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Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2016-04
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.29 No.2, pp. 151-163
- Keywords
- Interdependent value ; Insider ; Second-price auction ; First-price auction
- Abstract
- We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent
values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value
while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as
well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields
efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient
equilibrium.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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