Browse

Art, Museums and Contests: Private vs. Public Provision

Cited 0 time in Web of Science Cited 0 time in Scopus
Authors
Garcia-Sobrecases, Francisco; Lee, Sanghack
Issue Date
2000-01
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.13 No.1, pp. 1-20
Keywords
revenue-risingsocial welfareintrinsic merit
Abstract
This paper examines revenue-raising competition among art museums when the government gives matching grants to one of them. Matching grants are complementary to revenues raised by the museums. Revenue-raising and revenue-spending activities of the museums are assumed to generate positive externalities to society. This paper derives Nash equilibrium revenues raised by the museums. The outcome is then compared with the socially optimal level of the revenues. Depending upon the type of social welfare function and the extent of externalities, the revenues raised by the museums can be greater than, equal to, or smaller than the social optimum. This paper also discusses the role of the matching mechanism of the government with which the Nash equilibrium can be equated to the social optimum.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1189
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.13(1) (Spring 2000)
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse