

## **Power Transition and U.S.-China Relations: Is War Inevitable?**

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*What can U.S.-China interactions since 1990 foretell the trend of this most important bilateral relationship in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? This article explores whether and how a potential power transition from the United States to China will take place peacefully in the future. Historically power transitions from a dominant nation to a challenger almost always led to wars. While some progress has been made in accounting for the causes and consequences of wars associated with power transitions, little research has been done on the problem of peaceful management of power transitions in the international system.*

*Theoretically, this research expands the Organskian power transition proposition and advances peace studies by analyzing factors contributing to systemic changes at international, domestic, societal and individual levels. After reviewing the U.S.-China relations since 1990 at all four levels, the author draws a tentative conclusion that a potential power transition from the United States to China is most likely to be peaceful. Policy recommendations are provided for managing this complex relationship in the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in order to promote peace and avoid another human tragedy associated with power transition.*

**Keywords:** *Power Transition, U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Levels of Analysis, Diplomacy*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

U.S.-China relations are arguably the most important and consequential bilateral ties in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As Chinese power continues to grow and expand, many worry about the future of U.S.-China relations and international security. Some compare today's China to pre-World War I Germany. With growing economic and military might, China, it is assumed, will probably challenge the existing international system violently and force a global confrontation just like what Germany did. It is therefore interesting and imperative to study whether a potential power transition from the US to China will lead to another major war in the international system.<sup>1</sup>

Since 1990, U.S.-China relations have experienced many ups and downs. What is the status of U.S.-China relations today? What can we learn about the future trajectory of the bilateral relations from their interactions in the past? Historically, power transitions from a dominant nation to a challenger almost always led to large-scale systemic wars. As one leading realist international relations scholar observed, peaceful power transition in the

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<sup>1</sup> For U.S.-China relations in general, see David M. Lampton (2001), Ezra F. Vogel, ed. (1997), James Mann (1999), Michael Schaller (2002), Christopher Marsh and June Teufel Dreyer, eds. (2003), Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro (1997). For great power relations in general, see some of the recent works such as Benjamin Miller (2003), John J. Mearsheimer (2002), and William R. Thompson (1998).

international system had a very low probability (Robert Gilpin, 1981: 15).<sup>2</sup> While some progress has been made in accounting for the causes and consequences of wars associated with power transitions, little research has been done on the problem of peaceful management of power transitions in the international system. Based on theoretical exploration and empirical examination, this article surveys U.S.-China interactions since 1990 and predicts the future development of the bilateral ties in the context of a potential power transition.

Theoretically, this research expands the Organskian power transition proposition and advances peace studies by analyzing factors contributing to systemic changes at international, domestic, societal and individual levels. It applies the theory to specific analysis of U.S.-China relations. The article asserts that a multilevel analysis can better explain and predict power transitions in the international system. Using a modified new framework, this paper reviews U.S.-China relations since 1990 at all four levels and investigates whether the two countries can manage a potential power transition smoothly. Based on the findings of generally positive interactions between the two countries, the paper concludes with an optimistic note that a potential power transition from the United States to China is most likely to be peaceful. The paper also offers policy recommendations on how to manage this complicated bilateral relationship in the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in order to avoid another major war in the international system associated with global power transition.

## 2. THE POWER TRANSITION THEORY

China's rise in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries will probably become one of the most significant and most frequently written and read chapters in any future book of international politics and world history. China's reemergence may challenge the United States as the dominant global and Asia-Pacific regional power. This is not unusual since great powers rise and fall.<sup>3</sup> The rise of Iberian powers, the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the United Provinces, Spain, France, Germany, and Japan during different periods from 1400 to 1900 all led to violent systemic changes. The cyclical war associated with power transitions in history prompted historian E.H. Carr (1964: 208-23) to identify the "problem of peaceful change" as the central dilemma of international relations. "Great powers emerge from great wars," declared a renowned international relations scholar (Knutsen 1999: 21). Literature that accounts for power transition and its linkage to war abounds in international relations and history. Historians and international relations scholars such as Arnold Toynbee, Quincy Wright, Charles Doran, Robert Gilpin, Immanuel Wallerstein, George Modelski, Paul Kennedy, and Torbjorn Knutsen have all discerned a pattern or cycle of major wars associated with systemic changes in world politics.

But it was political scientist A.F.K. Organski (1958) who, in his *World Politics*, first and more explicitly linked power transition to wars between great powers and called attention to the danger that probability of war may increase during a period of power transition (Organski

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<sup>2</sup> "Although ..... peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system)."

<sup>3</sup> For a fascinating account of the rise and fall of great powers, see Paul Kennedy (1987) and Torbjorn L. Knutsen (1999).

1958; Organski and Kugler 1980). A direct challenge to classic realism that claims the international system is anarchic, Organski and other power transition theorists contend that the international system is hierarchical, and that in each historical era a single dominant state leads the international order as head of a coalition of satisfied powers. As long as the leader of this status quo coalition enjoys a preponderance of power, peace is maintained. But when power reaches parity, i.e. when a dissatisfied challenger begins to overtake the status quo power, wars are most likely to break out. Power transition theorists emphasize “power parity” and “dissatisfaction with the status quo” as crucial elements contributing to the risk of system-transforming war. The theory is based primarily on changes in the distribution of power in the international system. “The cornerstone of power transition theory is that *parity* is the necessary condition for major war” (Kugler and Lemke 1996: 4). The basic hypothesis is that the probability of war increases as the power gap narrows, especially as a rival dissatisfied challenger comes closer to equalizing the capabilities of the once stronger guardian of the international status quo.

If a rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo, like the pre-WWI Germany, then a violent power transition is expected. When both powers are satisfied with the international status quo, the actual overtaking is most likely to be peaceful. This was the case of the United States and Great Britain in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The United States’ overtaking of Great Britain did not threaten the structure of the existing international order. It simply reinforced existing rules.

Ever since A.F.K. Organski first formulated it as a competing theory to counter traditional balance-of-power theory, power transition theory has undergone various modifications and expansions. Organski himself extended the theory to cover the nuclear era in the second edition of *World Politics* published in 1968. The fundamental test of the theory is found in Organski and Kugler’s *The War Ledger* (1980). More theoretical testing and extensions are done by other scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Kim (1992), Kim and Morrow (1992), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Lemke (1997), Kugler and Lemke (1996, 2000), DiCicco and Levy (1999), and Tammen et al. (2000), who have all contributed to the clarification and improvement of the theory. But the power transition perspective remains far from satisfactory as a theory when used to explain and predict great power relations both at global and regional levels.

Power transition theory identifies one possible cause of wars between great powers, but there are multilevel factors that contribute to the outbreak of wars. Even theorists of power transition themselves reject the deterministic claim that power transition alone causes wars (Organski and Kugler 1980: 51).<sup>4</sup> Power transition provides an opportunity for war, but for a war to occur, there must exist other factors, particularly the international and domestic constraints and the political will of decision makers on each side. Power transition theory falls short of acknowledging the uncertainties associated with power differentials and the dynamic interdependent relationship between the status quo power and the challenging power. It leaves out such vital variables as decision-making, statesmanship, diplomacy, and societal relations. From the rational choice perspective, great powers may choose to cooperate during a systemic change in an interdependent world if cooperation yields more benefits. Or as the expected utility model suggests, if the expected gains outweigh costs, a decision maker will probably strive for the expected benefits (Bueno de Mesquita 1985: 156-177). War is waged with reason rather than without it. Power transition theory reduces a

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<sup>4</sup> For a good exploration of the causes of war, see Greg Cashman (1993) and Stephen Van Evera (1999).

policy maker to the status of a passive keeper of the international structure rather than an agent capable of influencing and even changing the outcome of power transition.

To study whether a power transition will lead to war, political, economic, military, cultural and social dimensions of great power relations have to be examined. Power transition theory emphasizes domestic growth as the source of national power. It only vaguely links domestic and international politics in one single perspective. In this respect, the logic of two-level games on international negotiations could provide a better explanation for war or peace decisions as a result of the interactions between international and domestic environments.<sup>5</sup> Power transition theory also fails to acknowledge the importance of new international regimes. How globalization, deepening interdependence and multilateral cooperation will affect power transition is a question largely evaded by power transition scholars.

An expanded theoretical framework is needed to identify multiple causes of international conflict and war. In his *Man, the State, and War*, Kenneth N. Waltz (1959) explicitly explored the causes of international conflict at individual, domestic and systemic levels. This research borrows Waltz's "three images" and develops them into four levels of analysis: international, domestic, societal, and individual. Aided with the explanatory strength of the multilevel analysis, the power transition theory will offer a more forceful explanation about great power interactions.

### 3. A MODIFIED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


The central argument of this paper is that while power parity and dissatisfaction of the challenging power may be necessary conditions for wars associated with power transition, the process and outcome of a power transition are determined by the interactions of the international environment, domestic politics, societal links and individual leaders. Power transition provides a window of opportunity for war, but war or peace decisions are made by individual political leaders who base their decisions on evaluations of the overall relationship between the two competing powers under certain international and domestic conditions. This new theoretical framework treats power transition as a dynamic process and places it in a broader international and domestic context. Different from Organski's historical-structural interpretation, this new model offers an agent-structural interpretation of power transition.

The original power transition theory does not look at the power transition process from different levels of analysis. The new framework emphasizes the importance of non-systemic factors that have largely been ignored by structural realism such as societal links, personalities of leaders, domestic politics, and statesmanship. The non-systemic factors are critical variables to be reckoned with in understanding state behavior. This contextual, interactive, and integrative perspective is more nuanced and more persuasive. To elaborate on the new theoretical framework, the following hypotheses are proposed:

*General hypothesis:* If the government, the public and top leaders in both the dominant power and the challenging power have positive evaluations of their relationship in a friendly international system, power transition will end in peace.

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<sup>5</sup> For the linkage of domestic and international politics, see Robert D. Putnam (1988: 427-460) and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992).

**Figure 1.** The dynamics of power transition: a multi-level analysis.

This general hypothesis can be divided into five sub-hypotheses in order to analyze power transition from four different levels:

- H1: The more accommodating the international system is towards the rising power, the less likely the rising power will challenge the international status quo violently.
- H2: The more a rising power respects the dominant power's vital interests, the less likely the dominant power will try to block its growth.
- H3: The more the dominant power recognizes a challenger's vital interests, the less

confrontational a challenger will become.

H4: The more extensive and strong links the two societies have, the less likely there will be war between them.

H5: The more efforts top leaders devote to a stable bilateral relationship, the less likely there will be war between the two powers.

The dependent variable in this research is the dichotomized outcome of power transition: war or peace. Specifically, the process and outcome of a power transition are determined and influenced by a set of conditions at various levels of bilateral interactions. The independent variables are conditions, factors and circumstances at the global, domestic, societal, and individual levels that have direct impact on the process and consequence of power transition as well as on the political decisions for war or peace.

To operationalize, Hypothesis I looks at the bilateral relationship at the international level. For example, does the international system maintained by the dominant power welcome the rise of a challenger? To what extent has the challenger been incorporated into the international political and economic system? Are both powers participants and defenders of the current international regimes? This forms the first level of analysis by looking at the interactions of the two powers at the international system.

Hypotheses II and III study how perceptions and evaluations and corresponding foreign and domestic policies of each power affect relations between the two rivals. The “vital” interests include those that are considered the “core” of each country’s domestic and foreign policies. For example, in the case of the United States, enhancing national security, maintaining economic prosperity and promoting democracy and human rights are generally believed to be vital national interests. In the case of China, sustaining economic development and safeguarding national unity such as preventing Taiwan or Tibet from becoming independent are some of those core interests. Hypotheses II and III form the second level of analysis by looking at domestic politics and foreign policy of each power.

Hypothesis IV looks at the relationship from the societal level such as trade, educational, cultural, personnel and other exchanges. A close bilateral relationship cannot be maintained by political leaders alone without solid grass-roots support. This is the third level of analysis. Hypothesis V, which is the fourth level of analysis, studies the impact of the perceptions, personalities, and evaluations of national leaders on foreign policies. How much have they devoted to the improvement of bilateral relations through their words and deeds? To what extent are diplomacy and statesmanship actively involved?

In short, this research studies great power relations from interactions and mutual responsiveness at individual, societal, governmental, and global levels. This integrative decision-making model is crucial when analyzing and predicting power transitions in the international system. To further elaborate on the theoretical framework and these hypotheses, the paper focuses on U.S.-China relations since 1990 as a case study. Placing U.S.-China relations in theoretical and historical perspective, I make an assessment of how this potential power transition may evolve under current international and domestic environments. The conclusion drawn from this research is tentative, but it may provide useful implications for policy makers and the public in the United States and China as well as the international community in general.

#### 4. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 1990

How to deal with a rising China is probably the most serious foreign policy challenge for the United States in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Realistically speaking, in the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the United States will probably remain a hyper-power unmatched in every dimension of national capabilities. China will not be in a position to challenge the American military, technological and economic supremacy any time soon. There are daunting economic, political, and social challenges that China has to meet now and in the near future. So, military conflict between China and the United States originating from power rivalry is unlikely in the next two or three decades. But exactly because of this, the next two or three decades are particularly crucial in determining the nature and the future tendency of the relationship between China and the United States. If they can handle this complex relationship constructively now, a potential power transition in the future is more likely to be peaceful.

##### 4.1. International Environment

The post-Cold War U.S.-China relationship has been a complex mixture of contention and cooperation. The key factors precipitating this change were the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union. To some extent, the Tiananmen incident fundamentally changed Americans' perception of China. The image of an opening and outward-looking China was replaced almost overnight by the image of a ruthless dictatorship. Furthermore, the end of US-USSR rivalry removed the most obvious rationale for Sino-American cooperation in world affairs.

At the turn of the century, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a new consensus seemed to be emerging in the United States with regard to the greatest threat to the national security. Asymmetric warfare, including terrorism, is a greater danger to U.S. interests and a subsequently higher strategic priority than any traditional military threat (Rudman 2002). According to U.S. ambassador to China Clark Randt, the September 11 attacks demonstrated to Americans that they have real enemies, and China is not among them.<sup>6</sup> For the United States and China, the 2001 terrorist attacks provided some breathing space for the tense relationship jeopardized by the spy plane incident and President Bush's statement of defending Taiwan "at any costs" earlier that year.

Nevertheless, the rise of China as a great power has never been comforting to some in the United States. Even during the height of war against terrorism, the hawks in the United States have not let down their guard against China. For example, in July 2002, two official reports submitted to the U.S. Congress — one by the U.S.-China Security Review Commission on bilateral relations and the other by the Department of Defense on China's military power — both portrayed China's surge as a threat to American interests.<sup>7</sup> Since

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<sup>6</sup> Quoted in "Jiang Looks to U.S. for Unlikely Final Legacy," *CNN News* at [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com), accessed on October 22, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> The U.S.-China Security Review Commission report, published on July 15, 2002, claims China presents "an increasing threat to U.S. security interests, in the Middle East and Asia in particular." See the highlights of the report on the Commission's webpage at [www.uscc.gov/pr7\\_15.htm](http://www.uscc.gov/pr7_15.htm). The Department of Defense's report, published three days earlier, considers China's missiles along the

1990 China has been frequently singled out as the most dangerous potential threat to U.S. national interests in military and security spheres.

China, on the other hand, has come to see its interests inseparably aligned with those of the international community. China's priority since the late 1970s has been to take advantage of the relatively peaceful international environment for its modernization programs. With some twists and turns, China's door to the world and the West in particular has opened to the point where it is almost impossible to close again.

To a great extent, the United States has helped to bring China back to the international stage after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Since the 1980s, through trade and investment, the United States has facilitated China's modernization. Through interactions with the United States and other countries in the fast changing world, China has become an important regional and global player. Being an active member of such international and multilateral organizations as the United Nations and the WTO, China is helping to rewrite the global rules of the game.

While opposing America's frequent unilateral approach in international affairs and its high-handedness towards China on some issues, China has a basically a positive view of the U.S.-dominated international system. China has been taking advantage of the current international regime for its own development without attempting to alter it. According to political scientist Samuel Kim, China's role in international organizations is distinctively system-maintaining, not system-altering. China is "a satisfied conservative system maintainer, not a liberal system reformer nor a revolutionary system transformer" (Lardy 2002: 155).

China's modernization requires a peaceful international environment. This means that it shares an interest with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere; preserving stable oil and commodity markets; and restricting the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. China's efforts to shore up regional currencies during the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, its willingness to agree to a code of conduct in the South China Sea, its work in the United Nations on international peace, and its cooperation with the United States in the area of arms control indicate that China has just as much interest as the United States in maintaining a predictable, rule-based international order.

In the security arena, China and the United States have clear common interests in North Korea, South Asia, terrorism and stability in the Middle East. Despite disputes over Taiwan, human rights, and nonproliferation, U.S.-China relations remain one of the most dynamic and resilient and have weathered several crises since the mid-1990s. As two major players in regional and global affairs, the United States and China have perhaps learned the importance of cooperation and the danger of conflict in an era of globalization and deepening interdependence.

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Southeast China coast not only a threat to Taiwan, but a direct threat to the United States and U.S. interests in Japan and the Philippines. The full text of the Department of Defense report can be accessed at [www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf).

## 4.2. Domestic Politics

### 4.2.1. *The United States*

The checks and balances mechanism ensures intense domestic debate on major issues. Congress and the White House may agree upon U.S. objectives towards China, but they often diverge on concrete policies. Traditionally, Congress has been more outspoken and critical of the negative aspects of the Chinese society and accordingly, has advocated tougher policies. The White House has tended to take a more balanced approach towards China. Though both Republicans and Democrats have held office in the White House since the end of the Cold War, China policy objectives and practices of various administrations have remained similar.

Criticisms on China coming from members of Congress are often harsh. From human rights, rule of law, to Taiwan and Tibet, many members of Congress rarely have anything positive to say about China. Several members of Congress have taken a strong personal interest in China policy. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Frank Wolf (R-VA), for example, are personally identified with concern over Chinese human rights issues. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and former Senators Frank Murkowski (R-AK) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) are closely identified with strong U.S. support for Taiwan. Interestingly, despite its harsh criticism of China's poor human rights record and its lack of respect for the rule of law, U.S. Congress has never funded the rule of law program for China that was announced by President Clinton in 1997 during his summit meeting in Washington with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin.

The divergent views on China are best summarized by Henry Kissinger's comment in 1998: "Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as a laboratory for the spread of American values. Both view China through the prism of their party's experience over the last 30 years. Unfortunately, too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic ostracism and ideological warfare. Too many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the complexities of Chinese history" (Brahm 2001: 63).

Since Tiananmen, there has been a hot debate in the United States between China hawks and China doves. Some officials see China as a strategic competitor and a potential adversary. Some would like to engage China so that China will turn out to be a benign power. Yet from a broader and longer term perspective, there is no real domestic division in U.S. policy toward China. Both the so-called doves and the hawks aim at neutralizing China as a potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia. Their difference is only one of tactics and timing. The doves promote "peaceful evolution" through trade and engagement while the hawks promote pre-emptive confrontation through military conflict. Neither advocates an all-out war with China.

Secretary of State Colin Powell is widely believed to be a moderate while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney are considered hardliners. In terms of the China policy, the views and policies from the State and Defense departments may differ. For example, on July 12, 2002, the Pentagon released its first Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China under the Bush administration. Citing Beijing's deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan and its recent purchase of Russian weapons, the Pentagon report claims that Beijing is pursuing "a coercive strategy" to force

Taiwan to negotiate on Beijing's terms and that China's military modernization could pose a threat to Japan and the Philippines as well as Taiwan. The report concludes that China is rapidly modernizing its military with the goal of countering American power in the Pacific and pressing Taiwan to accept unification.<sup>8</sup> These pentagon views are apparently not in line with what Secretary of State Powell said the day before the report was released. In a joint press conference with the visiting Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on July 11, 2002, Powell remarked that China and the United States have "good bilateral relations" and "we're anxious to have more military-to-military exchanges with the Chinese." He said that as China develops, some of its wealth will be used to modernize Chinese military forces. That itself is not "frightening" and the United States will monitor it carefully. To which point the Australian foreign minister added that Australia "does not have any great concerns" about modernization of the Chinese armed forces since "we haven't seen any change in China's strategic posture that would cause us any concern."<sup>9</sup>

Since no new consensus has been reached in the United States regarding its future relations with China, domestic debate over China will continue in the United States, especially during an election year.

#### 4.2.2. *China*

Though the non-transparent character of Chinese politics makes its intentions less predictable, China's policy towards the United States has been rather consistent since the end of the Cold War. To quote former President Jiang Zemin, "reducing trouble and promoting cooperation" has been a major feature of China's US policy. China has adopted a policy of keeping a low profile in international affairs while focusing on domestic development.

As it is in the United States, there are both moderates and hard-liners in China with regards to their U.S. policy. The Chinese "hawks" include the People's Liberation Army and some conservative scholars in government-funded think tanks. For example, hardline Chinese officials, angry at Washington's invitation to Taiwan's defense chief to attend a March 2002 military conference in Florida where he met with senior U.S. officials, demanded that Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao's plan to visit the United States that same year be cancelled.

As a developing country, China faces enormous challenges at home.<sup>10</sup> These challenges include but are not limited to population, environmental deterioration, ethnic separatism, and the rule of law. Furthermore, admission into the WTO offers China both opportunities and challenges. It's "a gamble of historic proportions" (Lardy 2002: 7). Tens of millions of workers are unemployed in state-owned enterprises, while from 60 to 100 million surplus rural workers are adrift between the villages and cities, subsisting on part-time low-paying jobs. WTO participation also requires banking and financial systems reform, and the establishment of the rule of law. All these challenges, together with the Communist Party's

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<sup>8</sup> "New Pentagon Report Sees Rapid Buildup by China," *The New York Times*, July 13, 2002. Accessed online the same day from <http://www.nytimes.com>.

<sup>9</sup> The transcript of the July 11 2002 joint press conference can be found on the website of the Embassy of Australia in Washington, D.C. at <http://www.austemb.org>. Interestingly, the same transcript cannot be found at the U.S. State Department website, which only contains reports about Australian Prime Minister's visit to the United States.

<sup>10</sup> These enormous challenges prompt some people to think that China is going to fail in the next 20 years or so. See, for example, Gordon G. (2001). This author does not take such a pessimistic view.

task to sustain rapid economic growth and maintain national unity and stability to prolong its legitimacy in power, will keep China busy for quite some time.

Complex domestic issues will prevent foreign relations from rating high on the policy agenda; when they do, they will tend to be viewed in the context of linkages to the domestic economy, society and polity. For its ambitious modernization program, China wants U.S. trade and investment; but it also wants a non-hierarchical relationship with the United States. The imperatives of China's economic modernization require cooperation with the United States. Yet China's domestic politics dictate that cooperation cannot be at the expense of core Chinese interests such as Taiwan.

### 4.3. Societal Links

#### 4.3.1. Public Sentiment

The Chinese public has demonstrated a feeling of hope and disillusionment towards the United States. This is best illustrated by the phenomenon that some of the students who protested and threw rocks at the U.S. embassy in Beijing after the U.S. military hit the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 appeared at the U.S. embassy the next day to apply for a visa to come to the United States.

Indeed, Chinese views of the United States are mixed. On the one hand, the United States is seen as a democratically governed, economically prosperous, technologically advanced country — a trading partner vital to China's economic growth. On the other hand, the American government is seen as arrogant and overbearing that harbors hegemonic ambitions. The Chinese public's favorable images of America's domestic achievements have not changed much despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship. According to Dr. Wang Jisi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, most average Chinese have two different perceptions of America. Domestic issues received positive responses. Chinese views of American foreign policy, especially in Asia, are negatively viewed and often marked by perceptions of American hegemony.<sup>11</sup> Chinese envy America's wealth, stable political system, and advanced technology; but there are also mixed feelings on America's crime rate. "Democratic inward, hegemonic outward," summarizes Zi Zhongyun, a leading America scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Thomas and Zhao 2001: 31).

Some Chinese are pessimistic about the long term prospects of the bilateral relationship. For some, the future is uncertain at best. "China and the United States will always confront each other," according to Shen Dingli, deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Shanghai's Fudan University. "They are fundamentally different, and they should collide" because "they look to their own interests."<sup>12</sup> Yet in one survey conducted in 2001, though seventy percent of Chinese participants believed that Americans see China as the greatest threat to U.S. security, the majority of the Chinese surveyed (70 to 80 percent) also felt increasingly optimistic about the future of U.S.-China relations. Significantly, at the Central Party School, eighty-five percent felt optimistic about a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, despite the widespread resentment of what they see as U.S. interference.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> "China-United States Sustained Dialogue," Program Brief, the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> "Year after Spy Plane Crisis, China-US Ties Face New Uncertainty," *AFP* news from Yahoo! Singapore at <http://sg.search.yahoo.com/search/news>, accessed on April 1, 2002.

Interestingly, some authors and novelists in both the United States and China are now obsessed with the prospect of a future conflict between the two countries. *The Coming Conflict with China* and *Dragon Strike* are just some of the recent titles by American authors who believe an American conflict with China is inevitable and advocate forceful containment of China (Bernstein and Munro 1997; Hawksley and Holberton 1999). While *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu* (China Can Say No) and *Quanqiu hua yinmou xia de Zhongguo zhi lu* (China's Road: Under the Conspiracy of Globalization) are some of the Chinese books demonstrating strong nationalistic sentiments.

In general, many Chinese greatly admire America's inroads in technology, science, computers, finance, and management. American products are immensely popular. Young Chinese seem to have been seduced by American culture and ideology. Coca-Cola and McDonald's are hailed in China as symbols of modernity. Yet, nationalism is also strong, especially when the Chinese feel they are wronged (again) by the United States. Many Chinese do not understand why the current PRC government, the most liberalizing regime in Chinese history, is the one most attacked by U.S. media, politicians, and intellectuals — the same groups that in many cases tolerated both Mao Zedong's and Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorships.

Comparatively speaking, ordinary Americans know far less about China than ordinary Chinese know about America. Most often, the first impressions of China held by Americans are hazy and based on bits of information gleaned from various sources: newspapers, movies, books, Chinese restaurants, etc. According to a research done by the Kettering Foundation based on community forums on U.S.-China relations across the United States in 2000, ordinary Americans' views of China are ambivalent and their image of China is a work in progress. In every forum, participants called for a more accurate picture of China and of the Chinese people.<sup>14</sup> The participants in these forums ranged from youth to elders from all major racial groups, college and high school students, university faculty, veterans of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and business people. On the issue of China's rise, while some participants saw China as a threat, many of these citizens saw opportunities in the possibilities for a strong China-U.S. relationship. Many participants wanted constructive engagement with China and a deep interdependent relationship with China to create a secure world. While the participants did not envision military conflict with China, they strongly believe that human rights and individual freedoms are the ideals to which China should conform. In general, they are more concerned about China's domestic development than its foreign policy posture.

While some people in both countries consider one another as the greatest threat or potential threat, the majority in both countries seem to disagree. China and the United States may not be natural allies or even close friends, but the two countries can certainly establish a mature relationship and become normal partners in the international community. More exchanges between the two peoples are needed to facilitate better understanding of one another's history, culture, domestic and foreign policies.

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<sup>13</sup> "China-United States Sustained Dialogue," Program Brief, the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2002. Many of these surveys were conducted between April 1 and September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on America may have influenced some of these perceptions about America.

<sup>14</sup> "U.S.-China Dialogue Research Report, October 2000" in Thomas and Mei (2001: 2-21).

#### 4.3.2. *Strong and Extensive Ties*

In an era of globalization, extensive economic and trade relations help soothe difficulties in the security area. Though extensive ties alone may not be enough to deflect conflicts, strong economic, social, cultural and other interactions between the two countries serve as a stabilizer and balancer against the ups and downs in the political and security relations.

Despite such episodes as the Tiananmen Square tragedy, Taiwan Strait missile crisis, Chinese embassy bombing, and EP-3 spy plane incident in the past decade or so, the two countries have maintained a rather dynamic working relationship. Bilateral trade probably has the strongest support in both societies. Extensive economic and trade relations have become the most fundamental the strongest link between the two countries. The United States is China's number two trading partner while China ranks number four in America's foreign trade. The bilateral trade volume exceeded US\$100 billion in 2003. By 2002, the paid-in value of U.S. investment in China had exceeded US\$35 billion, making it the largest source of foreign investment in Chinese mainland after Hong Kong.<sup>15</sup> According to China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation the United States can overtake Japan as China's largest trading partner by 2005.<sup>16</sup> American investment and technology play a positive role in China's modernization. Since the early 1980s, American businesses have rushed to provide China with everything from financial services to convenience stores. In return, China's growing economy benefits American consumers with a wide choice of inexpensive and high-quality products.

Trade relations are just part of the extensive linkage between the two countries. The strong ties are also reflected by other exchanges between the two societies. For example, the two governments have reached more than 30 official agreements on cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, educational and other fields. China remains one of the top Asian destinations for American tourists. In 1979-80, only about 1,000 Chinese students were studying in the United States and almost no American students were studying in China. Today there are over 60,000 Chinese students studying in the United States and more than 5,000 American students studying in China.<sup>17</sup> China is one of the top countries to send students to the United States; the PRC students comprise about 10 percent of all international students studying in the United States.<sup>18</sup> According to a study by the Institute of International Education, the number of American students studying in China has increased dramatically over the past five years. In 2001, for example, of the total 8,834 American students enrolled in Asia, 2,949 (over one-third) were studying in the PRC.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Hu Jintao, "Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative Relationship between China and the United States," speech in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002. According to Nicholas R. Lardy(2002: 158) with the Brookings Institution, bilateral trade turnover (the sum of exports and imports) grew from \$1billion in 1978 to \$116 billion in 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in "Jiang Sets off for Final U.S. Tour," CNN News, October 20, 2002, accessed online at <http://www.cnn.com> the same day.

<sup>17</sup> Hu Jintao, "Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative Relationship between China and the United States," speech in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002.

<sup>18</sup>The Institute of International Education data, accessible from IIE's webpage at [www.opendoorsweb.org](http://www.opendoorsweb.org).

<sup>19</sup> "Highlights from Open Doors 2001" at IIE's website at [www.opendoorsweb.org](http://www.opendoorsweb.org).

In another example of close social connections, more than 5,000 Chinese children were adopted by American families in 2000 alone.<sup>20</sup> Even the epidemic disease of SARS in 2003 has not prevented many American parents from going to China to pick up their adopted children. Also, as an indication of expanding trade and personnel contact between China and the United States, transportation authorities of the two countries reached agreement in 2004 to drastically increase commercial flights before 2010. Under the agreement, the number of weekly commercial flights between the two nations aboard U.S.-based airlines will rise from 54 to 249. Of those additional 195 flights a week, 111 will be by cargo carriers, 84 by passenger airlines.<sup>21</sup>

#### 4.4. Top Leaders

If top leaders strive for a normal relationship, the relationship will most likely be smooth. President George H.W. Bush was committed to stabilizing the relationship and believed he understood both Chinese and American interests. In 1990 and 1991, he relied on his authority in foreign policy and his domestic popularity to wage an uncompromising battle against his congressional critics for the extension of China's most-favored-nation status. In retrospect, without Bush's personal attention and efforts, U.S.-China relations could have been much more problematic in the early 1990s given the strong international and U.S. domestic outcry against Chinese government's handling of the Tiananmen student demonstrations.

President Bush had a deep, lifelong interest in foreign affairs and devoted much attention to Sino-American relations following the 1989 Tiananmen incident. He considers himself as a China hand and is called "an old friend of the Chinese people" by the Chinese government, yet in fact he was not so "friendly" to China during the later days of his presidency. In an effort to garner more votes for his re-election, he approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in August 1992, then the largest sale of the most advanced weapons to Taiwan since 1979. This move appears rather contradictory from his other conciliatory policies towards China, including his dispatch of secret envoys to Beijing following the bloody incident at the Tiananmen Square. Nevertheless, President Bush's efforts to prevent Sino-American relations from further deteriorating after 1989 are to be commended.

As power passed from George H.W. Bush to William Jefferson Clinton, U.S. national leadership shifted from a man who personally cared about American relations with China to one who saw China through the eyes of advisers with competing agenda. As the new administration set about examining its worldwide responsibilities, China did not command a high priority. But as culpable as Clinton might have been for not vigorously attacking the difficulties in the U.S.-China relationship, it is not true that he sought to isolate China or to punish it for the human rights violations that he deplored.

That China received scant attention from President Clinton during his first term does not mean he had no intention or did nothing to improve the relationship. In September 1993 President Clinton signed an action memorandum approving an interagency review of China policy. Henceforth there would be "comprehensive engagement" with frequent visits and

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<sup>20</sup> "U.S.-China Ties Still Strong," *Associated Press News*, May 31, 2001 at [http://dailynews.yahoo.com/hx/ap/20010531/pl/us\\_china\\_life\\_goes\\_on\\_3.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/hx/ap/20010531/pl/us_china_life_goes_on_3.html).

<sup>21</sup> "U.S.-China Flights to Increase," *USA Today*, June 20, 2004, accessed online 21 June 2004.

regular exchanges between high-level civilian officials, renewal of military-to-military contacts suspended since June 1989, and a Clinton-Jiang summit during the approaching Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Seattle. The crisis in U.S.-China relations over Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 also prompted the Clinton administration to pay more attention to China policy. It was during his second term that Clinton's China policy gathered momentum. He and President Jiang Zemin exchanged state visits and announced the formation of "strategic partnership" between the two countries. During the last two years of his presidency, though troubled by his personal scandals, President Clinton managed to score foreign policy points by striking a deal with China about China's WTO admission.

Shortly after taking office in January 2001, President George W. Bush and his hawkish foreign policy team repeatedly provoked China on the sensitive Taiwan issue. In addition to selling or proposing to sell large amount of advanced weapons to Taiwan and perceptibly upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations, President Bush openly declared in April 2001 that the United States would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan. This new rhetoric, as the Chinese government complained, will probably only embolden and encourage separatist forces in Taiwan. No wonder many people including Richard C. Bush, former Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan believe that on balance there is no compelling reason for the United States to state in advance the details of its response to the use of force against Taiwan. Spelling out exactly what the United States would do is not a good idea (Bush 2001: 197). Others warn that writing a blank security check to Taiwan could drag the United States into a deadly conflict with China (Lampton 2002).

President George W. Bush, despite his straightforward talk about Taiwan, attended the APEC conference in Shanghai in November 2001, his first foreign travel after the September 11 attacks. He paid an official working visit to Beijing in February 2002 during his three-nation Asia tour. It is unusual but significant for a U.S. president to visit a foreign country twice within several months. The Bush administration has also apparently backed down from its overly pro-Taiwan rhetoric earlier. In August 2002, in response to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's "one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait" statement, the White House National Security Council spokesman remarked that the United States adheres to the "one China" policy and does not support Taiwanese independence.<sup>22</sup> In May 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, considered a hardliner in the Bush administration, also mentioned that the United States would not support Taiwan's independence.<sup>23</sup> And in December 2003 at a White House meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, President Bush himself warned Taiwan leaders not to attempt to unilaterally change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait (Lakely 2003).

George W. Bush is merely the most recent in a series of U.S. presidents who took office pledging more forceful policies towards the PRC only to be reconciled eventually to the need for continued cooperation with China. Jimmy Carter in 1976, Ronald Reagan in 1980, and Bill Clinton in 1992 all acted in much the same fashion. This process of socialization of American presidents to the imperatives of cooperation with China is "largely a function of

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<sup>22</sup> "The U.S. Reiterates It Does Not Support Taiwan Independence," *Lianhe Zaobao* (Singapore), August 9, 2002.

<sup>23</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz at the Foreign Press Club, Washington, DC, May 29, 2002. News Transcripts from the Department of Defense's website at <http://www.dod.gov/news/May2002/briefings.html>.

the reality of the PRC's great national capabilities and, consequently, of the very high costs the U.S. risks if it fails to reach an accommodation with China," commented China scholar John W. Garver (2002: 284).

Not only top leaders in the United States have attempted to maintain a strong U.S.-China relationship in the past decade or so, Chinese leaders are equally if not more committed to a smooth and constructive relationship with the United States. Since the early 1990s, President Jiang Zemin had promoted the so-called big-power diplomacy, a codename referring to promoting cooperative relations between China and the United States, Russia, the EU and Japan. His policy has been criticized by some in China as too weak and too accommodating to the United States especially on the Taiwan issue, the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing incident and the 2001 clash between an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet. President Jiang's own evaluation of U.S.-China relations is a mixed one. During a CBS "60 Minutes" interview with Mike Wallace on August 15, 2000, Jiang expressed his views on the state of the bilateral relationship: "Sometimes China-US relations are good and sometimes in a storm. There are certain people in America who do not want to see China and the U.S. having good relations. They always make some problems" (Brahm 2001: 64).

"Increasing trust, reducing trouble, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation" have been President Jiang's U.S. policy guidelines (Klintworth 2001: 51). Even during rough times in the bilateral relations, President Jiang still tried hard to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. For example, he backed continued U.S.-China negotiations on China's WTO admission in the second half of 1999 following the U.S. bombing of Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and the publication of the sensational, later discredited, the Cox Report which accused China of posing a serious threat to U.S. national interests by stealing nuclear technology from the United States. Also, he supported Vice President Hu Jintao's April 2002 maiden visit to the United States following Taiwanese defense minister's U.S. visit and his meeting with senior U.S. officials at a Florida conference earlier that year.

The fourth generation of Chinese leaders headed by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao seem equally positive about developing and expanding U.S.-China relations. In his only public speech during his May 2002 U.S. visit, the then Vice President Hu Jintao called on the two nations to step up dialogue at all levels, intensify exchanges and cooperation in all fields, and seek common ground while shelving differences. He concluded by saying that the two nations will overcome interruptions and difficulties and "write a new chapter in the development of bilateral relations."<sup>24</sup> Since assuming the positions as Communist Party General Secretary and the state President in October 2002 and March 2003 respectively, Hu has reiterated his intentions and determinations to maintain a good relationship with the United States each time he meets with American visitors. President Hu has also maintained regular telephone conversations with President Bush to exchange their views on regional and global issues.<sup>25</sup>

At the APEC summit meeting in Chile in November 2004, President Hu and President Bush had a friendly discussion on issues of economic cooperation, war on terror, North Korea nuclear program, and Taiwan. Both leaders expressed satisfaction about the current

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<sup>24</sup> Vice President Hu Jintao's speech at a dinner in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002, accessed from the Chinese Embassy website at <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/29640.html>.

<sup>25</sup> "Bush to Hu: US Opposes Independence for Taiwan," *The Straits Times*, May 30, 2004, accessed online from <http://straitstimes.asia1.com> the same day.

state of the bilateral relations. They also exchanged invitations to visit each other's capital soon.

## 5. INFERENCES AND SUMMARY

This short survey of post-Cold War Sino-American relations reveals the general trend of cooperation and competition in the bilateral relations. Despite the changeable official terms used to describe the relationship such as "strategic partnership," "strategic competitors" or "constructive cooperative relations," the United States and China have developed a normal relationship, in which they cooperate on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues but disagree and even argue over some other issues. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, U.S.-China ties have strengthened and expanded into a complex relationship, often cooperative, sometimes contentious, but always vital to global stability.

Generally speaking, common grounds and common interests far outweigh disputes and disagreements between the United States and China. Despite the many differences between the two countries, there is no indication that they will resort to war as a means to resolve them. Considerable interdependence of the two societies at multi-levels compels both towards mutual accommodation.

Recalling the hypotheses for this research, the following summary is made and the corresponding policy recommendations are offered.

*H1: The more accommodating the international system is towards the rising power, the less likely the rising power will challenge the international status quo violently.*

This research proposes that to avoid a potential conflict between China and the United States, the best strategy for the United States is to welcome and incorporate China into the international community such as the WTO, G-8 and other international organizations. Participation in international organizations will expose China to international norms and practices, including democratic institutions and civil society. China's participation also ensures that China becomes a writer of new rules in a multilateral structure. It is less likely that China will challenge or attempt to violently alter the rules of the game that itself helped to write. Supporting China's participation in the international system will not only satisfy China's needs and interests, it also conforms to America's long-term objectives to help bring about a peaceful, democratic and prosperous China.

*H2: The more a rising power respects the dominant power's vital interests, the less likely the dominant power will try to block its growth.*

This research suggests that China needs to become more transparent in its policy making. It has to demonstrate, through words and deeds, that its rise will not pose a threat to its neighbors and that it does not intend to replace the United States as the global power or drive the United States out of Asia. It is encouraging that China has proposed a free trade zone with Southeast Asian nations to boost development in the region. It has also adopted a code of conduct with regards to the disputed Spratly Islands.

Furthermore, China must understand the importance the United States attaches to the ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights. The United States has traditionally been a

Pacific power and it is not likely to withdraw from Asia due to its vital national interests in the region. On the Taiwan issue, while strongly opposing Taiwanese independence for the sake of its own national interests, the Beijing government needs to respect the American interests of peacefully settling the cross-Strait dispute. Without doubt, U.S. supply of weapons to Taiwan is partially linked to the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s military upgrading and its perceived threat to Taiwan. It may be helpful for the PLA to gradually withdraw or reduce the number of short-range missiles deployed on China's southeast coast opposite Taiwan, although Taiwan needs to take corresponding measures simultaneously to ensure that it does not intend to seek permanent separation from China.

*H3: The more the dominant power recognizes a challenger's vital interests, the less confrontational a challenger will become.*

Similarly, it is in the long-term interest of the United States to respect China's core interests, especially regarding Taiwan. Perhaps to bring Taiwan and mainland China together under a loose political framework of "one China, separate rule" acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait is the only viable solution. This will not only guarantee Taiwan's continued autonomy, freedom and prosperity, but will satisfy China's vital interest to keep Taiwan as part of a unified China. To support an independent Taiwan, coupled with continued sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, is an unwise and even dangerous choice for the United States. To accommodate the PRC on this vital issue does not mean appeasement of an aggressive China; and it is simply wrong to consider Beijing's strive for national reunification as an indication of its aggressive foreign policy in the future.

Realistically speaking, Taiwan's future lies in China both economically and politically. Instead of burning its bridges to China, Taiwan should, as former Democratic Progressive Party chairman Hsu Hsin-liang has suggested, boldly go westward and cooperate with China during the latter's modernization. Taiwan can set an example for Chinese mainland to gradually democratize as its economy continues to expand. A more prosperous and democratic China with which Taiwan is closely associated serves the best interests of the 23 million residents in Taiwan. The United States can do more to promote cross-Strait exchanges and dialogue.

*H4: The more extensive and strong links the two societies have, the less likely there will be wars between them.*

U.S.-Chinese cultural, educational, personnel and other societal exchanges at the grass-roots level are extensive and by some calculations the strongest in the world. Economic and trade ties have steadily expanded and deepened. The two Pacific countries have been closely linked.

The weakest link between the two sides is perhaps the exchange between the two militaries. Despite extensive ties and huge trade volume between the two countries, military-to-military exchange has been limited. On both sides, the militaries are probably the most hawkish forces and remain deeply suspicious of each other's intentions. Existing exchanges such as those between the two national defense universities have served as a back channel opportunity even when times get tense. But more extensive exchanges at all levels and mutual understanding of each other's intentions are crucial for confidence building between the two militaries.

*H5: The more efforts top leaders devote to a stable bilateral relationship, the less likely there will be war between the two powers.*

The greatest strength of the bilateral relationship lies in the common interest in expanding the already enormous trade and extensive societal links and cooperating in international and regional security issues in an era of globalization. Indeed, these factors have caused senior officials in both countries to stabilize a relationship that sometimes threatens to spin out of control. Top level visits and meetings occur regularly if not frequently. Every U.S. president has visited China since Richard Nixon. Major Chinese leaders have also visited the United States since 1979. US Secretary of State and Chinese Foreign Minister regularly talk on the phone. Hotlines have been established between the two presidents. Clearly, leaders from both sides are committed to maintaining and developing this important bilateral relationship. High-level contacts are symbolic of warming relations and are helpful for improving ties. Such exchanges and commitment at the top level should continue.

*General Hypothesis: If the government, the public, and top leaders in both the dominant power and the challenging power have positive evaluations of their relationship in a friendly international system, power transition will not result in war.*

It is an exaggeration to claim that both China and the United States are completely satisfied with the relationship. Nevertheless, the current status of the bilateral relationship is acceptable to both sides. Globalization at the international level is generally positive for a smooth relationship. In the broader global context, the two great powers have much more common challenges to deal with, such as water pollution and shortage, AIDS, SARS, environmental degradation, the Third World poverty and debt issues, international crimes, etc. In the era of globalization and deepening interdependence, China and the United States must seize the opportunity to expand their cooperation and become responsible players in international affairs.

The hypotheses raised in this paper require further research and empirical test. As a tentative conclusion, this paper suggests that though the British-American style security community has not been, and probably will never be, established between China and the United States, strong links across the Pacific have tied the two societies closely together.<sup>26</sup> China and the United States have much more common interests than differences today. In general, both international and domestic environments are conducive to a cooperative relationship between the two Pacific powers. This bodes well for a potential power transition in the future. Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked in a September 2003 speech “U.S. relations with China are the best they have been since President Nixon’s first visit.”<sup>27</sup> Mr. Powell’s assessment might be overly sanguine, but judging from the current state of bilateral interactions at all four levels, one can be cautiously optimistic that a

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<sup>26</sup> The concept of “security community” was explained in Karl Deutsch (1957). “Security community” based on shared culture and values is often used to account for the peaceful power transition from Britain to the United States in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Also see Bruce M. Russett (1963). This author does not think that “security community” is the only foundation for great power cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

<sup>27</sup> Colin L. Powell’s remarks at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., September 5, 2003.

potential power transition from the United States to China will most likely be peaceful in the future.

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