Price Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly Market

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorMahanta, Amarjyoti-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.29 No.2, pp. 165-180-
dc.description.abstractSeveral studies on mixed oligopoly indicate that the ownership

pattern of firms does not affect the equilibrium price. This idea often

suggests that ownership is irrelevant. In a mixed duopoly under

price competition, firm ownership is irrelevant. This study reveals

that ownership is irrelevant in a single publicly owned firm and in

any positive number of privately owned firms. However, if two or

more publicly owned firms exist, then ownership becomes relevant

in a homogeneous good market with a strictly increasing convex

cost schedule and a downward sloping demand curve. If firms set

the price sequentially and if the lone public firm is a price leader,

then social welfare is constantly greater than when the latter is a

price follower. The unique price is the competitive price when the

public firm moves first in the sequential game.
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectMixed oligopoly-
dc.subjectPrice competition-
dc.titlePrice Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly Market-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of Economics (SJE)Seoul Journal of Economics vol.29 no.1~4 (2016)
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