military administration in Japan between 1945 and 1972 and the continued US presence afterward delayed the emergence of an Okinawan identity, as Hirofumi Hayashi notes in his contribution to this volume. The security of Japan and the importance of the US-Japan alliance were also main issues for both policymakers and academics. To make matters worse, the government's revisionist interpretation of the incident came in 1983, when the Ministry of Education requested that the Okinawa incident be termed a mass suicide.[5]

However, the end of the Cold War divide two decades ago reversed this situation. The notion of security received new attention from the academic community and became omnipresent in the social sciences. Human security in particular, where the referent objects are individuals and groups of people, became an indispensable part of the research agenda. In the 1990s, civilian vulnerability—mass casualties in the Rwandan civil war and the Kosovo conflict—called special attention to human security needs. The frame of reference effectively shifted from the state to its inhabitants, who were now treated as intrinsically deserving of protection by the state and its agencies. Consequently, the state and its agencies could also be held to account if such security was not provided.

Now it is time to shed light on such state violence from a comparative perspective. The examination of the cases focused on in this volume may benefit from the changed international environment and the gradual political transitions in the countries under investigation. Stabilized security in Cambodia and democratization in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are encouraging signs in the movement to uncover the dark history of these countries. The resolution to the Kwangju incident, which coincided with democratic consolidation in Korea, provides a model for comparison. The significance of the Tiananmen incident in China lies elsewhere: that is, we need to analyze why Tiananmen has not become a public agenda item notwithstanding the rapidly changing nature of Chinese society.

Identifying Victims and Perpetrators

The initial question arising from an examination of state violence is: who were the victims, and who were the perpetrators? This question is not simple enough to be answered straightforwardly. It is no overstatement that all inquiries about past violence start with this question and end with it as well. The most debatable question that should be addressed in this regard is *why the state targeted the specific groups* under investigation. There might be variations among cases: some accounts, for example, stress the power-competition explanation, emphasizing the military's perception of the threat posed by students' challenge amid a power vacuum, as in the Kwangju case in Korea; some stress the cultural explanation, emphasizing the elite's anger over a shaming challenge to patrimonial governance, as in the Chinese tradition.[6] But these accounts still do not address a key question regarding victims and perpetrators: who stood behind the weapons, and, more important, why did they use a specific form of violence against their particular victims? The latter question considers the issue of threat perception, as well as the recourses and resources available to those in power.

Violence, to use Hannah Arendt's term, is a means to multiply natural strength and to keep the power structure intact.[7] Accordingly, there should be a certain relationship between how rulers perceive challengers and how they use violence in a given situation. If the rulers view a certain peripheral group's actions, whether demonstrations or clandestine organization-building activities, as an existential threat to state sovereignty per se, it is highly probable that they will exercise instrumental violence, as Vincent Boudreau notes in this volume. On the other hand, if the rulers regard the crisis situation as a challenge to the rules of the regime, they may either use exemplary violence or loosen the tightened control. A delicate point here is that rulers as offenders often view the challengers' situation differently from what the challengers originally intended. For instance, the Cold War divide rendered the military leaders in Korea suspicious that the demonstration in Kwangju was instigated by procommunist elements; the anticommunist ideology prevalent in the 1960s drove Indonesian military officers to undertake cruel counterinsurgency measures and to unfairly persecute several hundreds of thousands of men and women, most of whom were innocent of any crime except being members of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia,

PKI) or its sympathizers. It is fair to say that most cases of state violence involve a serious *perceptual gap* between the perpetrators of violence and those subjected to it, in relation to threat, order, loyalty, and governance.

The question of who were the victims of violence and who were the perpetrators becomes a very hard-pressing one, as any attempt toward resolution invariably enters into a stage of either assessing victims' and perpetrators' versions of the truth or prosecuting perpetrators. In naming victims and perpetrators, there are a number of stumbling blocks. Since the violence in these cases is state led, to name both victims and perpetrators is a "fundamentally political task."[8] Without the approval and assistance of rulers, whether initiated by the new regime or with the cooperation of the old regime, naming victims and offenders is almost impossible. In particular, naming specific people—who ordered or endorsed violence—is a prohibitively difficult task. Even with their identification, assigning all responsibility for the calamity to a single individual is not enough.[9] This is because institutional arrangements must have facilitated such a situation. To make the question more complicated, if the resolution adopts a moderate approach toward the perpetrators, then how a given society deals with those who may say "we were all victims"—that is, that the victims of violence include those who were forced to become evildoers at a particular juncture—is an unavoidable issue.[10] The Khmer Rouge massacre in Cambodia is a good example: layers of orders and hierarchy were involved in executing the mass killing, as well as in causing deaths through starvation and disease, blurring the blade-cut line of responsibility; this was particularly true for the rank-and-file officials who were involved in the massacre but did not know about or predict the chains of atrocity and their consequences.

Counting the number of victims is also related to the settlement of past violence. This issue is problematic both in the process of calling for any form of perpetrator responsibility and in the process of applying criminal justice to perpetrators. It is probable that contentious numbers may haunt perpetrators and that discourses within a society may fall into a numbers game.[11] When the state considers reparation to victims, the numbers issue again becomes contentious, because of the significance of who will be entitled to reparations and who will be excluded. Unlike the issue of identifying victims and perpetrators, however, the numbers question is not a politically divisive, polarizing issue in a society in transition.

THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE: THE JUSTIFIED, FEARED, AND FORGOTTEN PAST

Continued repression is a typical means of quelling any possible disturbance after the outbreak of state violence, but it is not the only means of doing so. First, the perpetrators in some cases examined here refuse to admit culpability, justifying the violence in the name of protecting integral state sovereignty. Consequently, the victims become double victims: once because of the physical and psychological wounds inflicted by the violence and again because of society's—not to mention the perpetrators'—treatment of the victims as an "enemy outside" and "enemy of the order."[12] Those who risk association with the victims of violence are labeled subversives, raising suspicion that their behavior is also detrimental to the integrity of the state. The Thai military's repression has been described as a counterinsurgency measure, the Myanmar oppression has been justified for maintaining order within the state, and the demonstration at Tiananmen Square in China is still described as a disturbance of state order.

Because of the state's monopoly on the means of violence and its ability to determine the tone and temper of state-society relations afterward, the victims of violence do not have recourse to shelter within broader society. This dynamic alerts us to another important aspect of states that use violence against their own citizens. Such states invariably conflate state and regime security: threats perceived by the regime in power are automatically assumed to constitute threats to the state as well. This conflation is naturally interactive with strengthening regime legitimacy. More important, and within a broader context, such definitions also heavily influence the structuration of state-society relations. The regime's discourse and location of the context for the perpetration of violence simply collapse different layers and levels of society into regime-defined conceptions of proper and subversive behavior.

Second, fear, for both perpetrators and victims, leaves the postviolence situation unchanged in most instances. One explanation for this may be that just as fear of being ostracized makes victims remain silent, so fear of losing privileges and being subjected to punitive justice renders perpetrators equally resistant to settlement of past violence. Victims who did not lose their lives have often been heavily monitored, their movements restricted accordingly. Many of them have also been subjected to

lengthy periods of detention and even internal political exile, as in the case of Buru Island in Indonesia, the whole of which was designated as a prison colony. For the perpetrators, the fear is political rather than psychological or cultural.[13] A rereading of the past may well render them liable to criminal prosecution. Consequently, it is not uncommon for perpetrators of state violence to destroy evidence that may implicate them, as shown in the cases of Thailand and Indonesia. In Indonesia, the Suharto-led regime actually imposed a ban on research and study of the period leading up to the violence against the PKI.

Finally, the emergence of regulated space maintained by the regime is another reason why past violence has not become a public agenda item. Within this regulated space, the rulers as offenders provide both victims and related groups with various incentives that may be more rewarding than remembering the violence and advocating some form of settlement. Some cases vividly illustrate the types of incentives involved. The reparation to the Okinawan victims in postwar Japan was intended, even if not successful, to create an official memory of them as loyal citizens who fought for the country, rather than as civilians who were killed by the imperial army. The donation to Buddhist monks and temples in postviolence Myanmar, which exceeded normal practices, was apparently aimed at inducing broader support from one of the country's most influential social and legitimizing groups. The rapid economic growth in reformist China not only benefited all Chinese people but also gradually marginalized critics of the regime. In other words, oppression is not the only means by which an unresolved situation is perpetuated; such regulated space also allows rulers to design many means to legitimate the violence afterward. It is difficult to predict how long such regulated space will survive, but it seems clearly to function to alienate victims from many segments of society, watering down the memories of the incident and invariably delaying its resolution.

DIVERGENT PATHS OF RESOLUTION

Most cases examined in this volume, except Korea and Cambodia, have not reached the point of resolution for the various reasons discussed above. Here it is necessary to start with an examination of the theoretical implications of the two different types of transitional justice if we are to understand the possible paths of resolution that individual postvio-

lence cases are likely to follow.[14] The ongoing UN-sponsored tribunal in Cambodia stands for the initial stages of retributive justice, whereas the step-by-step resolution of the Kwangju incident, running parallel with democratization in the 1980s and the 1990s, represents an admixture of retributive justice and more restorative, reconciliatory justice.

Retributive justice, advocated mostly by legal scholars, maintains that prosecution is a precondition for other elements of resolution, such as repentance, reparation, and reconciliation. The central goals are to punish the perpetrators on the one hand and to reinstate the lost honor and human rights of the victims on the other. Standards of justice are situated within an international framework, that is, the international legal context of human rights.[15] The advocates of retributive justice by and large place less emphasis on the institution as a context for the occurrence of state violence; they are also less concerned about social rehabilitation within a broader context. In the same vein, for these advocates, there is little room for forgiveness and reintegration within a more conciliatory framework.

On the other hand, advocates of restorative justice are mainly concerned with justice's transformative effect in relation to both perpetrators and the society at large. For them, resolution of the violence should be an impetus for the attitudinal and behavioral change of past offenders and for reintegrating them into a new society. Therefore, restorative justice is more closely related to forbearance and social unity than to any other forms of settlement, and for this reason, it is frequently called *reconciliation.* Reconciliation here presupposes "a condition of mutual respect among former enemies" and requires "reciprocal recognition of moral worth and dignity of others," to cite Ernesto Verdeja's normative definition.[16] But reconciliation also has limitations. If the transformative effect of reconciliation is overly emphasized, then resolution of past violence may become a soft option without extensive truth-finding. No doubt, excessive concern about harmony and social consensus invites criticism from advocates of human rights, as well as victims of state violence.

There is quite an interesting parallel between the retributive-restorative dichotomy and the liberal-nonliberal distinction in such matters. The advocacy of retributive justice is akin to the liberal tradition, emphasizing protection of individual human rights and punitive measures over the violation of these rights, whereas advocacy of restorative justice prioritizes restoration of social unity rather than penalizing

measures. The retributive-restorative distinction also parallels, if not in exactly the same way, the private-public distinction. Whereas retributive justice values rights at the individual level, restorative justice essentially concerns the public nature of justice. The logic of the latter is that the wounds were inflicted in the name of public order, so that justice over the past public—meaning the old regime—is a crucial part of justice.[17] In this logic, individual rights are relatively, if not absolutely, given less priority than the question of the legitimacy of the old regime.[18]

It is notable that just as the retributive-restorative dichotomy raises an intense theoretical debate, it brings about an equally difficult choice in the real world. In more than half of the cases around the world in the midst of the justice question, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the path of reconciliation has been taken. Ideally, retributive justice and reconciliatory measures should go hand-in-hand; they should be complementary. Probably the most idealistic approach is to begin with truth-telling and accountability for reinstating victims' political rights and saving them from the stigma of "enemy of the order," then moving to reparation, repentance, conditional amnesty, and forgiveness. In reality, however, the political elite are tempted to take the "second-best choice": social unity and reconciliation. This is so because they want to avoid social polarization in dealing with past violence.[19] Even after regime transition, vestiges of the past are never totally displaced, and members of the previous regime often remain in positions of power and influence. This is especially the case if a military authoritarian regime was previously in power. The military's notion of discipline and solidarity often makes it difficult for perpetrators to be criminally prosecuted. Rank-and-file loyalties and the military's corporate image may also affect the form of resolution that is available. In fact, it is not uncommon for such regimes, or senior individuals within them, to arrange for immunity or impunity prior to regime transition.

Is there any practical need for truth-telling and its instrument, the truth commission, in the process of the resolution of past violence? The truth commission eventually aims at reconciliation even if it pursues strict punitive justice over perpetrators at the initial stage; the establishment of a truth commission presupposes—probably with the exception of the imprisonment of top commanders—such ensuing processes as offenders' repentance, victims' forgiveness, and amnesty from the succeeding regime. The success or failure of a truth commission depends on apprais-

als of its role. For instance, there are diverging views on the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in South Africa. Advocates of human rights groups particularly have charged that the TRC watered down the legal standards of criminal justice and failed to play its expected role in restoring the victims' rights.[20] Furthermore, when the truth commission is considered a state-manipulated ritual and as presenting a spectacular scene of the victims' pain and suffering, it will be subject to severe public criticism. Such ritualistic public testimony may overly individualize political calamity and thus ignore the deeper structure of violence.[21] Even if such appraisals or criticisms are not within the mainstream, the role of truth commissions, whether for postviolence resolution in a broader sense or for the healing of victims' wounds in a narrower sense, remains controversial.

The truth commission is not the only solution to past violence, but its value in regard to democratic practices should not be ignored. On the one hand, truth-telling, as Leigh Payne aptly notes, might justify violence if the offenders speak only about the crimes they wish to confess. In this case, the victims of past evils are victimized again rather than healed by such perpetrators' self-justification. On the other hand, truth-telling and truth commissions, as Payne argues, may contribute to democratization. Telling the story of the horrible experience of the victims; confessing to crimes, even if the narrative is incomplete; feeling repentance and remorse—all these actions open up some new space where a possible "contentious coexistence" may be created.[22] The victims, who have been treated as the enemy outside, and the evildoers, who are now the enemy of justice, may be situated together with a new value: mutual accommodation. In this respect, Kirk Simpson notes the need for "communicative justice," through which public democratic deliberation and communication take place among all people, offenders as well as victims. Borrowing Jürgen Habermas's notion of communicative action in the public sphere, Simpson maintains that communicative justice is the core aspect of transition to peace and reconciliation.[23]

In sum, dealing with past violence in East Asia (especially the unsettled cases of the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Okinawa, China, and Indonesia), societies must pass through both contentious debates and hard-pressing political choices regarding the questions of retributive-versus-restorative justice and punitive-versus-reconciliatory resolution. The backdrop of this bifurcation may be relevant to the nature of state–

civil society relations at the particular juncture of the resolution of the past violence—for instance, whether or not state–civil society relations have changed since the occurrence of violence. In other words, understanding why a certain country takes a specific path—in relation to the resolution of past violence—must go hand in hand with understanding changes in state-society relations and democratization. If a country has no other way forward but to accept the international arrangement of resolution, then postviolence settlement is highly likely to begin with retributive justice. The ongoing trials in Cambodia illustrate just such an outcome.

The Relationship between Political Transition and Resolution

Does the resolution of state violence bring about political transition, or does political transition provide an appropriate environment for resolution? What, if any, is the cause-and-effect relationship between the two? If the relationship is not one of cause and effect, how is one relevant to or interactive with the other?

To postulate: the resolution of past violence, either punitive or reconciliatory, is an inevitable step in creating new social relations, one that may truly take place in the process of transition. The analysis of state violence and its resolution is logically associated with an understanding of political change. On the one hand, reconciliatory resolution, as well as punitive justice in some sense, will likely promote new democratic practices and end the state's illegitimate use of violence and its old practices of transgressing human rights. On the other hand, room for the resolution of past violence is more likely created when the old regime breaks down or when the existing regime concedes to allow truth-telling. In the particular case of the existing regime's concession, such regimes tend to take preemptive moves to prevent harsher retributive justice by later rulers.[24] For example, an authoritarian regime may pass laws that admit, even if incompletely, its misdeeds and pardon those associated with state violence prior to a transfer of power, and the succeeding regime may acquiesce to such a request.

An empirical question arises from this ongoing discussion. Why is a new regime—or a newly emerging order—more likely to make the practical choice of restorative, reconciliatory resolution rather than rigid, victim-centered retributive justice in dealing with the past? In the majority of

state-violence cases, as exemplified in Spain, Chile, El Salvador, Brazil, and Poland, restorative reconciliation has been chosen.[25] One answer might lie in the presumption that reconciliation will be more viable in the long run.[26] It may be more practical and feasible to draw a consensus for social unity holding that perpetrators are fallible human beings who should be given a chance to contribute to reconstruction.[27]

The more convincing answer, however, lies in the fact that transition in general involves many forms of institutionalization, such as introduction of an electoral system, consolidation of the rule of law, and establishment of power-transition rules; in turn, institutionalization entails various forms of negotiation, and bargaining and compromise are at the heart of the transition.[28] In this context, the resolution of the past violence tends to become one of several subjects of negotiation, a situation that both victims of violence and advocates of human rights sometimes do not expect to materialize. Also, resolution tends to become a topic of the *pact* between the opposition and the state in place—whether a rising new regime or the decaying old regime. According to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, such a pact is desirable for democratic transition, more effective than continuous contention with a divisive agenda.[29] The important point is something more than what is desirable; it is an empirical question of under what conditions transition is more likely to be successful, as exemplified by the TRC in South Africa and by the May 18 special laws in Korea. As opposed to the successful cases, the Argentine case is instructive in another sense. The Raul Alfonsin administration's rigid retributive justice for the crimes of the "dirty war," which was led by the military regime of 1976 to 1980 and brought about more than nine thousand deaths, ended in failure in 1989. In this case, overly restrictive, punitive justice arrived at an impasse, ironically polarizing the society because of the vestiges of military power and failing to properly respond to mounting public expectations in a time-constrained situation.[30]

Particularly in the cases of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and China, the military has remained a significant feature of the state apparatus, either dominating or sustaining order within society, while showing varying degrees of change in its role since its involvement in state violence; therefore, the form of the military's engagement in the institutionalization of political transition deserves special attention in relation to the resolution of past violence. There should be increasing legitimacy concerns within the military regarding the process of

institutionalization, and such concerns must be closely associated with changes in the apparatus's perception of the threat and of the opposition, as Alfred Stephan notes.[31] Further, the military's readiness to shift its major focus from the domestic order to its own professionalism is a key indicator of institutionalization, allowing means toward the resolution of past violence to be deliberated.[32] In addition, the resolution of state violence depends on the relative empowerment of civil society at the time of transition, either positioning past state violence for punitive justice or arriving at compromise and reconciliation through negotiation and bargaining with the main perpetrator—the military, in most unresolved cases. It seems that the success or failure of resolution depends on the proximity of justice in application to each country's unique mode of transition rather than on the form of justice per se. Consequently, it is difficult to be prescriptive with regard to what models should be adopted in the East Asian cases. The natural fear deriving from any judgment of this sort, especially when longer-term reconciliation between the state and society is desired, is that the perpetrators of violence will be pardoned during the process of resolution on the utilitarian premise of achieving the greatest good for the greatest number.

Notes

1. For an extensive discussion of the relationship among global significance, public awareness of state violence, and the ensuing alteration of state behavior, see James Ron, "Varying Methods of State Violence," *International Organization* 51, no. 2 (1997): 275–300.

2. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78, 124.

3. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

4. See Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problems in International Relations* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983).

5. For details on the Cold War situation and the Japanese government's ideological disposition, which impeded extensive research on Okinawa and other Japanese war-crime issues, see Yoshiko Nozaki, *War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945–2007: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy and Ienaga Saburo's Court Challenges* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

6. Particularly for the Chinese case, see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); L. H. M.

Ling, "Rationalizations for State Violence in Chinese Politics: The Hegemony of Parental Governance," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 4 (1994): 393–405.

7. Hannah Arendt, "From *On Violence,*" in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 239.

8. Jemma Purdey, "Problematizing the Place of Victims in *Reformasi* Indonesia: A Contested Truth about the May 1998 Violence," *Asian Survey* 42, no. 4 (2002): 621.

9. Ibid., 617.

10. Katherine E. McGregor, "Confronting the Past in Contemporary Indonesia: The Anti-Communist Killings of 1965–66 and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama," *Critical Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2009): 195–224.

11. One exemplary case of the numbers game concerns the number of casualties of the Nanjing massacre. The notion of the numbers game was inspired by Iris Chang, *Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); for details of the ongoing game, see Peter H. Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2004).

12. Daniel Philpott, "Beyond Politics as Usual: Is Reconciliation Compatible with Liberalism?" in *The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice,* ed. Daniel Philpott (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 17.

13. Brandon Hamber, "Flying Flags of Fear: The Role of Fear in the Process of Political Transition," *Journal of Human Rights* 5 (2006): 127–42.

14. For a comprehensive discussion of the retributive-restorative distinction, see Mark R. Amstutz, "Restorative Justice, Political Forgiveness, and the Possibility of Political Reconciliation," in Philpott, *Politics of Past Evil,* 165–67.

15. Vikki Bell and Kirsten Campbell, "Out of Conflict: Peace, Change and Justice," *Social and Legal Studies* 13, no. 3 (2004): 299–301.

16. Ernesto Verdeja, *Unchopping a Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political Violence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009), 3.

17. Philpott, "Beyond Politics as Usual," 29.

18. For discussion of the conditions for successful retributive justice in particular, see Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger, "Conclusion," in *Prosecuting Heads of State,* ed. Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 275–93.

19. Philpott, "Beyond Politics as Usual," 17–19, 37.

20. Amstutz, "Restorative Justice," 175.

21. Michael Humphrey, "From Victim to Victimhood: Truth Commissions and Trials as Rituals of Political Transition and Individual Healing," *Australian Journal of Anthropology* 13, no. 2 (2003): 171–87.

22. Leigh A. Payne, *Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

23. Kirk Simpson, "Victims of Political Violence: A Habermasian Model of Truth Recovery," *Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2007): 325–43.

24. For self-punitive, preemptive moves, see Jon Elster, *Closing Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 258.

25. Paloma Aguilar, "Justice, Politics and Memory in the Spanish Transition," in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies,* ed. A. Barahona de Brito, C. Gonzalez Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92–118; Lavinia Stan, "Truth Commissions in Post-Communism: The Overlooked Solution?" *Open Political Science Journal* 2 (2009): 1–13.

26. See A. James McAdams, "The Double Demands of Reconciliation: The Case of Unified Germany," in Philpott, *Politics of Past Evil,* 129.

27. Ibid., 149.

28. Helga A. Welsh, "Political Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 4 (1994): 391.

29. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

30. Amstutz, "Restorative Justice," 169–72.

31. Alfred Stephan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 64–66.

32. For the significance of the military's professionalism in transition, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South American and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 219–20; Deborah L. Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism: Argentina in the 1980s," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1990): 151–76; J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience," *Pacific Focus* 4, no. 2 (1989): 99–147.

Conclusion

Comparing State Violence and Reconciliation across East Asia

N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim

A careful reading of the recent history of East Asia indicates that there are indeed many examples of state violence in the region. As noted at the outset, many instances of the worst examples of such violence occurred during the Cold War, and violence was often directed against those who were regarded as enemies of the regime in power and by extension of the state. This conflation between regime and state security that was common during the Cold War continues to obtain in many countries. Countries with authoritarian regime types often use such broad conceptions of security to legitimize violence against critics. In fact economic development in East Asia has often not been accompanied by political development that distinguishes between state and regime interests and political norms that allow for a plurality of interests and their subsequent contestation within clearly established structural and procedural norms. Rather, political elites often seek to entrench their power base and broaden it if possible. Additionally, positive economic performance is often used to strengthen political legitimacy through performance-based criteria than enhance political pluralism.

An important issue is how to systematically think about state violence in East Asia. Similarly, how does one account for the different conditions under which such violence occurred and for how regimes and

countries have dealt with the past? Do such episodes have symbolic value in identifying transgressions and unacceptable behavior, and how were they reconciled in the national psyche of the countries involved? Do they fall into certain categories, and can we create a schema of sorts to better analyze these important episodes in the region's history? In other words, are such events comparable at some analytical level, or are they simply too discrete and diverse to offer any form of useful comparative information that can guide research? Whatever the case may be, the best starting point is perhaps to identify aspects of the violence that make them similar as well as different in order to at least arrive at some attempt to catalog them.

In some senses the Okinawan case is unique because it occurred during conditions of actual war. Interestingly, however, the violence that was directed by the Japanese military against civilians was aimed not at foreigners but rather at local citizens. The evidence also indicates that the military treated the Okinawans with suspicion regarding their loyalty to the state and the government in power. So atrocious was the motivation behind such thinking and so horrendous the crime inflicted on an innocent civilian population subjected to the perceptions of its own military that the topic was left unattended and conveniently forgotten. The fact that the Okinawans were an insignificant minority within the national scheme of things and had little impact on domestic politics made such behavior and denial easier. The Okinawans continue to retain memories of the atrocities inflicted on them by the military, owing to their standing as a minority community, and they see the incident as part of a larger pattern of the exercise of state power by a dominant majority. In fact, the location of US bases and troops on their territory has also become a major point in both local and national politics. Okinawans regard hosting US bases as a disproportionate burden borne by them and have regularly voted in local elections against the continued presence of foreign troops and bases on their soil. Unfortunately for them, however, even well-intentioned local politicians like Hatoyama Yukio, who led the Democratic Party of Japan to victory in 2009 on the promise of renegotiating the base agreement, have been unable to change the situation. And his successors Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko appear less interested in pursuing the matter after US support in coordinating Operation Tomodachi in March 2011, in the aftermath of the massive earthquake and tsunami in the Tohoku region of Japan. If anything, the Japanese government has been far more concerned with reconstructing the damaged areas, reset-

tling the affected population, controlling and monitoring the nuclear fall-out, and restarting the devastated regional economy.

The Thai and Korean cases occurred under rather similar conditions. Both countries were ruled by military authoritarian regimes, which perceived a domestic challenge to their monopoly on power. In both cases, it is clear that the nature of the violence was indiscriminate and that what was perceived as challenges did not constitute a significant threat to the regime in power. The monopoly on violence was clearly utilized as a demonstration of power and the ability to stifle dissent through the use of force. In this regard, the violence that ensued was exemplary in nature and aimed at both primary and secondary constituencies, while retaining the regime in power. The trajectory of domestic political developments in Korea was strongly determined by the fate of the two generals-turned-president who were responsible for the 1980 Kwangju massacre, and the movement and generation that harnessed inspiration from the suppression has paved the way for rising anti-American sentiment since the early 1980s. In fact, it may be argued that this generation has had a profound effect in undermining the security compact that used to previously exist between the United States and South Korea. The Kwangju incident served as a source of intense embarrassment to the military and helped facilitate and entrench an activist political culture as well.[1]

Conversely, in the case of Thailand, the state never dealt with past episodes of violence, and the military continued to use lethal force against its own citizens with impunity. The Red Drum massacre in the 1970s was only part of a pattern of widespread abuse of power by the army and enforcement agencies. However, the events did lead to sufficiently widespread social unrest that the military junta in power was forced to abdicate and allow for a brief democratic interlude from 1973 to 1976. The fact that the military has never been called to task for its behavior until today, while having undergone a measure of democratic transition, is perhaps indicative of the sway that the institution still holds in domestic politics. And the inability of the country's social activists, citizens, and state agencies to hold the military accountable for its excesses also reveals the weakness of these constituencies. The coup against the Thaksin government in 2006 and the unfolding evidence of the deep linkages between the military and the monarchy, especially through the military-dominated Privy Council, provides ample testimony to the position of the military.[2] The utilization of the constitutional and administrative courts to weaken the

political opposition and disqualify it from political contestation has also greatly weakened the more neutral bureaucratic apparatuses of the state. In this regard, Thailand has not undergone the social transformation that accompanies economic and political development at the national level compared to other countries in the region, although a measure of such consciousness does obtain in urban areas.

Another way to interpret the evidence is that the realization of such consciousness in rural areas is steadily being thwarted by elites in order to retain them in a subordinate and pliant position. Consequently, violence used against the civilian population has both instrumental and exemplary value—at the former level it entrenches a certain conception of the state that is held to be sacrosanct and not subjected to challenge. During the 2011 election that led to the victory of the Pheu Thai Party and its leader, Yingluck Shinawatra, the military commander General Prayuth Chan-Ocha continuously reminded the electorate to vote in favor of the monarchy—a curious call in a democratic election in a constitutional monarchy. And the military continues to treat the 2011 violence against the Red Shirt movement that led to the death of approximately ninety persons as a law-and-order issue and prevents attempts to hold it accountable for the use of excessive force against mostly unarmed civilian demonstrators. It has also thwarted attempts by the political elite to negotiate terms with the Cambodian government in resolving differences over the Preah Vihear temple complex that have led to sporadic outbursts of violence between the two countries.

The Indonesian case involves violence against civilians within the context of Cold War ideology, since it was primarily directed, at least at the outset, against members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party. However, a military authoritarian regime was certainly not in place when Sukarno was in power. Sukarno's notion of Guided Democracy, which characterized the Indonesian political system from 1960 to 1965, was rule by presidential decree. Sukarno's linkages to the military lay in the nebulous relationship between the nationalist faction in domestic politics and the early paramilitary units that engaged the Dutch from 1945 to 1949 during the so-called revolutionary period in the country's political history. But the military linkages were significantly different from those that obtained from military elites in the Thai and Korean cases, who were professional soldiers. In what was interpreted to be a coup attempt against the government after the assassination of a number

of top generals, the blame was squarely placed on the PKI. The military involvement in the violence was initially to secure the capital city, Jakarta, before the violence spiraled out of control. The situation was aided and abetted by paramilitary and Muslim youth groups opposed to the PKI. Douglas Kammen's chapter in this volume indicates that leading military commanders often took the initiative regarding whether they should be involved in the violence and how severely the purge would be carried out. As a result of this initiative, Kammen thinks that it would be unfair to identify the state as the source of the violence. The outbreak of violence was left unchecked for a long period of time and clearly had a certain pattern that lasted until 1968 in Kalimantan.

The massive violence that resulted in almost five hundred thousand deaths eventually paved the way for regime transition, leading to the installation of Soeharto's New Order government in 1967. This case quite clearly concerns regime transition, and the violence was exemplary, with the PKI as the primary audience and other potential future challengers as the secondary audience. Soeharto's personal involvement in the restoration of order as the head of the Army Strategic Command in Jakarta and his staunch anti-communist credentials meant that the massacres were not investigated. In fact, if anything, the state continued to purge those accused of communist leanings, and communism became an easy way to brand political opponents as enemies of the state. Soeharto's lengthy tenure in office and the relative success of his corporatist developmentalist regime also meant that he decided how history was to be interpreted. The ban on research and alternative interpretations of what had transpired between 1965 and 1968 has for the most part sealed the New Order regime's interpretation of events as sacrosanct. Since many of the country's senior military commanders were implicated in the violence and Soeharto's own support base derived from the military, there was no question of any kind of fact finding regarding what actually transpired during the transitionary period. And although Indonesia has been a stable democracy since the election of the Yudhoyono government in 2004, there has been little effort at uncovering the past. The military is keen to retain its corporate identity and remains an important player in domestic politics. Leading figures in the present government as well as the opposition were also previously from the military, which makes investigation of past misdeeds problematic.

The Cambodian mass killing, by far the worst of the cases doc-

umented here, in terms of both the number of casualties and the extended period of violence, occurred under a military regime of sorts. The Khmer Rouge was clearly a military force with hierarchical command and control structures and a clearly defined strategy of warfare tailored along the Maoist model of rural insurgency. Whereas there was some attempted ideological justification of the sustained and large-scale violence directed against civilians, the general understanding of the situation is that the regime was motivated by extreme xenophobia against those of non-Khmer ethnicity but also sought a grotesque purity within the general population that quite simply defies logical explanation. This regime appears to have utilized violence to terrorize the entire population into general submission in order to reorder society and its structural norms with a seeming emphasis on proletarian values and a clear disdain for education and the arts. Sorpong Peou also mentions an ideology of radical egalitarianism, marked by extreme suspicion of urban dwellers and those engaged in capitalist enterprises. The violence also served as a cover for the inability of the Khmer Rouge to govern the country after the guerrilla victory.

The sustained nature of the violence in the Cambodian case far surpasses that of Indonesia in terms of total death toll and has often been classified as genocide. Evidence suggests that more people in the country perished as a result of malnutrition, starvation, and disease than outright killing. Whereas the Cambodian case falls under violence associated with regime transition, it is different to the extent that the Khmer Rouge was keen to erase all practices and memories associated with the past. Hence the violence and hardship had a far more pervasive and sinister character. And since the entire population was involved in the violence, it was clearly more than exemplary, in the way the term has been used thus far. Sorpong Peou tells us that the Khmer Rouge was motivated by extreme anxiety about its vulnerability in the urban areas and regularly purged its own cadres, so that the violence occurred within the state guiding the "revolution," as well as against its perceived enemies. And since the violence went all the way to the top and the movement was broad-based, there was a very real sense in which the situation spun out of control and the violence was nihilistic in character.

The Burma/Myanmar case presents a rather unique situation: a country where a military junta being challenged by the collapse of its socialist-style government was also challenged by a segment of the local urban

population. A nervous government, unable to cope with the challenge, used indiscriminate violence against its own citizens, with seeming disunity within the ranks of the military on the proper course of action. The closed nature of the state allowed for the incident to draw much less publicity than it would have otherwise, and there has been little serious effort to deal with this episode in the country's recent history. In 2007 the military brutally crushed an uprising that was led by the monkhood and subsequently detained a large number of monks. The military elite have demonstrated from their response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 that human security is not high on the agenda. In fact, the manner in which the referendum on the new constitution was rushed through in the aftermath of the cyclone indicates the regime's obsession with its own longevity and security. And the election of November 2010 was intentionally designed to sideline Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and privilege the military's Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), which was in turn represented by military elite who simply changed into mufti. It is therefore clear that the military has no interest in relinquishing its power anytime soon and is in fact trying very hard to ensconce its position while attempting to gain a measure of international credibility through applying minimalist democratic procedures.

The Tiananmen incident in China is not unlike the Burma/Myanmar case in that the regime in power felt threatened by public demonstrations in urban areas calling for greater democratization. Unable to cope with the rising tide of dissent, the regime in power deployed the military and resorted to violence. Unlike the Burma/Myanmar case, however, the Chinese incident attracted widespread publicity internationally, because the timing of the violence coincided with the period when communism was being challenged in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union, under the Gorbachev government, had proclaimed its policy of perestroika and glasnost. Consequently, protestors may well have been taken in by the euphoria of broader global developments that appeared to suggest the weakening of left-leaning ideologies. There is some evidence to suggest that the protestors in Burma/Myanmar were similarly inspired.

Finally the Mendiola Bridge massacre in the Philippines shares a number of traits with the other cases as well, although the contestation of what actually transpired is probably much more troubling. Like the Thai case, the state in the Philippines appears to commit acts of political violence with impunity and is never brought to account for its actions.

The massacre also occurred within the framework of a democratic polity that had just entered the political fray against the background of a military authoritarian regime that was deeply embedded in the Cold War and supported by the United States. Whereas the number of victims was the least in comparison to the other cases examined here, the new democratic regime's reliance on the military for its stability and legitimacy appears to have compromised President Aquino. Importantly, the structuration of the Philippine political economy, which draws on its Spanish colonial past, appears to make the country impervious to any form of structural economic and social changes. If so, it is likely that instances of political violence in the Philippines will never be resolved and that the state and its organs have effectively been captured by the ruling elite, who then determine their interests and enemies. Rommel A. Curaming, however, does not apportion willful behavior that regularly legitimizes violence to the elite. Rather, he takes note of the impossibility of any form of resolution of past violence under existing structural conditions.

Instrumental versus Exemplary Violence

Vincent Boudreau argues in his chapter that East Asian states were much more prone to violence at the time of state formation as a result of a larger number of contenders for power, compared to the European experience. Yet as essentially postcolonial states, East Asian states were under pressures that were ameliorated by colonial structures and practices and the demonstration effect of old states and international norms within the broader global context. He also argues that since states in Northeast Asia evolved from an absolutist authoritarian tradition, subsequent regimes were less prone to instrumental violence. In other words, certain norms associated with political hegemony and attendant practices had already been established, and subsequent actions emphasized regulations for mass participation.

The absence of the distinction between state and regime security in many parts of East Asia meant that it was not uncommon for violence to be directed against detractors or challengers to state power. The interesting question that arises from such considerations is: when can a state's use of violence be regarded as legitimate? Presumably conditions that warrant the exercise of such violence are those that truly jeopardize the state and perhaps the regime in power. Yet it would be difficult to arrive at

an acceptable definition of what constitutes a threat. The reason for this assertion is simply the fact that such calls are invariably an exercise in judgment, and authoritarian systems typically tend to err on the side of their own safety. And if the incumbent regime monopolizes power and discourse during the outbreak of violence, to redress it afterward becomes problematic. Some cultures also appear more prone to violence than others, and violence inflicted on marginal or marginalized communities is more easily explained and accepted, as Boudreau contends. Such violence is also more likely to be instrumental and more intense since the mainstream political community remains unaffected by it. Additionally, even democratic regimes have been prone to excesses in the past, and ideological considerations and broadly defined notions of "national interest" have been loosely used against those deemed a threat.

If it is indeed true that violence perpetuated during state-building is functional and therefore perhaps justified in the evolution of the state, then almost all of the cases examined in this volume would not strictly qualify as state-building enterprises. There are two possible exceptions to this generalization. The first is the Japanese case, where center-periphery tensions appear to have exaggerated the Japanese military's feeling of vulnerability when fighting US troops in Okinawa. Quite apart from Okinawa being a marginal community, a state of war with foreign forces on its soil would surely have constituted an existential threat to the state as previously constituted. The second case of a functional claim to violence can be made in the Myanmar case. After all, the military does not control the entire country and has negotiated peace agreements with seventeen different ceasefire groups that retain control over contiguous territory and the weapons in their possession. In fact, if anything, the cards have fallen in their favor, since the terms require the military to serve them notice when there is encroachment into these areas. The government's attempts to try and convert these private armies into a Border Guard Force (BGF) have not succeeded, and in 2011, when the government attempted to construct a dam in Kachin state with Chinese assistance, there was an outbreak of conflict between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the military; the situation has been stalemated since, and the fighting has spread to other parts of the state. The larger of these groups are clearly unprepared to give up the territories that they have controlled for over half a decade. Consequently, the process of state construction remains incomplete even with regard to territoriality in Myanmar. The military

is therefore understandably harsh toward those who would challenge the regime in power and threaten its legitimacy, which is being given a democratic varnish.

The Philippine case provides clues to a number of other difficult considerations. Can we apportion blame onto the state if the political executive did not condone the outbreak of violence and would likely have acted to prevent it? In other words, the assumption that the state is a unitary one may well be problematic in some cases. Curaming also alludes to another important consideration. He argues that at the time when the violence broke out at the Mendiola Bridge in 1987, both the perpetrator and the victims had much to gain in terms of political leverage if violence actually broke out. In such a situation, it will clearly be much more difficult to apportion blame. And it is for this reason that the state's version of the events that transpired is subjected to careful scrutiny. And if differing interpretations of what actually transpired cannot be effectively brought to a close, then resolution becomes all the more difficult, worsened in the Philippine case by embedded elite interests within the state's executive and judicial institutions. Douglas Kammen also points out how the scale and intensity of the violence in Indonesia were a function of whether regional military commanders were allied with Sukarno and how the navy and the air force were much less complicit in the violence than the army and the RPKAD. Hence, the evidence from these two cases does appear to suggest that the state may not be unitary when violence is utilized. Or to put it differently, elements within enforcement agencies have some leeway in determining the nature of the response when confronted with challenges.

The linkage between state and regime is nebulous in many parts of East Asia, and some elite in difficult situations may well truly believe that challenges to those in power constitute an existential threat. For example, when the Burmese military resorted to violence in 1988 to quell student protests, it was a regime with a deep sense of insecurity and one that had not been openly challenged in urban areas for a long time. Added to this was the fact that the collapse of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the defection of its sword arms, the Wa and the Kokang, clearly threatened the territoriality of the state. The Burmese military, since the coup that placed it in power in 1962, had not been able to control many of the highland areas that were inhabited by ethnic minorities. It was in light of this threat that the military government quickly negotiated ceasefire arrangements with the major ethnic armies from 1988 onward. Addition-

ally, the military regards itself as the champion of the state and its citizens against local detractors and foreigners, as Mary Callahan informs us.[3] Consequently, in the Burmese case, the conflation between state and regime security clearly obtains.

If the distinction is between segments of a target audience rather than actions, as Boudreau suggests, then two more cases examined here will also qualify as examples of instrumental violence, albeit state formation was not the motive for the violence. The case of Kwangju in Korea targeted the inhabitants of a specific locale, while the violence directed against the PKI in Indonesia was equally instrumental in identifying the members of an organization and its sympathizers. In the Indonesian case, however, the violence acquired its own momentum after some time, and as Douglas Kammen tells us, there was much settling of private scores as well. Both examples qualify in terms of categorical violence, rather than violence directed at the general population at large. Nonetheless, Namhee Lee regards the Korean case as an example of exemplary rather than instrumental violence.

There were a number of other factors that aided widespread and systematic abuse of state power. The monopoly of power exercised by the state and those who led it implied that such power could be abused with little consideration of norms of proper or ethical governance. There were few structural or institutional restraints; even where such obstacles were present, they could have been totally ignored. More important, individuals and agencies that were involved in and directed state violence invariably exercised traditional power in the Weberian sense. In other words, elements of power and its availability were associated with specific individuals and often agencies that they led. In many instances such agencies were those tasked to preserve order and that therefore could claim a legitimate use of state power as well. Since there were often no clear distinctions made between internal and external security functions, the task of maintaining state security more often than not actually fell on the military. Internal and external security was viewed as indivisible, especially during the Cold War; as a result, enemies of the state were present inside the country as well. Consequently, military authoritarian regimes that were guided by ideological considerations of threat definition would have regarded the use of force against "subversive" elements as necessary and justifiable. As a result of such tendencies, it is arguable that state violence that occurred under military authoritarian regimes was regarded as

justifiable under the circumstances in which the state and international community then existed.

Even in the most widespread case of violence documented in the region—that associated with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia—Sorpong Peou argues in this volume that the regime suffered from a general perception of vulnerability and weakness at the individual and corporate levels. The Chinese "counterrevolutionary riots" in Tiananmen Square are said to have stemmed from insecurity resulting from reform-era initiatives. In the Thai case, although there was the threat of communist insurgency, personal antagonisms at the local level clearly appeared to have played a part. To recognize such justification does not necessarily mean to condone it, however. Rather, it merely introduces the importance of time- and situation-specific considerations into the equation.

While dealing with military-authoritarian-regime types, it may be useful to note that such regimes often employ armed groups with which they maintain loose linkages. In fact, history has shown that authoritarian, totalitarian, and communist regimes often employ idealistic and energetic youth groups to further their ideological goals. Nazi Germany and Communist China under Mao Zedong were notorious for the use of such youth groups. These groups enabled the state to mobilize resources to engage in activities that might be regarded as unlawful or extra-legal. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that paramilitary and youth organizations were often involved in such indiscriminate violence in East Asia. The Indonesian and Thai cases bear this out clearly. And both countries continue to mobilize such resources when their security forces are stretched or when their governments desire to retain some distance from indiscriminate violence. The Indonesian military mobilized many such groups before and after the Timor referendum, like Aitarak, Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron), and Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), and Thailand did the same to counter the violence in its southern provinces. The use of such vigilante paramilitary and youth groups is clearly detrimental to the proper pursuit of law and order.

The exercise of traditional power in the states examined came with other connotative values as well. These included the fact that the appropriation of power and its exercise, no matter how illegitimate, could not be challenged. There were quite simply no mechanisms for changes and challenges. It is noteworthy that in a number of instances, a single individual was often associated with the lengthy tenure of an abusive gov-

ernment. This was certainly the case with the Soeharto government that rose from the violence against the PKI and its sympathizers and went on to cement a thirty-one-year leadership of the country. Additionally, the military, from which Soeharto first obtained power before consolidating his independence, remains well entrenched in Indonesian politics. Alternatively, the continuation of an existing structural situation that perpetuated power in a particular institution, as in the case of the Communist Party in China and embedded elite interests of the political executive in the Philippines, would also have thwarted addressing state violence.

If the state and its exercise of power were unrestrained, conversely, society was emasculated. Since the state often targeted specific groups or individuals as its enemies, it could generally continue its activities without broad-based challenges. And even in instances where resistance to such violence obtained, it was often muted or easily repressed. What societal structures existed were often co-opted by the state or placed under intense scrutiny for "subversive" activities that threatened the state. At best, some of these traditional structures could offer solace at the individual or very low levels of organization. In this regard it would make little sense to speak of state-society relations as we understand them today. The state quite simply existed independent of society and was often able to exert its will on society and attendant structures on its own terms. The only contingent conditions were probably the collapse of the regime from internal fissures; an uprising against it; or, in some cases, the withdrawal of external legitimacy. Alternatively, if the violence was exemplary and related to certain types of proscribed behavior, as Boudreau argues, then the general population learns to live by such proscriptions over time and internalize them.

Perpetrators and Victims of Violence

The apportionment of blame for violence and the identification of victims are also central to this book. The military appears to have played a key role in an overwhelming number of cases of violence; military involvement was clearly the case for the Northeast Asian countries discussed here, although subtle differences obtain. For example, in the case of China, the military acted under the orders of the leadership of the Communist Party. In Southeast Asia, some distinctions surface: in the Philippines, the marines and the police were responsible for the violence,

whereas in the Cambodian case, the Khmer Rouge, responsible for the ongoing massacre, constituted both the regime and the military. Sorpong Peou also mentions the faceless organization "Angka," a creation of the Khmer Rouge to which blame was attributed for both the violence and the identification of victims.

As for the victims, in China, they were predominantly "cross-class" demonstrators; in Japan, the violence was aimed at Okinawans; in South Korea, the victims were from Kwangju. The Japanese and Korean cases share similarities in that the violence was directed against a region-specific target. The Cambodian case, despite having a large number of victims, targeted urban dwellers, intellectuals and artisans, minorities, and religious groups in more systematic ways. In Indonesia, although the victims were initially members of the PKI and their sympathizers, there is also evidence of violence that targeted political enemies at a time of general turbulence and regime transition. The Myanmar case points to students and their sympathizers as the general targets of violence, and in the Philippine case peasants bore the brunt of the violence. The Thai study suggests that average citizens who were labeled as communists were subjected to violence.

An interesting correlation is that between state violence and the status of the regime in question. Four broad categories emerge from the case studies: regime crisis, regime transition, regime defense, and law-and-order considerations. The Chinese Tiananmen incident was clearly justified as a law-and-order issue, while the Japanese case appears to have been regarded as wartime defense of the state. The Korean case is a little complicated: it involved power transition within an existing regime, although it could be construed as regime defense as well, if the detractors are thought of as contenders for a different regime type. The Indonesian and Philippine cases also point toward violence associated with regime transition/consolidation, while the Cambodian and Thai cases tend toward regime defense. The Myanmar case differs from the others in that the regime was in crisis. The collapse of the BSPP government and Ne Win's "official" retirement created the crisis, which in turn spawned the protests and subsequent violence.

Whatever the specific circumstances of the situation may have been, it is clear that regimes engaged in violence against their own citizens sensed a threat to their authority and the exercise of power. Unwilling to give up power and framing the national discourse against protestors or challeng-

ers by defining them as enemies of the state, these regimes resorted to the use of force. Given the conflation between state and regime interests that typically obtained and in the absence of competing structures at the political and social levels, they were well placed to exercise the monopoly on the "legitimate use of force." In other words, as far as the regimes in power were concerned, their response was justified in returning the state to normalcy. And since police and military functions were not kept discrete, as in democracies, the military, with its far greater capacity for violence, was often utilized. The claim that those against whom violence was used threatened the regime in some way appears to have provided both sufficient provocation and subsequent rationalization for the use of force. Whereas the Cold War provided an ideological cloak in a number of instances, especially in the case of military authoritarian regimes, socialist and communist states also appropriated violence. In this regard, state violence has been a phenomenon of both the extreme right and the extreme left.

Resolution of State Violence

As for political transition and reconciliation in the aftermath of the violence, it has not always been forthcoming. In fact, as mentioned earlier, only the Korean and Cambodian cases have been attended to with some amount of rigor. Of these two, only the Cambodian case has emphasized retribution, and this approach was largely inspired by pressures emanating from the international community. The Korean attempt at resolution, which involved an admixture of retribution and reconciliation, obtained within the framework of a democratizing polity. And Japan, which counts itself as a well-developed democracy today, has yet to address some of its past episodes of state violence. A deep culture of taboo continues to obtain, although past misdeeds have transformed the nature of the state and led in turn to far greater recognition of fundamental liberties at the state level. Important gains have also been made by community-based lobby and interest groups. And in the case of Japan, the courts have also been engaged in interpreting state powers in the face of legal challenges. This separation of powers between the judiciary and the political executive may well be the harbinger of greater changes to come, if civic and interest groups force the state to respond to citizen-initiated lawsuits.

As for questions regarding the postviolence situation and how states

have attempted to deal with it, there is a wide range of outcomes in the manner of resolution. China has been able to deflect some of the pressures associated with Tiananmen as a result of rising affluence and a youth culture that cements regime legitimacy. Although there have been no formal attempts at resolving the situation, the regime may well address it at some point in the future when it feels more confident. In the meantime, the regime has permitted far greater levels of associational life through civic organizations. A major reason why states have not addressed previous episodes of violence also has to do with state priorities and challenges. For example, it is arguable that in the Chinese case, the threats, or the regime-perceived threats, deriving from peripheral areas and minority communities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, constitute a much more urgent matter than trying to reconcile the Tiananmen incident. After all, within the Chinese government's perception of priorities the maintenance of the state and its sovereignty is an overriding consideration. The same argument could be made with regard to the Taiwan issue. In the perception of the government, these are all issues that may well be regarded as state-building rather than aimed toward regime consolidation or transition, to borrow Boudreau's terms. Then there are tactics that regimes continually utilize to try and make amends with victims of state violence, albeit in an often piecemeal and opaque manner. Expressions of Chinese national pride at the country's new place in the international order and the breathtaking pace of socioeconomic changes blunt calls to address state violence, as demonstrated in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Kate Merkel-Hess's chapter. In fact, public sentiment almost justifies the path taken, since it constitutes a demonstration effect of the successful path taken, as opposed to that which was not.

In Japan, the government has attempted a backhanded apology by honoring the war dead as heroes, and revisionist history textbooks have been allowed to coexist alongside official scripts. In the meantime, however, the Okinawan community has introduced a unanimous demand for recognition of wartime forced suicides. South Korea has been the most progressive in resolving past violence through compensating and honoring its victims. The initiators of this policy were the regime under Roh Tae Woo, which came to power in 1988, and the more recent regime under Kim Young Sam. The political opposition took up the cause, and acts to commence resolution of the situation were legalized.

As for Southeast Asia, the new regime under the Hun Sen government

in Cambodia committed itself to a resolution of the situation in coopera-
tion with the United Nations, and tribunals to address the situation are
ongoing at the time of writing. The resolution has adopted the European
Commission's type of retributive justice, which seeks to prosecute the
perpetrators of violence. However, the government has placed some lim-
its on whom the courts may try and has warned international prosecutors
and the community that extending the mandate and the target group to
be prosecuted risks unraveling the peace that has obtained thus far. This
intervention and threat naturally serve regime interests, since Khmer
Rouge collaborators are in power at the present time. The Indonesian situ-
ation remains unresolved up until now, although it appears to be a matter
of time before civic groups and NGOs place resolution firmly on the coun-
try's political agenda. The residual fears of the families of victims are also
an important reason why there have been few calls from that quarter to
address the violence and mete out some form of justice. The military also
continues to remain an important national institution, with territorial-
deployment and administrative functions, despite serious attempts at
administrative and fiscal decentralization in the post-Soeharto period.

In the case of Myanmar, the regime is preoccupied with reestablish-
ing a modicum of domestic and international legitimacy that was lost
after the collapse of the Burma Socialist Program Party–led government.
Additionally, there is the important issue of integrating territories and
peoples that are currently being controlled by ethnic armies that chal-
lenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state. As in the Chinese
case, these are issues that may well fall within the ambit of state build-
ing. The patronage of the Buddhist Sangha by the regime in Myanmar
and its expenditures and upkeep of pagodas in the country are meant to
grant the regime traditional legitimacy in accordance with Buddhist vir-
tues. In the Myanmar case, the state continued with a repressive policy
while slowly increasing tolerance toward local and foreign NGOs. Initial
attempts at multiparty democracy were frustrated, and tension contin-
ues to exist between the regime and the political opposition. Elements
of the political opposition, however, have tried to break the impasse by
participating in the 2010 election to structurally attempt the introduction
of opposition in parliament, and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from
house detention. The government started negotiations with Suu Kyi, and
it released some two hundred political prisoners in late 2011. And in
April 2012, the NLD was allowed to register as a political party and suc-

cessfully won forty-three out of the forty-five seats that were available for contestation. Consequently, Suu Kyi is now a member of parliament and has been issued a passport for overseas travel as well. At the time of writing she is in the middle of a European tour that includes a stop in Norway to collect her Nobel Prize for Peace. Within the country many reforms are ongoing, and the international community has significantly relaxed its sanctions. In fact, many Western countries are now spearheading investment in Myanmar.

In the case of the Philippines, much has been done by way of symbolic resolution of the situation. President Corazon Aquino conveyed her condolences as head of state to the families of the victims of the violence, although there has been no conclusive outcome from the fact-finding mission that was commissioned. This mission continues to remain unsatisfactory to interested parties, and violence is ongoing over the issue of agrarian land reform, even though a monument to honor those who died at Mendiola has also been built. The incident remains a major political issue that regularly crops up on the national agenda. In Thailand, induced testimony brought the Red Drum incident to the fore, although there are still disagreements over the actual number of victims. Student organizations, the Interior Ministry, and elements within the military initiated the process of resolution, but no concrete actions have followed. As a result, whereas the military has admitted to the violence, there has been neither accountability nor reconciliation. Rather, victims have been reconciled to the "inevitability" of the situation and the culture of impunity, as described by Tyrell Haberkorn in this volume.

The initiation of retributive justice generally appears less likely in the East Asian cases examined thus far. There are multiple reasons for this assertion, including, importantly, retaining the memory of violence and summoning the political will to have it addressed at some point. The advocacy of such justice may suffer from disinterest and lethargy over time, especially when confronted with an authoritarian state. Notably, those who seek to keep such issues alive may themselves be branded as subversives and harshly dealt with. After all, repression is the easiest means of erasing negative memories associated with the state. As for the question of political will, successor regimes may naturally not see it as in their best interest to address past misdeeds. Regimes may regard such acts as unnecessary or beyond their purview. They may also paper over such events in order to demonstrate their willingness to forge a new social

compact that is devoid of the emotional baggage associated with the past. The political will to address past crimes may be forthcoming if a new regime is committed to specific changes in policy output and acquires its political mandate on the basis of campaigning for such changes prior to coming into power. Such drastic changes in regimes and their orientations are unlikely to obtain in states with more authoritarian structures and values. In any event, the regular conflation of interests between state and regime security makes the possibility of such changes in developing countries even more remote.

For all the reasons mentioned above and others that may be unique to specific countries, we conclude that East Asian countries are far more likely to engage in restorative rather than retributive justice. This is not to suggest that such states and societies are not keen to punish those associated with state violence and clear the names and memories of those persecuted. Rather, it appears to be the likely path toward some form of reconciliation that is intended to have a longer-lasting and less contentious transformative effect on state-society relations. This situation is likely to eventuate, especially if the previously hypothesized dichotomy between retributive and restorative justice corresponds broadly to the liberal and nonliberal traditions regarding law and human rights. Nonetheless, as mentioned at the outset, the restorative approach has its detractors too, who are interested in bringing those responsible for the abuse of state coercive power to account. Enforcing such accountability early on also has the demonstration effect of establishing norms of conduct for state and regime utilization of coercive power. Whatever approach is deemed necessary and workable, some form of neutral truth- or fact-finding commission is necessary at the outset in order to establish the terms of reference for both the perpetrators and the victims of violence.

Political Transition and Reconciliation in the East Asian Context

The case studies that have been examined in this study yield no conclusive evidence about the nature of the relationship between political transition and reconciliation. The South Korean and Cambodian cases present starkly different findings. In the former, democratization was the major spur of attempts to deal with past violence, whereas in the case of communist Cambodia, the pressure of international opinion and the United

Nations led to the efforts at meting out retributive justice. And in the case of all the other countries examined, no settlement has been attempted or realized thus far. In any event, it is likely that states will find it easier to deal with events that did not involve large numbers of deaths in the first instance. For this reason, the Philippines may well find past violence easier to deal with: the Mendiola Bridge massacre resulted in relatively few casualties, although structural factors appear to have inhibited such an outcome. Conversely and notwithstanding the Cambodian example, it is likely that countries like China, Indonesia, and Myanmar will take much longer to deal with their past. Whereas it appears illogical that events involving mass casualties will not be accorded priority, the reality of the situation is that the number of affected and interested parties makes such an undertaking a large national one. And for this reason alone, only strong states with significant political will and the proper mindset are able to attempt to deal with past injustices. "Proper mindset" may seem an odd phrase in this context, but it refers to the regime's legitimacy and general principles of governance. For example, the Chinese and Myanmar governments continue to regard those who were subjected to state violence as essentially subversive elements that sought the overthrow of state power. Whatever the lexicon may be, it is important to realize that unless the discourse of the state shifts from emphasizing regime security to stressing some conception of human security, reconciliation is unlikely to be forthcoming. And as noted earlier, if the violence was indeed large-scale, elements of the state's coercive agencies that were responsible for the violence are likely to be still embedded within the social structure or to continue to have their interests structurally represented and protected.

And what is the nature of the relationship between reconciliation and regime transition? We posit that it is unlikely for states, especially authoritarian ones, to undertake reconciliation unless it serves regime interests in some way. A hybrid regime that is not entirely authoritarian and that seeks to entrench a corporatist or developmentalist ideology may well find some interest in undertaking such a task. This would especially be the case if sufficient time had elapsed to distance or disassociate the regime from past abuses of state power. Apart from changes to regime-specific characteristics and legitimacy, reconciliation may take place within the framework of revolutionary change inspired by a mass protest movement or alternatively by a regime that opts to drastically change its policies, even at the risk of its own potential displacement, as happened in the

South African case. However, in epochal terms, the period of revolutions appears to be over, and authoritarian regimes with benevolent and progressive leaders rarely exist. In light of such international norms, political transition is far more likely to lead to attempts to address past state excesses.

In any event, to draw this discussion to a close, regimes must abide by certain international norms of conduct, and there must be structural restraints on the exercise of coercive power. There must also be much stronger state-society relations and interaction, and the state must better reflect the constitution and will of its people. It is hoped that as countries examine their past and history is recorded, matters involving state violence will be seriously addressed. Failure to do so will invite legitimizing an essentially illegitimate use of power and violence. Ethical conduct at the individual, societal, and state levels requires nothing short of such redress.

Notes

1. Jung-kwan Cho, "The Kwangju Uprising as a Vehicle of Democratization: A Comparative Perspective," in *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present,* ed. Gi-wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 67–85.

2. See Duncan McCargo, "Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand," *Pacific Review* 18, no. 4 (2005): 499–519.

3. See Mary P. Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

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