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Public-Good Nature of Environmental Conflicts : Individual and Collective Litigations
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2007-07
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.20 No.3, pp. 283-296
- Abstract
- In environmental conflicts where private citizens sue a
polluter, a private citizens participation in the fight for
environmental damages is characterized by the public good
nature. We examine how the introduction of collective litigation
and asymmetric reimbursement rule affects each citizen's choice
between free-riding and participation in the collective litigation.
Following a Stackelberg model, we assume that citizens move
first and the firm follows, while each citizen has to state his
environmental damages to the court in the process. Important
findings are as follows: First, in the individual litigation, the
hungriest citizen who most highly values environmental damages
is the only one to participate. Second, in the collective litigation,
all citizens participate, provided the total damages of the
citizens' group are sufficiently larger than the damages of the
hungriest citizen. Third, under certain conditions, introduction of
the asymmetric reimbursement rule enhances the possibility that
all citizens participate in the collective litigation.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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