道德敎育의 認知的 接近은 과연 견지될 수 있는가

Abstract

There is a notion fairly wide-spread among those concerned in moral education as well .as among the lay people that moral education is not so much about knowing as about doing. Morality as a school subject is generally regarded as consisting of doing in contrast with science, for instance, which consists of knowing . This notion needs to be carefully examined before we arrive at an adequate definition of the nature and purpose of moral education. Particularly, the examination, in this paper, is directed toward answering whether or not the cognitive approach to moral education is viable. In relation to the logical status of morality or moral knowledge with regard to knowing and doing, the analyses so far have leaned heavily on the distinction, initially drawn by Ryle (1949), between knowing-that and knowing-how. An examination of the analyses by Hartland-Swann (1956) and by Roland (1961) shows that a fundamental ambiguity remains in the concept of morality with regard to knowing and doing. The ambiguity is reflected in the proposals for moral education suggested by Scheffler (1960) and Archambault (1963). It is asserted, in this paper, that the recent trend of curriculum theory as represented by Bruner (1960) shows a good promise to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the teaching of morality as a school subject. In this trend, science as a school subject is defined not as topics but as a mode of operatioη or, to use a somewhat awkward expression, as sciencing. This interpretation, moreover, seems to be more faithful to the Ryle's original distinction, which intimated that the useful distinction is not between knowing-how (doing) and knowing-that (knowing), but between intelligent and unintelligent knowing, regardless of how and that. In line with this interpretation, the purpose of moral education can be defined as enabling the intelligent moraling of the students. Accordingly, it seems to be of paramount importance in moral education to find out what constitutes the intelligent moraling. The results, it is hoped, will show that we will have to talk more about knowing the morality and less about doing the morality in moral education.