

Nuclear Politics, Past and Present: Comparison of German and Japanese Anti-Nuclear Peace Movements

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This article addresses the question of what has contributed to the difference between German and Japanese nuclear politics in the post-Fukushima era. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear energy, but Japan has done the opposite. The origin of this difference can be traced back to the development of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the early 1980s. West Germans turned against nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons, whereas Japanese peace activists carefully avoided the nuclear energy issue because of their concern over U.S.-Japan relations. The West German peace movement in the following years was in a position to foster cooperation between East and West Germans, whereas the Japanese movement missed the chance to go beyond the Cold War mentality.

Keywords Germany, Japan, nuclear energy, peace movement, nuclear weapons

Introduction

Today in Japan the meaning of peace and pacifism is changing. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has indicated his intention to alter the interpretation of Article 9, the peace clause of the Japanese Constitution, in order to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Abe has justified his proposal by invoking the principle of *sekkyokuteki heiwa shugi* (proactive contribution to peace). In this way Abe turned to a phrase popular in Japanese peace studies, *sekkyokuteki heiwa* (usually translated “positive peace”). But it is quite clear that even though they are the same words in Japanese, Abe’s *proactive* pacifism is not the same as *positive* peace used by scholars of peace studies. Abe’s problematic usurping of the “peace” terminology can be demonstrated through an examination of another peace-related issue: the case of the phase-out of nuclear energy. The nuclear phase-out seemed to have gained momentum in Japan after the Fukushima disaster on March 11, 2011 (hereafter the 3.11 incident or disaster), but recently the phase-

out process has been reversed. It has been decided that Japanese dependence on nuclear energy will not come to an end in the near future. If one understands positive peace as a concept related to human rights, human dignity, safety of life, and freedom from fear, it is fair to say that peace is now in more danger than ever before.

Given this situation, this article analyzes the Japanese peace movement and its connection to the anti-nuclear power movement. In particular a comparison will be made with the German case in order to give a global perspective to analysis of the history of the peace movement. A thorny question arises in comparing the two cases: Why is Japan not allowed to participate in military actions, while Germany—like Japan, a defeated country in World War II—has the right to do so within NATO? This kind of question has been asked repeatedly in Japanese society. Other important topics of comparison are the discussions about issues related to “overcoming the past” (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in German). The debate about nuclear power plants in the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster is another emerging popular point of comparison. The discussion about nuclear energy in Japan and Germany after the Fukushima incident has revealed differences in the nuclear politics of the two nations. The German government, under Chancellor Angela Merkel, declared a nuclear power moratorium on March 15, 2011, and the German Bundestag enacted a nuclear phase-out on June 30. The Japanese government, however, which stopped operations of all nuclear plants for the purpose of safety checks, has announced its decision to restart its plants. Notably, although both governments are conservative, their reactions to the disaster have been quite different. Since 2011 many articles and books have been published in Japan on the nuclear phase-out issue (Kido 2011; T. Kobayashi 2011; Kumagai 2012; Wakao and Honda 2012; Izeki 2013; Kawana 2013; Tamura 2013), and now, like the issue of overcoming the past, it has become a prominent focus in Japanese historical studies of Germany. The political and cultural backgrounds of both countries are quite different, and thus a simple comparison is sometimes not appropriate. However, in this case a comparison can be very helpful in understanding postwar Japanese history.

This article aims to examine differences between the peace movements of Germany and Japan, focusing on the anti-nuclear weapons movements in the early 1980s and their counterparts today. The peace movement in Germany at that time was primarily a protest movement against the NATO policy of deploying new nuclear missiles in the territories of its member states. This movement emerged in Western Europe and then developed worldwide to become a global anti-nuclear weapons movement. The German peace movement powerfully influenced the Japanese peace movement, which already had a tradition of anti-nuclear activism after the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This article analyzes not only comparative aspects of the peace movements in Japan and Germany but also their relevance to the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear

energy movements in Japan today.

West German Anti-Nuclear Movement in the Early 1980s

The West German anti-nuclear movement began with the Göttingen Manifesto, which was a protest by 18 prominent scientists against the proposed production of German nuclear weapons, and the *Kampf dem Atomtod* (Fight against Nuclear Death campaign) in the late 1950s. The former was the declaration made by famous German nuclear scientists against the production and the possession of nuclear weapons in West Germany, and the latter was a peaceful movement against nuclear weapons led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and trade unions. In the 1960s the West German people started to hold the annual Easter March, influenced by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom, and this has continued until today. It is noteworthy that as early as the 1950s, the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition) formed the basis of a new protest culture in German society. The style of the peace movement, which had traditionally been supported by political parties and organizations, changed in the 1960s; it developed into a *new social movement* incorporating the feminist and environmental protection movements. This was a significant shift in the culture of protest. The student activism in 1968 involved these movements and brought a fundamental change to West German society. The strength of the movement led to significant policy consequences as West Germany became a signatory to the international regime of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969. As a nonnuclear nation, West Germany, like Japan, chose not to possess its own nuclear weapons but to stay under the American nuclear umbrella; however, it also chose to develop nuclear power plants for “peaceful use.” Owing to the development of the NPT regime, the German anti-nuclear weapons movement became weaker in the 1970s, whereas the anti-nuclear power plant movement became stronger. This situation continued until the early 1980s when the so-called New Cold War era began.

From the end of World War II until the late 1970s the concept of peace was not an important issue in West Germany, whereas Japan throughout this period emphasized *peace* and *pacifism* as part of its national identity. The prevention of war was, of course, significant in Germany also, but democracy and human rights came to the forefront in German society. In this context, Germany further distanced itself from its Nazi identity and moved to a new, modern German identity. During that period the peace movement was rather a minor movement in West Germany, in particular because East Germany emphasized its own peace policy, which was influenced by Soviet politics. In the era of “better dead than red,” a peace movement was too red for many people in West Germany (Takemoto, forthcoming).

The character of the German peace movement again changed in the early 1980s. During the New Cold War, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union accelerated. Following the U.S. development of the neutron bomb and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO decided on the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The danger of a “limited” nuclear war seemed to be escalating. In these circumstances, the protest movement against NATO became stronger, at first in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, then spreading to other Western European countries, especially to West Germany. The Krefeld Appeal in 1980, which was an anti-nuclear weapons appeal written by a later Green Party leader, Petra Kelly, and her group, led to a significant increase in size and public attention for the German anti-nuclear movement. The appeal demanded that NATO remove all of its nuclear weapons from Germany and advocated for disarmament in Central Europe (Hoppe 1982, 89). The campaign to collect signatures to support the Krefeld Appeal had the backing not only of West Germans but also of many East Germans. After this appeal people became more conscious of the issue of peace. A peace demonstration in Bonn in October 1981, where more than 300,000 participants gathered, became a historic moment in Germany.

One of the important features of the anti-nuclear and peace movements in the early 1980’s was their grassroots strength. The movement was one of the biggest grassroots movements Germany had ever seen. In addition to the traditional peace organizations, such as the German Peace Society, many unaffiliated individuals participated in the demonstrations. Local governments, communities, trade unions, universities, and religious organizations all formed small groups. The second feature of the peace movement at that time was the establishment of the Green Party. It took the ideas of other grassroots movements, such as feminism, environmental protection, and peace, and brought these issues to the parliament. The third character of the peace movement in the early 1980s was the significant role of the churches. Churches were the only intermediary between West and East Germans. For East Germans, it was also the only place where they could talk about politics, especially about democracy, peace, and environmental issues. Through exchanges between churches West German peace activists kept in contact with Eastern peace and anti-establishment movements under the slogan “Make Peace without Weapons” (*Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen*). Stickers bearing the widely recognized Swords to Ploughshares image, based on a Biblical passage, became popular in West Germany as a symbol for the establishment of a peaceful society without weapons (Nakai 1983, 219).

To be sure, the German peace movements in the early 1980s were movements of protest against new missiles and nuclear weapons and against Europe becoming a nuclear battlefield, namely the *Hiroshimanization* of Europe or *Euroshima*. If judged strictly on their stated goals, the movements were far from successful since new missiles were deployed in 1983 as planned, and the

denuclearization of Europe still has not happened. But this does not mean that the movements were a failure. The public protest against the deployment of new nuclear missiles in the European theater was one of the main factors that led the leaders of the East and West, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan, to negotiate steps towards nuclear disarmament. They signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, which demanded the removal and dismantlement of cruise missiles, Pershing II, and SS 20 missiles from Europe. Removal of these weapons was also the objective of the peace movement in the early 1980s (Kaldor 1999, 361). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly in the long run, the anti-nuclear weapons movements at that time changed the *breadth* of the meaning of peace in Germany. The themes of labor and poverty were also discussed as peace issues. The movement against nuclear power plants, which first appeared in the 1970s, was combined with the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, as reflected in the ideas of Petra Kelly and the Green Party. Kelly called nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons “Siamese twins” (Kelly 1983a, 194). The peace movement, which was regarded by conservative Germans as communists spouting slogans in the early Cold War period, gained broader approval in the 1980s and came to be accepted by most West Germans. The peace movement developed from an anti-NATO movement to an anti-Cold War movement, thus eventually paving the way for the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the peace movement developed into grassroots movements to protect a secure life (Takemoto 2012). In such movements, the word “peace” was understood as the concept of positive peace.

Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement in the Early 1980s

The Peace Movement until the 1970s

The post-1945 Japanese peace movement has generally been regarded as a movement for supporting Article 9 of the Constitution, and for promoting activism against the U.S. bases in Japan, and against atomic and hydrogen weapons (Yamada 2009). The principle of unarmed and nonviolent pacifism enshrined in Article 9, which was established with the aim of overcoming the strong militarism of the Japanese Empire, is one of the important factors of the Japanese national identity after World War II. As Akihiko Kimijima argues, this principle dominates discussions on peace in Japan and defines the character of Japanese peace studies (Kimijima 2014, 9). However, Article 9 and Japanese pacifism have always been under threat. With the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan remains under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, while sacrificing Okinawa and the welfare of the people living there.

Different from the cases of other countries, the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement has assumed the important task of supporting the *hibakusha*

(survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) in their lives. However, in the first ten years after World War II the issue of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was ignored by most Japanese people. In 1954, in response to the U.S. massive hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll, and the resulting contamination of the crew of the *Lucky Dragon 5* fishing vessel, the anti-nuclear weapons movement was initiated by Japanese housewives and gained strong support from citizens in Tokyo, and then became a national movement centered on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement was driven mostly by the activism of the wartime generation who insisted on “no more war,” whereas the German movement was regarded mainly as one of the new social movements triggered by the student movement in the 1960s. In contrast to pacifism based on Article 9 that became Japan’s national identity, the anti-nuclear movement was regarded as a leftwing movement in Japan. In reality it was a limited, local movement in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; it was not able to sufficiently expand to other regions. The internal schism between socialists and communists brought a split in the hibakusha movement as well. Due to different responses to the nuclear tests of the Soviet Union in 1962 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, there was a dispute between the hibakusha and leaders of the anti-nuclear weapons movement. As a result, in 1964 the Hiroshima branch of the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations split into two groups. Although they cooperated with each other for a short period in the 1980s, until now they have still not reunited. Unlike in Germany, the new left in Japan completely burned out and did not rejuvenate the anti-nuclear movement and so it stayed in the hands of the older generation.

Influence of West Germany on Japan

The Japanese peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements in the 1980s reached their peak in 1982. They were influenced by the surge of the European anti-NATO movement. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 caused an upsurge in the popularity of peace movements across the world. Many Japanese, especially the citizens of Hiroshima, thought that since theirs was the only country to have been attacked with atomic bombs, and being where the nuclear disarmament movement had originated, Japan should become more active. This sense of responsibility moved many Japanese people to join the peace movement. A research group in Hiroshima found that 172 books on the A-bomb and the anti-nuclear weapons movement were published in 1982. The group also found that in 1982 alone 457 articles related to the A-bomb were published in journals. In addition, many newspaper articles were written about nuclear weapons and the peace movement (Hiroshima o yomu kai 1983, 2-3).

The European peace movement was enthusiastically supported in Japan at that time. In particular the West German movement was often reported on, and journalists and peace activists visited Germany to witness the movement

for themselves. Author Kenzaburō Ōe was one of them. The later Nobel Prize laureate in literature wrote on the issue of nuclear weapons in works such as *Hiroshima Note* (1965), and he himself was a peace activist. In an essay on his trip to Germany he used the word “Euroshima,” stressing the German pronunciation of the word to show his sympathy for the German movement (Ōe 1982). Other experts on German issues, including Asaho Mizushima and Kiyohiko Nagai, reported on the state of the German peace movements and analyzed how they were appealing to ordinary people (Mizushima 1981; Nagai 1982). Jun Yamaura wrote that the German movement was not only an anti-nuclear weapons movement but also an authentic peace movement. This implied that the West German movement could be a functional model for the Japanese movement, which was weak because of internal conflicts and the split between socialists and communists. Yamaura wrote that one of the features of the West German movement was that it was organized not by only one party but by a wide spectrum of people and groups. Although the Green Party played a particularly important role it did not control or lead the movement. For these broader movements in Germany, to oppose the deployment of new nuclear missiles was their *minimum* objective in order to bring peace. In other words, such varied people gathered because of their broader consciousness to establish peace (Yamaura 1984, 158). For Yamaura, the West German peace movement also reflected a general mood of resistance in West German society, which had assumed an oppressive atmosphere caused by the progressive shift toward a controlled society and a police state, in other words toward a form of “controlled Fascism” (ibid., 164-165).

Evaluation of Today's Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement

The influence on Japan of the German anti-nuclear weapons movement was remarkable. It can clearly be illustrated in the campaign against nuclear weapons led by prominent Japanese writers. In the winter of 1981 West German writer Hans Peter Bleuer visited Japan. He met with Japanese writers and demanded that they join the campaign to collect signatures in a campaign against nuclear weapons organized by European writers. As a reaction, Narihiko Itō, Kōji Nakano and others began a Japanese version of their own anti-nuclear weapons campaign, and announced the *Appeal of Writers in Japan against Nuclear War*. They sent letters to many Japanese writers asking for their support with the following appeal:

As those who have experienced the tragedy of the first and only atomic bombing in the world, we, writers, think that we should now raise our voices and warn of the true horrors of nuclear war, demand that the Japanese government and the nuclear superpowers in the East and West strictly obey the three non-nuclear principles of Japan, and spread them to the whole world and take measures for the abolition of nuclear weapons. (Ito et al. 1982, 14)

They also wrote in a separate statement:

We, who experienced *Hiroshima* and *Nagasaki*, think that it is our responsibility for human beings to try their best to do everything we can do in order to prevent the earth from becoming the second and last field of nuclear war. We ask to all people on the earth to act immediately for peace. We shall do so tirelessly and ever more vigorously. (ibid., 17)

Copies of this appeal were not only sent directly to writers but also published in newspapers, including the *Asahi Shimbun*. The organizers of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons campaign included several prominent writers such as Makoto Oda, Kenzaburo Ōe, and Hisashi Inoue, who had already been active in the peace movement themselves. Some famous writers of *Genbaku bungaku* (literature related to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) such as Sadako Kurihara and Kyōko Hayashi, who were hibakusha themselves, were also involved in the movement from its beginning. In addition to these writers who were generally political and interested in the issue of atomic bombs, the names of many other political writers, such as Masuji Ibuse, were also on the list of the organizers. The fact that more than 500 writers gave their signatures to this appeal was a remarkable event in the history of Japanese literature and therefore it created a great sensation at that time (Itō et al. 1982, 22). Moreover, other peace campaigns and demonstrations were carried out in 1982 such as the '82 *Hiroshima Action for Peace* in March, which was a massive anti-nuclear weapons demonstration held in Hiroshima. At the same time, a nationwide campaign against nuclear weapons collected some 27,540,000 individual signatures to be presented to the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (Takazawa 2011, 108). With such enthusiastic response to campaigns and peace demonstrations, the Japanese peace movement acquired the character of a grassroots movement. However, ever since the incident at Bikini Atoll in 1954, the Japanese peace movement had stuck to the method of collecting signatures as its only activity, and operating at this minimum level did not bring about any noticeable social change. In contrast, the West German peace movement drastically changed both its strategy and also German society in general.

How can we evaluate the peace movements of the Japanese writers today? Among their literary colleagues the campaign to collect signatures against nuclear weapons by writers has not been evaluated positively. In the early 1980s it was criticized because it was likely to appeal to emotion. The harshest criticism was made by writer Takaaki Yoshimoto. In his *Hankaku iron* (Objection to the Anti-nuclear Movement), he generated a stream of ideological opposition against the anti-nuclear energy movement in Japan (Yoshimoto 1982). The appeal by Itō and others and the criticism by Yoshimoto resurfaced following the 3.11 incident in Japanese discourse on nuclear energy. Professor and literary critic Minato

Kawamura also criticized the appeal and campaign. According to Kawamura, they represented no more than an anti-nuclear movement instigated by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had lost the nuclear space defense war with the United States and supported the anti-nuclear movement in order to weaken the nuclear missile deployments in NATO countries, especially in West Germany. For Kawamura, who regrets the insufficiency of the discussion on nuclear energy in Japan after the 3.11 incident, Japanese anti-nuclear campaigns in the 1980s were merely transient movements organized by the old leftwing, and a “kind of masturbation” on the part of the mass media that ended in vain, with no political efficacy. It was just a kind of merrymaking while repeating the same slogan (“No more Hiroshimas”), followed by the declaring of non-nuclear cities (Kawamura 2011, 74). More important was that Yoshimoto’s criticism of the appeal weakened the ideology of the protest movement which clearly targeted Japanese nuclear politics and the nuclear industry with the slogan of “anti-nuclear power plant” and “anti-nuclear energy” (ibid., 77). However, Hidetsugu Takazawa, who is also a literary critic, evaluated it differently. According to Takazawa, the campaign by Itō and Nakano was a depoliticized popular movement and it was fundamentally incapable of being radical. The campaign and the appeal by writers lacked the dynamism that could have been generated by the anti-nuclear power plant movement. Yoshimoto brought the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union to the discussion and attempted to break the political linkage between the anti-nuclear weapons, the anti-nuclear power plant, and the ecological movements (Takazawa 2011, 109). As these examples show, the Japanese debate on nuclear issues in the early 1980s, which was influenced by the Cold War system, resulted in a weakening of the anti-nuclear energy movement, and so actually reinforced Japan’s dependence on nuclear energy up until the 3.11 incident. This is one of the notable differences between Japan and Germany. In Germany, as mentioned above, the anti-nuclear weapons movement cooperated closely with the anti-nuclear power plant movement.

Actually the anti-nuclear energy issue could be seen in the Japanese peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Ichirō Moritaki, who was a hibakusha and a leader of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in Hiroshima, absolutely opposed all nuclear power as early as 1971 (Katō 2013, 264). Jinsaburō Takagi, an expert on nuclear issues and one of the pioneers of the anti-nuclear power plants movement from the 1970s, and also one of the founders of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center established in 1975, insisted that the Japanese anti-nuclear power plants and anti-nuclear weapons movements should merge (Takagi 1982). Also, members of the socialist groups of the anti-nuclear weapons movement (*Gensuikin*) had already launched an anti-nuclear power plants movement in the 1970s and had good connections with the German Green Party. In local areas like Ikata in Ehime Prefecture strong anti-nuclear power plant movements were started. However, even though the

Social Democratic Party Japan opposed nuclear energy, it could not support movements led by Moritaki or Takagi. The supporters of nuclear power still had strong influence in the Party (Katō 2013, 266). The issue of nuclear power plants was “removed from the discussion in order to gain support from a wide variety of people” (Suga 2011, 116). Therefore, those who gave their signatures for the appeal, like Takayuki Suga, criticized it because the anti-nuclear power plants issue was not integrated into the appeal. It was also criticized for allowing participation by some right-wing writers in the campaign without considering their past support for the war (*ibid.*).

In this way, the campaign by writers against nuclear weapons did not involve the anti-nuclear power plants movement. However, it can be said that it is typical and traditional in the Japanese peace movement to focus on a “single issue” as a strategy to involve more people. As early as the 1950s the campaign against nuclear tests tactically limited their discussion to the anti-hydrogen bombs discourse in order to become a nationwide movement (Y. Kobayashi 2013). In discussing the nuclear energy issue after the Fukushima incident and noting the different approaches in Germany and Japan to the phase-out of nuclear power, some scholars emphasize the differences in reaction to the Chernobyl disaster. However, as already shown, the difference between Japan and Germany can be found in the features of their respective peace movements in the 1980s. In the case of Japan, the anti-nuclear weapons movement could not develop into an anti-nuclear energy movement.

In the case of West Germany, the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement in the early 1980s went beyond the Cold War East-West dichotomy. It gained the power of being viewed as an alternative, based on protest culture such as civil non-obedience, a factor that was missing in the Japanese peace movement. In 2011 a philosopher and expert on Germany, Toshiaki Kobayashi, in his article about the background of the German nuclear phase-out, examined the Japanese peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement of the early 1980s. He implicitly criticized Yoshimoto as a thinker who opposed the peace movement as propaganda from the East and characterized his attitude as “a grandstand play of an intellectual who lived in an island country and was ill-informed about the situation in Europe” (T. Kobayashi 2011).

The Japanese peace and anti-nuclear movements in the early 1980s remained ineffective. However, they led many local authorities to declare their cities to be nuclear-free. This movement was first started in the United Kingdom. It spread to Japan and almost 90% of the Japanese local governments declared themselves nuclear-free. While the declaration and similar non-nuclear cities campaigns did not have any legal effect, they aroused public interest in the history of the war. Citizens organized many local exhibitions on the Pacific War and as a result this led to the establishment of peace and war museums in many cities. These museums provided opportunities for citizens to learn about peace. The opening

of a large number of peace museums is a characteristic of Japan where pacifism is regarded as part of the national identity. Recently some of these peace museums were reviewed under the influence of conservative and revisionist mayors and the exhibitions on Japanese atrocities were eliminated. However, in general, museums for peace are effective forums for citizens to discuss the issues of war and peace. It is difficult for peace movements organized by cities to have a direct influence on world peace, but they can be expected to link the citizens to their government. For example, the Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons is a peace movement jointly organized by citizens and local governments (Nagasaki City and Nagasaki Prefecture). It has had the power to influence peace policies in Nagasaki. In addition, by involving the younger generation the Assembly contributes to keeping the memories of the atomic bombings alive in the public consciousness.

The campaign to collect signatures against nuclear weapons in the 1980s had a by-product. The authors who were the initiators of the campaign edited a collection of literary works on the atomic bombings that contributed to the progress of research on atomic bomb literature. Telling the experiences of the atomic bombings does not simply mean to describe the suffering of the Japanese people. It forced them to think about Japanese war responsibility and also nuclear energy, such as the damage caused by radiation and the rights and wrongs of nuclear energy. At the same time, the campaign by writers in the 1980s became a stimulus for the West German peace movement. In November 1982 some of the organizers of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons campaign—including Narihiko Itō, Sadako Kurihara, Makoto Oda, and Chihoko Koura—participated in the international literature conference *Inter'lit 1982*, held in Cologne in West Germany, where they discussed peace with German intellectuals like Günther Grass and Christa Wolf (Engelmann et al. 1982). Many books on Hiroshima were published in West Germany at that time (Kelly 1983b). In addition, German activists, including Petra Kelly and Gerd Bastian, visited Hiroshima and met hibakusha and Japanese peace activists. Both through their books and their personal experience in Hiroshima, hibakushas' testimony and the situation of the Japanese peace movement became better understood in Germany. In one sense, the campaign by Japanese writers contributed to developing the connections between Hiroshima and Germany.

After the 3.11 incident the discussion in Japanese society on the meaning of the writers' campaign of the 1980s developed into a discussion on post-war culture, the significance of nuclear energy in Japan, and the role of intellectuals. However, as already mentioned, these discussions sometimes cannot go beyond a Cold War mentality, while recent German studies try to see the transnational character of the history of the peace movement. As far as the Japanese peace movement is concerned, it operates in the context of the Cold War and is regarded as a failed movement because of the split of both left parties, the Social

Democratic Party and the Communist Party. It is difficult for the peace movement to become a movement of protest and non-obedience. Further discussion and broader perspectives are necessary to understand the Japanese peace movement.

Conclusion

Following 3.11 the issue of nuclear energy suddenly became a major topic of peace research and of the peace movement in Japan. The same phenomenon was also seen in the field of historical studies. Historians started to look at the history of nuclear politics and to try to find the reasons for the nature of Japanese nuclear culture. The West German anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1980s integrated with the anti-nuclear power movement. The culture of civil protest paved the way for the nuclear phase-out in Germany, as well as for the strong environmental protection movement. Civil protest was a protest against the dangers to life and against everything that threatens a peaceful society. As a result, this movement could promote and develop cooperation between the people in the East and West and the German people could transcend the Cold War system. By contrast, the Japanese people still cannot go beyond Cold War politics, which could be due in part to the strong dependence on the United States.

However, like Japan, Germany is still under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and it seems that people today are more interested in the anti-nuclear power plant movement than in the anti-nuclear weapons movement. This situation, both in Japan and in Germany, means that it is necessary to reevaluate what the peace movements in the 1980s achieved and did not achieve. This evaluation could help the movement for establishing a peaceful and nuclear-free world to regain some of its lost momentum.

Note

This article is a product of two research projects: (1) *Toward Peace Studies as Global History: Memories of Auschwitz and Hiroshima*, supported by Kaken-hi (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), 233201061) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and (2) *Peace Museum Studies on Relationship of the Idea of "Peace" and Presentation of Information on Radiation Disasters by Local Governments*, supported by Peace-related Grants of Hiroshima City University. Thanks are due to Yūji Wakao (Kyoto), Ran Zwigenberg (Penn State), Robert Jacobs (Hiroshima), David Lee (Hiroshima), and Yūko Takahashi (Iwakuni) for helping with the English translation and for comments on the manuscript.

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