Publications
Detailed Information
CEO Inside Debt and Costs of Bank Debt Financing
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | HAN, JOONG HO | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-21T08:30:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-21T08:30:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-12 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Business, Vol.17 No.2, pp. 123-150 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1226-9816 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/75593 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines the role of CEOs pensions and deferred
compensations by exploring their impacts on pricing and non-pricing contract terms of bank loans. CEOs inside debt, defined as the sum of defined benefit pensions and deferred compensations, pays fixed amounts at periodic intervals. We find that higher inside debt holdings significantly reduce both loan rate spreads and demands for collateral. We also find that such effects are particularly pronounced under weak external governance proxied by strong anti-takeover defenses. Overall, our results support the idea that debt-like incentives for CEOs increase align the interests between managers and creditors. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | College of Business Administration (경영대학) | - |
dc.subject | inside debt | - |
dc.subject | managerial agency | - |
dc.subject | costs of debt | - |
dc.subject | debt contracts | - |
dc.subject | loan terms | - |
dc.title | CEO Inside Debt and Costs of Bank Debt Financing | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 한중호 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Business | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 150 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 123-150 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 123 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 17 | - |
- Appears in Collections:
- Files in This Item:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.