Contradictions of Global Accountability: The World Bank, Development NGOs, and Global Social Governance

Abstract

This study sets out to investigate the structural contradictions of accountability deficits in global

social governance, with the particular reference to the World Bank Inspection Panel and its associated development NGOs. In theorizing global social policy as a new field of social policy agendas, less attention has been hitherto paid to the notion of accountability, which should have been placed at the centre of discourses on global social governance. Given the absence of central global government which can enforce the accountability mechanism, the World Banks attempt to embrace external actors – particularly, international NGOs – as key stakeholders contributes to filling the accountability gaps, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the Banks intervention in globalised social problems. This study aims to locate not only the intersection of the accountability problem and global social policy, but also some structural dilemmas embedded in the accountability of policy transfers from global institutions to national social policy. By taking the two investigation cases of the World Bank Inspection Panel (China and Argentina), it identifies two modes of contradictions of global accountability: (i) the abused which results from the overemphasis on accountability, thereby sidelining the Banks effective functions; and (ii) the phased denial which is the negative outcome of the Banks deliberate controlling system designed to reduce the number of accountability requests.