Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments

Abstract

This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development, as presented in a former paper on this study. In a direct democracy, the median voters social policy preference is critical because he is a Condorcet winner in pair-wise pure majority voting. However, in a more general setting, we should think of various political institutions as a collective choice of device. For this reason, I draw a formal model that formulates

three contrasting types of political institutions that are distinguished by the developments of political democracy and the differences in electoral rules. Comparative patterns of key variables that measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social policy preferences provide support for arguments. My empirical results suggest that three political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other

institutions, a committee system entails more targeted subsidies and a less universal benefit. In contrast, proportional elections produce a more universal benefit and fewer targeted subsidies.