

Russia as a 'New Seasoned Facilitator' in Making Medium and Long-Term Prosperity for the Korean Peninsula within the Framework of the 'Six-Party Talks'

Park, Jisun (King's College London)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine *a new role for Russia as facilitator of pragmatic solutions for the Korean Peninsula within the framework of the Six Party Talks*. In this regard, I will focus on the role of Russia in creating a new approach to Korean peninsula issues, based on the presumption that Moscow's contribution to the Six-Party Talks might bring positive alternatives. Thus, the new Russian role in making contribution to a medium and long-term solution on the Korean peninsula is to be the main theme of this paper. Subsequently, this paper will pursue the following steps to suggest the new role of Russia within the framework of the Six-Party Talks:

- **【Step1】** Understanding the Six-Party Talks functioned as a multilateral negotiation framework
- **【Step2】** Scrutinizing the new role of Russia in the course of the inter-relations between Russia and the two Koreas

- 【Step3】 Suggesting an important scenario, the so-called ‘Economic Reconstruction Project for the DPRK’, to promote Russia’s participation as a ‘new seasoned facilitator’ by using the framework of the Six-Party Talks

Key words: North Korea, Six Party Talks, Russian Foreign Policy, New Seasoned Facilitator, Medium-Long Term Prosperity for the Korean Peninsula

I . Introduction

“Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation on nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond……”

UN Resolution 1718(2006)¹⁾

The purpose of this paper is to raise a crucial question on the assumption that the Six-Party Talks is a plausible framework to resolve the Korean peninsula issues beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis: If this is so, what is a role of Russia providing more pragmatic solutions for the Korean

¹⁾ See UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006).

[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%20\(2006\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%20(2006))
(accessed on: 01/09/2015)

Peninsula as a new experienced facilitator within the framework of the Six Party Talks? Before suggesting possible answers to the question posed above, this paper will offer three presumptions:

- i. The Six-Party Talks should fashion more pragmatic approaches to provide viable benefits in favors of all the six players ;
- ii. The agenda of the Six-Party Talks should be extended from political issues related to the North Korean nuclear crisis to imminent economic problems of the Korean peninsula such as a solution for economic prosperity; and
- iii. A 'new seasoned facilitator' within the Six-Party Talks, in this case Russia, should emerge to intensify the two presumptions mentioned before.

On this basis, I will explore the possibility of expanding the role of Russia on the Korean peninsula, based on the presumption that Moscow's contribution to the Six-Party Talks might bring positive alternatives to the current status quo. In recent years, the significance of the Korean peninsula for Russia has grown within the overall framework of a pragmatic 'multi-vector' foreign policy.²⁾ In September 2015, the current Russian Ambassador, Alexander Timonin, said a primary cooperation between Seoul and Moscow is to seek a feasible way to resolve nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. He believes that "the six-party talks are the most appropriate structure to gather all related parties and discuss nuclear issues."³⁾ In this

²⁾ Georgy Toloraya, "Russian Policy in Korea in a time of chang," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 21:1 (2009), p.68.

³⁾ "Russian Envoy Discusses Pyongyang tests, Thaad," Korea Joongang Daily, September 25, 2015; (<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3009631>).

regard, the new Russian role in making contribution to a medium and long-term solution on the Korean peninsula is to be the main theme of this paper. Thus, this paper will examine the following three steps to determine the feasibility of three suppositions mentioned before:

【Step1】 Understanding the Six-Party Talks functioned as a multilateral negotiation framework

【Step2】 Scrutinizing the new role of Russia in the course of the inter-relations between Russia and the two Koreas

【Step3】 Suggesting an important scenario, the so-called ‘Economic Reconstruction Project for the DPRK’, to promote Russia’s participation as a ‘new seasoned facilitator’ by using the framework of the Six-Party Talks

In this regard, the significance of this paper is to demonstrate a new perspective relating to the medium-long term prosperity of the Korean peninsula within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.

However, the first limitation which this research is facing is the fact that no definitive conclusion can be made since the talks are still progressing, although it seems be the ending of the denuclearization talks since North Korea walked out in 2009. This is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea openly releases the news that chief negotiators for the Six-Party Talks have regular discussions via public press and official websites.⁴⁾ Secondly, previous studies about the Six-Party Talks usually focus on the role of the US and China, which deals with politico-strategic interests

⁴⁾ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea;
(http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/kpen/nknuclear/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_20_20_10&tabmenu=t_2).

at the negotiation table. In other words, most academic papers written by individual researchers on Pyongyang's nuclear weapon are focused on empirical studies of North Korea negotiating behaviors and memories of participants in the Six-Party Talks.⁵⁾ The objective of these studies is to discover the main features of Pyongyang's political decision-making of negotiation processes by analysing empirical cases with North Korea. For example, North Korea's coercive negotiating style, the so-called "Brinkmanship" is originated from such studies through the periodical analysis of strategic behaviours during the Six-Party Talks.

By taking such considerations into account this paper pursues a problem-solving approach based on history-based cases and critical analyses to alleviate such limitations mentioned above. For this reason, although there are unavoidable obstacles to develop some propositions for the paper, this approach can be worthy as a pragmatic academic study suggested with important hypothesis and scenarios. Therefore, on this basis, this paper will aim to establish the pre-conclusion offered: Russia and six-party talks as the new approach for a medium and long-term solution on the Korean peninsula.

5) *Some of the studies in the Six-Party Talks are as follows: Downs Chunk, *Over the Line* (1999); Snyder Scott, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behaviour* (1999); Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb*(2007); Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis*(2008); Dong-Won Lim, *Peacemaker* (2008), Soo-Hyuk Lee *Transforming Event* (2005); Funabashi Yoichi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (2007).

II. Understanding the Six-Party Talks

The main purpose of this step is to determine the significance of the multilateral negotiation on the medium and long-term issues of the Korean peninsula beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis by looking into chronological backgrounds of the Six-Party Talks.

Indeed, the “blueprint” for the 21st century peace-building on the Korean peninsula must be a smarter approach because insecurity and prosperity co-exist in this region. When it comes to the geopolitical aspect, the peninsula influenced from the by-products of the Cold War can be regarded as a spot of strategic importance where interests of the major powers such as the US and Russia are contested. In fact, different actors surrounding the Korean peninsula have different interests on the inter-Korean dialogues. In this sense, the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula demonstrate a unique pattern on the international political order. North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang’s rocket launch on 5 April 2009, and a revelation of their uranium enrichment facilities at Yongbyon in 2010 which created major uproars could be examples of power game of how complicated the situation in the region is. No matter what the intention of Pyongyang—whether it was a peaceful experiment or intimidating military provocations—the United Nations Security Council condemned the increasing military threat of the North as it is causing international security risks beyond the Northeast Asian region.⁶⁾ Additionally, neither South Korea

⁶⁾ After Pyongyang’s rocket launch in early April, the United Nations Security Council

nor the US was able to impose strong actions against Pyongyang at their discretion because they have to consider positions and reactions of the neighboring states such as Japan, Russia, and China and so on.

In this same way, a framework to discuss complicated matters concerning North Korea by the neighboring countries was founded in 2003: the so-called "Six-Party Talks". The participants of the Six-Party Talks consist of Japan, People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, United States, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea.⁷⁾ Such a multilateral composition offers a framework for a peace-building effort on the Korean peninsula as 'the second best option' in high-politics areas such as military and diplomatic means. Actually, the task of the Six-Party Talks for the members other than North Korea is clear—ending the North Korean nuclear weapons programs and scraps relevant technological capability. That is a pivotal purpose to create the framework which calls up the six players having different interests.

However, despite the existence of the collective desire by the players to stop North Korea, in reality, there are many obstacles in reaching a resolution within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Recently, Kim Jong-un regime continues to escalate repetitive military provocations in the Korean peninsula by newly stating in its constitution that "it has become a nuclear state, launching another long-range missile in December and

was to set a unanimous resolution denouncing North Korea's rocket launch based on the Security Council resolution 1718; (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2009/dprk-090411-voa02.htm>).

7) *Both official and unofficial designation for the participants of the Six-Party Talks members will be used in mixture including such terms as, for example, North Korea, the North, Kim Jung-Il regime and Pyongyang.

conducting its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013”.⁸⁾ For this reason, North Korea issues demands fairly multifaceted calculations owing to the historic, political and economic dilemmas among the participants. In this respect, the talks have not produced a comprehensive agreement or feasible actions since the beginning even though this approach is a commendable model of such a multilateral negotiation.

Nevertheless, I conclude that the Six-Party Talks plays an important part in the resolution about comprehensive issues adjoining the Korean peninsula. In spite of many obstacles facing the Six-Party Talks, the players kept the multilateral and intricate meeting continue for more than 10 years while expecting favorable results to extend their strategic goals.

When it comes to chronological steps of the Talks, the first Six-Party Talks initiated in 2003, but the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is regarded as the main theme of the Six-Party Talks originated in the early of 1960s. After the Korean War, North Korea established a nuclear energy facility at Yongbyon in 1962 based on the agreement of peaceful nuclear energy development with the Soviet Union. Since then, a suspicion that Pyongyang might have the capacity to develop a workable nuclear weapon became an ‘open secret’. Finally, such a suspicion was known to the international community with a concrete evidence—the US and French satellite images of Yongbyon.⁹⁾ Owing to the apparent information of the

⁸⁾ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea;

(http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/kpen/nknuclear/overview/index.jsp?menu=m_20_20_10)

⁹⁾ Kook Sin, Kim, “North Korean Nuclear crisis and International Responses,” *Korea Institute for National Unification*, Issue Paper for the Korean Reunification (Nov 2006), pp.2~10.


Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington concluded that North Korea was pursuing a uranium enrichment program.

Hence, as an appeasement to end the future high-tech military provocation of Pyongyang, the 1994 Agreed Framework was created—The Geneva Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang.¹⁰⁾ Specifically, on the basis of the agreement, Washington pledged to provide fuel and construct two light-water reactors with the establishment of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) while North Korea promised to end a plutonium enrichment program in exchange.¹¹⁾ However, both the US and North Korea did not meet the key demands of the 1994 Agreed framework. What is more, North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program and Pyongyang' continuous development of nuclear weapons led to a breakdown of agreement between Pyongyang and Washington in 2002. At the same time North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) once again.

¹⁰⁾ The Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK (Geneva, Oct. 21, 1994); http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/agreedframework.htm.

¹¹⁾ Jayshree Barjoria , and Beina Xu , “The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” *Council on foreign Relations* (September 2013).

(Figure 1) Chronological Steps of “The Six-Party Talks”



Unfortunately, by failing to keep pledges, both Washington and Pyongyang caused the following outcomes: 1) providing official reasons for continuous nuclear development program; 2) weakening chances of the bilateral talks between the US and the DPRK due to growing distrust; and 3) accelerating security threats on the Northeast Asian region.

These outcomes resulted from the first North Korean nuclear crisis which eventually led to the Six-Party Talks. Shortly thereafter, the second North Korean nuclear crisis was developed by the side-effects of the first nuclear crisis. The “three-party talks” among the US, China and North Korea began in April 2003 to discuss the second crisis when Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in January 2003. However, the meeting was not enough to deal with the crisis because more complicated ‘power games’ beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis was evident. From this perspective, the other regional players – Russia, Japan and South Korea - pushed cooperation to turn the “Three-Party Talks” into the “Six-Party Talks”¹²⁾, stressing the need to deal with the crisis on the Korean peninsula

through a new regional framework. This is the origin of the 'Six-Party Talks' covering comprehensive problems generated from North Korea's nuclear issue.

III. Critical Analysis of the Six-Party Talks Demonstrating Different Interests of Six Players

The obvious goal of the Six-Party talks is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.¹³⁾ However there is what can be dubbed as 'grand agenda' to resolve the some of the unsettled regional issues even though it can arguable depending on respective issues. By analyzing three major agreements which resulted from the Six-Party Talks, it is possible to contain the contents of a 'grand agenda.' They include: 1) the September 19 Joint Agreement in 2005; 2) the February 13 Agreement in 2007; and 3) the October 3 Agreement in 2008.¹⁴⁾ In particular, in the case of 'Initial Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement', meetings of five Working Groups

12) Pang Zhongying, "The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-U.S. Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a New Northeast Asia?" *Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies* (March, 2009), pp.1~4.

13) *In the Second-Phased actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of the Six-Party Talks clarified as follows: the first goal is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peace manner.

14) *Official names of the three agreements are: 1) Join Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (Beijing 19 September 2005); 2) Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (13 February 2007); and 3) Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (3 October 2007).

(WG) held in 2007.¹⁵⁾ The main purpose is to carry out the initial actions and to achieve the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement. The details are as follows:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of U.S-DPRK Relations
3. Normalization of Japan-DPRK Relations
4. Economic and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

As it has been seen, the follow-up working groups of the Six-Party Talks dealt with fairly broad subjects beyond the prevention of Pyongyang's high-tech military threats. In this regard, Zhongying (2009) states: "the Six-Party Talks has mutually advocated some crucial goals"¹⁶⁾ : 1) the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; 2) the ending the Korean War with a peace treaty; and 3) building a regional mechanism for peace-building and prosperity. From this viewpoint, even if the main task of the Six-Party Talks, denuclearized the Korean Peninsula, failed due to the unexpected internal or external factors of the six participants, the other options like 2) and 3), which Zhongying suggested might become another key agenda for the six parties. Thus, it is important to recognize the value of such all-inclusive approach to resolve the difficult regional issues through the Six-Party Talks rather than focusing on the North Korean nuclear threats alone.

¹⁵⁾ Diplomatic White Paper of the Republic of Korea (2008), pp.32-36.

¹⁶⁾ Pang Zhongying, "The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-U.S. Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a New Northeast Asia?" *Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies* (March, 2009), p.4.

Taking the importance as a 'grand agenda' into consideration, it is important to analyze distinctive features of the process of the Six-Party Talks, and this will lead to the identification of the main limitations of the Six-Party Talks. Such limitations will support the following argument: When the range of the Six-Party Talks' agenda is extended to include comprehensive and pragmatic agenda for medium and long-term resolutions of the issues of the Korean peninsula, this multilateral talks can produce more positive outcomes while embracing the regional interests of the six nations. More crucially, *ipso facto*, the suggestion to create more comprehensive multilateral framework will enable the following creative and new approaches: 1) the emergence of a 'New Actor', Russia, instead of the main actors such as the US and China within the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks; and 2) the strengthening of the economic approach concentrated on prosperity rather than intensive political and military negotiation.

Above all, the most important characteristic of the Six-Party Talks is that the talks necessitate complicated calculations to balance all members' interests. After the first talks in 2003, the participating members began to involve in dynamic diplomatic maneuvers based on each other's own domestic issues, national interests and interpretations of historical analogies. Owing to these diverse considerations, regardless of the main challenge of the Six-Party Talks framework to stop the North Korean nuclear program, many other challenges have been identified. The Six Parties were aroused by the internal and external interests like the wide-ranging topics of five Working Groups discussions after February 13 Agreement in 2007.¹⁷⁾

¹⁷⁾ Diplomatic White Paper of the Republic of Korea (2008), pp.32-36.

1. Critical Analysis on Six Parties' Responses after the Adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)

As an important case, the different responses by the each of Six Party participants on the Security Council resolution 1718¹⁸⁾ is a good example of demonstrating complicated strategic calculations of everyone involved. After a nuclear ballistic missile test in October 2006, the Security Council condemned the test and unanimously adopted resolution 1718 in 14 October 2006 calling for an immediate return to the Six-Party Talks.¹⁹⁾ The resolution called for, based on Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, excluding automatic military enforcement of its demands under the Charter's Article 41,²⁰⁾ the members of the UN prohibit a range of goods from entering or leaving the DPRK and imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on persons in terms of the nuclear weapon program.²¹⁾

In reaction to the resolution, the six players showed different reactions. In this paper the responses of six players are largely divided into three

¹⁸⁾ * On 14 October 2006, after the nuclear ballistic missile test of Pyongyang, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1718 condemning the nuclear test.

¹⁹⁾ Security Council Resolution 1718(2006);
(<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement>).

²⁰⁾ * According to the Charter's Article 41, the Security Council decided what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to the DPRK. These include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

²¹⁾ UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006);
([http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%20\(2006\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%20(2006))).

groups: Group (I): US, Japan, South Korea; Group (II): China, Russia; and Group (III) North Korea. Before analyzing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, one important thesis in this case study is that the criteria of the grouping stated above is focused on only the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 rather than including all resolutions of United Nations.²²⁾ This is because eight UN resolutions related to North Korea's nuclear issue from 1993 to 2013 demonstrate different politico-strategic outcomes. In this regard, in the Table (1) the distinctive responses of the three groups are categorized. In brief, this table illustrates the complexity of the Six-Party Talks depending on politico-strategic relations while emphasizing the importance of a multilateral approach for a long-term solution on the Korean peninsula.

²²⁾ *These are a list of United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to the North Korean nuclear issues from 1993 to 2013.

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 825(1993)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695(2006)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087(2013)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013)

(Table 1) Critical Analysis on Six Parties' Responses after the Adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718

	Nuclear Capability (DPRK)	Resolution 1718	Comeback of the Six-Party Talks	Military Enforcement to DPRK	Sanctions against DPRK
 The US (Group I)	x	●	●	◐	●
 Japan (Group I)	x	●	●	◐	●
 S. Korea (Group I)	x	○	●	x	○
 China (Group II)	x	○	●	x	◐
 Russia (Group II)	x	◐	●	x	x
 N. Korea (Group III)	○	x	◐	x	x

※ ●: strong support ○: support ◐: partly support x: objection

Group(I): U.S., Japan, and Korea

In the case of the first Group, it rallied behind Washington whose stubborn reaction against Pyongyang led to the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1718.²³⁾ John Bolton, who was the former US Ambassador

to the UN, stated “a nuclear test in 2006 was the gravest threat to international peace and security”. During a Security Council meeting, he maintained that the resolution 1718 should impose more strict demands complementing the Security Resolution 1695 which is regarded as a failure. As a result, the US and Japan enthusiastically bolstered the resolution 1718 welcoming the contents of strengthened sanctions compared with the resolution 1695.²⁴⁾ On the surface, South Korea - which sustained considerably close relationship with the US - seemed to unwillingly follow the resolution, emphasizing that the problem should be solved under a peaceful and diplomatic approach. In fact, a division was recognizable within this group. While the US and Japan stuck together in unity in purpose and actions ²⁵⁾ against the irrational behaviors of North Korea for doing missile tests, the South Korean government was committed to a two-pronged policy. Indeed, the grand strategy of the South Korean government was to pursue the following two aims: the prevention of Pyongyang provocations and reconciliation of the two Koreas. In other words, although all three maintained close cooperation, they all had slightly different interests and conditions.

23) UN Security Council meeting on 9 October 2006;

(<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>).

24) *The main subjects of the Security Council Resolution 1695 are: 1) stopping games of 'brinkmanship'; 2) complying with Security Council demands; 3) returning to the Six-Party Talks; and 4) implementing terms of the joint statement for the last round of the talks. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006).

25) *The expectations of Washington and Tokyo from the Six-Party Talks are: 1) the withdrawal of Nuclear weapons first, then negotiations afterwards; and 2) the establishment of a democratic government similar to the US standards.

Group (II): China, Russia

In the case of the group two, China and Russia, who have been close supporters of North Korea for more than an half century, demonstrated similar reactions as the members of group one did. While they agreed on the general direction of the resolution, each had a slightly different view on the extension of the contents. In the case of China, not only Beijing was the main actor in initiating the Six-Party Talks, but also a very close friend to North Korea.²⁶⁾ However, China chose to support the sanctions against Pyongyang under the resolution 1718. Meanwhile, Russia had a different view. In an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council, unlike China, Russia did not support such stringent sanctions against Pyongyang although Moscow agreed on condemning the North Korean rocket launch. Even if in the end both Beijing and Moscow supported the resolution 1718 in general, it was an occasion when the two countries showed different approach toward Pyongyang during the adoption process of the resolution.²⁷⁾

Group(III): North Korea

Contrarily, the reaction of the third group, North Korea, was fairly obvious against the Security Council Resolution. Park Gilyon, North Korea's Ambassador to UN, said that Pyongyang rejects the resolution 1718 since the resolution is a coercive declaration by a "gangster-like" Security Council.²⁸⁾

²⁶⁾ See Security Council Meeting on 9 October 2006;
(<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>).

²⁷⁾ See Security Council Meeting on 9 October 2006;
(<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>).

²⁸⁾ See Security Council meeting on 9 October 2006;
(<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>).

Nevertheless, the main limitation of the talks still remains: without creative alternatives to disentangle intricate interests of the participants of the Six-Party Talks, no feasible output can be expected from such a multilateral meeting. Thus, in order to overcome the above-mentioned limitations of the Six-Party Talks, I suggest an approach, which emphasizes the following points: 1) the emergence of a 'new experienced facilitator' instead of previous main actors to encourage more pragmatic approaches; and 2) the combination of political and economic tools, especially in highlighting the economic approaches. Consequently, this paper will focus on Russia's role as **a New Seasoned Facilitator** since Russia can offer new possibilities for a long-term resolution of the issues on the Korean peninsula.

2. Russia as a 'New Seasoned Facilitator' for Dealing with Issues on the Korean Peninsula

In this part, the role of Russia will be scrutinized as a possible new strong facilitator who might offer long-term solutions to the problems on the Korean peninsula in the 21st century. Since most of the studies concerning cooperation on the Korean peninsula tend to focus mainly on the role played by the US and China, I argue that this paper may provide an innovative contribution to the study of the "Six-Party Talks", stressing Russia's new role vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula. In my view, indeed, Russia's role on the Korean peninsula progressively emerged in recent years, shaping the image of "facilitator", interested in persuading North Korea to seek an alternative to the nuclear weapons program, and promote energy

cooperation in the region, which might hasten possibility of peace on the Korean peninsula.

According to Vorontsov (2007), the basic positions of Moscow for the Six-Party Talks are as follows: 1) advocating the strict inspection of NPT and the denuclearized Korean peninsula; 2) persisting peaceful negotiation among the six players; and 3) promoting the inter-Korean dialogues.²⁹⁾ In contrast to the hard-line stance of White House³⁰⁾ to eliminate all factors related to North Korean nuclear program, in terms of the Korean issues, the current Russian government seems to strive for the achievement of the goal 2) and 3). When it comes to the geostrategic situations, the Korean issues have recently become one of the major considerations for Moscow because the US, China and Japan have gradually played important roles on the issues of Korean peninsula, who are all Russia's direct neighbors.³¹⁾ Namely, owing to the invisible 'Power Race' among the major powers, Russia is increasingly interested in the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula.

In the same way, unlike the general expectations on the global stage, the Russian role within the multilateral talks may have substantial influences as well as the other actors have contributed to the meetings. In the beginning

²⁹⁾ Alexander Vorontsov, "Current Russia - North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements," *Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies* (2007), p.17.

³⁰⁾ * Still, North Korea seems to believe what White House pursues a hard-line policy toward Pyongyang. An unnamed spokesman of Pyongyang stated on 8 May 2009: "the Obama administration for the past 100 days..... the hostile policy toward Pyongyang remains unchanged."; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/09/world/asia/09korea.html?_r=1&ref=global-home.

³¹⁾ Georgy Toloraya, "Russian Policy in Korea in a time of change," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.21:1 (2009), p.69.

stage of the talks, some countries had skepticism about Moscow's participation in the talks because the Four-Party Talks (the US, China and the two Koreas) - except for Moscow - was a general pattern on the inter-Korean issues³²⁾. However, Kremlin played an essential role in inviting Pyongyang in joining the Six-Party Talks because North Korea insisted Pyongyang would not participate in the 2003 meeting without Russia.³³⁾ When it comes to Russian official stance in 2015, Moscow continuously supports the Six-Party Talks for denuclearization in the Korean peninsula while Russia does not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.³⁴⁾

Historically, Russia and North Korea have significantly long and meaningful relations throughout the period of Korea's liberation following Japanese colonization, the Korean War and the opening and ending of the Cold War. In particular, the two countries enjoyed a very strong cooperative relationship during the Korean War.³⁵⁾ Following the Korean War, the Soviet Union became the main trade partner and a sponsor for the nation-building of Kim Il-sung' regime. Approximately 93 factories and industrial facilities in North Korea were established under the Russian technical assistance, ³⁶⁾constructing Pyongyang's heavy-industrial backbone

32) Moscow's absence from the Four-Party Talks proposed by the former President Bill Clinton and President Kim Young Sam on April 16, 1996 demonstrated Russia's dwindled regional influence in the Korean peninsula. Yang et al (2004), p.801.

33) Vorontsov (2007), p.22.

34) "Russian Envoy Discusses Pyongyang tests, Thaad", Korea Joongang Daily, September 25, 2015; <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3009631>.

35) * During the Korean War, the Russian pilots contributed to the air defence of North Korea, resulting in the loss of 135 pilots and more than 300 airplanes, Ibid, p.5.

e.³⁷⁾ Such a close alliance between the two communist societies continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, during the President El'tsin's administration, the Russian policy toward the Korean peninsula shifted due to the unilateral rapprochement with the ROK as the new diplomatic approach, in the so-called "democratic romanticism", which called for greatly pro-Western at the expense of Russia's interests.³⁸⁾ Such transformed Russian policy seemed to cause a crack in the friendship between Moscow and Pyongyang.

However, since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin, the Russian political elites began envisaging new approaches towards the Korean peninsula. Putin's new approach functioned as a breakthrough to reinforce previously weakening relations between Russia and North Korea. As a result, a historic treaty on "Friendship" between Kremlin and Pyongyang—Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation—was created in 2000.³⁹⁾ Currently, Kim Jong-Un regime has mainly concentrated on strengthening trade relations with Kremlin, and both Moscow and Pyongyang have taken positive consensus towards

36) * The North Korean nuclear energy facilities were established with the Soviet technical assistance in 1962.

37) Vorontsov (2007), p.5.

38) *On 27 October 1991, El'tin addressed two main aims fo the Russian Foreign policy: 1) pursuing favourable external conditions for the domestic political and economic reforms; and 2) overcoming the legacy of the Cold war. Richard Sakwa (2008), *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.368-369.

39) *After the treaty of 'Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation', the Moscow's declaration of the DPRK and the Russian Federation was released on 4 August 2001. The DPRK-Russia joint declaration is the advanced version of 'good-neighbourliness and cooperation' signed on 9 February 2000. Since then, the two countries have tried the friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation.

enhancing their economic cooperative relationship. In 2014, Putin's cabinet concluded the withdrawal of \$10 billion of Pyongyang's \$11 billion debt that had accrued during the Soviet Era.⁴⁰⁾ It seems that Putin's cabinet assumes that this gesture of goodwill will contribute to the construction of a gas pipeline covering the Korean peninsula. When it comes to both geopolitical and geo-economics aspects, North Korea could have profitable investments opportunities.

All in all, such a historic fortification of the inter-relationship between North Korea and Russia provides diverse chances for the improved role of Russia in making contributions with the backing of other partners of the Six-Party Talks. Based on this fact, it would be possible to focus more on the possibility of Russia's increased contribution to the talks. In fact, there is a strong possibility that Moscow could function as a 'mediator' and 'facilitator' between Pyongyang and the other members of the Six-Party Talks.

There are a number of important cases⁴¹⁾ through which Moscow enabled diplomatic efforts assume the role of a 'facilitator', or 'mediator'. When it comes to the bilateral relations between Republic of Korea and Russia, the two nations started nearly at a zero point at first. However Kremlin and Blue House have created new economic, science and cultural systems. For example, since 1990, the leaders of South Korea and Russia have officially met 27 times. In 2013 President Vladimir Putin's visited to Seoul when the two nations' annual bilateral trade exceeded \$26 billion.⁴²⁾

⁴⁰⁾ "North Korea Looking Abroad," Korea Economic Institute, February 18, 2015; (<http://blog.keia.org/2015/02/north-korea-looking-abroad/>)

⁴¹⁾ Vorontsov, op.cit., p.17.

In particular, in July 2002, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited the two Koreas respectively to persuade both to return to the negotiating table which was halted after a naval clash in the West (Yellow) Sea in June 2002. Although the visit was not connected to the Six-Party Talks directly, the case seems to confirm Russia's efforts to assist the improvement of the inter-Korean relations. What is more, in terms of the US-DPRK relations, Moscow provided an opportunity for a meeting between the North Korean Foreign Minister Paek NamSun and the former US Secretary of State Colin Powell during the ministerial meetings at the ASEAN Regional Forum talks in Darussalam, Brunei, in 2002.⁴³⁾ In short, Moscow's effort to carry out "balancer diplomacy" after Putin's inauguration shows potentials to be a smart 'mediator' within the multilateral negotiation such as the Six-Party Talks.

3. The Russian 'New Realism' Policy Applied in the Korean Peninsula

Then the questions are: *to what degree can Russia be engaged in resolving the inter-Korean issues; and what kind of benefit can Russia expect from the increased involvement with the issues regarding the Korean peninsula, especially in the Six-Party Talks?*

In the recent years, the interest of the Russian politicians and academics toward the Korean peninsula seems to be soaring. As an 'active part', the

⁴²⁾ "Russian Envoy Discusses Pyongyang tests, Thaad," *Korea Joongang Daily*, September 25, 2015; <<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3009631>>.

⁴³⁾ Ibid.

Korean peninsula can be regarded as a region of interest and strategic importance as the Asian-Pacific region is seen to have increasing economic implication for Russia due to the lack of involvement by Moscow in the region of economic prowess.⁴⁴⁾ In particular, when Moscow participated in the Six-Party Talks, its approach seems to have strategic bearing toward the Asia-Pacific region because the region, especially the Korean peninsula, is now regarded by Moscow as an area of considerable importance.

In fact, Russia's burgeoning interests for the Six-Party Talks contemporize with the inauguration of the Putin's administration. Namely, Putin's 'New Realism', based on the pragmatic approach over all Russia policies, can be applied to the evaluation of the Russian intention and purpose toward the Six-Party Talks. On the whole, the national motto of the 21st century Russia is 'Pragmatism', which also significantly influenced the current Medvedev's cabinet.⁴⁵⁾ On a meeting of the Security Council in March 2000, the new Russian 'Foreign Policy Concept' was introduced by Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister at the time. The main concept of the document was 'more realistic' for rebuilding the domestic economy and promoting the Russian economic interests abroad as it strives to become world's tenth biggest economy in the 21st century.⁴⁶⁾ Hence, Moscow's foreign policy influenced

⁴⁴⁾ Natasha Kuhrt, *Russian Policy towards China and Japan: The El'tsin and Putin periods* (New York: Rutledge, 2007), pp. 54-56.

⁴⁵⁾ * In January 2002, the former President Putin had an interview with a Polish Newspaper and Polish TVP Channel. In the interview, he stated that 'Pragmatism' as a key means for the economic cooperation with other nations: "We began this talk by pointing out that the soundest approach... on the basis of pragmatism and pragmatic interest in each other,";
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2002/01/15/0001_type82916_147392.shtml).

⁴⁶⁾ Sakwa(2008), pp.371~391.

by such realistic and pragmatic approaches seems to have valid bearing for both the Six-Party Talks and the inter-Korean dialogues, especially when the economic aspects are addressed.

In essence, what are the specific interests Moscow might have on the Korean peninsula? The answer to this question is: *the more the Korean military threats are slackened, the more Russia's security and economic interests are amplified.* In terms of this argument, Meyer (2005) identified the reasons for the Russian Federation's participation in the multilateral meeting. He indicated that by supporting reconciliation between DPRK and ROK, Russia can achieve the following objectives: 1) the symbolic objective to be recognized as a permanent major power on the global stage; 2) the military objective to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing nuclear weapons program not to weaken the global commitment for NPT; and 3) the economic objective to establish favorable conditions for the development of a trilateral economic cooperation among Russia and the two Koreas.⁴⁷⁾

In relation to the third objective, when Putin was the president, he had strong interests toward the Korean peninsula as there were potentially lucrative economic opportunities available. Such projects included connecting the inter-Korean railroad to the Trans-Siberian railroad, and exporting natural gas from the Kovyktinskoe field in Irkutsk to the Korean peninsula through China.⁴⁸⁾

In fact, it can be concluded that the third reason which Meyer identified is the main objective of Russia's participation in the Six-Party talks: therefore,

⁴⁷⁾ Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia Interests and Objectives on the Korean Peninsula," *International Journal of Korean Studies* (Fall/Winter 2005), Vol 4, No. 2, pp. 145~147.

⁴⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, pp.148~154.

it could be assumed the promotion of economic issues can be conceived and used as a tool to make a breakthrough to overcome the sluggish multifaceted talks dealing with North Korea high-technology fears. More specifically, I argue that the natural gas projects can dramatically increase Russia's penetration on the Korean peninsula, and promote - in turn - Moscow's effort to bring positive changes to the talks. From this perspective, Russian economic leverage might become a cornerstone for bringing peace in the Korean peninsula. In the following part, I will present a possible scenario in which this assumption might be substantially developed.

IV. A New Role of Russia on the Korean Peninsula

Figure 2, as shown below, portrays a possible scenario of cooperation on the Korean peninsula, which emphasizes the following aspects: 1) the importance of the Six-Party Talks for the future of cooperation on the Korean peninsula in the 21st century; and 2) the suggestion of new alternatives, which focus on Russia and its economic involvement to boost multilateral talks. In building-up the scenario, the key presumption is that economic cooperation can create a "functional leverage", in a political scenario characterized by a substantial political rapprochement due to the enforcement of a legally binding treaty (i.e. a Peace Treaty that could officially end the Korean War) and prepare a definitive process of nation-building among the two Koreas. This "functional leverage" is based on the role played by CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) program⁴⁹⁾ to eliminate all

military threats—nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles threat from North Korea. In principle, the objective of CTR is to reduce the dangers created by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their delivery vehicles. The actors of the CTR are consisted of a host who eradicates, secures, or converts the WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) programs, while the other partners supporting such efforts.⁵⁰⁾

The most attractive function of the CTR for the following scenario is that the partners provide money, technology, equipment and training to the host nation. In case that the six participants select the option during the process of the WMD removal, the main problems such methods and incentives in terms of the North Korean nuclear withdrawal will be solved naturally. Furthermore, the main argument to highlight the economic approaches with flexible funds produced by rewards of the CTR programs can be persuaded more convincingly. Therefore, the following section will justify this alternative based on the postulation mentioned above—the application of the CTR in the process of the Six-Party Talks.


49) * The CTR (or sometimes called for ‘Nunn-Lugar’) programme provides funding and expertise for the states in the former Soviet Unions including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan under disarmament treaties; (<http://nunn-lugar.com/index.shtml>).

50) Joel S Wit, Wolfsthal Jon and Oh Choong-suk (2005), “The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea,” *A Report of the CSIS International Security Program Dec* (Washington D.C.: CSIS), pp.7-8.

1. A Scenario Suggested: 'Economy Reconstruction Projection for the DPRK'

As stressed before, the founding hypothesis of this scenario is a substantial political shift on the Korean peninsula, prospecting a clear "ongoing process": "one Korea reunified". However, in my argumentation the crucial assumption is not related to dynamics leading to the political rapprochement among the two Koreas and neighbor countries, which are members of the Six-Party Talks. Instead, the central point of the first scenario is to focus on the preparations and nation-building toward the reconciliation of the two Koreas through multilateral economic negotiations. Namely, *to what extent can the framework of the Six-Party Talks and Russia influence on peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula as the means of economic approaches?*

(Figure 2) Economy Reconstruction Project for the DPRK



Stage I

As shown in Figure 2, this scenario will be developed through four stages. During Stage I, in order to resolve the core problem of Pyongyang—the disposal of all WMD including chemical, biological, nuclear weapons, and the CTR program will be offered strongly. Under the circumstances, North Korea seems to be a proper candidate for the CTR. In the case of the CTR, the multilateral approaches owing to the political and financial burden-sharing among the sponsors are indispensable.⁵¹⁾ Although the Northeast Asian region has not been a suitable case for the program, the Six-Party Talks has shown a consensus on the difficult security problems, especially on Pyongyang's military threats. Such a partnership among the participants of the Six-Party Talks which has been cultivated for seven years of working together produces more positive results in the progress of the disposal of nuclear weapons during the period of conducting the CTR program.

In addition, Moscow will play a key role in the application of the CTR program for North Korea. When it comes to the beginning of the CTR, the program focused intensively on the countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As a result, 6600 nuclear warheads have been eliminated since 1991, and more than 470 long-range missiles have been destroyed, while over 1800 other missiles, strategic bombers have been disassembled.⁵²⁾ With

⁵¹⁾ Ibid, pp.1~3.

⁵²⁾ *The United States has invested \$7 billion in the former Soviet Union since 1991, and is recently investing \$1 billion per year. There are additional participants—EU, UK, Germany and France. Ibid, pp.7~8.

such an impressive precedent, Russia is able to provide a workable solution during the process of Pyongyang's cooperative threat reduction. The most impressive strength of the first stage is, provided that North Korea and the five members of the Six-Party talks collectively pursue the CTR program, the following economic incentives will be offered for the reconstruction of North Korea: 1) a reward of nuclear withdrawal; and 2) the reuse of resources previously used in the North's nuclear program.

In relation to CTR with application to the case of North Korea, it possible to argue that Russia – mindful of the CTR program provided by the US in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire – could potentially reuse the rationale behind the above-mentioned mass destruction dismantlement program in order to materially help North Korea to eliminate these kinds of armaments as well as to boost a more comprehensive trust-building process in the direction of Pyongyang, increasing Russian influence over the North and the overall region.

Stage II

During the Stage II, the expected economic incentives offered from the implementation of the CTR project will be connected to the establishment of a factual organization—'Economy Reconstruction Project for the DPRK'. Continuously, the international community should remain concerned about a steep decline of the North Korean economy which in the past caused the most destructive famines of the 20th century. As many as one million people, who represent about five percent of the North Korean population, perished in the mid-1990s as a result.⁵³⁾ Therefore, the members of the Six-Party Talks should pursue Pyongyang's economic reforms and

reconstruction simultaneously since the countries regard economic inability of Kim Jung Un to be one of the causes for using the military threats.⁵⁴⁾

Therefore, it would provide a vital opportunity to bring changes in North Korea if an organization which focuses on the economic benefits is founded. For this purpose, this study recommends the establishment of ‘Economy Reconstruction Project for the DPRK’ within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The aspiration for the DPRK project is based on the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 2007 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The September Statement encouraged the economic cooperation in the areas of energy, trade, and investment within the Six-Party Talks framework.⁵⁵⁾ Also, in the February 2007 Joint Statement, the six players promised humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and established an Economy and Energy Cooperation Working Group.⁵⁶⁾ Although such agreements to boost the North Korean economy did not

53) *Haggard, Stephan, and Noland, Marcus, “A Security and Peace for Northeast Asia: The *Economic Dimension*,” *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, Policy Brief, No. PB08-4 (April 2008), p.2.

54) *In 2000, North Korea tried “marketization from below” in the areas of local organs, government offices, and military units with the recommendation of the international community. *Ibid*, p.2.

55) See Join Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing (19 September 2005);

http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/hbd/hbdread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=247&seqno=293918&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=2&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=).

56) See Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (13 February 2007); http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/hbd/hbdread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=247&seqno=293924&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=3&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=).

produce output in reality, the international concerns seemed to have reached a consensus relating to the ideas of 'Economic Reconstruction Project for DPRK' introduced for the Stage II.

Stage III

The following study on the similar subject reflects such international concerns in a pragmatic way: '*pipeline gas introduction to the Korean peninsula*.'⁵⁷⁾ In the Stage III, as a long-term scenario to rehabilitate the DPRK's economy, the idea of 'pipeline gas project' introduced by Paik (2005) will be applied. Within the Six-Party Talks framework, energy assistance is another integral theme which is seen as important area to resolve the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. What is more, such energy supply options for DPRK generated from the gas pipeline project can be functioned as a versatile negotiation tool combining the geopolitical and economic reality on the Six-Party Talks table.

In fact, one well-established energy development organization—KEDO—already exists. The mission of KEDO is to implement the Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK on the assumption that Pyongyang agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its breathing nuclear program.⁵⁸⁾ Unfortunately, the KEDO led project failed due to the North Korean distrust towards KEDO due to the ailing relationship between Washington and Pyongyang caused by the North Korean military threats and the failure to meet the agreed

⁵⁷⁾ Keun-Wook, Paik, "Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula," *Korea Foundation Project 'Energy and Environmental Cooperation in the Korea Peninsula* (2005).

⁵⁸⁾ Baker et al, op.cit., pp.135~138.

provisions.⁵⁹⁾ Unlike the KEDO projects, the introduction of the long distance gas pipeline passing through the DPRK territory will involve the two Koreas and Russia. In particular, intended for Pyongyang, the pipeline gas would provide energy to power many major cities in the DPRK assuming that a 1.5 bcm⁶⁰⁾ natural gas would be allocated to the North as a transit fees. Also, South Korea can provide additional support to prevent the collapse of the North Korean economy.⁶¹⁾ In addition, further funding can be allocated for the CTR programs which will intensify the effort to support rebuilding of the North Korean economy.

Other than the economic merit, Moscow is well positioned in this pipeline project since the major Russian company Gazprom, which is the largest extractor of natural gas in the world, has outstanding options to promote the project from all the shareholders. For this reason, the role of Russia should be given more weight in the third stage.

In terms of the Economy Reconstruction Project for the DPRK, this study will follow the main idea of the paper Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula by Paik. In his in-depth study, Paik suggested 'the Proposed Greater Circular Pipeline in Northeast Asia'. As shown in Figure 3, the Korean peninsula is ideally located to have pivotal benefits from the

59) *There are two main conditions: 1) KEDO finances and constructs two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors(LWR) of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant in the DPRK; and 2) KEDO provides DPRK with an alternative source of energy for heating and electricity until the first of the two reactors is completed. (<http://www.kedo.org/ap_main.asp>).

60) *30bcm is an amount which can handle gas over 30 years. Baker et al, op.cit., p.101.


61) Ibid., pp.81~82.

Russian oil and gas pipeline infrastructure. In the case that the gas pipeline scenario is applied in reality, as a useful alternative for the settlement of the current North Korean nuclear crisis, this project will provide significant contribution to in promoting energy cooperation between Russia and the Two Koreas.

Stage IV

In the final stage, a consensus and convention to justify this project within the Six-Party Talks framework should be guaranteed. This is necessary to avoid the inevitable problem of incompatibility between the laws and regulations among the six players and different investment environment.

(Figure 3) Map: The Proposed Greater Pipeline in Northeast Asia



*Source: Paik (2005) p.41

2. Strength and Limitation of the Scenario

Based on the scenario introduced above, the expected roles of Russia and the members of the Six-Party Talks is as follows.

(Table 2) Expected Roles of Russia and the Six-Party Talks in the Scenario

	The Six Party Talks	Russia
Stage I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing a Negotiation Tool (the CTR Program) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiating North Korea into Russian precedents of the CTR program
Stage II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invoking international concerns about N,K's economy reconstruction • Implementing the project based on the Agreements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting this project actively
Stage III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating conventions to recognize the gas pipeline project with six players 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating in the gas pipeline project actively persuading Gazprom
Stage IV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Building the consensus and trust of the Six-Party Talks members 	

In short, the main feature of 'Economy Reconstruction Project for the DPRK' is a product of a multilateral economic diplomacy. In general, such a multilateral economic approach has an unavoidable drawback in that such a pragmatic diplomacy cannot move ahead regardless of the difficult security concern of the Korean peninsula. In particular, I recognize that an increased Russian role on a unified Korean peninsula would increase the tensions among the main regional actors.

However, the strength of this scenario is combining security and economic issues together to offer a comprehensive resolution concerning the main threat that would inhibit inter-Korean rapprochement that is an unchanged provocative posture of North Korea vis-à-vis its security needs.

In other words, the CTR program for Pyongyang's WMD can be a suitable alternative to prevent the North Korean military actions. In addition, the economic rewards and investment for the DPRK during the negotiation based on the gas pipeline project would enable advancement the North Korean economy, which in turn will have a positive effect on a long-term solution such as the reconciliation between the two Koreas. Furthermore, if an economic reconciliation can be reached with the help of the new actor 'Russia', this could become a plausible alternative reunification strategy of the Korean peninsula. Such a new consideration will justify the economic and pragmatic approaches in the framework of the Six-Party talks.

V. Conclusion

Time has changed. However, the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula, where interests of major powers are contested, still display a unique and multifaceted pattern on the international political order. The dilemma of the peninsula is the coexistence of 'insecurity' and 'prosperity' which is an inevitable by-product caused by the geopolitical situation.

Despite such a reality, smarter alternatives to achieve 'peace' and 'prosperity' on the Korean peninsula in the 21st century should be created. The option available currently is 'the Six-Party Talks'. This study has suggested that such a multilateral talk offers a plausible framework to resolve the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis. Obviously, the complex diplomatic calculations of the

six players are the key limitation of this framework, but the talks seems to be worthy as it is acting as a creditable model of the multilateral negotiations. In particular, this study dealt with the role of Russia because when it comes to the process of the Six-Party Talks and inter-relations with the two Koreas to date, Moscow's contribution on the Six-Party Talks brought positive alternatives which rival the contributions of Washington and Beijing. Based on such a development, a scenario under which Russia can play a positive role in creating a new and a long-term resolution to the issues of the Korean peninsula, can be postulated.

However, there are limitations which this study cannot escape. Firstly, as the worst case scenario, if the second Korean War breaks out suddenly, the reality of the multilateral talks and the scenario introduced above may presumably have no bearing. Secondly, due to unexpected internal and external conditions of Russia such as instability of the regime or global economy crisis, the role of Russia can fluctuate. Thirdly, if the others actors, especially in the US and China, wants to maintain strong influences, a 'power game' might break out, the result of which might have negative effects. Finally, the methodology of this research is a problem-solving approach, which was connected to the current policy analysis based on comprehensive study of the primary sources. As a result, it is impossible to deliver obvious and exact facts and information in terms of the Six-Party Talks, which is still in progress.

Nonetheless, the aim of this study was to offer an alternative to the current difficult, though hypothetical. As a result, this study was able to lead a conclusion: *the Six-Party Talks and the role of Moscow are able to be a persuasive and plausible alternative for a long-term solution on the Korean*

peninsula. The importance of the Six-Party Talks, the inter-relations between Russia and the two Koreas, and a scenario suggested supported the conclusion.

All in all, the increased and positive Russian involvement toward the two Koreas can be a stepping-stone for a dialogue and cooperation for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the full use of the Six-Party Talks will ultimately contribute to security of the Northeast Asian region beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis.

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6자회담 틀 내에서 한반도 중장기 평화변영을 위한 러시아의 '숙련된 중재자(New Seasoned Facilitator)' 역할

박지선 (런던대 킹스 칼리지)

국문요약

본 논문은 한반도의 중장기 평화변영 방안을 위해 교착상태에 빠진 6자회담의 틀 안에서 러시아의 역할에 대한 새로운 학문적 접근을 보여주고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 북한 핵무기 개발 프로그램의 중단이라는 공동의 목적을 달성하기 위해 설립된 6자회담의 주요 행위자들의 정치적·전략적 이해관계를 경제적 영역으로 확대하면서 보다 실용적인 한반도 문제 해결 방안을 제시하고 있다. 특히 '숙련된 중재자(New Seasoned Facilitator)'로서의 러시아의 역할에 대해 심도 있게 고찰하면서 6자회담 틀에서 가능한 하나의 시나리오를 실험적으로 제안하고 있다. 본 논문의 주요 내용은 1) 6자회담의 연대기적 분석, 2)한반도를 둘러싼 6자회담 주요 국가들의 이해관계 분석, 3) '숙련된 중재자'로서의 러시아의 역할을 고찰, 4) 실용적이고 실행 가능한 경제협력 방안이 될 '한반도 평화정착을 위한 북한경제재건 프로젝트'의 시나리오 등이다.

주제어: 6자회담, 러시아 외교정책, 북한, 중재자, 한반도 중·장기 변영.

박지선(PARK, JISUN)

영국 런던대 킹스 칼리지(King's College London) 국제분쟁학 석사 학위를 취득하고 현재 동대학원 전략학 박사과정에 있다. 주요 연구실적으로 "Constructivist Understandings of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Programme: National Security Policy Based on North Korea's Strategic Culture"(2014), 『한반도 신뢰프로세스를 통한 비핵국가 한국의 핵 안보전략: 제2차 핵시대를 맞이하여』(2013, 공저), 『클라우제비츠의 전쟁이론으로 본 냉전 이후 북한의 핵미사일 전략에 관한 연구』(2010, 공저) 등이 있다.