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개념과 징표 - 일반논리학과 초월논리학의 관계 연구(1) : The Relationship between Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic(1)
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | 박진 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-11-17T06:24:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-11-17T06:24:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 철학사상, Vol.22, pp. 173-204 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1226-7007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/12477 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the true meaning of
Kants theory of concept within the historical and systematic context and to disclose the relationship between Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic. Paton has asserted that Formal Logic is the foundation of Transcendental Logic while Laeisz has argued that there is correlative dependence between Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic. I insist that Formal Logic depends on Transcendental Logic and that Transcendental Logic is the basis of Formal Logic. To demonstrate this, I argue the following. 1. Intuition and Concept In Formal Logic, we have no concern for the relation between concept and object. We analyse concepts and classify them without regards to its relation to objects in Formal Logic. But the focus of Transcendental Logic is to disclose the relation between concept and object. Characteristics of objects arise through intuition and become the contents (intentions) of concepts. Subsequently, intuition is regarded as an important factor that is prior to concepts in Transcendental Logic. 2. Classification of Concept In Formal Logic, the origin of concept is not a concern and every concept is categorized into concepts. However, in Transcendental Logic, four different kinds of concepts are classified by the origin of their contents. Accordingly, they are 1) empirically acquired (acquisitio derivativa) such as red and apple; 2) acquired a priori (acquisitio originaria) which include terms like substance and cause; 3) empirically made that of terms like unicorn and pegasus; 4) made a priori such as point and rectangle. 3. Structure of making Concept Critique of theory of Abstraction In Formal Logic, every concept is regarded as the result of abstraction without regards to the difference of its origin. But It is emphasized in transcendental reflection that empirical concepts originate from reflection on common characteristics (natas communes) intuited from objects, and categories (notio) as a priori concepts of understanding (conceptus dati a priori) are formal conditions of reflection itself. Therefore, categories and reflective concepts (conceptus reflectentes) are preconditions of every reflected concepts (conceptus dati a posteriori). Accordingly, transcendental synthesis as a mental activity (operatio mentis) of Transcendental Logic is prior to abstractive analytical thinking of Formal Logic. 4. Clarity of Concept Critique of theory of Comparison In Formal Logic, clarity of concept is regarded as the result of comparison and analysis of concept. But synthetic clarity of concept which originated from the synthetic activity of mind (apprehensio, reproductio et recognitio) on common characteristics derived from intuitions of objects is prior to analytic clarity of concepts. Consequently, It is clear that this transcendental synthetic unity (unum transcendentale) of the mind is the highest point of Transcendental Logic and any analytical thinking is derived from this synthetic unity of apperception. I, therefore, conclude that Formal Logic is derived from Transcendental Logic and Transcendental Logic is the basis of Formal Logic. | - |
dc.language.iso | ko | - |
dc.publisher | 서울대학교 철학사상연구소 | - |
dc.subject | 명료성 | - |
dc.subject | 비교 | - |
dc.subject | 반성 | - |
dc.subject | 추상 | - |
dc.title | 개념과 징표 - 일반논리학과 초월논리학의 관계 연구(1) | - |
dc.title.alternative | The Relationship between Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic(1) | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | Park, Jin | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | 철학사상 | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 204 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 173-204 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 173 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 22 | - |
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