

【논문】

Descartes on Body-to-Mind Causation in the Sixth Meditation

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【Abstract】 In the Sixth Meditation of his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes presents an account of sensations as mental modes arising from the causal interaction between two distinct substances, mind and body. According to Margaret Wilson, that the causal relation is instituted one way rather than another is at best arbitrary and purely contingent. In this paper, I will argue, *contra* Wilson, that there are important constraints restricting the scope of arbitrariness and contingency characterizing the institution of the causal relation. In particular, I argue that the causal relation between mind and body is in fact necessary within the restricted context of *human nature*, which determines the nature of the causal relation itself, and thereby places constraints on the sort of relations that can occur between mind and body.

In the Sixth Meditation of his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes presents an account of sensations as arising from the causal interaction between two distinct substances, mind and body. According to Descartes, exactly one sensation has been instituted by nature to be caused by a certain motion in the brain's pineal gland. Is there a principled reason that violent motions in the pineal gland, originating in the foot, are instituted by nature to cause the sensation of pain as if in the foot?¹⁾ According to Margaret Wilson, the institution of this causal relation is arbitrary and purely contingent.²⁾

In this paper, I argue, *contra* Wilson, that the causal relation between mind and body is constrained and even necessary in a certain way. I focus exclusively on Descartes's discussion of mind-body interaction in the Sixth Meditation. In section I, I provide a brief overview of that discussion. In section II, I examine Wilson's interpretation of those passages. In section III, I argue that Wilson's reading fails to garner adequate textual support. In section IV, I argue that there are important constraints on the natural institution of the causal relation between mind and body that limit the scope of contingency and arbitrariness marking the relation, and that establishes a necessity in the relation.

1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference. I would like to thank Allie Bogle, Jisoo Seo, and Clare Shin for their help.

2) (Wilson 1996).

I

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes confronts an apparent problem concerning his nature. My nature is the way that I have been designed by God, and since I am a creature of God, it seems that my nature cannot be flawed in any way. By nature, I am inclined to pursue and avoid what causes in me a sensation of pleasure and a sensation of pain, respectively.³⁾ Sensations themselves are “properly only given by nature <proprie tantum a natura datae sunt>” to show the mind what is “advantageous and disadvantageous <commodo sint vel incommodo> to the mind-body composite <composito>.”⁴⁾ Similarly, my nature teaches me through the sensations of hunger and thirst that I should eat and drink, respectively.⁵⁾ However, at times certain things are “exhibited to me by nature as if to be pursued or avoided <tanquam persequenda vel fugienda mihi a natura exhibentur>” when in fact they should not be. Two cases are discussed. The first involves a person afflicted with dropsy, which causes a person to sense thirst when drinking would be detrimental to her health. In this case, our nature seems to go *against* its design by telling us to drink when doing so would be *harmful*. The second case involves an amputee experiencing phantom limb pain, which is the phenomenon of feeling pain as if in a body

3) AT VII 82, CSM II 57. I adopt the following convention to refer to Descartes's works: “AT” refers to (Adam and Tannery 1996), with Roman numerals indicating volume and Arabic numerals indicating pages; “CSM I” and “CSM II” refer to (Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch 1990) and (Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch 1999), respectively; and “CSMK” refers to (Cottingham, Stoothoff, et al. 1997). In those cases where I provide my own translation, I cite only AT.

4) AT VII 83.

5) For more on the teachings of nature, see my paper *Sensational Union: Descartes's Argument for Mind-Body Union in the Sixth Meditation*.

part (e.g. the foot) that is no longer present due to prior amputation. The amputee's sensation of pain-as-if-in-the-foot tells her that her foot is being harmed, which is false and misleading since there is no foot. Both cases appear to show that our sensations can fail to fulfill their design, which conflicts with God's being a perfect artisan.

The basic thrust to Descartes's response is that the conflict is *merely apparent*. His solution begins with four observations.⁶⁾ First, body and mind are distinct insofar as the former is divisible and the latter is indivisible. Descartes notes that the various faculties of mind, such as the power of sensation and the power of intellection, are not proper parts of the mind, since it is the same mind that senses and understands. Body, on the other hand, does have proper parts that can be separated and divided due to its essence as an extended thing. Second, the mind is affected immediately only by the common sense, which is located at the center of the brain; when certain motions occur in it, the mind is always affected in the same way, regardless of what state the rest of the body is in. Third, a particular motion in the common sense that typically originates in the nerves in location *L* in the body can be caused by stimulation to any intermediate location in the nerves connecting *L* to the common sense. Fourth, for any sensation resulting from a particular motion in the brain, no other sensation but that one occurs.

The *institution by nature* is first mentioned by Descartes in the third observation. Roughly, natural institution is the systematic way that mind and body have been set up by nature to interact. My nature was instituted such that mental state *M*, and *only M*, occurs

6) AT VII 86-87, CSM II 59-60.

in the mind whenever physical state *P* occurs in the brain. Injury to the foot causes a certain motion in the nerves, which travels up to the center of the brain, where “nature has laid it down <qui institutus est a natura> that this motion should produce in the mind <mentem afficiat> a sensation of pain, as occurring in the foot <sensu doloris tanquam in pede existentis>”.⁷⁾

According to Descartes, God could have constituted <constitui> human nature <natura hominis> in such a way that those same motions “exhibited <exhiberet> to the mind any other thing: to be sure, either the motion itself, in so far as it is in the brain, or in so far as it is in the foot, or in some other intermediate location, or lastly any other thing whatever.”⁸⁾ Even though the sensation of pain-as-if-in-the-foot occurs whenever a particular motion *P* occurs in the brain, God could have set things up so that *P* caused pain as if it were in any location in the body: foot, brain, hand, etc. It appears that God’s *choice alone* determined that *P* should always give rise to pain-as-if-in-the-foot.

II

Wilson attributes the Natural Institution theory to Descartes, which interprets the relation between mind and body as nothing more than their causal interaction. She states:

“Since it is *part and parcel* of the Natural Institution theory that a given motion in the brain could give rise to *just any experience*, and that the *tendency* to locate experiences is itself the result of

7) AT VII 87, CSM II 60.

8) AT VII 88.

natural institution, we will of course have to say it is *a purely contingent matter* that we feel pains ‘as if in the hand’ or ‘as if in the foot’ but not ‘as if in the blackboard’ or ‘as if in the hull of our ship.’⁹⁾

For Wilson, both the “tendency to locate” the experience and the experience itself are arbitrarily instituted to arise from certain motions in the brain. She concludes that it is a “purely contingent matter” that we feel pains as being in certain bodily locations.¹⁰⁾ A particular sensation results from particular cerebral motions only because of God’s choice.¹¹⁾ At best, the actual causal relation is *per se* contingent, but necessary only insofar as God’s choices and actions are necessary.¹²⁾ Wilson conjectures that the basis for the arbitrariness and contingency is Descartes’s inability to find and establish an “intrinsic connection” between sensations in the mind and motions in the brain.¹³⁾ There is nothing about the underlying physical cause *per se* that necessitates its established mental effect, nor is there anything about the effect *per se* that necessitates its instituted physical causal base. According to Wilson, the causal relation must therefore be established on extrinsic grounds, namely, by God’s choice, so the relation is at most extrinsically necessary since it was established by God, whose choices are necessary. She takes the relation itself to be *intrinsically contingent* in that *nothing*

9) (Wilson 1996, 185). Emphases added.

10) Note here that Wilson thinks that the tendency is to locate the *sensation* to a particular part of the body. Wilson as many other scholars have taken Descartes to be using such terms as “pain” and “thirst” as being synonymous with “the sensation of pain” and “The sensation of thirst”. I, on the other hand, do not think this is the case. This point, however, will not be discussed in the current paper.

11) See Chapter VI of (Wilson 1996).

12) (Wilson 1996, 181-185).

13) (Wilson 1996, 183).

about each relatum can provide sufficient reason that necessitates a connection with the other relatum.

Wilson's interpretation seems to garner support in the twenty-second paragraph of the Sixth Meditation.¹⁴⁾ Descartes states that although a particular kind of violent motion in the brain "gives a sign <signum dat> to the mind to sense something <aliquid sentiendum>, namely, pain as existing in the foot", the "nature of humans <natura hominis> could have truly been constituted by God in such a way, so that that same motion in the brain exhibited <exhiberet> to the mind any other thing".¹⁵⁾ According to Wilson's reading, it is a contingent matter *that* we sense pain when a particular type of motion occurs in the brain, and also *where* that pain is located in our experience of it. The experience could have been "any experience" and located "in any other things whatever". The particular motions could have exhibited "either the motion itself, in so far as it is in the brain, or in so far as [the motion] is in the foot, or in some other intermediate location, or lastly any other thing whatever."¹⁶⁾ Such statements seem to support Wilson's reading, for it seems that it was completely up to God how to institute the causal relation between mind and body and thus constitute our nature.¹⁷⁾

14) AT VII 88, CSM II 60.

15) AT VII 88.

16) AT VII 88.

17) In other works, Descartes tends to use the locution "ordained by nature <institué de la nature / institutus est a natura>", which seems to suggest further that the naturally instituted causal relation is arbitrary. See AT VI 130, CSM I 167; AT VI 134, CSM I 169; AT VI 137, CSM I 170; AT XI 357, CSM I 342; AT XI 369, CSM I 348; AT XI 394-395, CSM I 359-360; AT XI 399-400, CSM I 362; and AT XI 429, CSM I 376.

III

A closer examination of the relevant passages from the Sixth Meditation¹⁸⁾ reveals that Wilson's account overlooks important details and considerations. First, Descartes does not say that *anything* could have resulted in the mind following the violent motions in the brain. Instead, he states that these motions could have *exhibited* something different from what it actually exhibits to the mind. It may be that *what* is exhibited to the mind by these motions could have been different, but *that* something is exhibited to the mind may not be a contingent matter at all. Moreover, in the examples Descartes gives, the arbitrariness is restricted to *where* something is exhibited as being: certain motions in the brain could have exhibited themselves *insofar as they are in the brain* or *insofar as they are in any intermediate location between the injury in the foot and the brain*. These examples are specific to the apparent *location* of the motions in our sensation of them. Nothing in the passage suggests that the causal effect in the mind resulting from these motions in the brain could have been anything whatsoever.

Second, to sense *pain* is to sense motions in some particular region of *the body*. Toward the end of the sixth paragraph of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes describes hunger and thirst as appetites that he sensed “in and for <in illo et pro illo>” his body, where hunger is a tugging in the stomach and thirst a dryness of throat.¹⁹⁾ These are clearly bodily occurrences, so sensing hunger and thirst amounts to sensing *something in the body*. Similarly, Descartes

18) AT VII 87-88, CSM II 60-61.

19) AT VII 76, CSM II 53.

states that whenever he sensed pain and pleasure, his attention was directed <advertēbam> to *them in various parts of his body*.²⁰ Like hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure are *in the body*. All of these things—tugging in the stomach, dryness of the throat, injury to the body, etc.—are just motions in different parts of the body. *How* we sense them is through the stimulation (movement) of nerves connecting them to the center of the brain where the mind takes its seat.

Taking these two points seriously suggests a different picture from the one offered by Wilson. When we sense pain-as-if-in-the-foot, what we are sensing are *bodily motions*, and we sense them *as if being in the foot*. *Which* motions in the body we are sensing is determined prior to where those motions *are presented to us as being in our sensory experience of them*. This is how Descartes explains what is happening in the phantom limb case: the amputee senses motion in some particular region of the body, e.g. upper leg, but her sensory experience of those motions presents them as being in the foot, as if it were still there. The epistemic fact of where those motions are presented as being in our sensory experience of them is contingent. Nothing here suggests that *any* experience whatsoever could have been instituted as effects of those motions. Wilson's first claim that "it is part and parcel of the Natural Institution theory that a given motion in the brain could give rise to just any experience" lacks textual support.²¹

Descartes states only that the motions in the brain could have *exhibited* something other than what they actually exhibit. As I understand him, what the sensing is *of* could have been different.

20) AT VII 76, CSM II 52.

21) (Wilson 1996, 185).

Bodily motions are just bodily modes, so the motions *per se* neither represent nor necessitate some particular representational content. Hence, there is no reason that a particular cerebral motion *per se* necessitates a sensory state, let alone one that is *of* some particular motion in a specific location. However, this does not entail that *any* experience could have followed. What we find is that particular motions that arise from stimulation of the sense organs give rise to a certain kind of experience, and *insofar* as an experience arises, it is a *sensory* experience, viz. a sensing of bodily motion.²²⁾

Wilson's second claim is that "the tendency to locate experiences [in certain parts of the body] is itself the result of natural institution".²³⁾ That what is the *result of natural institution* is the result of God's decision in instituting our nature in a certain way is indeed supported by the text. However, she also ascribes to Descartes the view that there is a *tendency in the mind* to locate the experience, and that this tendency is "by God's institution". The location of the experience "is merely a function of the *mind's locating* the sensation," and where the mind "locates it, or tends to locate it, will depend on what God has determined a particular change in the brain should mean to the mind."²⁴⁾ These claims do *not* find textual support. For one, Descartes does not say anything about a separate *tendency* of the mind to locate experiences. Insofar as what is exhibited by these motions is what our sensory

22) Note that I am not claiming that a given motion under Descartes's view *cannot* give rise to any other experience. It might be that Descartes holds that a particular type of motion in the brain could give rise to *some* experience *other* than the one it actually does. My point is that Descartes's explicit word is specific to what is exhibited in sensing, or where it is presented as being in our sensing of it.

23) (Wilson 1996, 185).

24) (Wilson 1996, 183). See also (Wilson 1996, 184-185).

experience is *of*, the locational information is also part of the sensory experience itself. No separate act of locating the experience is stated as happening. Two, the context suggests that Descartes is not talking about the location of the *experience*, but the apparent location of *what the experience is of*. The location of the experience, a mental phenomenon, is *always* in the mind. However, the experience here is an experience *of some bodily occurrence*, which is always located in the body.

Our analysis shows that the case for Wilson's interpretation lacks sufficient textual support. However, her conclusion that it is "a purely contingent matter that we feel pains 'as if in the hand' or 'as if in the foot' but not 'as if in the blackboard' or 'as if in the hull of our ship'" might nevertheless be true.²⁵⁾ In the next section, I offer an account that shows her conclusion to be inaccurate.

IV

The fact that Descartes's discussion of natural institution takes place within the context of *human nature* places important constraints on how that causal relation can be instituted. By 'nature' in this context, Descartes means "the totality of things bestowed on me by God".²⁶⁾ Since I am a being composed of two substances, mind and body, I have a nature *qua mind* and a nature *qua body*. Hence, there are things that God has bestowed upon me insofar as I am a mind and insofar as I am a body.²⁷⁾ According

25) (Wilson 1996, 185).

26) AT VII 80, CSM II 56.

to Descartes, a human being is a true unity, i.e. an *ens per se*. It is not a mere sum of mind and body, but a true union of these two substances: I am an *embodied mind*.²⁸⁾ The nature of this embodied mind just is the nature of a human being, and it is nature in this regard that is of “sole concern” in this context.²⁹⁾

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes distinguishes nature as an *extrinsic denomination* <denominatio extrinseca> from nature in an *intrinsic sense*. The former is exemplified by a clock and a human body, both of which are extended things and thus determined by the laws of mechanics.³⁰⁾ A badly constructed clock and a well-made clock are both equally determined by “all the laws of nature”, i.e. laws of mechanics,³¹⁾ as is an unhealthy human body and a healthy one.³²⁾ While both have an intrinsic nature as an *extended thing*, they also have a nature that is *extrinsically* denominated “from my thought” or based on a “preconceived use”.³³⁾ It is on the basis of the latter that we are able to apply to them normative notions like good, bad, healthy, and unhealthy. However,

27) AT VII 82, CSM II 57.

28) In December of 1641, Descartes writes to Regius: “In your theses you say that a human being is an *ens per accidens*. You could scarcely have said anything more objectionable and provactive” (AT III 460, CSMK 200). In the following month, Descartes writes: “...you should give out that you believes that a human being is a true *ens per se*, and not an *ens per accidens*, and that the mind is united in a real and substantial manner to the body...that they are united not by position or disposition, as you assert in your last paper – for this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, quite untrue – but by a trued mode of union, as everyone agrees” (ATIII 493, CSMK 206). For further discussion on this topic, see (Alanen 2003), (Rozemond 1998), (Hoffman 1986), and (Cottingham 1985).

29) AT VII 82, CSM II 57.

30) AT VII 84, CSM II 58.

31) AT VII 84, CSM II 58. The CSM translates “leges omnes naturae” as “laws of its nature”. However, the original Latin text indicates no possessive pronoun.

32) See AT VII 84-85, CSM II 58.

33) AT VII 85.

the nature of a *human being*, i.e. a *mind-body composite*, is “something which is really to be found in the things themselves,”³⁴⁾ and there is “truly something that is to be found in fact in the thing, and therefore [for it] to have something of the truth.”³⁵⁾ Unlike the clock and the human body, the nature of “the mind united with this body...is not a mere label.”³⁶⁾ There is a human essence that is not merely denominated from without, but is intrinsic to the very being of a human.³⁷⁾ The composition of mind and body that is the human being is a *true union* that has a distinctive, intrinsic nature.³⁸⁾

According to Descartes, our nature as human beings teaches us to “to avoid what induces a feeling of pain and to seek out what induces feelings of pleasure, and so on”,³⁹⁾ and *sensations* serve to inform the human being of what is beneficial and harmful to it.⁴⁰⁾ When I sense something painfully, I sense it as harmful to my well-being. When I sense something pleasurable, I sense it as conducive to my well-being.⁴¹⁾ A human being is essentially a

34) AT VII 85, CSM II 59.

35) “[P]er illam vero aliquid intelligo quod revera in rebus reperitur, ac proinde nonnihil habet veritatis” (AT VII 85).

36) AT VII 85, CSM II 59.

37) The word ‘nature <natura>’ is often used by Descartes to indicate essence. See AT VII 78, CSM II 54; AT VI 33, CSM I 127; and AT VIII B 347-348, CSM II 297. Descartes’s usage follows scholastic tradition, according to which ‘natura’ refers to the essence of a thing *insofar as the proper functions of a thing are being considered*. See Aquinas’s *De Ente et Essentia*, Chapter 1 (1968).

38) In talking about the nature of the union, Descartes states that he is “taking nature to be something more limited than the totality of things bestowed upon me by God” since this includes “many things that belong to the mind alone” and “body alone”. However, he explicitly states that he is “not speaking of these matters”, but that his “sole concern here” is with his nature as a “combination of mind and body” AT VII 82, CSM II 57.

39) AT VII 82, CSM II 57.

40) See AT VII 83, CSM II 57 and AT VIII A 41-42, CSM I 224.

living thing. Although our capacity to have thoughts separates us from other corporeal creatures, Descartes takes us to be embodied minds that share in the basic needs and functions characteristic of all living things. Hence, the well-being of the mind-body composite is, in the very least, continued survival as such. Our intrinsic human nature is to seek and maintain this well-being, and the defining purpose of our sensations is determined within the context of this nature. Given these points, bodily injury *should* be perceived through the sensation of pain. Sensing injury pleurably would amount to perceiving it as *beneficial*, which would have disastrous consequences for the composite being. There is clearly a reason that the sensation of pain rather than of pleasure occurs when our foot is injured. There is also a reason that such a sensation is felt *as if in the foot* rather than *as if in the brain*. As Descartes himself states, “there is nothing else which would have been *so conducive to the continued well-being of the body*.”⁴²⁾ The body’s need for hydration results in a motion in the brain that “produces in the mind a sensation of thirst, because the most useful thing for us to know about the whole business is that we need drink in order to stay healthy.”⁴³⁾ Human nature is a unified, organic *system* that fundamentally aims at survival, and “the best system that could be devised” is the one where that sensation, “of all possible sensations, is most especially and most frequently conducive to the preservation of the healthy man.”⁴⁴⁾ Hence, which

41) Alison Simmons argues that sensations for Descartes represent ecological properties, e.g. pain represents damage, etc. (Simmons 1999). See also (Simmons 2001).

42) AT VII 88, CSM II 61; emphasis added.

43) AT VII 88, CSM II 61.

44) AT VII 87, CSM II 60.

sensation arises is normatively constrained by the intrinsic nature of a human being that it is supposed to serve.⁴⁵⁾

In addition, the ability to have sensations requires the mind to be united with the body, and the very nature of a sensory state is determined by the mind-body composite that it serves and presupposes.⁴⁶⁾ Human sensations are *modes of the mind*, i.e. *thoughts*.⁴⁷⁾ Hence, sensations can occur only in a thinking thing, i.e. a mind.⁴⁸⁾ Moreover, sensations arise *only* in a mind *that is united with a body*. In a letter to Henry More on August of 1649, Descartes states that a human mind *separated* <separatas> from the body does *not* have sensory perceptions, and since it is unknown whether “angels are created like minds distinct <distinctarum> from bodies, or like minds united <unitarum> to bodies”, it is unknown whether angels have sensations like humans.⁴⁹⁾ Clearly, Descartes believes that sensations can only arise in an *embodied mind*.⁵⁰⁾

As explained earlier, sensations are mental states arising *for* this

45) As an anonymous reviewer has rightly pointed out, this does not explain the details of the structure of the causal relation. The lack of such an explanation has led philosophers to be skeptical of Descartes’s causal dualism. However, this issue is separate from the issue of whether that causal relation is contingent and arbitrary or in some sense necessary. My focus here is on the latter issue. As the reviewer astutely notes, just because the causal relation was instituted by God’s decision and could have been instituted differently does not entail that the actual causal relation is not necessary. I completely agree.

46) See AT VII 81, CSM II 56; AT VIIIA 23, CSM I 209; and AT VIIIA 315-322, CSM I 279-285.

47) See AT VI 109, CSM I 164 and AT VII 78, CSM II 54.

48) I am specifically talking about sensations of the kind had by human beings.

49) AT V 402, CSMK 380.

50) See also AT VIIIA 41, CSM I 224. Descartes also puts this point in epistemic terms in his letters to Princess Elizabeth: the notion of mind-body union is fundamental, and our understanding of interaction presupposes it (AT III 665-666 and 691-692, CSMK 218-219 and 226-227). For further discussion of Descartes’s conception of mind-body union, see (Rozemond 1998). See also (Baker and Morris 1996).

union: their purpose is to inform it of harms and benefits. The previous paragraph shows also that what makes a mental state a *sensory* state is that it arises *from* the mind-body union. The identity of these mental states *qua sensation* is determined by the intrinsic nature of a human being. Violent motions in the brain arise from an injury to the foot, which then causes the sensation of pain as if in the foot. The foot is a foot, and the brain a brain, *insofar as they are integral parts of an organic, unified human nature*. Indeed, a bodily injury is an *injury* only within the context of a *human being*. Contrary to Wilson, then, there *is* a sense in which an internal connection exists between sensations and motions in the body: they are *what* they are in relation to the same whole of which they are parts, namely, *the mind-body composite*. Different causal relations might be possible, but only at the expense of losing the metaphysical context that determines their very nature. Only that structure where the instituted causal relations can sustain and maintain life is one where certain motions are *injuries* and parts of extended stuff are *organs*. In short, *human nature* places constraints on the causal relations.

I have argued that the relation between a particular motion in the brain and the specific sensation caused by it is not entirely arbitrary and contingent as Wilson claims. Human nature serves to determine and even define the causal relations.⁵¹⁾ This nature necessitates that, say, motions arising from an *injury in the foot*

51) This forms the basis of Descartes's solution to the problem of error and divine creation explained in Section I. Human nature places constraints on viable institutions of the causal relation. Error arising under special circumstances need not reflect badly on God, in just the way that a computer that errs under certain conditions (e.g. getting wet; computer virus; etc.) does not necessarily reflect badly on its design or its designer.

cause *the sensation of pain as if in the foot.*⁵²⁾ In better understanding the nature of the causal relation, we can better appreciate Descartes's dualist interactionism, which is too often dismissed by contemporary philosophers of mind and metaphysicians. Beyond the historical interest of my paper, I hope that at least a little light might be shed on the general issue of mental causation through understanding how the causal relation between mind and body might be determined within the context of the (nature of the) whole in which the relation occurs.

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52) See (Almog 2005) for a more thorough discussion on such relations.

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데카르트의 제6성찰에서의 심신인과 이론

황조셉

『제일철학에 관한 성찰』의 제6성찰에서 데카르트는 감각에 대해 그것이 두 개의 구분된 실체, 즉 정신과 신체 사이의 인과적 작용으로부터 일어나는 정신적 양태라는 설명을 하였다. 마가렛 윌슨에 따르면 그 인과적 관계가 다른 방식이 아닌 어떤 한 방식으로 도입되었다는 것은 임의적이며 전적으로 우연적이다. 이 논문에서 필자는 윌슨에 반해 인과적 관계의 도입을 특징 짓는데 있어 임의성과 우연성의 범위를 제한하는 중요한 제약들이 존재한다고 주장할 것이다. 특히 필자는 정신과 신체의 인과적 관계는 인과적 관계 그 자체의 본성을 결정하고 따라서 정신과 신체 사이에 일어날 수 있는 종류의 관계에 제약을 가하는 인간 본성의 제한된 맥락에서 필연적이라고 논증한다.

주제분류: 서양근대철학, 심리철학

주요어: 르네 데카르트, 심신작용, 심신연합, 감각, 인식