

## **Ready to Become a Great Power? The Recent Nationalist Movement and China's Evolving National Identity**

**Lichao He**

*Rising nationalism in 2008 has marked the turning point in China's evolving national identity. This most recent wave of nationalism shows that, as China rises as a great power, the Chinese people's perceptions about their national identity are challenged by a number of issues that need to be addressed. The transformation of the Chinese national identity is influenced by both the Chinese government and the public. The Chinese government plays a leading role in constructing a national identity that complements its cultural diplomacy and serves China's core national interests. Meanwhile, the public also contributes to the forging of the national identity through expressing its views and demands in this regard. It is of great importance for people to understand China's emerging new national identity in dealing with this rising power.*

**Keywords:** *China, 2008, nationalism, national identity, government and public, transformation*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The year 2008 marked the rise of a new wave of Chinese nationalism triggered by a series of events, including the Western media's distorted report on the March 14<sup>th</sup> Tibet Incident and the attacks on the Olympic flame in the London and Paris legs of the torch relay. Those events instigated widespread internet protests against the major Western media outlets, including the BBC and CNN, and led to the boycott of the French retailer Carrefour in major cities in China. The momentum of the popular nationalist movement accelerated in 2009 with the online protests against Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama and Christie's auction of the bronze zodiac animal heads looted from the Yuanmin Garden by the French and British armies back in 1860. This rise of nationalist sentiment culminated with the publication of *Unhappy China: The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges* in March 2009, which instantly became a national sensation.

When China's rising has caused strong reverberation around the world, the rise of neo-nationalism in China attracted much attention from the public, academia and policy makers in the West. During a TV interview, Evan Osnas, the New Yorker magazine's residential correspondent in Beijing, noted that the most frequently asked question about China during his lecture tour in the U.S. was about the nationalist sentiment in China.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the recent outburst of popular nationalism echoes China's rising as a major world power and directly addresses the key issues that China needs to tackle as it seeks to become a great power. It additionally signifies the fundamental transformation of the Chinese people's perceptions of their national identity.

This paper argues that the Chinese national identity is undergoing major changes: the Chinese people are casting off the identity of being the victim of foreign oppression and

---

<sup>1</sup> Evans Osnas, interview by Q & A, CSPAN, broadcast on May 3, 2009, 10:30 PM (Central Time).

taking on the new identity of a great power. This new national identity seeks the prestige of a major power that is rooted in the Chinese civilization and culture. While the government in China plays a predominant role in shaping this new national identity, the public also contributes to the process by voicing its nationalist sentiment and participating in nationalist movements. This paper further argues that China is at a crucial stage in adjusting its role in the international community. Such adjustments could deeply affect the future of the international system.

This paper first analyzes the nationalist movement that occurred between 2008 and 2009 and discusses the key elements in forging a new national identity, as reflected by this movement; it then studies the role of the Chinese government and public in formulating the national identity, especially the government's strategy and policies in this regard. The paper concludes by analyzing the trajectory of the transformation of Chinese national identity and its implication for China's foreign policy in the near future.

## 2. THE RECENT WAVE OF NATIONALISM

To the Chinese people, the year 2008 was an eventful year – the March 14<sup>th</sup> Tibetan Incident caused widespread reverberation and led to the West's protests against China's hosting the Olympic Games. In May, the earthquake in Sichuan resulted in more than 80,000 casualties. Recovering from the shock and grief of this devastating disaster, China hosted the Olympic Games successfully, fulfilling its long-cherished dream. This chain of events deeply affected Chinese emotions and gave rise to the most recent wave of the popular nationalist movement both at home and abroad.

What triggered the nationalist movement in 2008 was the Western media's report of the March 14 Tibet Incident. A picture posted on the CNN website, showing a group of people running in front of a military vehicle on the streets of Lhasa, was found to have been deliberately edited to remove the image of a person throwing stones at a peaceful Chinese policeman. This discovery immediately spread throughout the internet and evoked wide protests on the web. On the internet, Chinese netizens and overseas Chinese launched protest campaigns and posted their own videos to spread the truth. The *Xinhua Net*, the official website run by the Xinhua News Agency, criticized the reports of some Western media because they did not "conform to the facts" (Xinhua News Agency, 2008). In the discussion rooms and bulletin boards of major Chinese internet portals like [www.sina.com](http://www.sina.com) and the *China Daily* website, netizens collectively roared with the question "CNN, what's wrong with you?" Likewise, within a few days, the quote "Man should never act as low as CNN" had become a very popular saying on the web (*China Daily* 2008) – a satirical remark used by people when they make negative comments about others' behaviors.

It was soon revealed that CNN was not the only media outlet that was not telling the truth – quite a number of other newspapers and TV stations in the West distorted or even fabricated the facts about the Tibetan incident in one way or another. As a result, Chinese netizens became indignant and in response, quickly disclosed information about how some of the Western media had been using false information in their reports ([sina.com](http://www.sina.com), April 03, 2008). Meanwhile, anti-CNN and anti-BBC websites were created by Chinese netizens and overseas Chinese. The netizens voiced their disappointment about how biased and unfair Western media could be when reporting events in China, because of the deep rooted misunderstanding of and prejudice against China. The netizens also criticized the Western

media for their “unethical” behavior and deliberate negligence with regard to facts, despite the media’s claims to maintain “objectivity” and “professionalism.” On YouTube and other major Chinese websites, videos made by Chinese netizens about Tibet reiterated China’s sovereignty over Tibet and tried to reveal the distorted images of Tibet portrayed by the Western media.

The nationalist action did not stop at the internet sphere. When the Olympic torch relay was going through Paris, the Chinese Paralympics athlete Jin Jing, who was bound to a wheelchair, was attacked by a protestor for Tibet independence. Infuriated, the Chinese netizens advocated boycotting French products. In China, the French retailer Carrefour has become a particularly prominent target due to its perceived backing of Tibetan independence (Kolhammer, 2008). Outside China, in almost all the major cities along the route of the Olympics torch relay, people from overseas Chinese communities went out to welcome the torch bearers, waving Chinese national flags and banners and chanting the national anthem to demonstrate their support for China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games.

After the Olympic Games, in December 2008, when France was holding the rotating EU presidency, French President Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in Poland. The meeting had evoked strong protest from the Chinese government and furthered the nationalist movement in China. The Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, cancelled his visit to the Sino-EU summit scheduled in Lyon that month, and the Sino-French relations were faced with severe challenges. Further, in early 2009, when Wen Jiabao undertook his European tour, France was not included. The Chinese state media called Wen Jiabao’s visit a “trip of confidence,” since Wen’s tour had demonstrated China’s influence as a major power in a time of world financial crisis. The Chinese netizens nicknamed Wen Jiabao’s visit to Europe the “Grand Tour around France” (*huanfai luxing*) in the satirical sense, as this term in Chinese can be literally used to describe the well-known European road cycling stage races – the Grand Tour or “*Tour de France*.”

In February 2009, Christie’s decided to auction two bronze zodiac heads looted by the British and French imperialist armies in 1860 that most recently belonged to the collection of Yves Saint Laurent and Pierre Berge. Once more, Sino-French ties became a hot topic on the internet (Zhou 2009). Art stolen from China during the age of imperialist plunder had always been an emotional issue in China that aroused indignant patriotism (Kraus 2004: 196). In the eyes of many Chinese, the repatriation of national treasures is an act to remove the past humiliation and thus an emblem of China’s rising as a strong nation. This event caused the Chinese netizens to direct their anger at both Christie’s and the French government, criticizing the latter for stealing the Chinese ancient treasure and doing nothing to redress the wrongdoings. The wave of the nationalist movement reached its crest when, in March 2009, a book entitled *Unhappy China* was published. As a follow-up of *China Can Say No*, a book filled with nationalist sentiment published in 1996, the first print of *Unhappy China* was 70,000 copies, and within two weeks, the publishers had increased the print to 200,000 copies (sina.com March 24, 2009). This number continued to increase, and within one month, a total of 600,000 copies were sold.

### 3. CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TRANSFORMATION

With the end of the Cold War and the communist ideology losing its appeal, nationalism has moved to the center stage of the Chinese political scene. Nationalism is used by the

government to claim the royalty of the Chinese people (Zhao 2005: 134) and to rally their support to achieve the agenda of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. At the same time, popular nationalism has been on the rise since the 1990s, marked by major events like the protest against the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of the U.S. EP3 spy plane with the Chinese military aircraft in 2001, and the anti – Japanese protests in 2005. The most recent wave of nationalism demonstrated that the transformation of the Chinese national identity is at a crucial historical juncture, especially with regards to the Chinese people’s perception about the nation’s role in the world. It also shows that while China is taking on the new national identity of a great power. Yet it has to tackle a number of key issues.

National identity refers to the perceptions of the state and its people about the nation’s role in the international system. Samuel S. Kim has pointed out the importance of national identity on international relations: “The identity of a state (national identity), more than anything else, provides a cognitive framework for shaping its interests, preferences, worldview, and consequent foreign policy actions. An understanding of this identity will therefore contribute to more accurate accounts of state behavior” (Kim 2003: 41). Dimitter and Kim have discussed how a nation-state’s identity is defined by its role in the world: “We have argued that the substantive content of national identity is the state and that the state defines itself by what role it plays – by self-categorization in alignment with positive reference groups and in opposition to negative reference groups – by its performance in the international arena” (Dittmer and Kim 1993: 17). Peter Gries has also pointed out the following: “Chinese national identity evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past” (Gries 2004b: 19).

More specifically, Townsend has argued that “China’s entry into a world of sovereign nation-states was unusually prolonged and traumatic because it forced the Chinese to reject their age-old cultural identity and to adopt a new politicized one .... and this long, wrenching ‘identity crisis’ makes contemporary Chinese nationalism unusually intense, becoming in the resolution of the crisis something like the religion of modern China” (Townsend 1996: 5). China was traditionally regarded as an aggrieved power (Pollack 2005: 330) due to the “hundred year of humiliation” imposed by the imperialism. After the founding of the PRC, China’s national identity was mainly defined by political ideology as being a member of the “third world.”

During the past three decades since the reform, the Chinese people have been grappling with an evolving national identity. This identity is, for the most part, constructed by the government in accordance with its grand strategy of modernization. While Deng Xiaoping urged China to catch up with the West through the modernization drive, he also insisted that China should keep a low profile in international arena. Deng’s famous doctrine, *buyao dangtou* (“do not seek leadership”), “repeatedly warned his successors against actively seeking leadership in global and regional affairs and shouldering responsibilities that China cannot bear” (Zhang and Tang 2005: 49). Deng’s “developmental nationalism”(Chang 2001: 151) prevailed in the 1990s, as the Chinese government put great emphasis on the importance of developing cooperative relations with major powers and tried to rein in popular nationalism (Zhao 2005: 134). Under these circumstances, most people believe that China still remains a developing country – given that it lags far behind the developed nations in terms of per capita income (Chan 2005: 697-8) and still has a problem of the huge disparity between the developed eastern coastal areas and the less developed western hinterland – despite the fact that China has registered the highest economic growth rate in the

world

The year 2008 was the turning point in the transformation of the perceptions of the Chinese people regarding their national identity. China was at an important historical juncture: the year marked the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its reform and opening up. As some Western scholars have observed, “Beginning in the late 1970s, China experienced three decades of extraordinary growth that raised every indicator of material welfare, lifted hundreds of millions from poverty, and propelled China from near autarky into regional and global prominence” (Keller and Rawski 2007: 3). Hosting the Olympics was also regarded as a hallmark of China’s economic achievements, and many in China cited the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games as a parallel to suggest that China had risen as one of the world’s leading economies, just as Japan rose to become one of the world’s leading economies after the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. In fact, it was in 2008 that China overtook Germany to become the world’s third largest economy.

Today, “China also seems to be shedding its traditional twin identities of historical victim and object of great power manipulation” (Shambaugh 2005: 25). China’s nationalism, which is derived from both the pride in Chinese civilization and the past humiliation of being bullied by the West, is now dominated by the aspiration to rejuvenate the Chinese nation and make China rise again as a world power. The emerging new Chinese national identity is constructed on this “Chinese Dream.” However, although China is no longer a “victim,” its path to becoming a major power will not necessarily be a smooth one. The recent outburst of nationalism has revealed some of the major challenges in the transformation of the national identity. There are three major issues that concern the Chinese public with regard to China’s great power status: as a great power, China seeks recognition and respect from other nations; as a great power, China needs to extend its influence in the normative sphere and have a bigger voice in the international community; as a great power, China will not tolerate any challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

#### 4. EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: KEY ISSUES IN FORGING CHINA’S NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY

##### 4.1. Different Perceptions Regarding the Rise of China

Ng-Quinn remarked that while a nation-state’s identity is “collectively constructed by its members,” it is “a function of ...the state’s changing interaction with other states. Therefore, discrepancies between internal and external expectations and realities may cause identity confusion or even crises” (Ng-Quinn 1993: 32-3). Kim has also remarked that “a state actor in the international system understands other states based on the identity it ascribes to them, and it often responds accordingly” (Kim 2003: 41). In one word, a state develops perceptions about its national identity through its interactions with other states and by drawing references from how other states view it. In fact, China’s national identity is profoundly influenced by its interaction with the world’s powerful states and their perceptions of China.

While today the Chinese people are expecting respect from the West and looking forward to the profound elevation of China’s international status, the reality is that the West’s perceptions about China’s rising are incongruent with such expectations. The chain of events that occurred in 2008 and 2009 has highlighted such discrepancies. While the Chinese people are becoming increasingly confident about their international status, they are also confronted

with and frustrated by the distrust and prejudice from the West. The most recent wave of nationalism is the response to such external pressure.

The negative portrayal of China's rising has been especially prevalent among the status quo powers – represented by the U.S. and other Western countries like Germany and France, and Japan in East Asia. Many have drawn parallels of China's rising with some of the twentieth century's most disruptive international actors – Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union (Goldstein 2003: 61). In East Asia, "the Japanese public increasingly views China as a threat and supports the assertive stance of political leaders like Prime Minister Koizumi toward it" (Shirk 2007: 145).

Almost ten years ago, Western observers of Chinese nationalism found that "whatever nationalism there is in China today is *reactive*, in the sense of a historical grievance and resentment at the humiliation Chinese endured under Western and Japanese imperialism [emphasis in original] (Chang 2001: 179). However, after ten years, fundamental changes have taken place as the Chinese people are becoming increasingly confident about their country. According to the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China, "the Chinese people express extraordinary levels of satisfaction with the way things are going in their country. These findings represent a dramatic improvement in national contentment from earlier in the decade when the Chinese people were not nearly as positive about the course of their nation and its economy" (The Pew Research Center 2008). Subsequently, the Chinese perception of the nation's status in the world has changed profoundly. As one author observed in the late 1990s, "increasingly confident and self-assured, China is now rightfully feeling safe as a nation. Many of its people believe that a rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is approaching" (Wang Feiling 1999: 21-2). Chinese scholars also have admitted that "China has become an insider in the international system, and "China is now turning from a regional to a world power" (Shirk 2007: 107).

People in China also hold very different perceptions from the West regarding their emerging new national identity. Contrary to the "China threat" theory, many in China view their rising as peaceful and believe that it will cause no harm to the other nations. Zhao has quoted Yan Xuetong, a famous Chinese scholar on nationalism as saying "the rise of China is and will be peaceful" because China is seeking national rejuvenation and "the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China's lost international status rather than as obtaining something new ... The Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others" (Zhao 2004: 250). Foreign scholars like Goldstein shared similar views. Goldstein compared today's China to Germany under Otto von Bismarck and argued that China is "a nationalist rising power whose interests sometimes conflict with others' but one that so far lacks any obvious ambition or reason to indulge a thirst for international expansion, let alone dominance" (Goldstein 2003: 63).

As Yu Bin has pointed out, "Unlike Chinese nationalism of the past, coming when the country was weak and divided, contemporary Chinese nationalism is rising along with the growing Chinese power" (Yu 1999: 197). With China becoming economically more powerful, it becomes increasingly important for the nation to be respected and reckoned by other nations, especially the status quo powers. The most recent wave of nationalism not only aimed at condemning the "wrong doings" committed by the Western media, but also rectifying the biased perceptions of China and establishing a new image of a China that is dignified and inviolable.

#### 4.2. The Right to Expression

The 2008 Olympic Games and issue of Tibet have caught the attention of the Chinese public because they have important implications for China's new identity. The symbolic value of China's hosting the Olympic Games cannot be over-exaggerated. By hosting the Olympic Games, China was able to recover its past glory and be recognized by the international community as a powerful and important nation. At the same time, as Hughes has pointed out, "With Beijing scheduled to hold the summer Olympic Games in 2008, it seems that a growing degree of 'soft power' has secured China's place in the global cultural system, too" (Hughes 2006: 1). Therefore, any kind of obstruction of China's hosting the Olympic Games is regarded as a challenge to China's aspiration to become a world power, an act of belittling Chinese friendliness towards the world.

To most Chinese people, China's new international status as a great power not only requires recognition from other countries, but also should give China the power to express its own ideas and values and justify its causes. The protest against the distorted report on Tibet is a case in point. Disappointed by the West's reaction to the rise of China, the Chinese public is eager to speak to the international community about China's views on those issues that are fundamental to China's national interests.

It is not the first time that the media in the West has instigated the indignation of the Chinese people because of biased reporting. One scholar has observed that "the U.S. media have played a large role in U.S.-China relations; during the mid-1990s, it stimulated rather than smoothed out the turbulence between the two countries (Zhang 1999: 155)." Even though some policy-makers in the U.S. tended to adopt a moderate approach towards the rising of China,<sup>2</sup> such thinking does not often reach the Chinese public. To the Chinese people, the Western media represents the prevalent Western view about the rise of China, a view that is deeply rooted in ideological prejudice and the fear that China is challenging the world order that used to be dominated by the West.

The Chinese public was angered by CNN's report because it denigrated the image of China. Susan Shirk has remarked that "a nation's reputation is clearly very important,' just as important as its economic or military power (Shirk 2007: 98)." Gries has also emphasized the importance of "saving face" and "maintaining face" in China's dealings with other nations (Gries 2004b: 22, 28) and pointed out that the Chinese people cared very much about foreigners' view about China because of the "collective self-esteem" (Ibid. 19). For a nation that has been subject to a hundred years of humiliation, the ability to command the respect of the international community is an indispensable element in defining the identity of being a great power. The 2008 nationalist movement sent out a clear message that China should no longer tolerate the dominance of international public opinion by the Western media and that, as a big power, China should speak more loudly about its views.

As a result, the netizens and street protestors have made great effort to demonstrate to the world how they really feel about the issue of Tibet. In recent years, the so-called "Tibetan fever" has spread in the West (Wang Lixiong 2002: 164), and, with regard to the protest

---

<sup>2</sup> Some of the policy-makers' views on U.S. foreign policy towards China are demonstrated in the panel conference entitled "The U.S. Foreign Policy towards China" sponsored by the Committee of 100 attended by the Director and former Directors of the National Security Council in May, 2009. The program was broadcast on C-SPAN II on May 4, 2009.

against the Chinese policy towards Tibet, the non-official opposition is even more prevalent and intense than the official opposition (Wang Lixiong 1999). To reach out to a wider audience, the netizens not only established anti-CNN and anti-BBC websites, but also posted videos on the YouTube to defend China's sovereign rights over Tibet. Overseas Chinese students held gatherings on campus or in the street to talk about the Tibet issue. Young people in Beijing held up posters in front of Carrefour, showing what has happened in Tibet. These actions were aimed at breaking down the Western media's monopoly over the discussion of those controversial issues. By asserting the "right to expression," ordinary Chinese people are trying to help their country to assert its role as a major power in the international community.

#### **4.3. Territorial Integrity as a Key Element of the Chinese National Identity**

Ever since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the goal of Chinese nationalism has been to "enrich the country and strengthen the army" (*fu guo qiang bin*), a goal that has been embraced by various political forces in China. The Chinese national identity that is based on this ideal has put much emphasis on China's ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Deng Xiaoping's famous saying that "a nation is bound to be bullied if it lags behind the other nations" explicitly expressed the idea that defending China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the primary goal of China's modernization drive. Two fundamental tasks of the Chinese government since 1978 are the "reunification with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and the avoidance of national disintegration by quenching separatism in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and elsewhere" (Guo 2004: 43). For many Chinese officials and scholars, "national interests are the embodiment of the nation as a whole, and their pursuit is the natural and 'inalienable right' of the nation-state" (Deng 1999: 50). Therefore, "To many ordinary Chinese people ... the West's criticism on China's stance on Tibet and issues that directly concern the territorial integrity is regarded as an evil design of 'divide and conquer,' an old trick in the past used by the former colonial powers to constrain the rise of China" (Shirk 2007: 106).

A vision shared by many Chinese people is that now that China has become stronger, it will be more capable of defending its territory. On the internet, one of the most frequently quoted sayings is a remark made by a Chinese general in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.): "One who dares to provoke the Han, no matter how far away he is, he will be chased after and demolished." This saying has revealed the netizens' nostalgic feeling for the strength of the Chinese empire and their resolve to defend its territorial integrity. On the other hand, it also shows that the Chinese people's perception of China's identity as a rising great power emphasizes the maintenance of its territory, rather than territorial expansion.

Discussing China's military modernization, Takamine remarked that such modernization "can be understood partly as a psychological defense mechanism, underpinned by the harsh reality of China's modern history" (Takamine 2005: 442-3). The recent nationalist sentiment over Tibet, Diaoyu Island and territorial disputes in the South China Sea has demonstrated that the Chinese national identity is grounded in the integrity of the Chinese nation – in terms of culture, territory and people, especially as China becomes more powerful and has more leverage in world affairs. The issue of Tibet has instigated widespread reaction among the Chinese people, because, due to China's past experience of being divided and humiliated by the Western powers, the majority of the Chinese people firmly believe that the rejuvenation of China cannot be achieved without retaining its national unity and territorial integrity.



## 5. FORGING THE NEW IDENTITY: THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC

The national government of a state always plays an important role in forging the national identity. Whiting has argued that the “national identity [of China] emerges in how the policy-making elite perceives and articulates the image of China in its relationship to the world” (Guo 2004: 10). Nieto also mentioned the role played by the Communist Party in shaping the national identity. He remarked, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party have promoted over the course of time a ‘state version of identity’, i.e., certain actions originating from the state tending to produce a political-ideological sense of national belonging inside or outside its frontiers” (Nieto 2003: 180).

In China, the government takes the leading role in formulating the national identity through defining its grand strategy in international relations, implementing foreign policies, and propagating the government’s perceptions about the role of the nation to the public. By promoting the official version of patriotism, i.e., the “state nationalism,” the government unites the people under the nation-state, a political territorial unit, and makes people believe that “party rule and a strong state are of paramount importance in maintaining national autonomy, unity and identity” (Guo 2003: 18). State-nationalism represents the collective interests of the whole populace (Chang 2001: 180), and it also gives the government more legitimacy and power over the nation (Baum 2003: 25; Mochizuki 2005: 137). State-nationalism is often used as a vehicle to transmit the government’s perception about the role of China in the international arena and to rally the support from the people to build such an identity. However, while China has been increasingly integrated into the global community, the Chinese people have been able to develop their own perceptions about the national identity that are more diversified than the national identity sponsored by the state. The interaction between the government and the public has greatly influenced the nature of the emerging national identity.

The Chinese government sets the basic tone about China’s role in the world. Since the economic reform of 1978, nationalist sentiment has replaced the political ideology and become the most salient ideological power that holds the Chinese nation together. The Chinese government has effectively employed the ideal of reinvigorating China to rally the popular support. Molding a national identity would help the state to better unify the people and justify its foreign policies.

In the past, the national education system and state media “have conditioned the broader Chinese public to think of China as a long-suffering target of deprecations and pressures from outside powers” (Sutter 2005: 289-305, 291). During the nationalist campaign launched by the government in the early 1990s, the government instilled the idea that with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, China had become the target of the sabotage by the West headed by the U.S. (Guo 2004: 27). However, with the deepening of the market reform and the further integration of the Chinese economy into the global economy, the idea of an opposition between China and the West rooted in ideological differences has been gradually replaced by the view that China is becoming an important and responsible power in the international community.

The official-sponsored national identity is carved out of the pragmatic considerations in accordance with China’s grand strategy – which is to secure a peaceful international environment for its economic development. Maintaining a high economic growth rate is the key to China’s domestic stability and its international strength. It will also enable China to

solve the issue of Taiwan and to maintain its territorial integrity by fending off the secessionist movement in Tibet and Xingjiang. For the Chinese leaders, it is not China's goal to seek fundamental changes in the international system by challenging the predominance of the U.S. Gill has remarked that since the early 21th century, the Chinese foreign policy has been moving away from the reactive 'victimhood' complex to identify more closely with 'a great power mentality' in regional and global affairs by adopting a "more 'mature,' 'constructive,' and 'responsible' great power diplomacy" (Gill 2005: 247). To serve China's core national interests (*guojia hexing liyi*) the Chinese government tries to keep a low profile and act as a responsible power, although on many international issues it has become more assertive than before.

Even though the Chinese government has chosen up to now to adhere to the foreign policy designated by Deng Xiaoping, a policy that focuses on maintaining peace for China's modernization drive, this does not mean that the Chinese government is not trying to extend its influence. On the contrary, the Chinese government has been very conscious about creating a new national identity that can further China's international influence by adapting to the changing international system. This new national identity is no longer constructed on political ideology, but built on the Chinese tradition and culture.

Under Communism, "collective identity through 'unification of thought' and a centralist state require each other" (Meissner 2003: 212). Now, since it is increasingly difficult to achieve a "unification of thought" through the indoctrination of political ideologies, the Chinese government has been trying to resuscitate Confucianism and to integrate some of its core values into the current policy guidelines. As Copper pointed out, the Chinese political culture is highly moralist in that political decision-making is seen as ethical in nature (Copper 2007: 81). By assuming the role of the guardian of the heritage of the Chinese civilization, the Chinese government is constructing the identity of a peaceful rising power that emphasizes the traditional Chinese value of "universal harmony."

Building the national identity on the Chinese cultural tradition has other advantages. As demonstrated by the most recent wave of nationalism, the emerging new Chinese national identity is an identity that is able to attract and encompass most ethnic Chinese in the world. Some authors have pointed out the importance of the shared "collective cultural memory" (Guo 2004: 33) and the sense of belonging to the same ethnic community among the overseas Chinese (Nieto 2003: 178). According to Nieto, this cultural and racial belonging has become an important component of the Chinese national identity among overseas Chinese people (Ibid.). Townsend has identified four "Chinese nations," one of which "includes Chinese elsewhere around the world who retain some idea of dual nationality" (Townsend 2004: 16).

This kind of national identity has become more powerful when as China is rising as a major power. The so-called "centripetal" power of the Chinese culture has made the ethnic Chinese living abroad render their support to the cause of China's revitalization. Being very well aware of the power of the Chinese culture, the Chinese government has been trying to promote China's new national identity as a time-honored civilization turning into a major power. Since the reform and opening up, the Chinese government has been paying great attention to connecting with the overseas ethnic Chinese and enhancing their sense of cultural belonging. Chinese leaders often visit the leaders of the overseas Chinese communities during their state-trips. Chinese representatives in the embassies often participate in community events and at times give speeches about the political and economic situation in China (Nieto 2003: 183). To reach out to the overseas Chinese community, in

2004 the Chinese government established Chinese satellite TV services in a number of foreign countries, although some in China are still urging that more work needs to be done in this regard (*Nanfang Weekend* March 5, 2009).

This culture-based national identity has enabled Chinese nationalism to go beyond the national border and to mobilize both the Chinese nationals living in foreign countries and overseas Chinese. The overseas Chinese not only contribute to China's national cause through extensive economic ties, especially investment, but also help China to further its political influence. The power of the nationalism has been demonstrated by the overseas Chinese communities' widespread support for the Olympic torch relay and their fervent response to the distorted news report. In this sense, developing a national identity becomes an effective means for China to project its soft power.

On the other hand, a new national identity serves well China's need to reduce the tension caused by its very rise in the international arena. It also helps China to consolidate its status as a major power by furthering its influence in the normative sphere. Shambaugh has remarked, "Beijing does seem to exert some influence in at least two areas. The first is in the normative realm, where Beijing's enunciation of the 'new security concept,' 'strategic partnerships,' and other initiatives to fashion a new set of norms to govern interstate relations and prevent conflict resonates positively among many Asian nations" (Shambaugh 2005: 25). In 2002 the Chinese government put forward the concept of a "peaceful rise." In his speech at the 2004 Boao Forum, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao referenced China's ancient "tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness, and trust toward the neighbors" and that "we pursue a policy of bringing harmony, security, and prosperity to neighbors" (Shirk 2007: 109). China is trying hard to promote the image of a rising power that has a unique value system which place great emphasis on peace and harmony.

Since the 1990s, China's growing economic strength has enabled it to create a favorable international image. China's responsible behavior in holding stable the value of the *renminbi* (RMB) during the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis has won wide applause from Asian countries (Lampton 2005: 307). The active role China played in promoting free trade agreements with ASEAN nations is also seen favorably as an effort to create "win-win" situations between China and the countries in the Southeast Asian region. At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, China exempted 10.9 billion *yuan* (about 1.36 billion US dollars) worth of debt held by 31 heavily indebted and least developed African countries. The 2009 Chinese Foreign Policy White Paper proposed that economic diplomacy and cultural diplomacy should become the focus of China's diplomatic work (sina.com January 20, 2009). All these efforts of the Chinese government testify that China is working very hard to influence the perceptions of foreign countries by relying more on its economic leverage.

The Chinese government is playing a leading role in shaping the new national identity through the implementation of foreign policies; at the same time, it is also capable of influencing the perceptions of the ordinary people through education and propaganda. The 2008 Olympic Games is a good example that shows how the government has defined the official version of the national identity and made the public adopt similar perceptions. In a press release during the Second Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress in March 2009, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi remarked that the 2008 Olympic Games was a major cultural events and part of the government's efforts to promote cultural diplomacy. He also pointed out: "For a long time before the Games, great efforts have been made by the government to educate the people about the significance of the Olympic Games" (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of China 2009).

As to the interaction between the Chinese government and the public in creating a new national identity, one also needs to note that the government and the public share the aspiration of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and both tend to adopt the realists' perspective regarding foreign affairs issues. The public almost always tends to side with the government when people find that China's great power status is being challenged by outsiders. This attitude also explains why the Chinese nationalists felt so strongly about the incidents surrounding the Olympic torch relay. While the Chinese nationalists advocate China's "right to expression" (*hua yu quan*), their action is in line with the government's policy to extend China's cultural influence by establishing new norms in the international community.

However, the public does not always agree with the government on various foreign policy issues, especially when it comes to China's role in world affairs. Nowadays, although the government is taking the leading role in shaping the Chinese national identity, ordinary citizens are also contributing to the process by voicing their opinions and participating in various nationalist movements. For example, the neo-nationalists demanded that the government take more assertive stances on China's territorial disputes with other countries. Many also voiced their doubts about the "keeping a low profile" foreign policy guideline. As one internet chat room posting said, China should "behave strongly [and] not only behave friendly to people ... to be a responsible great power we have to hold a rose in one hand and a gun in the other, in many circumstances to oppose and revenge" (Shirk 2007: 139).

Since the 1990s the Chinese government has become increasingly subject to domestic constraints and responsive to popular nationalism. Since the legitimacy of the Chinese government lies in its ability to achieve high economic growth and safeguard the country, the government needs to convince the public that it is fully capable of defending the national interests. The 2008 nationalist movement has made the Chinese government more conscious of and ready to respond to the popular sentiment. Regarding the protest against the foreign media's report of the Tibet incident, some believed that the young people's quick action of boycotting the Carrefour directly caused the Chinese government to cold-shoulder the French leaders at the 2009 Davos Forum.

Between 2008 and 2009 there has been heated discussion on the internet about the territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and a number of countries including Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Chinese government has taken quick actions and become more proactive to address issues concerning China's maritime territories. At the end of 2008, the Chinese government sent navy ships to patrol in the high seas near Somalia to protect the Chinese merchant ships from the pirates; and in April 2009, the Chinese government launched the largest-ever marine inspection in the South China Sea by sending marine inspection vessels to conduct regular patrolling in that region. In June 2009, against the opposition of Vietnam, the Chinese government imposed a fishing ban on the South China Sea, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked that China has "indisputable" sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, including Xisha and Nansha islands, and their adjacent waters (*People's Daily Online* June 9, 2009). These events were widely reported by the Chinese media, demonstrating that the Chinese government has both the resolve and capability to defend its sovereignty over these territories.

## 6. THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY

How will the Chinese national identity evolve in the future? First of all, the Chinese government will pay more attention to crafting and promoting its international image. The 2008 Tibet incident and the subsequent nationalist movement led the Chinese government to realize that it is important to communicate better with the public in the West. In an online dialogue with the Chinese netizens, Wu Jianming, China's senior diplomat and the former president of China Foreign Affairs University pointed out: "The Chinese has its own jargon system, which could not be understood easily by the other peoples, and we might need to make some changes to the system" (Wu March 2009).

Secondly, the transformation of the national identity also depends on the interaction between the government and public. Currently, there has been a debate about whether China should still hold onto the "pragmatic nationalism" and continue to keep a low profile on many issues. Some nationalists have been criticizing the government for being too accommodating to the big powers. One element of the neo-nationalism is the so-called "New Left of Academy," a group which represents anti-Westernism and who feel it is time to "liberate the Chinese from their worship of Western modernization" (Xu 2002: 28). The book *China Can Say No (zhongguo keyi shuo bu)* published in 1994 is filled with such sentiments. The *Unhappy China* also urges the Chinese government to challenge the dominance of the U.S. In the eyes of many "new leftist" nationalists who voiced their opinions on the internet, the government has compromised the interests of the Chinese nation for the sake of economic benefits. Although China has achieved amazing economic success, the grievances arising from the economic inequality and social injustice has provoked disappointment – and the "new leftist" nationalists put the blame on the people who reaped the most economic benefits by supporting China's integration into the global economy. For the "new leftists," those privileged groups have been trying to avoid confrontation with the West in order to serve their own interests at the expense of the national interests.

While the "new leftists," or the so-called "*fen qing*" (angry youth), have attracted some supporters, their views have also provoked heated debate and strong criticism. The *Unhappy China* has been criticized as being naïve and unrealistic because it encourages confrontations between China and other countries. To its critics, it is unwise to demand that the Chinese government adopt a more aggressive attitude in international affairs (Tian 2009). Unlike most nationalists, they believe that the current economic crisis did not fundamentally change the relative power between China and the U.S., and now is certainly not the right moment for China to replace the U.S. to become a new leader of the world. Many are also worried that extreme nationalism will eventually become detrimental to China's core interests. Siding with the government, these people believe that China should rely on its unique culture to help achieve peace and harmony in the world and try to maintain world peace and harmony. It is clear that with the social interests becoming more diversified, there will be more debates over the new Chinese national identity, especially among the well-educated social elite and policy makers.

The Chinese government has been very careful not to let the nationalist sentiment run out of control in order to maintain domestic stability; it also wants to make sure that the nationalist sentiment does not disrupt the implementation of China's grand strategy. Meanwhile, the government keeps a close watch on the public opinion concerning foreign

policy issues. The Chinese foreign policy decision-makers, including the former Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, are reaching out to the public by holding online dialogues with the netizens on major foreign affairs issues. One author has observed, “China’s foreign policy decision making body have developed various means to study, synthesize, and incorporate online public opinion” (Wu Xu 2007: 184).

In the future the government will continue to adopt policies to fulfill the expectations of the public with regard to China’s elevated international status, and will adopt a more assertive attitude on certain issues. The Chinese government has demonstrated its resolve to build blue water Navy and even aircraft carriers, a decision that has won tremendous applause domestically. The USNS *Impeccable* incident in March 2009 also demonstrated that the Chinese government is assuming a more assertive stance in defending its maritime sovereignty. China will also be more likely to use its economic power to extend its influence. At the BRIC Summit in June 2009, the member states, in their Joint Statement, expressed their intention to advance the reform of international financial institutions and to demand a bigger voice and more representation in international institutions.

In spite of these changes, the Chinese government will still pursue a pragmatic foreign policy that focuses primarily on economic development, and it will not seek to establish a national identity as a regional hegemon in the near future. At the Eleventh Sino-E.U. Summit in May 2009, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao criticized the concept of G2 and reiterated that China is still a developing country (*Xinhua Net* March 27, 2009). Under this policy, the Chinese government will continue to tame the nationalist sentiment and adopt a pragmatic attitude to achieve the goals of the nation’s grand strategy.

## 7. CONCLUSION

A series of events that occurred between 2008 and 2009 mark a critical point in the transformation of the Chinese national identity. The rising of popular nationalism, a movement rooted in the Chinese public’s frustration with the West and its response to the rise of China, touches upon a number of issues that have to be addressed in forging a new national identity. To become a great power, China wants to keep the unity of the Chinese nation and maintain sovereignty over its vast territories; moreover, it needs to have its voice heard in the international community and demand respect from the other major powers.

The Chinese government plays a leading role in shaping the new national identity through education, propaganda, and foreign policy implementation. The government and the public both hold the aspiration of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. The Chinese government has been very cautious not to present an aggressive international image, and it refrains from challenging the status quo power. Instead, it tries to create a national identity that is constructed on Confucian values that emphasize universal harmony. The public is very confident about China’s role in the world, and some nationalists are demanding that the government advance national interests in a more assertive manner. The Chinese government is becoming more responsive to the public, and the interaction between the government and the public will continue to impact the evolution of the new national identity.

While China’s rising has caused some major changes in the balance of power in the international system, there is evidence suggesting that China is adopting liberal approaches by engaging more in international governmental organizations (Hempson-Jones 2005: 702). As Christensen points out, “China’s perspectives on international relations should provide

practical lessons and cautionary warnings for foreigners as they seek to engage China in the economic, military, and political spheres” (Christensen 1999: 253). The Chinese national identity is undergoing major transformation, metamorphosing from “being a victim” to “being a great power.” The changes in the perspectives of the Chinese government and public regarding China’s role in the world will profoundly shape China’s future foreign policy. Meanwhile, these perceptions are also formed based on the interaction between China and the rest of the world. Therefore how other nations, especially the other major powers, deal with China is also of great significance to China’s evolving new identity.

**Article Received: 24-Jul-2009   Revised: 12-Oct-2009   Accepted: 12-Oct-2009**

#### REFERENCE

- Baum, Richard, 2003, “Present Nationalism and Communist Power,” In David Arase, ed., *The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium*, Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2003.
- Chan, Steve, 2005, “Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. and China?” *Asian Survey*, 45 (5) (September/October):687-701.
- Chang, Maria Hsia., 2001, *Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- China Daily, “Man should never act as low as CNN” (BBS post) (March 28, 2008) <http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?gid=2&tid=598536&extra=page%3D1>
- Christensen, Thomas J., 1999, “Pride, Pressure, and Politics,” In Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Copper, John F., 2007, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* Philadelphia, PA: West View Press.
- Deng, Yong, 1999, “Conception of National Interests: Realpolitik, Liberal Dilemma, and the Possibility of Change,” In Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Ng-Quinn, Michael., 1993, “National Identity and Premodern China, Formation and Role Enactment,” In Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim eds., *China’s Quest for National Identity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Committee of 100, “The U.S. Foreign Policy towards China,” Panel Conference held in May, 2009. The program was broadcast on C-SPAN II at 11:30 PM (Central Time) on May 4, 2009.
- Dittmer, Lowell and S. S. Kim, 1993, “In Search of a Theory of National Identity” In Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim eds., *China’s Quest for National Identity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gill, Bates, 2005, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy” In David Shambaugh ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Guo, Yinjie, 2004, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Goldstein, Avery, 2003, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?” In G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno eds.,

- International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gries, Peter Hays, 2009, "Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?" In *Global Studies – China*, Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill Contemporary Learning Series.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 2004 (a), "Popular Nationalism and State legitimation in China," In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen eds., *State and Society in 21<sup>st</sup>-century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation*, Lanham:RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor & Francis Group.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 2004 (b), *China's New Nationalism – Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hempson-Jones, Justin S., 2005, "The Evolution of China's Engagement with International Governmental Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?" *Asian Survey*, 45 (5) (Sep-Oct):702-721.
- Hughes, Christopher R., 2006, *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*, London: Routledge.
- Keller, William W. and T.G. Rawski, 2007, "Asia's Shifting Strategic and Economic Landscape" In William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski eds., *China's Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia*, Pittsburgh, Pa.: The University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Kim, Samuel S. , 2003, "Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus," In Samuel S. Kim ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Kraus, Richard, 2004, "When Legitimacy Resides in Beautiful Objects: Repatriating Beijing's looted Zodiac Animal Heads," In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen eds., *State and Society in 21<sup>st</sup>-century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation*, New York: RoutledgeCurzon (Taylor & Francis Group).
- Kolhammar, Jens, 2008, "The Fen Qing's War against Dialogue," The China Elections & Governance Website (Jointly run by the Carter Center China Program and the Institute of International Comparative Political Economy of Renmin University of China) (posted on April 22, 2008)
- Lampton, David M., 2005, "China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's Expense" In David Shambaugh ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Meissner, Werner, 2003, "Collective Identity and Nationalism in Europe and China," In Fisac, Taciana and Stemberge, Leila Fernández eds., *China Today: Economic Reforms, Social Cohesion and Collective Identities*, London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets the Press" (March 7, 2009). <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/yfgk/t541251.htm>
- Mochizuki, Mike M., 2005, "China-Japan Relations, Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?" In Shambaugh, David ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nanfang Weekend. Column Article (March 5, 2009): "A Rising China Needs Changes to Its Unsatisfactory Overseas Propaganda," article originally published on Sing Tao Daily (Hong Kong) (February 28, 2009).
- Nieto, Glayds, 2003, "Overseas Chinese Associations," In Fisac, Taciana and Stemberge, Leila Fernández eds., *China Today: Economic Reforms, Social Cohesion and Collective Identities*, London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Osnas, Evans, Interview by Q & A, CSPAN, broadcast May 3, 2009, 10:30 PM (Central Time).



- People's Daily Online, "South China Sea fishing ban "indisputable": foreign ministry spokesman" (June 9, 2009), <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6674774.html>
- The Pew Research Center, *The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China: The Chinese Celebrate Their Roaring Economy, As They Struggle with Its Costs, Near Universal Optimism about Beijing Olympics*, 1 (July 22, 2008). <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/261.pdf>
- Shambaugh, David, 2005, "Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century" In David Shambaugh ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shirk, Susan L., 2007, *China: Fragile Superpower*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sina.Com. [www.sina.com/](http://www.sina.com/) "CNN: What's wrong with you?" <http://english.sina.com/china/p/1/2008/0403/153112.html> (April 03, 2008, originally posted on the China Daily website)
- [www.sina.com.](http://www.sina.com/) "Controversies Led to Increased Publications: *Unhappy China* Sold 200,000 Copies" (Online interviewed by Sina.book with the publishers and chief editors of *Unhappy China*, March 24, 2009) <http://book.sina.com.cn/news/c/2009-03-24/2359252971.shtml>
- "Chinese Foreign Policy White Paper (2009) Will Announce the Emphasis on Cultural Diplomacy" <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-20/022017076948.shtml> (January 20, 2009)
- Sutter, Robert, 2005, "China's Regional Strategy and Why It May Not Be Good for America," In David Shambaugh ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Swaine, Michael D., 2005, "China's Regional Military Posture" In David Shambaugh ed. *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Tian, Kai, 2009, "Commentary: The Political Wisdom of Maintaining a Low International Profile Is Far From Being Outdated." *Nanfang Weekends* (June 4, 2009).
- Townsend, James, 1996, "Chinese Nationalism," In Jonathan Unger ed., *Chinese Nationalism*, Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book.
- Wang, Fei-Ling, 1999, "Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and Political Insecurity," In Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
- Wang, Lixiong, 2002, "The 'Tibetan Question': Nation and Religion," In C.X. Georgie Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu eds., *Exploring Nationalisms of China: Themes and Conflicts*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Wang, Lixiong, 1999, "On the Issue of Tibet," *Strategy and Management*, Issue No.2 (1999).
- Wu, Jianming, Online Dialogue at the [www.qq.com](http://www.qq.com) (*Teng Xun Wang*) (March 3, 1999) <http://junshi.blog.china.com/200903/4538709.html>
- Wu, Xu, 2007, *Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Xinhua Net*, "The G2 Concept Proposed by the West Is Detrimental to China by Exaggerating Its Elevated Status," (Special features of Xinhua Net, May 27, 2009) [http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-05/27/content\\_11442055.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-05/27/content_11442055.htm).
- Xinhua News Agency, "Foreigners in Tibet: Western Media Reports Do Not Conform with Facts" [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/25/content\\_7851676.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/25/content_7851676.htm) (March

- 25, 2008)
- Xu, Jilin, 2002, "Intellectual Currents behind Contemporary Chinese Nationalism," In C.X. Georgie Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu eds., *Exploring Nationalisms of China: Themes and Conflicts*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Yu, Bin, 1999, "China and Its Asian Neighbors, Implications for Sino-US Relations ," In Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Zhang, Ming, 1999. "Public Images of the United States," In Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds. *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, 141-158. Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Zhang Yunling and S. Tang, 2005, "China's Regional Strategy" In David Shambaugh ed., *Power Shift – China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Zhao, Suisheng, 2005, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 29(1) (Winter 2005 -06):131-144.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 2004, *A Nation-State by Construction – Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Zhou, Jing, 2009, "Netizens: Sarkozy's Attitude Key to Sino-French ties" (March 3, 2009) [http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-03/03/content\\_17363588.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-03/03/content_17363588.htm) (accessed May, 2009)

*Lichao He, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Baylor University, 1 Bear Place 97276, Waco, TX76798 USA. Tel: 254-710-1381, Email: lichao\_he@baylor.edu*