Political Islam: Moderation or Radicalism?
Case Study of Political Islam with Respect to Lebanon Hezbollah

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, bloody wars that arose as a result of separation in Yugoslavia (among the Christian Serbs and the Muslim Bosnians), the 2001 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center in New York and finally the victory of Islam-based movements to achieve power in Islamic countries (such as the Welfare party in Turkey, Islamic Saving Association in Aljazeer) resulted in concerns about the possibility of a second cold war by the Western people. In this new cold war, the opposing parties are not communism and liberalism but rather it is the Armageddon among the political Islam (as a divine school) and Western secularism ideology (as human school). In this war, the recent thought has its root in the open mind age of philosophical, cultural and scientific history of the West and more than 200 years of modernism where most of the thinking, belief, epistemology and ontology of west are formed on this basis. Meanwhile any political activity of Islamic countries at the international level that is on the opposition of secular principles of Western countries is regarded as Islamic fundamentalism in the West camp and the movement of the political Islam is regarded as a subsidiary and unprecedented issue in the study of the policies of the Islamic countries. The important point is that there is a basic difference among political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism and in this way the method and approach of Islamism should be noted in order to obtain Islamic rules and regulations at national and international level. Some western thinkers do not recognized any difference among these two movements and regard them as identical. Therefore, the governments in Western countries approach the region in the same manner. It is to be noted that when the issue of political Islam is raised, this aspect of Islam is neither integrated nor concentrated as its religious aspect and we are faced with a vast range in which there is liberal Islam oriented and democrat people on one hand and fundamentalists, on the other hand. In order to apply Islamic rules and regulations by authorities, they do not neglect any action even if it may be on the opposition of Islamic rules and regulations. A question is raised here as to which between the Moderation and Radicalism approaches are more successful in obtaining sovereignty of Islam at the national level and finally in defending Islam at the international level and whether they have achieved the aforesaid goals. The present article intends to find answers to the aforesaid question with respect to the epistemological and historical point of view and analyze the activities and the effects of Lebanon Hezbollah on domestic policy of Lebanon and available regional policy in the Middle East.

Keywords: Political Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, Secularism, Moderation, Radicalism, Lebanon Hezbollah

1. INTRODUCTION

If we regard the Westphalia treaties (Osnabrück and Münster) concluded in order to end the 30 years of religious wars among the Saint German Rome emperorship and the King of France as the starting point of international relations, then it should also be recognized that this marked the end of religion in the field of international policy. In other words, the starting point of international relations is the end point of religion in the field of international policy.

This process is completed followed by important events such as the Industrial Revolution, the start of the period of Enlightenment, victory of the French Revolution. These events prepared the grounds for separating existing religion from international policy and domestic field of western countries. In this regard, some have defined the Westphalia treaties as the symbol of renaissance in the field of international relations. After the conclusion of the aforesaid treaties, the European people observed unique achievements in the field of political affairs, such as the formation of government and nation based on four elements (government, sovereignty, population and land) and changes in the components of government legitimacy from the traditional ones based on religion and royal dynasties to the public will which was determined by the level of public satisfaction about the society (Halliday 2001: 359-373). Historically, throughout the age of Rome emperorship and that of the Medieval times, there were a series of paradigm changes in how a government should be formed. As time passed, the European people began to regard the modern framework of forming political societies and establishing the governing system based on the aforesaid modern indices as better than other frameworks. Consequently, they attempted to popularize it and transfer it to other societies as well. Upon the emergence of the Industrial revolution in Europe, the victory of the French Revolution and modernism in the political, social, cultural and economic fields, the issue of religion in the West came to be gradually neglected. Rather, a newer issue such as the infrastructure of the modern government came to be recognized as an important development in the field of international policy. Following globalization of international relations in the final quarter of the 19th century and the development of European foreign policy based on colonialism, the initial attempts to plant the newly developing modern government paradigm to countries outside the European continent including Asia, Latin America, and Africa were made. Different geographical regions reacted differently in response to the modern government paradigm. For example, in Latin America, the new framework was promptly adopted in the process of creating new nation-states and achieving independence. However, in the Middle East, in spite of the long existing backgrounds of civilization and culture, the process of creating the nation-state was substantially delayed. The people of the region could not easily adapt to the process and opposed and resisted the new framework. Events such as the outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the first decade of 20th century resulted in vast changes in the Islamic land of the Middle East region and prepared grounds for the advance of the Western colonial governments (England and France). The nation-states in this region were only established when international organizations such as the United Nations exercised its mandate under which the two governments officially implemented their previous agreements (Sykes and Picot Agreement) that divided the lands. It is not an exaggeration to describe government reform in the Middle East region as a challenge, since more than a century has passed since the initial attempt. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, the region experienced a change of environment, especially in the eyes of the West, with the emergence of radical Islamic movements. This paper recognizes and takes notice of these movements in the following analysis of the power and influence of political Islam in the Middle East. By virtue of the activities of the political Islam in the Middle East, four main movements in this region have been created. In this way, it is necessary to mention that the main reason behind the emergence of political Islam is the changing beliefs and patterns of the religious identity of people in the Middle East region, which were influenced by their exchanges with the modern Western beliefs and culture. This exchange may be divided into four time periods as follows.

1) The first movement of political Islam was formed by prominent thinkers including Sayyid Jamal-ad-Din Asadabadi and Muhammad Abduh. This began with the advance of the Western people to the Muslim countries when England intervened in the government system of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. This continued onwards to 1914 when England took over Egypt. In addition to reviving Islam and emphasizing Islamic values for people in the Middle East, this group of thinkers focused on remembering the past glorious periods of the Islamic nation. In fact, the activism of Islamism during this period was a reaction and a response to the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East region (Simbar 2009: 120). They sought to prevent the presence and activity of the Western countries in Islamic systems from growing by developing non-religious governments to oppose the autocracy and attempted to discredit their integrity, from the view point of Islam.

2) Some theoreticians consider the 1967 "Six Day War" between Arab and Israel which resulted in the defeat of Arab and the support of the Western countries as the principal factor that triggered the second movement of the political Islam. At the time, the prevailing government system in Arab countries was mainly based on imported ideology such as socialism and secularism. In spite of having gone through six crises (legitimacy, identity, distribution, influence, integration and partnership) and economic problems, to change the public perception, they encouraged their military forces to fight against Israel in the process of leading the Pan Arabic movement in Arab lands. Finally, as a result of the aforesaid problems and the indisputable support of Western countries for Israel, the Arabic army consisting of Egypt, Syria, Jordon and Iraq were quickly defeated. The problems in Arab countries, the inability of the system to resolve these problems, and the defeat of Arab people in the war against Israel which had the backing of the Western countries, led to a feeling of frustration in the region's people. Against this backdrop, the Islamic movement was created in these countries and the slogan such as 'Islam is the Solution of Problems' was popularized in region (Esposito 2000: 50).

3) Most of the Western writers and thinkers that had dealt with the issue of political Islam have argued that the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a turning point in the creation of Islam orientation in the Middle East. In this way, the Islamic political system replaced and was favored over secular government types of the West. It also came to dominate the rules and regulations in a country that was already regarded as the center of gravity for the Western block. Thus, the movement of Islam was formed in the Middle East region. The Iranian Revolution that challenged hegemony of the West and the East harked back to days of grandeur of the Islamic civilization and creation of Islamic identity among people in this region. The Revolution also exerted national and regional influence in developing political Islam in the Middle East region and this continues to this day (Teti 2008: 218).

4) The last and the most powerful movement of political Islam in the Middle East region goes back to the end of the Cold war and the final decade of the 20th century. It was accompanied with events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the gap of power at the international system level, openness towards other ideologies including Western liberal democracy within the framework of globalization at the international level. In this way, Western theoreticians including Samuel Huntington with his theory of the Clash of Civilization, Francis Fukuyama who wrote The End of History and The Last Man, and Benjamin Barber who authored Jihad vs. McWorld (Murden 2001: 539-552) divided the

world into two opposition camps of the Islam and the West. Furthermore, they prepared grounds for creation of terrorist movements such as Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad affiliated to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

In the current Middle East, in addition to the Islamic Republic of Iran government, other powerful regional and national movements such as the Development and Justice party in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine form a vast range of political Islam. As time passed and the Islamic movements expanded, this issue worked against the benefits of Western countries in the Middle East region. In line with these changing circumstances, nowadays, academic centers in Western countries pay considerable attention to the increased recognition of the political Islam as a modern challenge to the West world that emerged after the end of the Cold war. According to most Western experts in the field of Middle East affairs such as Bernard Lewis who belongs to the first generation of regional experts, Michael C. Hudson, Daniel Pipes, Richard V. Allen, Steven L. Spiegel, Anthony Cordesman, Philip Robins, John Esposito, Malcolm H. Kerr, James p. Piscatori, Graham Fuller, Fred Halliday, and Eastern experts such as Albert Hourani, Majid Khadduri from first generation and Hisham Sharabi, Rashid Khalidi, Richard Hrair Dekmejian, Bassam Tibi, Fawaz Gerges, and David Menashri are regarded as more or less fundamentalists in the field of political Islam. According to these groups of experts, any attempt for establishing government system that does not conform to the Western patterns that leads to struggles may be affiliated to fundamentalism. The definition of political Islam that is accepted by most of the Western thinkers is an attempt to dominate the basics of legal laws, ethical norms and religious values in government system with the goal of achieving spiritual salvation. According to the aforesaid definition, if we regard insisting Islamism on executing Islamic rules and regulations in political structure system as criteria for affiliating them to fundamentalism, then the Western thinking relation to establishing political system based on components of modern world (government, nation, secularism, people oriented, basics of legitimacy of government) in other governments may also be considered as fundamentalism. Meanwhile, attention to the epistemology of Western opinion with respect to political Islam and the same understanding of political Islam, in spite of the growing movement to find out the negative aspects of Western countries toward activity of political Islam has great importance. According to opinion of the Western thinkers, since political Islam an attempt to change secular discourse that dominates the international system, it has always been studied in a negative light. While political Islam as a divine religion has a pluralistic nature (Ehteshami 1997: 179-199) and thus, limiting it within a framework of conceptual fundamentalism is not a fair assessment. This can also backlash and result in increasing range of violence related to radical groups of Islamic nations against imported patterns of government structure of Western countries. Nowadays political Islam covers a vast range of Islamic activities in which there is Al Qaeda Islamism on the one hand that avoids the components of the West's modern world with their own understandings of Islam and Imam Musa Al-Sadr on the other, which vindicates Shiite population of Lebanon within framework of national and secular government. In this way, Lebanon's Hezbollah is a merge of the Western modern government system, nationalism, and search for its nature through framework of political national system of Lebanon. In addition to accepting secular system of Lebanon and activity in political national system of this country, Islamic identity is regarded as an active component of the Middle East region. As a result, during the past 20 years, it has changed the system of this region. Maybe it is possible to say that emergence

and activity of Hezbollah within framework of domestic rules and Lebanon confirms the view point of western countries in relation to political Islam, since studying activity of Hezbollah in historical series of Lebanon show this movement merging positive components of Western countries and reformism method of political Islam at the regional and the international system. According to the aforesaid issues, in addition to two components such as political Islam with respect to Western epistemology and Hezbollah with respect to studying historical series of its formation in political society of Lebanon based on social movement theory (SMT), and the change of this movement from radicalism to moderation and its entrance to political system of Lebanon, we intend to test to following hypothesis: Political Islam as a promoting movement intends to adopt the positive aspects of modern achievements of Western countries and fundamentalism, and violence is a method applied only by a few number of Islam oriented groups. However, the aforesaid elements are not regarded as components and nature of political Islam movement. The present article analyzes this issue in three chapters. First, the relationship of Islam and the international system from epistemological point of view of Western countries is studied. Then being aware of the incorrect understanding of Western people, the difference between political Islam and Islamic fundamentalist, and the political activity of Lebanon Hezbollah is studied as a social movement and reformism of political Islam movement at the international level.

2. POLITICAL ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The term political Islam was first raised in 1970 like the term nationalism in spite of having had a long background of more than 1400 years. It entered the international relations literature of with great delay. Of course it is to be noted that since the field of international relations is regarded as a relatively recent academic field and it has been less than 100 years since this field has been established at university centers, active Western theoreticians tend to neglect looking at the background of the activity of Islamism at the international level and only pay attention to the Islam seeking movements during the recent century (i.e. since the creation of nation-state in the Middle East region). Therefore, in spite of more than 14 centuries that Islamism has been active in the field of international policy, this term nevertheless, entered the international relations literature only upon the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In any case, according to Denoeux's definition, the term political Islam means the movements and ideologies affiliated to Islamic sources, statements, organizations and events originated from Islamic traditions that act based on detailed and comprehensive political instructions (Denoeux 2002: 61). Ayubi regards political Islam as an issue dealing with theories or movements. He claims that Islam has political and governmental theory (Ayubi 1992: 60-78). Hefner believes that political Islam seeks to revive piety and general religious activities that was prevalent during 1970s and 1980s in Islam world. However, he insists that there exists a diverse set of commitments within this movement and that there are differences among general aspect of Muslim's piety, identity and political Islam (Hefner 2005: 18). Salvatore has referred to political Islam as a conceptual and symbolic structure that is cannot be described in a simple manner since it is not a clear phenomenon (Salvatore 1999: xxvi). He believes that looking at only the political aspect of Islam results in rejection of the religion from related norms and rejection of Islamic government from initial concepts of political sciences (Salvatore 1999: xx). According to the aforesaid opinions, it seems that view points of Hefner and Salvatore are important with respect to several aspects:

1) Maintaining diversity for commitment of Islamic movements

2) Originating political Islam from ordinary Islam and extending field of political Islam

The attempt to understand the traditions of Muslims regardless of their insistence for accompanying religion and politics, the two elements in which modern society intends to separate, with respect to practical and conceptual aspect, is doomed to failure. As Mitchell argues, in his book *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity,* social sciences is based on obvious experiences of the Western world's history and is regarded as a standard framework for global knowledge (Mitchell 2002: 7). In this way, the view points of the political Islam in the field of international relations are formed based on secular epistemology.

On this basis, the framework for secular concepts specifies questions which are asked in relation to separation of religion, politics, religion and political religion (Asad 1996: 11). According to Hirschkind, a comprehensive recognition of political Islam should be based on Western concepts such as religion, politics and secularism since it indicates historical extension of statements. In addition, they may not be used as a set of global issues or new issues (Hirschkind 1997: 14). Most of the attempts to offer theory in the field of international relations intend to find relationship among religious patterns, actors and organizations inside sovereignty, security, global government, solution of disputes, human rights, dialogue among civilizations and role of main actors. According to this, all of the desired hypotheses in relation to recognizing political Islam are all secular. So nowadays, traditions, attitudes and secular habits are regarded as part of cultural basics and norms of international relations in the contemporary world and are inseparable part of traditional epistemology of research. Consequently, the traditional approaches of international relations guarantee special type of religious topics that has its roots in center of power for secularism (Lynch 2000: 758). Secular epistemology has created special conditions because in today's human life, the general, the private, the religious, the political, the mundane and the spiritual are all separate fields. Such approaches have resulted in a special understanding of the political Islam and reviving religion. They have also yielded important political results in international relations. Political Islam is regarded as secondary phenomena by secular analysts. They look to political Islam as a divergent and aggressive movement for public space, and so that retrospect to pre-modern methods, it is regarded as political discipline for Muslims. In sum, recognizing Islam and its policies are possible by using specified secular frameworks. This results in creation of religious and cultural backgrounds which help the Western people can understand political Islam. Shakman Hurd has regarded two classes of secular hypothesis to form cultural background as follows (Shakman Hurd 2008: 118).

1) In laicism, the political Islam is regarded as a front for political and economic benefits and illogical violation of religious approaches from general secular lifestyle of the majority of the people. This threatens the general democratic discipline and is an indicator of movement of society toward divine government.

2) In Jewish- Christian secular belief, the phenomena of political Islam is regarded as nonstandard mixture of Islam and politics and it seems that there is fundamental difference among modern point of view (Christians or Judeo-Christian) in relation to separation of church from government.

Research on the status of Muslim societies shows that separation of political power and religious power is not only available at most of the societies with respect to historical point of view, but also due to the unique components in Islam, it cannot be maintained. Each of the two aforesaid hypotheses generally deals with this issue that political Islam is regarded as a refusal to accept and confirm the superiority of domain of the private field and violation of public and private fields of seculars (McAlister 2001: 220). As Connolly has argued, the reason for identifying such behavior with political Islam is that in this point of view, the impartial conditions are not maintained for analyzing topics and concepts through hegemony of Western secular methods (Connolly 1999: 22). At the present time, Western secular epistemology creates public understanding of political Islam. So, this insight about the obstacles for understanding this issue results in creation of mentality that few people deals with nature of political Islam (Euben 1999: xiv). In fact, this point of view that originates from secularism hypothesis which has its roots in history and experience of the Western countries. This is the basis of the public understanding of political Islam. In other words, secular epistemology and its power pays a particular attention to the special mode of religious topics and special understanding of common policies. It appears like so, from this point of view to Muslim societies. Based on this, the secular point of view deals with the entrance of religion into the field of politics, against fundamentalism and bigotry. Until now the relationship of the political Islam and the West has not studied from this point of view. For example, William Raymond Baker, in his book *Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists*, has referred to the preference of the West for political framework in the negative aspect while looking at modern Islam oriented movements in Egypt. He explains that this negativism is an obvious mistake of the West which may not be accepted by researchers (Baker 2003: 4). Fawaz Georges has mentioned that cultural values of Western countries play a key role in the formation of understanding politicians from Islamism (Georges 1999: 20). Based on this, the following two important issues shall be given attention to.

1) Secularism approaches of western countries enjoy a special status in the formation of recognized cultural differences and cultural values that have not already been noted by Baker and Georges (as theoreticians who deal with thinking and philosophical differences). Although finding a causality among them is a complicated task, the epistemology of the secularists results in indescribable cultural impediments.

2) Evaluation of secularists from the viewpoint of the political Islam has important political results in the field of international relations. Among the results, the most important result we may refer to is the retrogressive point of view of political Islam approaches in the analysis of secularism, which the Western countries believe that Islamic movements are about to be merged with fundamentalism.

According to the aforesaid issues, it seems that the negative perception of the Western countries towards the activity of political Islam and basics and principles of this movement originates from their epistemology of political Islam. By neglecting the fundamental differences between the phenomena of Islam as a divine school and its empirical achievement which forms the basics of the ideology, they attempt to dictate their frameworks to other societies. Thus, the reason that the Western people equate political Islam with fundamentalism is a result of determination, lack of sufficient recognition for behaving with this phenomenon.

3. POLITICAL ISLAM & ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Islamic fundamentalism is a term that most of western thinkers apply it to call the movement of political Islam. In sum, this title, in addition to other titles such as Islamic awareness and Islamic reviving, is a term that is used by experts in the field of Islamic movements. However, the title of political Islam or Islam orientation is more preferred by the Islamic thinkers in describing contemporary Islamic movements. As it was already mentioned, the political Islam is a new term that belongs to the modern world. Before the emergence of the concept of sovereignty of Western modernism and secularism teachings in world, this term was not applicable. When the West entered the Middle East region in the first 20th century and attempted to suggest their political, social, economic and cultural system, a movement of political Islam was raised against Western modernism teachings in which the Western people in order to emphasize its abnormality, dubbed this movement as fundamentalism or Islamic radicalism. Application of the term political Islam is a result of such attempt. Of course there are differences among fundamentalism and political Islam. The term fundamentalism has a completely different nuance in the Western culture. However, the term political Islam has no negative meaning and is partially neutral. It should be noted that how the term such as Islam oriented and political Islam first came to be used is not clear. Fundamentalism is an ambiguous term. This term originates from the West's Christian world. It was first used by the American protestants in the 1920s when they published pamphlets with the title of "Fundamental" on an optional basis. They first used this term upon accepting the absolute correctness of text of the sacred book against the new interpretations in Christianity in opposition, to the principles of modernism and return to the Christian principles with respect to the Western point of view which is regarded as strict and based on bigotry (Heywood 2007: 292-317).

Although the term fundamentalism first originated in the context of the American protestants, Western thinkers of contemporary Islam oriented movements used this term without regard for such context. By applying the term fundamentalism to describe all contemporary Islamic movements, this came to be understood as a type of Islam oriented movement against Western fundamentalism. In this way, with respect to the Western point of view, any movement that deals with return of religion to political fields may be regarded as fundamentalism. This understanding of political Islam is common in west. The approaches of the Western countries have a linear way of viewing the Islam oriented movement and regards all Islamic movements as fundamentalism. This is not correct. Simon Murden, in a book called *The Globalization of World Politic: An Introduction to International Relations,* has referred to this point, that Islamism has different points of view, that it is possible to classify them in several groups and that there are classes with respect to methods of achieving to political discipline. For example, some Islamism has a reform-based approach, while Islamic fundamentalism has a revolutionary nature and adopts Machiavellistic method in their approach towards the current situation. In other words, Islam as a tool is in the hand of the fundamentalists. Also, through this, Islamism, their method and behavior is specified. In fact, fundamentalists have unique characteristics and thus it is possible to distinguish them from Islamism. The differences between these two approaches are described as follows.[1]

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[1] Authors believe that there are essential differences between political Islam and the fundamentalist one. Therefore, the Western thinkers' tendency to equate the two may be due to their incorrect

3.1. Type of Behavior & Political Behavior

In Islamism, the element of Islam is regarded as the main component of belief and faith for the people of the society and intersection point of politics and society. Meanwhile, fundamentalists, in spite of having resorted to religious ceremonies, are not bound by ethical element of religion. They are not afraid of taking any type of action in order to achieve their goal. Islamism in its quest toward perfection is bounded by its principles and basics. However, fundamentalists look to problems in accordance with the Machiavellian view and take any action in order to achieve their goals. It is to be noted that Islamism has a reformistic point of view to the world and attempts to remove unsuitable and negative problems from world. However, fundamentalists attempt to seize the world in favor of their benefits through grave and violent behavior and seek to organize their own desired world. Islamism discourages sacrificing values in order to attain their goals and borrowing political plot from non-Islamic resources, to achieve a power called Islam.

3.2. Facing with Modernism Phenomena

One of the basic differences between fundamentalism and Islamism is their behavior vis-a-vis modernism phenomena and its consequences. In this regard, Islamism considers the following Western concepts including democracy, human rights, pluralism and economic freedom as positive. Fundamentalists, fully aware that adopting Western countries' signs is regarded as index for specifying their political identity, reject them and instead turned to anti-modernism approach (Fuller 2004: 11). In other words Islamism is not bifurcated into two separate fields of religion and world. In addition to disapproving the negative aspects of modernism, they also look at the positive achievements. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, do not accept the positive results of modernism and instead condemn it. The most prominent index of fundamentalism may be that it refuses to look at the modern West in which modernistic fundamentalism movement is equivalent to corruption and collapse. There is a belief that secularity is based on atheism and real and true life can only be achieved when one returns to traditions of old golden age.

3.3. Understanding Islam

Distinguishing and understanding fundamentalists from Islam is accompanied with lowering its status to an ideology. By collecting several components, absolute political and social understanding of religion simplifies Islam and their influence in society in order to obtain their goals. In other words Islamic fundamentalism does not require all aspects of Islam. Rather it looks to Islam for a combat weapon. In this way, some thinkers have viewed this understanding of Islam as changing verses of the Koran to ideology within the framework of political reactions. In contrast, Islamism demands religion. Islamic society is pluralistic where there are no frozen patterns or limits to the religion. This society is a criterion for superiority of pious people and it shall be found inside society rather than

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understandings about the Islamic beliefs. This paper tries to not only open up a new gate to the international relations literature by clarifying political Islamists and the fundamentalist ones, but also intends to show the differences between them.

outside the society. Therefore, Islamism acts very conservatively in the society and observes the acquittance principle.

3.4. Type of Political Structure & System

If Islamism is capable of establishing political structure within their society, their system may be regarded as a Political Institution. Political institutions are made of human and may change and complete in accordance with their needs. Islamic political institution in accordance with religious norms and values, in addition to solving basic human needs, organize their behaviors based on religious patterns and create discipline to regulate the activities of the people. Political institutions, by creating a partially fixed structure for the exchange of humans, decrease uncertainty in life. They also specify domain for selection of people and imposes limits to the people of the society. It is then possible to conclude that political institutions create limitations which results in organizing relations and behaviors of people at Islamic society. Its most important characteristic is stability. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalism, due to nature of its fixed thinking has not changed into an institution. Rather it continues its existence through the framework of Political Movement. Political movement consists of people with common benefits that cooperate to achieve same goal. Generally these movements are created out of their official institutions and have no concentrated effort for creating discipline.

The behavior of fundamentalism movements due to lack of a central core for disciplining behavior methods does not have enough stability and sometimes it is observed that it does not have required durability for effectiveness and achieving goals.

3.5. How to Behave with Logicality Phenomena

Another distinct indice among Islamism and Islamic fundamentalists is the attention to wisdom phenomena including the superior element of human life. Islamism in addition to mixing logicality with religious basics have reconciled among these two important issues. Some of great Shiite jurisprudents in the contemporary age (like Akhound Khorasani) believe that religion and law complement each other. So each point that is raised by religion is certainly logical and any order that is authorized by wisdom is regarded as religious issue. In this way, fundamentalist disrespect wisdom and regard it as fallible. The way to achieve success depends on following the scripture without any philosophical and logical understanding in which in some cases it may accompany with tradition and lead people toward good fortune. By studying the movements of political Islam we can conclude that, contrary to the assumption of the Western people that political Islam is the same as Islamic fundamentalism, patterns of political Islam with no fundamentalistic characteristics are active in the Middle East region. However, they are mistakenly called fundamentalism. One of the groups of political Islam is movement of Lebanon Hezbollah.

4. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY & ISLAMIC ACTIVISM

Social Movement Theory (SMT) analyzes different movements through 3 elements as Political Opportunity, Resource Mobilization and Forming Process (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 1-20). The first generation of social movement theory studies Islamic movements

were based on social psychology theory (Wiktorowicz 2004: 6). However, later on, these movements were analyzed within framework of resource mobilization. Both of the study methods analyze Islamic movements. However, the first generation of theories was not able to offer neither any response nor reason for Islamic activism. The first generation of social movement theory created relationship among the increasing problem in society and formation of social mobilization in order to explain Islamic movements. The social psychology school has offered two reasons for Islamic activism.

1) First, it is assumed that social movements originate from structural tension. Meanwhile the main motivation for Islamic activism under influence of structural crisis is the failure of secular renovation projects (Ibid).

2) The second factor was cultural imperialism that was created as a result of opposition to Western culture and Islam, in the colonized regions (Wiktorowicz 2004: 7).

Meanwhile, prompt social-economic changes in the way that wealth was accumulated among Western genius people, the status of capitalism and people with corrupt positions has negatively affected the minds of the people. Unfavorable economic status deprived the majority of the people of political power. This is mixed together with the monopoly of a small group of intelligent people who support the alien value system. Finding reasons of Islamic activism in the social psychology based on tensions within the society and available dissatisfaction was not enough. The primitive method of social psychology theory in social movement studies has received several criticisms. Communication among structural tension and social involvement were equally raised for similar approaches in the field of Islamic activism. The available contradiction or failure in social psychology theory is that social movements logically are not related to social tensions. In other words, analyses that show a causal relationship among expression of complaints in the society and the creation of social movement to express dissatisfaction are losing support. Such theories need to beef up their inference by using from resource mobilization theory. Resource mobilization theory argues that movements as logical and an indicator of organizing group activity. Resource mobilization theory removes all deficiencies of social psychology theory through analysis and covers resources and mobilizing structures. The social psychology theory pays attention to role of Social Movement Organization (SMO) instead of collecting personal complains. For example, Lebanon Hezbollah as a social movement of mosques and social services, plays the role of SMO in relation to transferring message. Islamic non-governmental organizations form another set of vast organizations. Islamic non-governmental organizations range from medical clinics, to hospitals, to charity associations, to schools and to cultural centers. They supply necessary goods and basic services. They seek to confirm that Islam is required solution for daily problems of Muslim societies. In other words, within a weak central government, the Islamic movement enters the stage and by supplying aforesaid services, builds a friendly image in the public space (Wiktorowicz 2004: 11). This is how the Islamic message becomes popular. This is also how the sectarianism policy remains unchanged. Social movements based on social services strategy show that a stable Islam may be a viable option against failures of modern secular government.

5. STRUCTURE & DIVIDING POWER IN LEBANON

Lebanon like other countries of the Middle East region suffers from nation-state crisis. Lebanon like other countries of the Middle East region has several thousand years civilization which goes back to Phoenician civilization in the Mediterranean region. Since 800 B.C, when the Phoenician people lived in it, and until its independence experienced 12 different periods of power transfer. Carl L. Brown, a prominent researcher in the field of Middle East affairs, has argued that this region is the most penetrable in the world (Brown 1984: 75). Lebanon, after many historical struggles and support from France in its establishment of a Christian country in the Middle East region, was separated from Syria in 1920. Under France's mandate, the nation-state building process began. The first constitution was written in accordance with third republic of France in 1926. This constitution, due to obvious partiality from Maroni Christians, and the lack of regard for political and national rights of other groups in Lebanon, was revised in six phases. At the present time, the constitution distributes power based on sect and religious divisions. Power is distributed hierarchically, among Maroni Christians (president), Sunni Muslims (prime minister) and Shiite Muslims (head of parliament). In addition to these groups, there are other groups and sects such as Druze, Ismaili, Jewish, and Alawi (Nusayris or Ansaris) which are active only in the parliament due to their smaller sizes.

6. EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN LEBANON

Special conditions of power in Lebanon include sectarian structure of power, no one dominant group all through the country, religious pluralism, and having Israel as a neighbor. These have created special conditions which result in formation of modern and unique pattern of political Islam in this country. During formation of Lebanon, the first census was held in order to allocate coupon for offering subsidy goods. The Shiite population was announced to be the third largest after the Maroni Christians and the Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the Shiite of this country believe that France in the way of achieving its goals concerning to establish Christian government in the Middle East region Maroni Christians made secret agreements with Arab. Sunni countries have singled this country out, in spite of the fact it had more population in that time (1932) in comparison to Christians and Sunni. By creating false statistics and manipulating the census, they came to hold the lowest status in structure of political power in Lebanon (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: xii). Discrimination of the Shiites in Lebanon, negligence of citizen's rights and their demands, the presence of Imam Musa Al-Sadr, and the solidarity achieved by the Shiite has resulted in the creation of political Islam in Lebanon. In spite of higher power of Muslims in political structure of Lebanon, the Shiite population created the special approach of political Islam in Lebanon. The political Islam movement in Lebanon goes back to more than half a century. As Imam Musa Al-Sadr entered, and the Islamic revolution in Iran succeeded, and Hezbollah was established, it is possible to divide this movement into two periods where it had its highs and lows.

The first wave of political Islam in Lebanon started with Imam Musa Al-Sadr. An Iranian Lebanese, he came to Lebanon as a jurisprudent. When he learned about the discrimination that the Shiite population faced, he sought to establish Shiite society in this country, by

Figure 1. Effective components in formation of first wave of political Islam in Lebanon based on modern social movement theory

removing the structural poverty among Shiites and vindicating their rights to the central government. (Norton 2007: 18). Referring to Koran verses, Imam Musa announced that his goal was to eliminate poverty and deprivation from Lebanon. In order to achieve this goal, he intended to establish new political, economic, and educational institutes. Against this backdrop, the Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council (SISC) was first established. This may be regarded as his first step for entering politics Lebanon. Imam Musa Al-Sadr used religion to form a social movement. Through a political opportunity that was granted to him on behalf of the Shiite Supreme Parliament, he used his power and influence and established institutes such as occupational institutes that allowed him to mobilize resources. Linking these three institutes with Amal (military branch of Imam Musa Al-Sadr movement) finally resulted in the changing political philosophy for points of view related to secularism (for government), liberalism, and political Islam (Norton 2007: 15).

It is to be noted that although unstable political atmosphere of Lebanon was leading to more violence against the existing political system, Imam Musa Al-Sadr preferred that Amal and Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council act within framework of political system of Lebanon. In spite of his attempts to obtain more power, he never supported a complete collapse and establishment of a new Islamic government. As it was mentioned in his declaration at the Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council in 1977, Imam Musa Al-Sadr sincerely believed in keeping diversity of several sects in government of Lebanon (Deeb 1998: 684). In addition, the Amal statute has referred to this point that Lebanon originates from a patriotic atmosphere. In 1978, Imam Musa Al-Sadr while traveling to Libya was secretly killed. It seems that his death was related with his role in organizing the Shiite population in Lebanon. His mystery death (this may have been executed by the Libya government on behalf of those in power in the political field of Lebanon) coincided with the absence of Imam Mahdi (Twelfth Imam of Shiites). The permanent loss of Imam Musa Al-Sadr resulted in the eternal Shiite activism in Lebanon. The pattern of modern political Islam headed by Imam Musa Al-Sadr during that period was obviously in contrast with primitive waves of political Islam in the Middle East region. The new approach of political Islam affiliated to Al-Sadr had reform oriented point of view that accommodated the phenomena of

Figure 2. Effective components in formation of second wave of political Islam in Lebanon based on theory of modern social movement

modernism in the West and welcomed its positive achievements. He established new indices of political Islam in the Middle East region. He established components such as civil associations, activity in the field of national political system, acceptance of the notion of sovereignty of the secular system, attention to civil rights and citizenship rights in all sects and religious groups and finally, resistance against Israel. This was followed in the next decades by modern Islamism in the Middle East region. Imam Musa, in addition to engaging in civil activity and working with other groups and the religious sects in the military branch of Lebanon called Amal, sought to resist against Israel. Imam Musa Al-Sadr established the Amal military group to resist against Israel. This shows that his political approach is a mixture of diverse behavioral modes (cooperation, complain, demonstration and war). He believed that this method may bring better results for Islam (Shanahan 2005: 120).

The second wave of political Islam in Lebanon began following the victory of the Iranian revolution and the formation of Lebanon Hezbollah. Political and social heteronomy of the Shiite Lebanon resulted in the formation of a powerful psychological structure that Hezbollah strongly supported. The aforesaid conditions (the heteronomy of the Shiites), the effects and the support for the Iran revolution, in addition to the miscalculation of the Lebanese governments and Israel created opportunity to establish social organization and movement.

Lebanon Hezbollah, which was established under the conditions of a civil war, mixture of teachings from the Iranian revolution, selected a unique approach. There was an undeniable tendency toward radicalism in the political structure of Lebanon. However, as time passed and the conditions changed, the movement changed toward moderation. The transformation of Hezbollah towards moderation may be expressed within the analytical framework of the social movement theory. The completion of the Hezbollah is as a result of changes in the formation process, the political opportunity and resource mobilization.

The formation and movement of Hezbollah toward moderation is divided into four periods as follows:

1) The pre-birth stage including the initial mobilization of Shiites under the leadership of Imam Musa where the basis of the Hezbollah was facilitated through lack of accepting political rest and political mobilization inside the Lebanese political system

2) Embryonic stage that was created through political and ideological opportunities offered on behalf of the Amal organization, the Lebanese civil war and the Iranian revolution

3) The most challenging phase of Hezbollah's development is its emergence during the attack of Israel in 1982 and the resources mobilized by the Iranian revolution

4) The last stage is the merge of the principal political path of Lebanon that includes all three elements of social movements theory

In sum, to explaining the political Islam as a general political structure of Lebanon, it is necessary to discuss the Formation Process with Islamic resistance, Political Opportunity as covering partnership in governmental institutions and Resource Mobilization as a mixture of assistance from Iran, domestic support and political organizational force. The completion of Hezbollah and the membership of Amal is completely compatible with modern social movement theory. According to the social movement theory, repeated oppositions and complains against developing competitive pressures has resulted in different groups and diverse patterns of movement. Divisions such as radical- moderate, conservative- liberal, old- young, ideological and activism within the movement show that the movement accepts diverse groups with different ideas (Wiktorowicz 2004: 17). This condition is exactly the same condition inside Amal. At the end of the Lebanese civil war, Amal lost its original dynamism and active support of movement that had been established by Imam Musa Al-Sadr. It turned into a system full of corruption, insufficiencies injustice which Amal was to fight against. The movement turned into severely political corrupt phenomena which needed to be reformed (Norton 2007: 23). This new reality was not taken well by all members. Being completely immersed in corruption, being accepted by government, and receiving benefits from Syria (Deeb 1998: 686), and carrying out unpopular activities among people are some of the reasons that have led to an increase in dissatisfaction of some Amal leaders. Therefore, it was time to establish a new branch inside Amal. However, until the Israeli attack, a political opportunity to assist this new movement was not created.

7. ATTACK OF ISRAEL TO LEBANON & FORMATION OF LAST POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

According to the social movement theory, every movement will need its own particular necessities for initiation. It can be hence inferred that the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces and the prolongation of Israeli army's stay in Lebanon has been the main reason for the creation of Hezbollah. Among other effective reasons, the situation of Lebanon during the creation of Hezbollah can be mentioned. By the time of Israel's invasion, Lebanon, which was engaged in civil war, was experiencing an abnormal political situation. After they were expelled from Jordan in 1970, the PLO active forces not only confronted Israel from inside Lebanon, but also challenged the Lebanese government. This situation not only turned the active political groups like Christian Lebanese Phalangists and Amal Shiite against the Palestinians, but also induced Israel to adopt short term strategies. These strategies consisted of responding to the attacks. On the long term, the strategy was to expel them from Lebanon based on invasion into that

country and violation of its territorial integrity. It is worth mentioning that it was the above mentioned situation which created the strategic unity between Christian rightist Lebanese and Israelis in the process of the repression of PLO and their expulsion from Lebanon. Due to the leftist orientation of the PLO forces, its members allied with the Druze and the communist parties in Lebanon. They were led by the Phalangists of the Lebanese Kataeb party. The two mentioned sides would then deteriorate the situation by launching occasional attacks such as the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, the Lebanese president at the time, and incurring mass human casualties against each other, as they did in the case of the Sabra and Shatila massacre. During that time, the Lebanese Shiite community was lacking leadership after Imam Musa Al-Sadr's disappearance. The collapse of the Shah regime and the subsequent formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran resulted in a favorable ground that created an ideological structure for the Shiite Islamism radicals in Lebanon. However, there is another point of view which posits a different story about the origins of the leadership of Hezbollah. Instead of the story that it was created based on inner group struggle in Amal (Norton 2007: 34), this alternative story argues that this opposition was created by Iran and Syria to challenge Amal and others in the mid 1980s. Iran revolution encouraged activism and helped form Shiite Islamism military groups (Haddad 2006: 24). Based on statements of Naim Qassem, the Deputy of Secretary General of Hezbollah, there was little time from the official announcement of the victory of the Iranian revolution and the appointment of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the Shiite population. The debate that took place within the Shiite clergy in Lebanon was serious. The Lebanese Shiites' support for Iran was ethical in 1979 and this was accompanied with attempts to have a working relationship with leadership of the Islamic revolution (Qassem 2005: 18). The initial center for the emergence of the Shiite Islamism activities in 1980 was a small group that accepted Hezbollah's leadership in which they studied Islamic jurisprudence and theology in the city of Najaf in Iraq. Qassem has argued that if the city of Qom were the brain center of the Iranian revolution, then Najaf was another center where different thoughts were collected. It was also a city where all the future leaders of the Hezbollah were educated. Three outstanding characters of the Hezbollah including Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Raghib Harb and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli (Norton 2007: 34) were all educated here. They were all well qualified to be Hezbollah's leaders. The effects of the Iranian revolution created a sense of urgency in the Lebanese Shiite radicals. This translated into the creation of the Hezbollah. Thus, the Hezbollah was greatly influenced by the Iranian revolution and the Islam movement. As Norton argues, when Hezbollah was created, tasks such as improving the society for the Lebanon Muslims were not among main priorities. Further, no one predicted that there would be an Israeli attack on the southern Lebanon. Even before the Israeli attack, the influence of the Iranian revolution still continued to be prevalent among the Shiites. Israeli occupation of Lebanon created a favorable condition for the growth and development of Hezbollah. On June 6, 1982, when Israel attacked Lebanon, two future leaders of Hezbollah, Harb and Tufayli were in Iran to attend the annual conference on Islam. Following the Israeli attack, Iran promptly announced its readiness to help the Lebanese people. The revolutionary corps of Iran immediately dispatched their troops to Ba'albak at Biqa' valley (Jabar 1997: 47). The official declaration of Hezbollah, announcing its existence as a social and political movement, took place three years after its establishment. In reality, Hezbollah was established on June 1982. Since the beginning of this institution in the Biqa' valley, the Iranian revolutionary corps was responsible for the resistance operation and the security of Hezbollah. Supports for Iran in addition to the Lebanese Shiites who devoted their life to the establishment and the

formation of the Hezbollah led to this newly established institution to continue its hidden activity for more than two years in Baʻalbak region at east of Biqaʻ valley. Baʻalbak was not occupied by Israel. This allowed the revolutionary corps of Iran to stay in this region. Moreover, it was regarded as safe zone where the Hezbollah movements were free to carry out their activities. The proximity of Baʻalbak with Syria permitted members of the Hezbollah movement to freely travel to Iran. Since the beginning, the Hezbollah fighters acted within the framework of national resistance for Lebanon. They did not make any claims that sought to obtain credit for their new existence. This group took courageous attacks against Israeli soldiers (Jabar 1997: 51). Hezbollah, to resist against the Israeli occupation, began its activities including recruitment of new work forces with the material support from Iran. Hezbollah clergymen were in charge of publishing the ideology of Islamic revolution anywhere. This ranged from social centers to mosques, and to cemeteries. The structure of Hezbollah was mainly sustained by the Islam and the clergymen. Resistance against Israel certainly played role in it. This became a type of structure that was famous all throughout Lebanon owing to the violence of the Shiites.

8. DEVELOPING FOLLOWERS

Although the Hezbollah initially had offensive aspect in relation to its ideology and military tactics, this condition did not result in a social success for this movement. This rather led to failure of this movement during the first three years. The most important lesson that Hezbollah learned during this period was how to attract and understand potential followers. Initially, the logic of Hezbollah was based on Islamic solution and slogan. They refused the East-West divide at the time which also referred to the ideological bifurcation of the time owing to the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They insisted on executing norms of Islamic behaviors in regions that were under their coverage. This was apparent in places like western Beirut and coastal cities in southern Lebanon. From 1983 until 1986, parallel to its growing influence and tasks, this group also began to offer social services. This way, the Hezbollah established seventeen medical clinics and two hospitals in Lebanon (Hamzeh 1993: 329). Offering social services resulted in attracting the support of the people. The popularity of Hezbollah began to overpower its former reputation that arose from its employment of violence in relation to norms of social behaviors. During that time the effects and the military presence of Hezbollah developed from Biqaʻ valley to suburbs of south of Beirut and south of Lebanon, so that in the end of 1983 it had developed into a considerable size, for a newly established force. During that time, only a few Lebanese understood real nature of this newly established force. However, from late 1983 and early 1984, western Beirut changed into an Islamic region. The appearance of one of the most famous international capitals of world promptly changed. When they dominated the Shiites in western Beirut, the Hezbollah military men were observed in great numbers in the ruined streets. They wore green cloths over their head. On the cloths, Allah Akbar (God Is Great) was written. They also imposed limitation on women to wear Islamic veil and clothes. They planted dynamites in front of liquor stores located in Shiite regions to force them to close these shops. Some restaurants in the city which were not destroyed, held the title of family outside the restaurant windows. These impositions resulted in the creation of lifelessness in west Beirut. Since mid-1986, because of their radical activities, Hezbollah's popularity among the public who required their support has declined. The Hezbollah forces in southern

Lebanon closed recreation centers including coffee shops. This had a negative effect for Hezbollah. For example, this prevented older people from enjoying their leisure time in coffee shops. Absolute Islamic rules and regulations in cities and villages imposed by the Hezbollah led to the emergence of radical interpretations in Islam. While the Hezbollah forces were happy to apply radical Islamic rules and regulations, the greater proportion of the Shiite population were dissatisfied. Imposition of such rules and regulations destroyed local economic institutions. Hezbollah-ruled area became secluded and became increasingly poor. Inhabitants of the southern villages immigrated to the northern shores around the cities of Sidon (Saida) and Beirut. Southern Lebanon changed into a war zone. This region seemed to be completely separated from other areas of Lebanon (Jabar 1997: 30). Timur Goksel, a senior political advisor of the UNIFIL who was a highly regarded Lebanese academic offered a short summary of the mistakes that the Hezbollah had made. Until 1986, Hezbollah was regarded as enemy. It showed aggressive behavior toward outsiders. Members of this movement were suspicious of other people. Thus, they worked behind closed doors. Communicating and talking with them was impossible task. Hezbollah during that time was a group of idealistic radical people. When Hezbollah forces attempted to dominate all aspects of people's lives, they lost their support. Hezbollah forces also neglected an important point in cultural of Lebanon people, especially those living in southern Lebanon. Culture had a special importance to these people's individuality and personality. In 1986, Hezbollah was separated into different groups. In the same year, Hezbollah forces applied radical Islamic approaches to behavior that were considered to be ultra vires. People's support for this group dramatically decreased. This condition prepared suitable grounds for the revival of the Amal secular party.

9. MOVEMENT OF HEZBOLLAH TOWARD MODERATION: OPENING POLICY

Two important events occurred in Lebanon in 1985.

1) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the suburbs of Beirut to area south of Litany river (in southern Lebanon)
2) Official declaration of Hezbollah as an Islamic resistance and movement organization

In 1985, Hezbollah sent an open letter to the Daily Star Beirut, a newspaper, officially announcing its existence (Hamzeh 1993: 329). Hezbollah's existence was argued to be legitimate since it became a force of powerful resistance which put the seemingly undefeatable Israeli forces under pressure. During that time, the unifying slogan of Hezbollah in relation to adhering to Islamic goals was much like an unwavering rock in which their most important goal was the jihad against Israel (Harik 2007: 55). The Hezbollah's tendency to be closed towards the outside world and their analysis in relation to losing people's support resulted in the reorganization of the movement in 1989. During that time Hezbollah went through a self-confidence crisis.

Three events occurred that opened a political opportunity for the moderation of Hezbollah and consequent structural changes:

First, the end of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in organized support of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Hezbollah and its move towards a realistic path.

Second, the Hezbollah leadership, which made the movement famous, turned into its

weakness. The death of Imam Khomeini as the political-spiritual leader of the Lebanese Islamic movement resulted in disagreements and inner struggles within the movement. This was manifested when Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, the radical leader of Hezbollah was dismissed from the movement's leadership.

Third, the Lebanese civil war ended in 1989.

The aforesaid factors induced group members to make changes to the principal structures. Efforts to reform the Hezbollah resulted in a separation of this movement from radical politics and organizational decision making. Finding an ideological balance led to two new opportunities for the Hezbollah. The most important among them was the Hezbollah's decision to take part in the elections. This was possible when the classic concept of jihad was redefined by extending its spiritual meaning to partnership in elections (Harik 2007: 58). Another result of the ideological change was the transformation of the military forces of the Hezbollah into an effective and small force with a completely separate political and social existence. Organizational separation of the military forces and the civil approach of Hezbollah prepared political atmosphere for entering this movement to principal political process of Lebanon. Its move from a secret organization into a transparent movement was not temporary started since the late 1980s and continues to this day. Upon end of the Lebanese civil war and signing of the Ta'if Accord, a new political opportunity opened for the Hezbollah. The 1989 Ta'if Accord, famous for the National Reconcile Agreement, offered a plan to end the civil war through national reconciliation and reform of the political system with more attention to the fair distribution of political power. The key factor was the dissolution of different military groups which were under the supervision of Syria, except one group. In order to retain its military branch, the Hezbollah changed its name from a military group to a resistance movement that was authorized to use weapon. The unique status of military branch of Hezbollah in Lebanon was a result of the implicit agreement between Iran and Syria (Ranstorp 1997: 51). Stabilizing the status of Hezbollah and allowing it to keep its military group as Islamic resistance group (not just a military group) received huge support from the Lebanese people. During that time, parts of Lebanon occupied by Israel was regarded as impediment for improving Lebanon. When the role of the Hezbollah as a resistance organization was redefined, this group was able to become a candidate for parliament elections in 1992. Partnership in the 1992 elections became a testing ground for the revolutionary view point of the Hezbollah. Following Hezbollah's decision to attend the elections, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary General of Hezbollah in April 1992. Nasrallah was the opposite of Subhi al-Tufayli, the ex-radical leader of Hezbollah. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli was one of the founders of Hezbollah and its first secretary general. During his leadership, Hezbollah showed extremist tendency including the establishment of an Islamic government in Lebanon. By May 1991, Hezbollah was seeking partnership in the Lebanese politics and so they had him replaced with Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi. As one of the closest friends of al-Tufayli, al-Musawi had his own ideas and methods. He tried to refrain from resorting to violence in handling domestic affairs and wished to settle problems in a peaceful manner. This was against the methods of al-Tufayli who confronted the domestic and foreign issues in the same manner. Al-Musawi's changes in methods were in fact a reflection of the changes in the visions of Hezbollah. The Hezbollah wished to comply with the realities of Lebanon after the dissolution of militant groups under the Ta'if Accord. Al-Musawi was killed in February 1992 attack of the Israeli helicopters with his child and wife. Thus, his leadership lasted less than a year. Nassrollah would follow his path, only with more power. During his reign, Hezbollah attracted social support as a result of its strategy. Its

strategy was an open policy (Harik 2007: 77). The result of this strategy was the attainment of 12 seats out of 128 seats in the parliament in the 1992 election. Political strategy of Hezbollah was effective. In spite of initial failures in attracting public popularity, Hezbollah successfully established its legitimacy as resistance force and civil representative of people in 1980[2]. Now, a great number of the Lebanon people are convinced that Hezbollah does not intend to eliminate and replace political system of Lebanon. They believe that it is attempting to join it. In the past, Hezbollah was considered a threat to Lebanon. As this group cooperated with the Christians, this fear was dramatically reduced. Such activities convinced many Lebanon people that the military branch of the Hezbollah was merely fighting against Israel rather than attempting to change the freed life style of the people.

10. CONCLUSION

The decision of the Hezbollah to participate in the elections was as a result of vast changes of the principal laws of this movement. From 1985 to 1992 Hezbollah changed its radical Islamic ideology into a moderate one. This moderation was dramatically manifested when it participated the 1992 elections. Events that took place after 1992 including the unilateral exit of Israel from southern Lebanon in 2000, the war with Israel in 2006, the civil struggle in 2008 to secure an independent Hezbollah telephone line and other issues related to the central government, and the newly established image of activism (or moderation) improved Hezbollah's reputation as an organization that has integrity in the Lebanese political system. Opponents of Hezabollah's new moderate policy resorted to engaging in a war-like resistance action against government in 2008, when the government tried to eliminate Hezbollah's communication network. The opponents were concerned about the intention of the Hezbollah in relation to the activities that came with its partnership as the principal path of Lebanon's policy. Hezbollah proved itself to be an important component of the Lebanese political structure in the summer of 2000 by disclosing that it retained a resistance force.

Following the exit of Israel from Lebanon, a series of serious discussions were held inside Hezbollah about issues including corruption, whether Hezbollah intended to focus on Lebanese policies of Lebanon and whether or not to maintain the current status of resistance at the national level (Lebanon) and the regional level (Middle East). Finally, Hezbollah proved this issue through its resistance in its war against Israel in the summer of 2006. Therefore as social movement theory predicts, the voting ballot is a death sentence for radicalism (Baylouny 2004: 2). Data indicate that when opportunity of partnership in political field is granted to movements whereby they have a choice to select a moderate policy, they will dramatically change their orientation and respond to this motive. The experience of Hezbollah proves this dynamism in the Lebanese domestic policy.

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[2] The Hezbollah's popularity was mentioned in order to show the change of public opinion about this group regarding the changes in its approach in the two different time periods of early and late 1980s. A proof to this claim was the result of 12 seats out of a total of 128 Lebanese parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections.

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