

Two Dimensions of Family Risk in East Asia: Variations and Contextualization*

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This paper investigates family risks from the perspective of risk society. Conceptual distinction is made between the first modern and the second modern type of family risk as well as between its objective and subjective dimensions. The major finding in terms of variation of family risks is that the second-modern type of risks is more conspicuous than the first-modern one in Seoul and Tokyo whereas the reverse is the case in Beijing. Yet these two types of risk coexist in all three cities. The contextualized relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions shows the tendency that the risk perception moves up or down in a way reflecting the official statistics of family risks. We argue that this pattern of contextualization can be explained by social construction of risks.

Keywords: Family risk, East Asia, Risk perception, the First modern type of family risk, the Second modern type of family risk, Social construction of risk

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Introduction

This paper investigates family risks in East Asia from the perspective of risk society. It focuses on two dimensions of family risk, that is, the objective and the subjective dimensions. The objective dimension refers to the official statistics related to family risk in three countries of East Asia - Korea, China, and Japan - and the subjective dimension refers to citizens' perception of these risks in the capital cities (Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo) through survey research. The contextualized relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions shows that risk perception tends to move up or down in a way reflecting the official statistics of family risks. We argue that this pattern of variation is explained by the social construction of risks.

It is well known that the family in East Asia has long been considered one of the most important institutions, generally showing strong collective orientations, solid ties among family members, and some shared Confucian traditions. These days, however, the family has been undergoing remarkable change in East Asia due to (among other things) economic crisis, feminism, aging, and individualization. Many indices, such as low fertility rate, high divorce rate and low marriage rate, show this. There have been numerous studies on the family and also on risk perceptions in East Asia. However, there seems to be no attempt to explicitly focus on family risk in East Asia. This paper is an attempt to study the family risk from the perspective of risk society. Family risk refers to a risk related to the tasks and relationship of the family. More detailed discussion will follow in section II-2 of this paper.

We take up this perspective for two reasons. First, it is because a risk perspective on the family allows us to see family problems in the context of current social changes and their global significance. More specifically, we can better understand family risks within the context of individualization, which is important because it is this that is giving rise to many of the risks that were not previously so conspicuous. Second, the risk perspective as well as the thesis of individualization helps us to perceive the basic condition for adequate social responses to family risks such as low fertility rates and high divorce rates; given the megatrend of individualization, we cannot go back to the traditional family but must find the way in which family risks can be managed by taking into account the choices and preferences of individualizing individuals.

Why do we focus on the objective and subjective dimensions of family risk? It is because we think that it is important to reveal how these two

dimensions are related. Subjective perception of risks such as the difficulties in child-rearing may give rise to certain actions or decisions (like the family with no children) which will have consequences upon official statistics. Also, statistics could have an influence on the citizens' risk perception directly or indirectly, through government policy and other mediating factors. Thus it is important to see the relationship between the two. There have been studies focusing on the objective dimension of family change using the official statistics (Park 2013), and there have also been studies focusing on the subjective dimension such family values (Eun 2004, 2006, 2009). However, there have not been studies relating these two dimensions from the perspective of risk society. This paper attempts to do this.

Between the two dimensions, more focus will be given to the subjective one. This is because risk, according to Beck, is an anticipation of a catastrophe, not a catastrophe itself (Beck 1997, pp. 73-4). This definition of risk is important because risk is socially constructed (Beck 1997, pp. 57, 284) and thus opens up a new space of risk governance. For a long time risk was defined by the government's decision and not by the citizens'; and citizens had no say in decisions, but had to feel their effects. Now the paradigm is changing from risk management by the government to risk governance with the participation of citizens and NGOs. It is necessary to pay more attention to the voices of citizens. This is why we focus more on the citizens' perception of the risk.

In this context we raise the following research questions: Firstly, what are the characteristics of family risk in East Asia? Do the family risks in East Asia have some common characteristics and/or variations? If so, what are they? For this we will compare family risk perception in three cities of East Asia: how do the citizens of these three cities perceive the various family risks? What is the variation in family risk perception in the three East Asian cities? In this regard we will conceptualize two types of risks, "the first modern type of family risk" and "the second modern type of family risk", and compare their distribution in three cities to determine their common characteristics. Secondly, what is the relationship between the objective and subjective aspect of family risk? This is related to the issue of the social construction of risks. As mentioned above, Beck claims that risk is socially constructed. And we would like to see whether this is so in East Asia. For this we will analyze the two dimensions of family risk: first, we will review and compare the official statistics related to family risk, that is, the objective dimension in three countries in East Asia. The question here is: What is the trend in fertility rate, divorce rate, and marriage rate in Korea, China, and Japan? Then we will see how these official statistics

are related to family risk perception. In other words the question is, how can we contextualize family risk perception with the official statistics? In this regard we will also discuss the government policy as a mediating factor, since the way a government defines and responds to the official statistics has significant influence on the risk perceptions of its citizens.

The data for this study is largely of two kinds; one is the official statistics of three countries, Korea, China, and Japan; and the other is the data from a 2012 survey on risk society in the cities of Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo.

Analytical Framework

Beck developed a theory of risk society (Beck 1997) and, later, second modernity (Beck and Grande 2010). These two are not clearly distinguished by Beck himself, but overlap in many ways. Risk society is a society that modern industrial society brings forth through its side effects. Characteristic of risk society is not the distribution of wealth, but the distribution of risks as an organizing principle of a society. According to Beck, risk society presupposes the success of a modernization process that produces numerous side effects causally linked to the accumulation of wealth and capitalist global development. In this context, the concept of second modernity serves to explain the logic of historical change involved and the overall direction of transformation. It explains historical change through the increasing radicalization of the principles of modernity and the destructive effect this has on modern institutions. Second modernity is neither a simple continuity nor a complete denial of first modernity but involves a rupture.¹ The national boundaries of labor markets, for instance, have become fluid and flexible not because of the failure of modernity, but because of the radicalization of such principles fundamental to modernity such as freedom, competition, and individual choices that result in economic globalization. The driving force of second modernity is already built into the logic of first modernity, as first modernity constantly renovates itself by destroying its institutions (Beck 1997). This *avant-garde* image of second-modern transformation is highly suggestive.

¹ For a conceptualization and comparison of the first and the second modernity, the following Figure will help. Please refer to Han and Shim (2010, p. 470), particularly the following Figure.

Typology of Risks for East Asia

Nevertheless, we need a typology of risks better suited to East Asia. An example is the conceptual framework developed by Han and Shim (2010) who tried to go beyond the thesis of radicalization to grasp the mode of risk production and mode of risk dispersion. Based on this, we propose to distinguish two modes of risk production. On the one hand, radicalizing modernity produces certain risks affecting the globe as a whole. The exemplars may include climate change, ecological destruction, economic inequality, unemployment, and aging society. On the other hand, certain types of risk are produced as unintended consequences of a specific strategy of development taken for granted in East Asia, such as compressed modernity or rush-to modernization. The exemplars can be identified in such various symptoms of risks as large-scale accidents, violence, contamination of foods and tap water, fraudulent constructions, moral crises such as corruption, family disorganization and so on (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 470-1).

In a similar way, Han and Shim (2010, p. 471) distinguish two modes of risk dispersion. Risks may be called ‘transnational’ if these can, in principle, happen anywhere in the world. In contrast, risks may be ‘regional’ if these tend to occur heavily, not everywhere, but in those countries in which this




FIG. 1.—Conceptual Components

TABLE 2-1
FOUR TYPES OF RISKS

Mode of Risk Production	Risk Dispersion	
	Transnational	National
Radicalization of Modernity	A	-
Deficiencies of Modernity	B	C

SOURCE.—Han and Shim, 2010, p.472.

developmental strategy has taken place.² This means that risk cannot be analyzed from a thesis of radicalization alone. Rather, deficiencies built into compressed modernity have to be fully recognized if we are to grasp the complexity of risks in East Asia.

The combination of these two axes is depicted in Table 2-1 and indicates three substantive areas of research. Category A refers to the type of risks generated as unintended consequences of the radicalization of principles of modernity. When radicalized free competition brings about the globalization of the economy, destabilizing the national institutions of labor markets and welfare systems. We may call this a systemic risk since its mode of production is inherent in a system's self-innovation via destruction (Han and Shim 2010, p. 471).

Category B refers to the type of risks deeply anchored in the very root of modernity, that is, within the paradigm of instrumental, calculable, and technical rationality. Modernity unfolds as a technocratic project of domination over the world - from the inner flows of emotion to the ecological environment. The one-sided or one-dimensional pursuit of instrumental rationality has resulted in a technocratic civilization insensitive to differences and multiplicities (Han and Shim 2010, p. 472). Here we find

² Certain risks assumed to be local may turn out to be deeply interconnected with transnational development. Globalization affects the life of ordinary people so deeply that one can hardly be free from of its threatening consequences. Consequently, the gap between the poor and rich tends to become widened, with the increasing number of job-less or irregular workers, which poses a serious risk. Originating from the economic system immersed in the world economy, this risk no doubt affects political stability, reinforcing zero-sum hostile human relationships and jeopardizing further the social basis of trust. Such phenomena as unemployment, poverty, new diseases, and the catastrophic fluctuation of the capital market, large-scale hurricanes and tsunamis can no longer be explained by through a nation-centered perspective.

modernity as a world-dominating project in the fundamental sense.³

The category C refers to the side effects of the super-speedy economic growth which is found in countries where rush-to modernization has been undertaken. Certain risks emerge due to the lack of responsible institutions as can be seen in the contamination of foods and fraudulent constructions. Other risks also emerge out of the deterioration of human relationships. A good example is the destruction of trust and the moral community (Han and Shim 2010, p. 471).

Crucial for our discussion are type A and C. Table 2-1 may help us to see why the risk type C is no less serious than the type A in East Asia. It also helps us to explore flexible approaches to the management of risks since strategies may differ depending upon the type of risk under examination.

Two Types of Family Risk for East Asia

Since this research is focused on family risk, the types of risk have to be redefined to fit the family context. In order to do this we rely on the concept of the family in first and second modernity. Among the various differences between the two, we pay attention to the difference in terms of the task of the family and the relationship between the couples. First, the task of the family in first modernity is primarily, but not exclusively, material, while the task in second modernity is far more emotional than material (Shim 2011, p. 26), as shown in Table 2-2. In the case of second modernity, most of the functions of the family such as economy, education, welfare have been moved to the social institutions out of the family, whereas this is not so in the case of first modernity. Consequently, the emotional task of the family has become crucially important for second modernity while the principle of love becomes radicalized.

Second, the relationship between the couple has also changed. To simplify, the first modern relationship is based on a sexual division of labor and gender inequality, while the second modern relationship is based on individualization and gender equality. In the former, the family functions as a strategic unit of community to survive, while in the latter we can find a specific relationship characterized by “I am me” (Beck 1997, p. 175), living “a life of one’s own” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, p. 22).

³ The destructive nature of modernity was grasped by Horkheimer and Adorno whereas Habermas has developed a theory of communication to show how we can escape this risk of modernity.

TABLE 2-2
CONCEPT OF THE FAMILY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND MODERNITY

	The Family in the First Modernity	The Family in the Second Modernity
Tasks of the Family	Material and emotional task	Emotional task
Characteristics of the relationship	Romantic love	Confluent love
Objective of the Relationship	Searching for a special person—living for others	Searching for a special relationship—living for oneself
Individual-Family Relationship	Family-centered, family-dependent	Self-centered, independent
Gender Relationship	Gender division of labor and gender inequality	Gender equality
Issue of Homosexuality	Assumption of heterosexuality	No distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality
Issue of Nationality	Assumption of same nationality	No distinction between different nationality

SOURCE.—Shim 2011, p.26 reconstructed from Giddens (2001), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002).

In this paper we discuss the seven items of family risk. They are: (1) divorce, (2) low fertility, (3) isolation and suicide of the elderly, (4) individualist tendency, (5) decrease in the parent's role in home education, (6) decrease in mutual help in the family, and (7) conflict in the property distribution. These seven items were selected to represent the changes in the tasks of the family and relationship in the family, and to represent two types of family risk, that is, the first modern type and the second modern type. First, we assume divorce, low fertility, isolation and suicide of the elderly and individualist tendency to be deeply linked to the individualization, that is, the radicalization of the principle of love, freedom and equality. As for divorce, there were divorces in the industrial society too; however they were very few. As the society develops into a risk society or second modernity, women's education, employment, gender equality and the attitude of "I am me" was also heightened. Thus high divorce can be classified as the second modern type of family risk. Low fertility can be classified as the second modern type in a similar sense. In East Asia, welfare has not been well institutionalized and

children have been regarded as a sort of asset which guarantees the welfare of the elderly life after retirement. However, in the second modernity the meaning of the children changed. Now the children became a source of emotional happiness and the parents should do their best to provide them with the best care and education. At the same time women who are more individualized want to pursue their own career and life. Thus the children became a burden because the parents should provide the best education and welfare until the children becomes an adult.

Second, as to family risks such as a decrease in the parent's role in home education, a decrease in mutual help in the family, and conflict in property distribution, we classify these as the first-modern type of risks. For example, conflict in property distribution may not frequently occur if individual property rights are well developed and family members are fully individualized. The same can be said in the case of a decrease in mutual help in the family and a decrease in the parent's role in home education, both of which presuppose conventional functions of the family.

Family Risk Perception in Three Cities

Data and Method

Questionnaire surveys were distributed to 1,609 people, about 500 people respectively Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo in 2012.⁴ In order to discuss family risk perception, we focus on three related aspects: first, everyday life anxiety as a context of family risk perception; second, seriousness of family risk as a main focus; third, low fertility-related factors as a specific example. These variables were measured as follows: First, in relation to "everyday life anxiety," we asked participants the following question about four statements: "How strong a feeling do you have about the following everyday life anxiety?" The four statements were: (1) "I feel anxious that I might fall behind because the competition is too severe in our society" (anxiety over competition), (2) "I am worried whether I could manage it if a member of the family get sick or

⁴ The surveys were conducted by Professor Li Qiang of Tsinghua University in China, by Professor Han Sang-Jin of Seoul National University in Korea, and by Professor Li Tingjiang of Chuo University in Japan respectively. The survey in Seoul was carried out as an online survey by Hankook Research based on its master sample. The surveys in Beijing and Tokyo were carried out as one-to-one interviews by trained interviewers majoring in sociology and were based on stratified random sampling.

encounters an accident” (worries about family accidents), (3) “I am worried if my home economy becomes needy due to economic crisis” (worries about household living due to economic crisis), and (4) “I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me” (loneliness and heartlessness). These questions are designed to determine the relative importance of work-related (the first question), family-related (the second and the third questions), and relation-related⁵ (the fourth question) anxieties. For the comparison the points were converted to scores on a 100-point scale.

Second, “seriousness of various family risk” was measured as follows: we asked the following questions about seven items, “How serious do you think the following family-related risks are in our society?” The seven items are: (1) divorce, (2) low fertility, (3) decrease in the parent’s role in home education, (4) isolation and suicide of the elderly, (5) individualist tendency, (6) decrease in mutual help in the family, and (7) conflict in the property distribution. They were measured in Likert scale (from 1 “not serious at all” to 4 “very serious”). For the comparison the points were converted to scores on a 100-point scale.

Third, in relation to the perception of “low fertility-related factors”, we asked the following questions about six items, ‘How much influence do you think the following items have on low fertility?’ They are: (1) increase in the burden of upbringing and education for the children, (2) poor housing conditions, (3) excessive work burden and lack of time, (4) late marriage, (5) tendency of avoiding marriage and preferring singlehood, and (6) stress of child-rearing. They were measured in Likert scale (from 1 “no influence at all” to 5 “very much influence”). These points were also converted to scores on a 100 point-scale.

The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are as follows: in terms of gender, there are more men in Beijing than in Seoul and Tokyo, while the gender balance is similar in Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of age, there are more young people (in their twenties) in Beijing, while there are more elderly people (over sixties) in Seoul.⁶

⁵ Here relationship could mean pure relationship. Pure relationship refers to a relationship for itself, not for material or other interests (Giddens, 2001).

⁶ The sample in each city was adjusted to better fit the population. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are shown in the following table (table 1).

Perception of Everyday Life Anxiety in Three Cities

Everyday life anxiety is discussed here to put family risk in the context of everyday life. As mentioned above, questions regarding work-related (the first question), family-related (the second and the third questions), and pure relation-related anxiety (the fourth question) were asked.

Let us see the perception of everyday life-related anxiety in three cities respectively (Figure 3.1). In Seoul, the highest level of anxiety is about family accidents (70.4) and household living due to the economic crisis (70.4), both family-related anxieties. The lowest is loneliness and heartlessness (49.8), a relation-related anxiety. In Beijing the highest level of anxiety is over being left behind due to competition (70.8), a work-related anxiety. Just like in Seoul however, the lowest levels are about loneliness and heartlessness (37.8). In Tokyo, people are most anxious about family accidents (68.7) and household living due to the economic crisis (65.2), both family-related aspects. Once again, loneliness and heartlessness was considered the least cause of anxiety, and was significantly lower than in Tokyo and Seoul. When we compare the perception of everyday life-related anxiety in the three cities

TABLE 1
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

		Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
(unit: total frequency)		(512)	(560)	(537)
Sex	Men	49.4	50.2	47.2
	Women	50.6	49.8	52.8
Age Groups	Twenties	19.5	38.9	20.1
	Thirties	22.7	20.0	18.0
	Forties	21.1	20.1	17.4
	Fifties	18.4	13.9	11.8
	Over Sixties	18.4	7.1	32.8
Education	High School & Lower	26.2	47.3	37.6
	College & Higher	73.8	52.7	62.4
Standard of Living	Upper Class	2.3	.9	1.1
	Middle Class	57.0	47.0	75.5
	Lower Class	40.6	52.1	23.4
Marital Status	Single	28.9	36.4	30.7
	Married	64.8	58.9	62.3
	Divorce/Separation	6.3	4.6	7.1




FIG. 3.1.—Perception of Everyday Life-related Anxiety in Three Cities

(Figure 3.1) anxiety perception is higher in Seoul and Tokyo and somewhat lower in Beijing except when it comes to one issue; anxiety over being left behind due to competition (a work-related anxiety).

When we compare aspects of anxiety, the family-related anxiety is higher than the work-related and relation-related aspects, except in Beijing, where work related anxieties are high. More specifically, worries about family accidents (70.4, 68.7, 64.9) and worries about household living due to the economic crisis (70.4, 65.2, 57.7), that is, the family-related anxiety, are higher than the work-related anxiety of being left behind due to competition (60.0, 59.0), except in Beijing (70.8), and also higher than the relation-related aspect, that is, loneliness and heartlessness (49.8, 46.7, 37.8).⁷ This shows an

⁷ There could be several reasons for these findings. First, as to the higher anxiety over work-related competition in Beijing, this could be because in China capitalism is relatively recently introduced, and people are more sensitive to competition, while in Korea and Japan people are accustomed to competition and take it for granted. Second, as to the higher family-related anxiety among Seoul and Tokyo citizens and the lower family anxiety (here related with economic situation) among Beijing citizens, this could be related to China's so far continuing economic expansion, and the standstill growth in Korea and Japan experienced within the context of the limited welfare policy in these countries. Third, as to the high relation-related anxiety about loneliness and heartlessness in Seoul and Tokyo, this might be a result of individualization and ageing in Seoul and Tokyo, while this kind of relation-related anxiety in Beijing may not be so serious as those in Korea and Japan, as the generation composition of the household shows. For example, the proportion of the household of three generations or more is 22.99% in China in 2010 (Wang 2013), while it is only 6.1% in Korea in 2010. In this regard, higher sensitivity to family anxiety among Seoul and Tokyo citizens can be interpreted in the context of the economic, welfare and household composition of each society.




FIG. 3.2.—Perception of the Family-Related Risks in Three Cities

overall tendency of everyday life anxiety in three cities. In this context we ask how seriously the citizens perceive family risk to be.

Seriousness of Various Family Risk Perception in Three Cities

When we examined the family risks, using the two types of family risk discussed in section 2 of this paper, divorce, no children or low fertility, isolation and suicide of the elderly and individualist tendency were classified as “the second modern type.” In contrast, decrease of parent’s role in home education, decrease of mutual help in the family, and conflict in property distribution were classified as “the first modern type.”

Let us first turn to the perception of family-related risks in three cities respectively (Figure 3.2). In Seoul, the highest risks among the seven family-related risks are isolation of the elderly (76.6), no children or low fertility (75.2), individualist tendency (74.7), and divorce (74.1) - all “the second modern type.” The lowest are conflict in property distribution (63.0) and decrease in mutual help in the family (66.4), which can be considered as “the first modern type.” In Beijing, the highest is conflict in the property distribution (61.8), “the first modern type”, and the next is divorce (62.3),⁸

⁸ The risk perception of divorce in Beijing turned out to be quite high. Some might consider to

and the lowest are isolation of the elderly (41.3), no children or low fertility (42.3), “the second modern type.” In Tokyo, the highest are no children or low fertility (79.7) and isolation of the elderly (79.1), “the second modern type”; and the lowest is conflict in property distribution (53.7), “the first modern type.” When we compare the perception of the seven family-related risks in three cities (Figure 3.2), family risk perception is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and lower in Beijing except in one: conflict of property distribution.

Next, when we compare the family risk perception according to the two types of risks, “the second modern types” turned out to be somewhat higher than “the first modern type” in Seoul and Tokyo, while “the first modern types” seems to be higher in Beijing. More specifically, “the second modern type”, that is, the first four items, was higher in Seoul and Tokyo and lower in Beijing except when it came to divorce. The contrast between Seoul-Tokyo and Beijing is particularly striking in the case of low fertility (79.7 and 75.2 vs. 42.3) and isolation and suicide of the elderly (79.1 and 76.6 vs. 41.3). Among “the first modern type”, the conflict over property distribution (61.8) stands out as the highest in Beijing. Two other “first modern types” of anxiety, decrease of parent’s role in home education (52.7) and decrease of mutual help in the family (52.5), were neither high nor low, but were higher than two “second modern types,” that is, low fertility (42.3) and isolation and suicide of the elderly (41.3).

From these findings, we can see the co-existence of the first modern and second modern types of family risks in terms of the perception of family risks in the three cities; even though there are variations, citizens’ perception of family risk as a whole is higher in Seoul and Tokyo. As to their perception of the two types of family risk, “the second modern type” is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and “the first modern type”, particularly conflict in property distribution, is higher in Beijing.⁹ Compared to Beijing citizens, the finding

show a high level of second modern type of risk perception. However, we have to be cautious about it. In Beijing, there are a lot of “fake divorce,” that is, a couple getting a legal divorce, but in reality living together. According to reports, this is largely due to the Chinese government’s policy on real estate, limiting one house per one household. Couples get a “fake divorce” to buy a second apartment or not to pay expensive tax for two apartments (*China Daily* 2010a; *China Daily* 2010b). This phenomenon was quite common, because the price of housing skyrocketed in Beijing and other big cities in China in recent years. Thus there are reports that there is a long queue of couples to get a divorce. This has become a big trend and now it is known as “Chinese style fake divorce” (*Crienglish* 2014) This kind of “fake divorce” is understood better as a first modern type of risk perception rather than the second modern type because it is not to end the relationship and has an ulterior motive, i.e., a material motive.

⁹ This may be so despite the high risk perception of divorce in Beijing, because the divorce in




FIG. 3.3.—Perception of the Low Fertility-Related Factors in Three Cities

that Seoul and Tokyo citizens are more sensitive to family risk in general, and the second modern types of risk in particular suggests they feel that the society in which they live has been transformed into second-modern life conditions, regardless of whether the society really has transformed or not.¹⁰

Perception of Low Fertility-related Factors in Three Cities

We will now focus on the participants' perception of which factors influence low fertility rates. In the same way that we have done so far, factors such as an increase in the burden of upbringing and education for children, poor housing conditions, excessive work burden and lack of time can be considered "first modern" types. In contrast, late marriage, tendency of avoiding marriage and preferring singlehood, and stress in the child-rearing can be considered as "second modern" types.

The perceived influence of the factors in three cities is shown in Figure

China has a particular meaning due to the widespread phenomenon of so called 'fake divorce' - as has been mentioned in footnote 8.


¹⁰ Japan may have experienced individualization and nuclear family earlier than Korea, and thus may have higher family risk than Korea. However, we cannot find much difference at least in risk perception. We will see why in section II of this paper.

3.3. In Seoul an increase in the burden of education for children (90.8), and poor housing conditions (81.9), both “the first modern type” risks, are perceived to be most important whilst the least important are thought to be late marriage (75.2) and a tendency of avoiding marriage and preferring singlehood (75.3), that is, risks of “the second modern type.” In Beijing, the most important factors are believed to be an increase in the burden of education for children (81.1) and excessive work burden and lack of time (76.3) – both risks of “the first modern type.” Late marriage (58.3) and stress of child-rearing (62.5), risks of “the second modern” type are thought to be much less significant. In Tokyo, the highest rated factor is an increase in the burden of education for children (66.2), a “first modern type” risk; and the lowest rated were stress of child-rearing and late marriage (41.1), anxieties of “the second modern type.” When we compare the three cities, we can say that risk perception turned out to be higher in Seoul and Beijing, and lower in Tokyo.

When we compare the perception of factors thought to impact fertility according to the two types of risk, we find the following tendencies. Both the first and the second modern low fertility factors were high in all three cities. However, Figure 3.3 shows that both the first modern and the second modern low fertility factors were perceived to be more important in Seoul and Beijing than Tokyo. This is somewhat different from findings presented in the previous section, where Seoul and Tokyo citizens were more sensitive than Beijing citizens to family risk in general, and the second modern types of risk in particular. Yet we can confirm the co-existence of the first modern and second modern types of family risks in terms of the perception of low fertility factors in three cities, even though there are variations among them. The finding that Seoul and Beijing citizens are more sensitive to low fertility factors in general, and the first modern types of low fertility factors in particular, shows that their life conditions tend to be more severely affected by risk society than Tokyo citizens. An interesting finding is that in Beijing, for risks of “the second modern type”, late marriage is perceived to be a relatively low factor in for fertility, but preferring singlehood is thought to be quite important.

Contextualization in the Official Statistics and Government Policy

Why is the family risk perception higher in Seoul and Tokyo and lower



SOURCE.—Korea, Yearly Report on Women Statistics, Korean Women Development Institute.

China, National Bureau of Statistics of China; Japan, Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan.

FIG. 4.1.— Fertility Rate in Korea, China and Japan 1950-2011


in Beijing? Can we interpret this risk perception to be related with the official statistics? If so, how is it related? In order to better interpret risk perception, we need to put it in context of changing official statistics and government policy.¹¹

Family Changes as Revealed in Official Statistics in Three Countries

One might ask how the family risk perception in three cities is affected by the actual family change under way. To explore this hidden link, we would like to put the risk perception into official statistics in three countries. More specifically, we will review and discuss the official statistics of fertility rate, divorce rate, and marriage rate.

Let us first look at the long-term trend of fertility rates. Figure 4.1 charts the fertility rate in Korea, China and Japan from 1950 to 2011 and all the three countries show a decrease during this period. Korea shows a

¹¹ There might be some factors mediating between the objective aspects of official statistics and the subjective aspects of citizens' perception, such as government policy, mass media, etc. In this paper, due to a lack of available data and space, we will focus on change in government policy, since the government policy reflects how the government defines family risk.




SOURCE.—Korea, Yearly Report on Women Statistics, Korean Women Development Institute.

China, National Bureau of Statistics of China; Japan, Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan.

FIG. 4.2.—Crude Divorce Rate in Korea, China and Japan 1970- 2012

particularly rapid drop however, beginning from the 1960's and coinciding with the family planning campaign instigated (in 1961) during the economic plan of the Park Chunghee regime. From 6.3 in 1950, fertility in Korea drops to below 2.0 in 1985 and reaches its lowest point in 2005 with 1.1. China shows a rapid fall in fertility during the great starvation that followed from the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961. It falls again in 1975, and then again in the 1980's with the introduction of the one child policy in the early 1980's, dropping from 4.6 in 1950 to below 2.0 in 1985. Japan shows a relatively early decrease in 1955, dropping from 3.7 in 1950 to below 2.0 in 1975, and 1.57 in 1989. It then remains relatively stable in comparison with two other countries. When we compare the fertility rate of the three countries temporally, Japan's is the first to fall, followed by Korea's, and then China's. When we compare the three countries' fall in fertility in terms of speed, Korea's seems to have been the fastest, and Japan's the slowest. However, despite the difference, the fertility rates of the three countries show some parallels; they are all in the same direction, all dropping, and all finally merge into low fertility.

The crude long-term trends in divorce rates are shown in Figure 4.2 for



SOURCE.—Korea, Yearly Report on Women Statistics, Korean Women Development Institute.

China, National Bureau of Statistics of China; Japan, Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan.

FIG. 4.3.—Crude Marriage Rate in Korea, China and Japan, 1970-2012

Korea, China and Japan from 1970 to 2012. All three countries show a rise in divorce rate during the period. Japan shows a relatively early rise in 1985 and 2000. Its rate goes from 0.9 in 1970 to 1.2 in 1980, 1.4 in 1985, 1.3 in 1990, and 2.1 in 2000. It then remains relatively stable from then on in comparison to the other two countries. Korea's divorce rate shows a rapid rise in the 2000's. It climbs from 0.6 in 1980 to 1.4 in 1985, and 1.1 in 1990 before reaching rates of 2.5 and 2.6 in 2000 and 2005 respectively. China shows a rather late rise, rising from 0.4 in 1980, 0.7 in 1990, 1.0 in 2000, 1.4 in 2005, reaching 2.0 in 2010 and continuing to rise to 2.3 in 2012. When we compare the divorce rate increase in the three countries temporally, Japan's is earliest, Korea's next, and China's last. When we compare the increase in terms of speed, Korea's and China's seem to be faster than Japan's. However, despite the difference, as in the fertility rate, the divorce rates of the three countries show some close affinities, all rising, and all converging at a similarly high divorce rate.

Figure 4.3 shows crude marriage rates for Korea, China and Japan from 1955 to 2012. All three countries show a drop in the marriage rate during the period. Japan shows a relatively early decrease from the 1970's, dropping from 10.0 in 1970, to 6.7 in 1980, 5.9 in 1990 and 5.7 in 2010. Korea is next,

showing a rapid fall from 10.6 in 1980 to 9.3 in 1990, 7.0 in 2000, and 6.5 in 2010. China is the last to fall, showing a steep drop from 16.4 in 1990 to 13.4 in 2000 before hitting its lowest rate in 2005 with 9.3. When we compare the marriage rate of the three countries temporally, Japan's is first to fall, Korea's next, and China's last. When we compare the marriage rate's contraction in terms of speed, Korea's and China's appears to be faster than Japan's. However, yet again despite variations, the marriage rates for these three countries show close resemblances, all shrinking, and all finally reaching low rates.

Family Changes as Revealed in Government Policies in Three Countries

Government policy changes according to how it defines family risk and how it responds to official statistics. Let us first see how the governments respond to the fertility rate. In response to the fertility rate, the three countries at first responded with birth control policies to lower the fertility rate, but later tried to raise the fertility rate as the situation changed (Table 4-1). In Korea family planning started from 1961 in order to facilitate economic development. The Park Chunghee regime, which came to power in a military coup, and the economic bureaucrats in charge of economic development planning considered rapid population growth an obstacle to economic and social development. Thus they launched the family planning campaign, providing various incentives to those who practiced contraception. However, when fertility kept on going down, it was recognized as a serious social problem (1.57 in 1990, 1.08 in 2005). In 2003 the Planning Group for Aging Society and Social Integration was established under the Office of Policy under the President, and on February 9, 2004, the Commission for Aging and Future Society was established. In 2005 the Low Fertility and Aging Society Act was legislated and the Commission for Low Fertility and Aging Society (2005) was established. This was later reduced to a commission under the Minister of Health and Welfare in 2008 by the Lee regime.

China, with the largest population among all three countries, also considered population growth an obstacle to economic development. Accordingly, with the reform and opening policy since 1980, a one-child policy has been introduced and implemented. There were four baby booms in China: The first in the 1950's with the population increasing from 500 million to 700 million; the second during 1963-1976 (this was due to a lack of population control policy); the third during 1985-90 in the rural areas (this stemmed from exception in rural areas from the one-child rule when the first

TABLE 4-1
FERTILITY-RELATED LAW AND POLICY IN THREE COUNTRIES

	China	Korea	Japan
1950	TFR 4.58	TFR 6.3	TFR 3.65
1960		Family Planning Campaign (from 1961)	TFR 2.0
1970			Decrease of Fertility Rate (1973)
1980	Family Planning Policy (One Child per Family Policy 1980) TFR 2.51 (1980)1.65 (1985)	Equal Employment Act (1989)	Equal Employment Act (1986) "1.57 Shock" (1989)
1990		TFR 1.57 (1990) 1.63 (1995)	Angel Plan (1995)
2000	Women's Rights Act (2002) Limited Relaxation of Family Planning Policy (2008)	TFR 1.08 (2005) Basic Act for Low Fertility and Aging Society (2005) Commission for Low Fertility and Aging Society (2005)	New Angel Plan (2000) Basic Act for Low Fertility (2003) New Basic Act for Low Fertility (2005)
2010	Expanded Relaxation of Family Planning Policy (2013)		

CDR: Crude Divorce Rate, CMR: Crude Marriage Rate

child is a daughter); and finally, the fourth from 2008 with the expansion of this exception to big cities and some provinces. Thus, we can see that in reaction to its low fertility rate China is now trying to change the one child policy, expanding the recognition of exception on a limited basis in 2008 and, more recently, following that up with broader expansion in 2013.¹²

¹² In Guangdong Province, for example, a family could have two children, under seven circumstances. They are: (1) if they are minorities, (2) if they are peasants and have a daughter as the first child, (3) if their first child is handicapped, (4) if one child got married to one child, etc. (4) is particularly actively encouraged in Beijing, Shanghai, Tenzin, Guangzhou and considered to play a role in another baby boom in next five years. In 2013 the one-child policy was further relaxed, expanding the recognition of exception to the family of two one-child couples (*NBC*, 2013)

In Japan the baby boomers were born in the 1940's and the fertility rate began to fall earlier compared to Korea and China, beginning from 1955. Since then it has generally continued to drop, reaching the so-called "1.57 shock" in 1989, when discourse about a low fertility crisis began to emerge. Hence, in 1994, the Angel Plan started, followed by the New Angel Plan in 1999, and the New-New Angel Plan in 2004. The first tried to increase the numbers of child care facilities and improve their quality, the second tried to implement leave of absence for child care and improvement of salaries, and the third tried to encourage leave of absence for child care on the part of men, and also encourage the active participation of enterprises and regions. In 2003 the Basic Act on Low Fertility was legislated and in 2006 the New Basic Act on Low Fertility was legislated (ChoYi 2006).

When we compare the policies of the three countries with regard to family planning, Korea was first (1969's) and China was second (1980's). With regard to policies aimed at combating low fertility, Japan is earliest with the Angel Plan (1995) and Korea (2005) is next. China is just beginning a relaxation of the one-child policy (2013).

Next, let us first see how the government responded to the divorce and marriage rate. Japan was first to legislate family laws, having them already in place in the 19th century, while in Korea and China family laws were legislated in 1948 and in 1949 respectively (Table 4-2). The family laws were revised in 1947 in Japan, in 1990 in Korea and in 2002 in China. The 1947 revision in Japan included the abolition of the head of the household system. The 1990 revision in Korea included recognition of custody rights for women and division of property at divorce. The 1996 revision in Japan introduced a shortening of the period of prohibition for remarriage after divorce from six months to 100 days, separate last names for the couple, and division of property according to contribution. The head of the household system, which was already abolished in Japan through the 1947 revision of family laws, was abolished only in 2005 in Korea. An interesting thing to note is that Korea responded to the rise in the divorce rate, making a deliberation period of six month mandatory before divorce in 2008 to delay the divorce process and to make the couple rethink their divorce. A care insurance act for the elderly was legislated in 1997 in Japan, while the Long-Term Care Insurance for the Elderly Act, a similar act in Korea, was legislated only in 2008. Thus, with regard to the position of women in the family, protection of women's rights at divorce, and policies for the elderly, Japan seems to have been the first to act, and Korea seems to have been next, but it is not easy to compare Japan and Korea with China in this respect since China seems to be slow in protecting

TABLE 4-2
FAMILY (DIVORCE)-RELATED LAW AND POLICY IN THREE COUNTRIES

	China	Korea	Japan
1940-70	Legislation of Family Law (1949)	Legislation of Family Law (1948) (head of household system)	Legislation of the Family Law in the 19th century Revision of Family Law (1947) (abolition of head of household system)
1980	CMR 14.6, CDR 0.7	CMR 10.6, CDR 0.6	CMR 8.7, CDR 1.22
1990		Revision of Family Law (1990)	Revision of Family Law (1996) Care Insurance Act (1997)
2000	CMR 13.4 (2000), 12.6 (2005) CDR 1.91 (2000), 2.7 (2005) Revision of Family Law (2002)	CMR 7.0 (2000), 6.5 (2005) CDR 2.5 (2000), 2.6 (2005) Abolition of Head of Household System (2005) Legal Delay before Divorce (2008) Long-Term Care Insurance for the Elderly (2008)	CMR 6.4 (2000), 5.7 (2005) CDR 2.10 (2000), 2.08 (2005)
2010	CMR 9.3, CDR 2.0	CMR 6.5, CDR 2.3	CMR 5.5, CDR 1.99

women's rights and caring for the elderly. On the other hand, China seems to be ahead of Japan and Korea in areas such as the position of women and allowing independence in constituting a family.

Perhaps this difficulty of comparison is because China has a different system. China established and used the *Hukou* system for a long time, and made and used a family register system in 1955 in order to maintain public order, to restrict the urban population, and to verify the people's identification. Even the husband and wife living together do not need the same family register, since China is against making laws subjecting wife to husband one-sidedly. According to article 8 of Marriage Law of China, "after marriage registration, with the mutual agreement, the wife can become a member of the husband's family, and the husband can become a member of the wife's family," And all the children should register with the mother's family register, instituting a matrilineal descent system.

Contextualization

Here we would like to see how these two dimensions of family risk are related to each other. There are two directions of relationship. One is the perception of the citizens affecting the official statistics, and the other is the official statistics affecting the perception. Here we will focus on the latter, because we are interested in the social construction of risk. For this, we will take two examples of divorce and low fertility, the two items of family-related risks.

First, as to the risk perception of divorce, this is high in all three cities even though there are some variations, as we have seen in Figure 3.2. When we turn to the official divorce rates shown in Figure 4.2, the crude divorce rate reached 1 or more in Korea in 1990, in China in 2000, and in Japan in 1975. It then reached 2 or more in 2000 in Korea (2.6), in 2010 in China (2.0), and in 2000 in Japan (2.1). So, Korea, China and Japan recently reached their highest divorce rates and did so very rapidly, even though it was somewhat lower and slower in the case of Japan. Citizens' risk perception could be interpreted against this background. Seoul citizens seem to take it seriously, reflecting the fact that the rate rose rapidly in 2000 and 2005. This became a serious social issue, also because the crude marriage rate is falling, too. Beijing citizens also take it seriously, showing a high risk perception for divorce. Actually perception of divorce shows the highest point among the four second modern types of family risk. Tokyo citizens also seem to take it seriously, even though the crude divorce rate reached 2.1 in 2000. In the case of Tokyo we should be somewhat cautious because the change was slow, happened over a long period, and also because the rate rose only to 2.1 in 2000.

Second, as to the risk perception of low fertility, there is a big difference between Seoul-Tokyo and Beijing; it is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and lower in Beijing. When we consider the official fertility rate, the total fertility rate fell rapidly in Korea during 1950-85, in China during 1965-85, and in Japan during 1950-60 (the earliest of the three). From 1985, the total fertility rate in Korea and Japan continued to drop at a similarly low rate, while China showed a rise in the rate. Citizens' risk perception could be interpreted against this background. Again, Seoul citizens seem to take it seriously because the rate fell rapidly in 1985 and 2005 and this became a serious social issue, with policy makers pouring out countermeasures for the problems. Tokyo citizens seem to take it seriously too. On the one hand, the official

fertility rate is the lowest along with Korea, but on the other hand, it has been a slow, steady decline since the initial drop in the 1950's. Perhaps the reason the latter hasn't led to a lower risk perception has something to do with the 3.11 Fukushima nuclear radiation leakage accident in 2011¹³. It needs more explanation. In contrast, Beijing citizens do not seem to take it seriously. This could be because a lower fertility rate was taken for granted due to the one-child policy being in place since 1982, and also because the marriage rate, even though dropping, is still high compared to Korea and Japan (Figure 4.3).

On top of this we have to mention the role of government policy. As discussed above, government policy might be mediating in this process since, for example, the government policy reflects how the government defines family risk. Korea and China could be good examples for this (Table 4-1). More specifically, in the case of fertility rates in Korea, the Korean government considered high fertility as risk since the Park Chunghee regime saw it as an obstacle to their pursuit of economic development and began a family planning campaign in the 1960's. As a result, the fertility rate began to drop. However, as the fertility rates began to fall too fast and too low by 2000, the government changed its position, defined low fertility as a risk, and began to organize commissions and legislate laws promoting high fertility. This might be related with the high risk perception of low fertility among Seoul citizens. In China, we can also find similar government policy changes, though somewhat later. In the early 1980's, twenty years later than Korea, China also defined high fertility as a risk for economic development and started the one-child policy. This has probably influenced the Beijing citizens' relaxed perception of the risk represented by low fertility since for a long time one child households were taken for granted. Only recently has the Chinese government changed its position, defining low fertility as a risk and relaxing the one-child policy.¹⁴

Another thing to discuss is why Seoul citizens' perceive low fertility and isolation and suicide of the elderly as more serious than divorce, despite the fact that both the divorce rate and the fertility rate are changing rapidly in Korea. The answer to this question can also be put in the context of

¹³ There was a news report on the change of Japanese young people's attitude toward the marriage after the 3.11 Fukushima accident. More young people who did not want to get married have realized the importance of the family after the accident and began to rethink their attitude to marriage.

¹⁴ Thus now we can see that with the low fertility, China is trying to change the one child-policy, expanding the recognition of exception on the limited conditions in 2008, and making broader expansions in 2013.

government policy. The Korean government was very active in making policy alternatives for low birth and ageing problems. For example, as shown in Table 4-1, it has established not only a Presidential Commission for Low Fertility and Aging Society in 2005, but also legislated the Basic Act for Low Fertility and Aging Society in 2005. However, the Korean government has not done much to counteract the soaring divorce rate, only introducing a legal delay by extending the deliberation period (Table 4-2).¹⁵

This contextualization and interpretation of risk perception through official statistics and the related policy changes provides us with a better interpretation of the different risk perceptions among the citizens of the three cities. When we ask why risk perception is higher in one city and lower in another, we can answer that the risk perception is higher when there is a recent rapid change in official statistics and government policy, and lower when there is no or a very slow recent change in official statistics and related policies. This means that official statistics for fertility and divorce rates influence the family risk perception of citizens, and those citizens' reproductive behavior influences the official statistics. It leads us to conclude that there is an interrelation between the official statistics and family risk perception with the mediation of government policy, and suggests that risk is an outcome of social construction. Further study is needed to see clearly how the process of the social construction of risk changes and is shaped.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has tried to investigate family risks from the perspective of risk society in East Asia, and to reveal its variations and contextualization. For this a conceptual distinction was made between "the first modern" and "the second modern" types of family risk and its objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension refers to the official statistics related with the family risk in three countries of East Asia, that is, Korea, China, and Japan, and the subjective dimension refers to citizens' perception of the family risk in the three capital cities of those countries through survey research. The research findings are as follows: First, as to the variation of family risk perception in the three cities, Seoul and Tokyo show higher family

¹⁵ As to the question of why the government put more emphasis on low fertility and the elderly issues than on divorce, the answer is probably to be found in the relatively high and fast pervasion of feminism in Korea compared to Japan and China.

risk perception than Beijing does. More specifically, family risk perception of “the second modern” type turned out to be higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and family risk perception of “the first modern” type turned out to be higher in Beijing. Both “the first modern” type and “the second modern” type were shown to co-exist in the three cities, even though there were some variations. Second, when we put the family risk perception of citizens in the context of the official statistics, with the specific examples of divorce rates and fertility rates, we found that the risk perception is higher when there has been a rapid recent change, and lower when there has been no or very slow recent change in official statistics. Of course, there seem to be some mediating factors at work such as government policy.

The conclusions we can draw from the findings are that, firstly, East Asian cities share not only a high risk perception of “the second modern” type, but also of “the first modern” type of family risk, and that this is something which characterizes East Asian cities. Secondly, the contextualization of family risk perception with the official statistics shows that these two are interrelated in a way that can be explained by the social construction of risk.

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