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Contests with Linear Externality in Prizes
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Park, Sung-Hoon | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Sanghack | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-16T00:41:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-16T00:41:40Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.32 No.3, pp. 323-336 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/160857 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines contests in which prizes are affected linearly by aggregate effort. In particular, this research analyzes a contest among individuals as a benchmark to scrutinize the effects of prize externality and sharing-rule information on rent-dissipation rate and social welfare. Thereafter, the current study investigates two types of group contest with linear prize externality: one with private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other with public information on intra-group sharing rules. Results indicate as follows. (1) An increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation rate but has no effect on social welfare. (2) The group contest with private information on sharing rules yields higher social welfare and lower rent-dissipation rate than the one with public information on sharing rules. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Group contest | - |
dc.subject | Linear externality in prize | - |
dc.subject | Intra-group sharing rule | - |
dc.subject | Private information on sharing rules | - |
dc.subject | Public information on sharing rules | - |
dc.title | Contests with Linear Externality in Prizes | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 박성훈 | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 이상학 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 336 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 323-336 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 323 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 32 | - |
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