공동체주의와 정치적 복종의 의무

Abstract

This study attempts to examine the two types of the communitarian approach to the problem of political obligation. The Wittgensteinians response to the problem of political obligation is that of what could be called conceptualism. It argues that a legitimate state ought to be obeyed because that is what legitimate means. The state is compared to the rule of a game like chess. Objections made to following laws, or rules, can only show that we have not understood that that is precisely what the membership of the state, or playing the game, means. But this obviously depends on an untenable analogy between states and games. A second argument, related to the Aristotelian vision, points out that a state ought to be obeyed because the state is the community of the communities'. But this is not powerful enough to sustain the conclusion that rational persons must have as their primary locus of loyalty the state, for it can not show that the shared goods of political life are always dominant. At best, it shows that commitments and loyalty to the state may be rational and justified, and that they are of value in a sound theory of legitimate authority. Perhaps we cannot fairly expect a stronger conclusion from the communitarians arguments.