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Comparative Analysis and Political Implications of China's Economic Retaliation Measures
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 안덕근 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 최은우 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-29T03:47:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-29T03:47:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-02 | - |
dc.identifier.other | 000000150073 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/141700 | - |
dc.description | 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제대학원 국제학과, 2018. 2. 안덕근. | - |
dc.description.abstract | China has undertaken economic retaliations for her own national interests, although the WTO Agreement does not allow its Members to undertake economic retaliations for a political purpose. China has rarely openly recognized her economic retaliations to avoid international responsibility and condemnation. In general, China prefers tactical retaliation, which she learned from her own experience of defending against economic retaliations from other states. China warns her target states that stronger repercussions will be made if they do not reverse certain actions that is considered as undermining her core national interests. Chinas ultimate goal of economic retaliations is to make others value their economic relationships with China more. To solve this matter, this paper seeks to find effective ways to reduce misconception and withdraw Chinas economic retaliation measure. | - |
dc.description.tableofcontents | I. INTRODUCTION 1
I.1. Background and Purpose of Study 1 I.2. Method and Contents of Study 2 II. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY OF CHINA 8 II.1 Economic Policy of China 8 II.1.1. Socialist Market Economy 8 II.1.2. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 8 II.1.3. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 10 II.2 Trade Policy of China 11 II.2.1. World Trade Organization (WTO) 11 II.2.2. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 12 II.2.3. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 14 III. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINAS ECONOMIC RETALIATION CASES 17 III.1. Strategic Retaliation & Tactical Retaliation 17 III.2 China as Target Country 17 III.2.1. China from 1949- 1970 19 III.2.2. After Tiananmen Square Incident 21 III.2.3. Proliferation Activities 22 III.2.4. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection and Market Access 23 III.3. China as Sender Country 24 III.3.1. National Security Issue 29 III.3.2. Political Issue 32 III.3.3. Territorial Issue 37 III.4. The Effect of FTA on Chinas Economic Retaliations 40 IV. STRATEGIES AND OBEJECTIVES OF CHINAS ECONOMIC RETALIATION 42 IV.1. Strategies 43 IV.2. Objectives 45 V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES CAUSED BY CHINAS ECONOMIC RETALIATION 47 VI. CONLCUSION 54 58 63 | - |
dc.format | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.extent | 2171191 bytes | - |
dc.format.medium | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | 서울대학교 대학원 | - |
dc.subject | THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System) | - |
dc.subject | economic retaliation | - |
dc.subject | economic sanction | - |
dc.subject | tactical retaliation | - |
dc.subject | smart sanction | - |
dc.subject | Free Trade Agreement (FTA) | - |
dc.subject.ddc | 327.17 | - |
dc.title | Comparative Analysis and Political Implications of China's Economic Retaliation Measures | - |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.description.degree | Master | - |
dc.contributor.affiliation | 국제대학원 국제학과 | - |
dc.date.awarded | 2018-02 | - |
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