

Who Is Willing to Pay More Taxes for Welfare? Focusing on the Effects of Diverse Types of Trust in South Korea and Taiwan*

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This article examines the effects of diverse types of trust on a willingness to pay more taxes for welfare in South Korea and Taiwan. We ask whether trust as a solidaristic value contributes to an increase in welfare support. We focus on people's attitudes toward paying taxes, and different types of trust, such as general trust, trust in acquaintances, trust in strangers and trust in government. This study analyzes the survey data from "Life and Society" of South Korea and Taiwan conducted for the purpose of studying attitudes and experiences of citizens with respect to social quality. First, the results demonstrate the positive effects of diverse types of trust on willingness to pay more taxes for welfare in both countries. Second, significant differences are found: institutional trust, such as trust in government, is critically important in South Korea, while trust in acquaintances strongly influences attitudes toward paying more taxes for welfare in Taiwan. In light of previous studies on the role of trust as a form of social capital, specified trust, such as trust in government or trust in acquaintances, more strongly affects attitudes toward paying higher taxes for welfare than unspecified trust in these two emerging welfare states.

Keywords: *willingness to pay more taxes for welfare, general trust, trust in strangers, trust in acquaintances, trust in government, South Korea, Taiwan*

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Introduction

South Korea (hereafter, Korea) and Taiwan share an economic, political, social and developmental history, and are considered as archetypal East Asian welfare states (Goodman and Peng 1996; Gough 2004; Kwon and Holliday 2007), which does not fit well Esping-Andersen's description of three groups of Western welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). Whether or not Korea and Taiwan are commonly referenced as East Asian welfare states, they show distinctly similar characteristics when compared to Western welfare states (Choi 2012; Dostal 2010; Hong 2014; Ku and Jones Finer 2007).

Welfare politics has received much attention since democratization in the late 1980s began facilitating welfare expansion in Korea and Taiwan. In the process of democratization, political party competition, growth of associational networks in civil society, and pro-welfare alliances among social organizations, including labor unions and civic organizations, have been emphasized as facilitating conditions and/or actors for welfare expansion in Korea and Taiwan (Lee 2012; Peng 2004; Peng and Wong 2008; Wong 2004; Woo 2011; Yang 2013). What remains unclear and what has not yet attracted much attention is who supports welfare expansion in Korea and Taiwan. In emerging welfare states such as Korea and Taiwan, are solidaristic values such as trust positively related to welfare expansion?

This study compares Korea and Taiwan with respect to the effect of trust on people's support for welfare expansion. A comparison of these two East Asian countries that share common traits shed lights on their differences, and it allows us to identify cross-national variations in people's attitudes toward the welfare state when influenced by trust as social capital. Particularly in these two countries, pro-welfare political alliances are at an early stage of development compared to those in Western countries. Consequently, public support for welfare policies exhibits relatively weak distinctions across classes, unlike other developed countries. Thus, it is crucial to investigate beyond the social cleavage model in order to seek a more sophisticated explanation for what truly enhances solidaristic attitudes towards public policies, especially welfare policies. To answer simply, we suggest that trust is the appropriate variable in building social solidarity for supporting welfare policies.

Trust, as one component of social capital, is expected to have a positive influence on attitudes toward the welfare state. Essentially, trust is believed to solve collective action problems by enhancing cooperative actions, as emphasized by social capital theory (Putnam 1993; Rothstein 2011). Then,

we should consider the more complicated ways in which trust affects attitudes toward welfare support.

First, when examining the relationship between trust and attitudes toward welfare, attention needs to be paid to the different types of trust, including interpersonal trust, (trust in others, trust in a familiar or unfamiliar circle of people), and institutional trust. Each type of trust affects attitudes toward support for the welfare state in different ways.

Second, a focus on attitudes toward tax increases is also useful. There are many ways to measure welfare attitudes; however, many of us have not paid much attention to the distinctions among the different welfare attitudes. For example, we can distinguish the normative from the practical dimension of welfare attitudes. Even when individuals normatively support the role of government in providing welfare, they may not be willing to pay more taxes for welfare services because they do not trust other people or the government. Our critical suggestion is that the practical dimension of support, “paying more taxes,” is more appropriate when we seek to understand the importance of trust with respect to welfare attitudes. Hence, “paying more taxes” is a typical example of a collective action problem, and therefore requires trust among citizens themselves as well as between those citizens and the government.

Although the importance of trust itself has been widely discussed across academic fields including economics, political science, sociology and psychology, the empirical analyses on relationships between trust and public attitudes toward welfare have not been studied much, especially in East Asian countries. While there are some recent exemplary studies on the effects of trust on welfare attitudes in Japan (Nagayoshi and Sato 2014; Sumino 2014), studies in the case of Korea (Kim 2010; No and Jun 2011) still remain exploratory. Given this situation, if trust is found to play a role in explaining attitudes toward the welfare state in Korea and Taiwan, a closer examination of trust will enable researchers to deepen their understanding of public attitudes toward welfare.

With these agenda in mind, the next five sections are structured as follows. First, this paper reviews literature on trust and welfare attitudes in order to understand the current academic outlook on the issue. The paper then continues to discuss various types of trust, and the relations between different types of trust and public attitudes toward welfare. Second, it examines the methodology used, which explains the selection of the data along with variables utilized in this study. Third, the statistical results are presented using multiple linear regression, and fourth, the paper provides an

explanation of the results, focusing on differences between Korea and Taiwan. Lastly, it concludes with main findings and aims to derive key implications for future research.

Literature Review: Trust and Welfare Attitudes

Trust as Social Capital

Many studies argue that trust is one of the main components of “social capital.” Putnam (1993, p. 172) defines social capital as “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” In this definition, trust is one of the major elements that constitute social capital. According to Rothstein’s explanation (2005, p. 65), “social” indicates that social capital is embedded in the social relationships among individuals and “capital” implies that social capital is utilized as “some kind of asset for the people who possess it” at the aggregate level as well as at the individual level. A great number of studies show that social capital leads to desirable effects for democracy, economic development, and subjective well-being (Han, Kim, and Lee 2013, p. 186). For this reason, “generalized” trust in others (typically called “social trust” or “general trust”), has received considerable attention because it is one of the most common indicators of social capital. General trust is thought to be the key to resolving a variety of collective action problems (Jeon 2012, p. 124), whether we see trust as a moral virtue, like sympathy for fellow citizens or a sense of solidarity (Jeon 2012, pp. 125-126), or as something different from blind faith, carrying rational calculation (Rothstein 2005, pp. 56-63).

If trust functions as social capital, then it also means that trust contributes to solving various forms of collective action problems by reducing transaction costs and future risks among interdependent actors. This can be applied to the production of public goods (Rothstein 2011, p. 148). The production of public goods requires the contribution of all members of a given community. When people distrust the shared contribution of the whole because of their concern about ‘free riders’ in the system, they will doubt the legitimacy of the production of public goods. This situation may prevent the continuation of the production of public goods. The welfare state is indeed one of the important public goods in modern society. Therefore, trust can contribute to the production of social welfare. This is why we need to pay attention to the relationship between trust and

public attitudes toward the welfare state.

The Empirical Literature on Determinants of Welfare Attitudes

What are the main determinants of attitudes toward the welfare state? The empirical literature has analyzed various determinants. One of the major determinants includes socio-economic factors such as income level, perceived social class (or occupational status), and employment status (employed vs. unemployed) (Andrefß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Jaeger 2006; Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008). Other determinants emphasize different socialization patterns by different groups according to age, gender, and educational level (Andrefß and Heien 2001; Jaeger 2006; Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008). In addition, ideologies and values such as political ideology (right vs. left) (Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008), egalitarian ideology (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003), post-materialism and trust are also analyzed as important determinants (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Although it is difficult to determine which factors have a consistently significant relationship with attitudes in support of the welfare state, there have been some patterns found in cross-country analyses.

In general, high-income earners tend to be weaker supporters of the welfare state. This tendency appears to be more prevalent in liberal welfare states such as the United States than in northern European states. On the other hand, public sector employees, women, and the unemployed tend to be more strongly supportive of the welfare state, largely because beneficiaries of the welfare system often belong to one or more of these groups. Here, the strength of the impact varies among countries. Age and education, as socialization variables, have a less clear impact. For example, older people may be more supportive of the government's responsibility for welfare because they are major beneficiaries of the welfare system. However, they may also be less supportive due to their attitudes that are less post-materialist than the younger generation.

Political ideologies and values are not strongly influential determinants. In general, the ideology of the political left wing and egalitarian values are positively associated with support for the government's responsibility for welfare. On the other hand, trust and post-materialism are weakly correlated with welfare support, but their influences depend on the country under consideration.

General trust (trust in a generalized group of others) is found to have a positive relationship with attitudes toward government's welfare responsibility,

but the relationship varies by country (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). A more interesting story is found in political trust, or confidence in political institutions (e.g., government or parliament). Edlund (2006, p. 397) suggests that confidence in the political system “does not influence how people view what the state should do, but it does influence how they perceive what the state is actually doing.” Svallfors (2002) emphasizes that those who trust the political system’s primary actors, such as the government and the parliament, are more supportive of high taxes. Those with high political trust are also “less suspicious of abuse, more positive toward collective financing, and more positive toward public institutions in delivering services” (Svallfors 2002, p. 197). The research on political trust implies that trust in the political system does not influence the normative aspect of people’s attitudes toward the welfare state; however, it does influence their evaluations of the ways specific welfare policies perform and how they benefit the people.

Types of Trust and Welfare Support

We examine the influence of different types of trust on attitudes toward paying higher taxes to benefit social welfare. First, let us look at interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust covers a range of personal relationship networks from trust in “a narrow circle of familiar others” to “a wider circle of unfamiliar others” (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011, p. 786). Social trust, measured by the level of “trust in most people,” is most widely used as “general trust.” However, social trust could refer to a narrower or a broader circle of people. Some scholars point out that social trust in Asian countries refers to a much narrower circle of people. For example, people in China and Korea trust “most people” much more than “strangers.” Given this unspecified character of trust in most people, Delhey et al. (2011, p. 801) suggest that trusting strangers is a good proxy of general trust, and recommend researchers to use both types of trust, trust in most people and trust in strangers together, in order to “capture(s) trust’s social force more fully.”

Trusting others also refers to trusting familiar people (“particular trust” or “in-group trust”). While general trust is widely accepted as the backbone of social capital, particular trust or in-group trust is considered either as “a necessary, yet insufficient, condition to build out-group trust” or as “a manifestation of group closure” (Delhey and Welzel 2012, p. 46). In the former, trusting familiar people can play a role in improving trust with unfamiliar people, while in the latter, a strong trust in familiar others

weakens general trust. It is well-known that Confucian cultures in East Asia cultivate collectivism based upon a narrow social circle, such as the family and geographic region, even in modern society (Delhey et al. 2011).

In fact, there is a specific reason why we should also look into particular trust (or in-group trust) in East Asian societies. Many studies suggest that informal networks such as *guanxi* in China or Taiwan and *yongo* in Korea are fundamental in the construction of one's identity and exchanges of his or her social resources.¹ We believe that trust is the crucial element at work in the forming of such informal networks among close people and acquaintances. Then, trust in kinships and immediate relationships shapes one's attitude towards other people to whom he or she is not related and with whom that person doesn't personally interact. Therefore, we need to validate whether trust in people who are in the scope of one's everyday interaction actually has any role in shaping stances towards the government and its decisions on welfare provisions.

Secondly, how important is institutional trust with respect to people's attitudes toward the welfare state? Some scholars argue that the decline of trust in institutions is not a problem for democracy and "it may be a good sign that citizens are becoming increasingly sophisticated about the conditions of trust" (Warren 1999, p. 6). Of course, we need to distinguish blind faith from trust, and we must strongly agree that people's critical attitudes, especially toward political systems, are desirable for the operation of democracy. At the same time, in complex societies where public institutions have been more and more involved in solving problems "that were once solved by spontaneous organizations of civil society" (Warren 1999, p. 6), trust in institutions is required to coordinate collective actions to solve the problems that societies confront. Institutional trust is, simply speaking, potentially the most extended form of trust, one not in any particular persons in institutions, but "strangers embedded in institutions" (Warren 1999, p. 4). Trust in institutions means agreement with the "basic idea" of an institution. As mentioned in the discussion of political trust, empirically, trust in political systems is likely to encourage people to support tax increases and state redistributive policies in Western societies (Edlund 2006; Svallfors 2002). Nagayoshi and Sato (2014) also report such a positive impact of trust in institutions on redistributive policies in Japan by showing

¹ There are previous studies on *guanxi* and *yongo* to be referred to: Lin (2001), Marsh (2003) for *guanxi* and Horak (2014), Lee (2000), and Yee (2000) for *yongo*. Also refer to Taube's paper (2015) for comparison between *guanxi* and *yongo*.

that trust in institutions reduces the negative influence of socio-economic status on the support for redistributive policies.

There have been some previous studies on the association between trust and welfare attitudes in East Asian countries. Some studies on Japan (Nagayoshi and Sato 2014; Sumino 2014) demonstrate that people with higher socio-economic status are less likely to support redistributive policies, while solidaristic values such as social trust, institutional trust, and national unity play a role in reducing the negative effects of socio-economic status or economic individualism. Even though there have been a few studies that show a positive association between trust and welfare support in Korea (Kim 2010; No and Jun 2011), a more systematic empirical investigation to analyze the association between trust and welfare attitudes in either Korea or Taiwan is difficult to find. Systematic efforts to compare the effects of trust on welfare support by using comparable data for Korea and Taiwan is even more difficult to find. Hence, this study tries to fill the gap.

Data and Methods

Data and Methods

This study analyzes the “Life and Society” survey data of Korea and Taiwan. The nationwide survey for Korea was conducted in 2012 through Gallup Korea and the survey for Taiwan in 2014 through Gallup Taiwan by the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research (ISDPR) at Seoul National University in Korea. The survey was designed to study attitudes and experiences of citizens in Korea and Taiwan with respect to social quality, which is characterized by four dimensions: socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion, and social empowerment. The questionnaire includes various questions about trust, social network, welfare attitudes, economic security, and political participation.

The statistical populations of the “Life and Society” survey represent residents aged nineteen and above in Korea and twenty and above in Taiwan who are given the legal right to vote in both countries. The area stratified quota sampling method was applied to surveys in both countries. The usable sample size was 1,000 in Korea and 1,200 in Taiwan. Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to examine the effects of trust on welfare support attitudes.

Variables

For the dependent variable, *willingness to pay more taxes for welfare* is used in this study. The willingness to pay more taxes for welfare refers to the practical dimension of people's welfare support attitudes. The willingness to pay more taxes for welfare consists of two responses: the willingness to pay more taxes for the poor's welfare, or selective welfare, and the willingness to pay more taxes for welfare in general, or universal welfare, regardless of income level. A 10-point scale (1 = not at all, 10 = strongly willing to) is used to measure the willingness to pay more taxes in each response. We use each response as a dependent variable in order to examine whether trust affects support for selective welfare and universal welfare differently.

Different types of trust are independent variables. *Trust in most people* (general trust) is measured by the response to an often used standard question of "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" (1 = most people can be trusted, 0 = I need to be very careful). *Trust in strangers* is measured by the response to the following question, "Could you tell me how much you trust strangers?" (4-point scale: 1 = do not trust them at all, 2 = do not trust them much, 3 = trust them a little bit, 4 = trust them completely) while *trust in acquaintances*, as trust in a narrow circle of people, is measured by the response to the question: "Could you tell me how much you trust acquaintances?" (4-point scale: 1 = do not trust them at all, 2 = do not trust them much, 3 = trust them a little bit, 4 = trust them completely). *Trust in government*, as a variable representative of trust in institutions, is measured by a single response to trust in government. The respondents were asked the question: "Could you tell me how much you trust the central government?" (4-point scale: 1 = do not trust them at all, 2 = do not trust them much, 3 = trust them a little bit, 4 = trust them completely).

Several socioeconomic variables are included as control variables such as *gender* (1=male, 0=female), *age* (years), *education* (level of education: college and above, high school, middle school and below), *household income* (total income of household members: midpoint scores of twenty-two household income categories with 10,000,000 (KRW) from the highest income category for Korea; a real monthly total income (TWD) of family members for Taiwan), *self-identified social stratum* (10-point scale: 1 = the bottom, 10 = the top) and *household financial situation* (4-point scale: 1 = save money, 2 = just get by, 3 = spent some savings, 4 = spent some savings and borrowed money).

Some other variables related to social and political values and attitudes are also included in the analysis as control variables. One is *egalitarianism* (1 = egalitarianism, 0 = non-egalitarianism, where non-egalitarianism is defined as agreement with the statement, "If someone has difficulties in earning a living, it is due to his/her lack of effort or ability," and egalitarianism is defined as agreement with the statement, "If someone has difficulties in earning a living, it is due to problems in the political or social system."). Another is *conservatism* (5-point progressive-conservative scale on which higher scores equate with more conservative views). In addition, *political efficacy* is also included: it refers to the extent to which people feel they can influence politics (15-point scale of political efficacy with higher scores meaning a higher level of political efficacy), which is measured by agreement or disagreement with the following three statements (5-point scale for each statement: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree): "No matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens."; "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."; "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." Cronbach's α for the three statements is 0.6999 for Korea and 0.5738 for Taiwan.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Our survey data show that all trust levels, including interpersonal trust and institutional trust, are higher in Taiwan than in Korea (Figure 1). For the respondents in Korea, 21.1 percent trust most people, 85.6 percent trust acquaintances, 8.1 percent trust strangers, and 26.7 percent trust government. For the respondents in Taiwan, 43.8 percent trust most people, 90.3 percent trust acquaintances, 16.8 percent trust strangers, and 49 percent trust government.

In the case of opinions on welfare policy, respondents in Taiwan support welfare extension and universal welfare slightly more than respondents in Korea (Figure 2). 51.5 percent of the respondents in Korea support welfare extension, while 57.6 percent of the respondents in Taiwan support welfare extension. Figure 3 shows that slightly more respondents in Korea (52.2%) support selective welfare while slightly more respondents in Taiwan support




FIG. 1.—Trust in Korea and Taiwan (%)




FIG. 2.—Support for Welfare Extension and Economic Growth (%)

universal welfare (53.8%). What is interesting is that respondents in both Korea and Taiwan are more strongly supportive of selective welfare with respect to the willingness to pay more taxes, our dependent variable. However, respondents in Taiwan are much more strongly willing to pay more taxes for selective welfare (6.1 points out of 10 on average) than those in Korea (5.1 points) (Figure 4).

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables including independent and control variables used in this study.




FIG. 3.—Support for Selective Welfare and Universal Welfare (%)




FIG. 4.—Willingness to Pay More Taxes for the Poor's Welfare and the Welfare in General (Mean)

Results of Multiple Linear Regression Analyses: Determinants of Willingness to Pay More Taxes for Selective Welfare vs. Universal Welfare

We conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis in both Korea and Taiwan with the two dependent variables: the willingness to pay more taxes for selective welfare and the willingness to pay more taxes for universal welfare.

Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis in Korea for various factors that influence the first dependent variable: the willingness to pay more taxes for selective welfare. Men are more willing to pay more taxes

TABLE 1.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES

	Korea		Taiwan	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	44.7	15.0	45.2	15.6
Household Income	3,150,260 (KRW)	1,682,816 (KRW)	76,508 (TWD)	72,683 (TWD)
Self-identified Social Stratum	4.9	1.6	4.6	1.7
Household Financial Situation	2.2	0.7	1.8	0.8
Political Efficacy	8.2	2.4	9.0	2.3
Conservatism	3.1	0.9	2.7	1.0
Trust in Strangers	1.7	0.6	1.9	0.7
Trust in Acquaintances	3.0	0.6	3.1	0.6
Trust in Government	2.1	0.7	2.5	0.8
Willingness to Pay More Taxes for the Poor's Welfare	5.1	2.0	6.1	2.3
Willingness to Pay More Taxes for Welfare in General	4.7	2.0	4.8	2.4
	%			
Gender (Male)	49.7		49.3	
Education:				
Middle school and below	18.1		17.9	
High school	38.6		30.8	
College and above	43.3		51.4	
Egalitarianism	32.3		34.5	
General Trust (Most people can be trusted)	21.2		43.8	

for selective welfare than women. Young people and those identified with a higher social stratum agree more with the payment of more taxes for selective welfare. People with higher political efficacy respond more positively to the willingness to pay more taxes for selective welfare. When taking all control variables into account, we find that trust in government significantly affects the level of support for paying more taxes for selective welfare.

Table 3 shows the effects of trust on the second dependent variable: the willingness to pay more taxes for universal welfare. Overall, the effects of various control variables are not different in relation to the first dependent variable. However, one difference is that the college-educated are more likely to support the payment of more taxes for universal welfare but not for

TABLE 2.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY MORE TAXES FOR THE POOR'S WELFARE IN KOREA

	B (Beta)	SE	B (Beta)	SE
Gender (male=1)	.578 (.145)***	.136	.610 (.153)***	.135
Age	-.020 (-.148)**	.006	-.021 (-.162)***	.006
High school	-.270 (-.066)	.215	-.310 (-.075)	.214
College and above	-.015 (-.004)	.249	-.126 (-.031)	.248
Household income	-.001 (-.005)	.004	-.001 (-.008)	.004
Self-identified social stratum	.214 (.173)***	.045	.202 (.163)***	.044
Household financial situation	-.044 (-.016)	.094	-.018 (-.007)	.094
Egalitarianism (egalitarianism=1)	.108 (.025)	.144	.154 (.036)	.144
Political efficacy	.118 (.142)***	.029	.108 (.131)***	.029
Conservatism	-.004 (-.002)	.077	-.043 (-.019)	.077
General trust (trust=1)			.258 (.052)	.173
Trust in strangers			.281 (.040)	.248
Trust in acquaintances			.030 (.005)	.199
Trust in government			.182 (.120)**	.052
Constant	3.881***	.571	3.392***	.598
R ²	0.131		0.152	

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

selective welfare. With respect to the effects of trust, both trust in strangers and in government positively affect the level of support.

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the analysis for Taiwan. One particular finding is that there are no strong associations among all independent variables and the two dependent variables. With regard to the willingness to pay more taxes for selective welfare, there are no effects of gender and age, which is different from Korea. At a significance level of 0.1, the positive impact of political efficacy on the level of support is found. Also, respondents identified with a higher social stratum demonstrate more willingness to pay more taxes at a significance level of 0.1.

With respect to payment of more taxes for selective welfare, different types of interpersonal trust work in a positive way. Trust in acquaintances and trust in strangers are shown to positively affect the level of support. In Taiwan, trust in familiar people works as a solidaristic value as does trust in strangers.

Gender and age have no effect on support for universal welfare. People identified with a higher social stratum are also strong supporters of the payment of more taxes for universal welfare as they are for selective welfare.

TABLE 3.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY MORE TAXES FOR WELFARE IN GENERAL IN KOREA

	B (Beta)	SE	B (Beta)	SE
Gender (male=1)	.372 (.092)**	.141	.402 (.099)**	.139
Age	-.010 (-.071)	.006	-.012 (-.091)*	.006
High school	.084 (.020)	.223	.017 (.004)	.221
College and above	.325 (.079)	.258	.188 (.046)***	.256
Household income	-.006 (-.048)	.004	-.006 (-.050)	.004
Self-identified social stratum	.212 (.168)***	.046	.192 (.152)***	.046
Household financial situation	-.019 (-.007)	.098	.002 (.001)	.097
Egalitarianism (egalitarianism=1)	.022 (.005)	.149	.064 (.015)	.148
Political efficacy	.112 (.133)***	.030	.098 (.116)**	.030
Conservatism	-.079 (-.035)	.080	-.114 (-.050)	.080
General trust (trust=1)			.284 (.057)	.178
Trust in strangers			.705 (.097)**	.255
Trust in acquaintances			.255 (.043)	.205
Trust in government			.160 (.103)**	.054
Constant	3.176***	.592	2.676***	.616
R ²	0.101		0.134	

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

TABLE 4.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY MORE TAXES FOR THE POOR'S WELFARE IN TAIWAN

	B (Beta)	SE	B (Beta)	SE
Gender (male=1)	.294 (.065)*	.138	.205 (.045)	.137
Age	.007 (.045)	.005	.008 (.052)	.005
High school	.149 (.030)	.217	.166 (.034)	.215
College and above	.200 (.044)	.222	.110 (.024)	.220
Household income	.000 (.025)	.000	.000 (.030)	.000
Self-identified social stratum	.084 (.065)*	.041	.070 (.054)+	.041
Household financial situation	-.051 (-.028)	.055	-.046 (-.026)	.055
Egalitarianism (egalitarianism=1)	-.062 (-.013)	.144	-.050 (-.011)	.143
Political efficacy	.062 (.063)*	.029	.056 (.057)+	.029
Conservatism	-.058 (-.024)	.073	-.055 (-.023)	.072
General trust (trust=1)			.135 (.030)	.146
Trust in strangers			.315 (.097)**	.108
Trust in acquaintances			.421 (.102)**	.134
Trust in government			.000 (.000)	.092
Constant	4.781***	.507	2.944***	.652
R ²	0.021		0.051	

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

TABLE 5.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY MORE TAXES FOR WELFARE IN GENERAL IN TAIWAN

	B (Beta)	SE	B (Beta)	SE
Gender (male=1)	.105 (.022)	.143	.049 (.010)	.143
Age	-.004 (-.024)	.005	-.003 (-.021)	.005
High school	.139 (.027)	.225	.143 (.028)	.224
College and above	.222 (.047)	.230	.145 (.031)	.229
Household income	.000 (.057)+	.000	.000 (.063)+	.000
Self-identified social stratum	.155 (.115)**	.042	.142 (.105)**	.042
Household financial situation	.048 (.026)	.057	.050 (.027)	.057
Egalitarianism (egalitarianism=1)	-.086 (-.017)	.150	-.063 (-.013)	.149
Political efficacy	.044 (.044)	.030	.041 (.040)	.030
Conservatism	-.053 (-.021)	.076	-.062 (-.025)	.075
General trust (trust=1)			.285 (.060)+	.152
Trust in strangers			.062 (.018)	.112
Trust in acquaintances			.319 (.075)*	.139
Trust in government			.172 (.055)+	.096
Constant	3.587***	.525	2.067**	
R ²	0.028		0.046	

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

One difference from the selective welfare analysis is that household income affects willingness to pay more taxes for universal welfare at a significance level of 0.1. Compared to the analysis for selective welfare, general trust and trust in government positively influence support for universal welfare expansion, although their effects are weak (positive at a significance level of 0.1). The positive influence of trust in strangers disappears here. Interestingly, trust in acquaintances also has a positive influence on support for universal welfare as it does for selective welfare.


When Korea and Taiwan are compared, some distinctive results are found with respect to the effects of different types of trust. For the case of Korea, institutional trust is important in the willingness to pay more taxes for both selective and universal welfare. One distinctive finding in Taiwan is that interpersonal trust in a narrow circle of people positively affects the willingness to pay more taxes for both selective and universal welfare.

Discussion: Trust in Korea and Taiwan from a Comparative Perspective

In both Korea and Taiwan, general trust and trust in strangers, as well as trust in institutions, positively affects attitudes towards welfare. From a comparative perspective there are two interesting findings: first, trust in government plays a crucial role in supporting welfare in Korea selectively and universally. However, this is not the case in Taiwan, which leads to the second finding: trust in acquaintances is significant in forming of solidaristic value in Taiwan. Do different national contexts explain these findings? Let us look at the effect of confidence in government in Korean contexts compared to those of Taiwan.

Early social policies in Korea and Taiwan were characterized by separate yet generous social insurance programs, typically for military personnel and civil servants. The national social insurance programs have limited coverage for the general population, and public assistance programs and social services have not received sufficient public funding (Ku 1997; Wong 2004). In the late 1980s, democratization was indeed the watershed in extensive changes in social policy in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, social insurance programs such as health insurance, old-age pension, and industrial accident insurance were extended to include a larger number of the population, and unemployment insurance was newly implemented in the 1990s. In Taiwan, the implementation of national health insurance in 1995 was a major accomplishment in the post-democratization period (Wong 2004). The introduction of a non-contributory old-age allowance was the result of political party competition between the prolonged dominant party (Chinese Nationalist Party or KMT) and the opposition party (Democratic Progressive Party or DPP) in the early 1990s (Choi 2008; Choi and Kim 2010). What remains currently debatable in Taiwan is whether or not a nationally unified old-age pension with more generous benefits to most senior citizens would be feasible in the near future.

Lee (2012) attributed the differences between Korea and Taiwan with respect to the reform of old-age pension programs to the ways in which civic pro-welfare organizations were involved in welfare reform politics. Lee pointed out that in Korea civil society groups were more extensively and actively involved in policy-making processes by setting pro-welfare agendas and suggesting alternatives. However, this kind of group involvement was limited in Taiwan.



SOURCE.—OECD (Korea); National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan)

FIG. 5.—Total Public Social Expenditure in Korea and Taiwan (% of GDP)

One critical feature of welfare reform in Korea is that the heated politics involving political parties, unions, and civic organizations surrounding the unification of social insurance contributed to the treatment of these welfare issues “along the line of targeted versus universal policies,” and not simply along the line of pro-welfare versus anti-welfare in Korea (Choi 2012, p. 281; Lee 2012, p. 511). The Korean public has become much more familiar with the issue of targeted versus universal welfare ever since the Kim Dae Jung regime. For example, the “free school meal” confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition party during Seoul’s by-election for mayor in 2011 continued the struggle for targeted versus universal social policies. Political debates became more receptive to welfare issues even though the government’s general financial conservatism and personal or family responsibility values remained strong.

Trends of social expenditure (Figure 5) show a somewhat different trajectory of welfare expansion for Korea and Taiwan.² Social expenditure has steadily increased in Korea while in the 2000s it stagnated in Taiwan. An explanation of the different trends of social expenditure is not the main focus of this study; however, we should note that these trends may relate to the implications of this study. With the current expansion, the public

² Data for Korea and Taiwan are not exactly comparable because Taiwan is not included in the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Thus, the figures for Taiwan have been calculated based upon the latest data (social security statistics and GDP) provided by its National Statistics Bureau.

expectations for welfare have been escalating in Korea. In addition, welfare politics is confrontational in the context of rising social inequality and increasing unstable employment especially after the 1997 economic crisis in Korea (Nam 2013).³

When welfare issues have been politicized with the gradual increase of welfare expenditure, as in Korea, people tend to see welfare policies as political issues and are concerned about whether these welfare policies could be misused by public institutions, especially the government. Therefore, higher institutional trust, or higher trust in government in particular is required to increase welfare support in Korea. Koreans seem to expect their government to respond to welfare demands given the fact that public welfare expenditure has increased gradually, until recent years. On the contrary, it appears that the Taiwanese do not associate strong trust in government with welfare support, because the rise in social expenditure has been stagnant for some time and welfare politics are less confrontational in Taiwan than in Korea.

Then, why does interpersonal trust such as trust in acquaintances show a significant relationship to people's willingness to pay more taxes for both selective and universal welfare in Taiwan but not in Korea? We cannot fully account for the differences between Korea and Taiwan. Nonetheless, this result signifies that the role of trust varies when applied in different social contexts. It is argued that a strong trust in familiar others diminishes the value of establishing solidarity in East Asian countries because such interpersonal trust toward an in-group is shaped by narrow collectivism as seen in familism, nepotism, and regionalism, which is strongly influenced by Confucian culture (Lee 2000; Yee 2000). In this cultural environment, those with stronger in-group trust are more narrow-minded (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). However, what the Taiwan case shows is that in-group trust can generate solidaristic attitudes, especially toward welfare.

Then, we go back to the question of why the effects of in-group trust differ between the two countries. In order to answer this, it is necessary to discuss the roles of informal social networks in these countries such as *guanxi* and *yongo*, as mentioned briefly in the previous section. While it is unnecessary to delve too much into the subject, we should take into account previous studies on the roles of *guanxi* and *yongo*, and from them derive conclusions as to their influences on the shaping of the in-group trust.

³ The conflicting gender norms have also been involved in this social clash regarding welfare politics in Korea (Park 2013).

Both *guanxi* and *yongo* are personalized networks among people who share common roots and memberships such as in schools or towns (Lee 2000; Marsh 2003; Yang 2002; Yee 2000). According to Lin (2001), this type of relationships exhibits two distinct dimensions in its role in trust formation: first is the instrumental aspect, particularly for exchanging resources and information. However, that is not that the sole characteristic of its nature, which leads to its second aspect – the emotional one. The emotional affinity in *guanxi* and *yongo* emphasizes reputation and loyalty among the people involved. Such informal networks function as “pseudo-families” beyond one’s own blood-ties (Horak 2014; Lin 2001; Taube 2015).

Despite these similarities, it is hard to deny the differences between *guanxi* and *yongo*. Such differences can explain why interpersonal trust such as trust in acquaintances in Taiwan is positively associated with people’s attitudes toward welfare support, while it is not the case in Korea. First of all, *guanxi* networks are either naturally given to families and relatives, or developed by sharing various experiences, which are not limited to families and ties to the same hometown and school. On the contrary, *yongo* is predetermined by kinship, education, and residence (Horak 2014; Lin 2001; Taube 2015). Secondly, *guanxi* consequently can extend to outsiders when mutual exchanges are possible, while *yongo* is immutable and relatively exclusive of outsiders. Therefore, *yongo* is highly homogenous and can be hostile toward others (Horak 2014; Lin 2001; Taube 2015; Yee 2000), while *guanxi* is rather accepting of outsiders as mentioned before.

Due to these different characteristics between *guanxi* and *yongo*, distinct implications can be drawn from them. Both are informal networks that mainly provide favors to their insiders (Lee 2000; Warren, Dunfee and Li 2004; Yee 2000). Nevertheless, *guanxi* is much more interactive with others, versatile and willing to extend its network parameters to other forms of *guanxi*, since it is less exclusive and more transferrable than *yongo*. With these key traits, the trust built in *guanxi* is not narrow-minded, but rather it can be the foundation for further extension of its networks. *Yongo*, on the other hand, tends to segment into far more exclusive factions, which can be defined as “patron-client networks” (Lee 2000). Within the already exclusive and homogenous boundary of *yongo*, such networks serve to benefit their own members. While its exclusive membership provides unbounded trust and support to those who are accepted to the group, *yongo* fails to extend its realm of trust to others who are not considered “in.” As a result, it is unlikely to evolve its trust into the general and broader form for the “others,” while *guanxi* is rather inviting to newcomers. In such a way, we can extract why

simple trust in acquaintances can increase people's support for welfare expansion in Taiwan: interpersonal confidence built upon everyday interactions seems to work as a basis for social solidarity.

Conclusion

In this study, we examined not only the relationship between trust and public support for welfare, but also the various determinants related to welfare support attitudes, such as demography and socio-economic attributes. Firstly, the demographic or socio-economic factors, we found, show no significantly different impacts on the two dependent variables – people's willingness to pay more taxes for selective welfare and for universal welfare – in both Korea and Taiwan. Then, between the two countries, we found that demographic variables demonstrate significant effects on welfare support more so in Korea than in Taiwan, particularly gender and age. In the case of Korea, we found that men are more prone than women to support paying more taxes, which, interestingly, contradicts the findings in Western welfare states (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008).

Secondly, we also found socio-economic determinants play a significant role in terms of welfare support attitudes. Those who identified with a higher social stratum are inclined to show greater willingness to pay more taxes for both selective and universal welfare support in both countries. Historically, the underprivileged groups in both countries have received fewer benefits from welfare policies than the privileged groups. For that reason, it appears that the working class has had fewer social opportunities to establish their political interests in welfare policies. This might be in contrast to the previous empirical finding that high income earners tend to be weaker supporters of the welfare state in Western countries (Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008).

Lastly, but as importantly, we explored the different forms of trust and their effects on welfare support. In our analysis, we found that trust in government matters strongly in Korea, while that in acquaintances matters more in Taiwan. Among different types of trust, general trust is weak in relation to welfare support, or rather exhibits no impact in both Korea and Taiwan. We can argue that welfare support attitudes might be influenced by a more concretely established trust rather than "unspecified" general trust in these two East Asian countries. However, the diminished role of general trust in people's willingness to pay more taxes may not be a phenomenon unique to East Asian countries. For instance, a comparative study of seven European

countries found only a weak association between general trust and public welfare support in Britain and Sweden, but no significant relationship between them in the other five countries (Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli 2008). The nature and influence of general trust may vary by social context, and further studies on this can be pursued in other countries along with Korea and Taiwan.

This study has its limitations. One critical limitation is that our regression model does not explain much of the variation of welfare attitudes in Taiwan (very low R^2 : more or less than 0.05), while much more explicable in Korea (R^2 is 0.134-0.152). One possible reason is that welfare politics has not been well developed in Taiwan because it has been less politicized. Another possible reason is that *guanxi* networks operate relatively well in Taiwan when compared to Korea; Taiwanese seem to be more or less well taken care of through the informal network of *guanxi*. Because of that, there is not strong cleavage to diversify people's interests in public policies and directions of national politics on welfare in Taiwan. However, the reason why we cannot explain much of the variation of welfare attitudes in Taiwan remains open for future research.

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