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Preannouncement as a Deterrence in a Model of Safety Regulation

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dc.contributor.authorKim, JeongYoo-
dc.contributor.authorKoh, DongHee-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21T04:29:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-21T04:29:00Z-
dc.date.issued1997-01-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.10 No.1, pp. 41-56-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/1095-
dc.description.abstractWe will examine the role of preannouncement (cheap talk) in a model of safety regulation. It is asserted that if the authority can make a preannouncement, it may transmit credible messages and can induce a more socially desirable level of precaution of the potential injurer even if it is unbinding, because the authority and the agent have some interest in common, that is, to deter accidents.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectpreannouncement-
dc.subjectcredible message-
dc.subjectcheap talk-
dc.titlePreannouncement as a Deterrence in a Model of Safety Regulation-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor김정우-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor고동희-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage56-
dc.citation.number1-
dc.citation.pages41-56-
dc.citation.startpage41-
dc.citation.volume10-
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