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Can the Cure for Metaphysical Realism Work? –The Case of Donald Davidson

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Authors
Lee, Poong-Shil
Issue Date
2011
Publisher
서울대학교 철학과
Citation
철학논구, Vol.39, pp. 49-83
Abstract
In this paper, I will examine Donald Davidsons attempt to overcome
Metaphysical Realism (henceforth, MR). But, merely saying that he tries
to overcome MR has a possibility to mislead the readers. It is true
that Davidson wants to reject several tenets of MR that has been
traditionally regarded as fundamental elements. However, it is not the
case that his rejection has led him to be committed to Anti-Realism
considered as an opposite position to MR. While it is generally said that
anti-realists argue that objects are mind-dependent, Davidson strongly
denies this claim and argues that his view retains the point that how
things are in the world is a matter independent of our minds. In other
words, his view contains his effort to retain the traditional concept of
objectivity, which is understood as the existence of objects independent
of minds of the subjects. This objectivity, in Davidsons view, is
inexplicably related to the concept of truth. Thus, Davidsons concept
of truth takes the center of the discussion of this paper.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/75636
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Philosophy (철학과)철학논구(Philosophical forum)철학논구(Philosophical forum) 제39집(2011)
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