Resetting the Strategic Rivalry: Challenges in U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control

Abstract

After decades on the brink of nuclear war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War in 1991 ushered in a new era of global peace and economic liberalization. Yet mutual efforts by the United States and Russia to substantially reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals have fallen short of their objectives. This brings up the question: what are the main barriers hindering further progress for the mutual reduction of nuclear weapons for the United States and Russia? Although both countries are currently obligated to reduce their deployed nuclear warheads stockpile numbers to 1,550 by 2018 under New START, there has been no further nuclear arms reduction cooperation between the two countries. This thesis will examine the military-technical factors and geopolitical factors hindering the prospects for deeper nuclear arms control cooperation. Regarding military-technical factors, disagreements on missile defense between Moscow and Washington, in particular NATOs missile defense system in Europe, have continued to stall closer nuclear arms control cooperation. On the other hand, geopolitical factors have reignited the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry. Russias annexation of Crimea during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis created a permanent rift between the Obama and Putin administrations. This rift was further exacerbated by a clashing policy agenda in the Syrian civil war and as a result, U.S.-Russian relations have deteriorated at an alarming rate. Given that both Ukraine and Syria are still ongoing conflicts, this thesis will attempt to offer a preliminary analysis of the evolving nature of nuclear arms control cooperation between the United States and Russia in a post-Cold War era up until the end of the Obama administration in 2016.