丙子胡亂 이해의 새로운 시각과 전망 - 胡亂期 斥和論의 성격과 그에 대한 맥락적 이해
A New Perspective to understand the Byeongja Ho’ran(丙子胡亂) war, and Prospect for future approaches: Examination of the “Cheok’hwa” Ideas’ Nature that prevailed during the war, and trying to understanding them with appreciation of the ‘Nature of the Period’
- Issue Date
- 서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원
- 규장각, Vol.47, pp. 163-200
- 丙子胡亂; 山城; 江華島; 主和論; 斥和論; 對明義理; Byeongja Ho’ran(丙子胡亂, Manchu's invasion in 1636); Mountain fortresses (山城); the Gang’hwa-do(江華島) island; Ju’hwa-ron(主和論, argument supporting the idea of pursuing peace with the enemy); Cheok’hwa-ron(斥和論, argument boycotting the negotiation of peace with the enemy); Daemyeong Euiri(對明義理)
- 이 논문은 丙子胡亂과 관련된 새로운 연구 시각과 전망을 외교적, 군사적, 사상적 분야로 나누어 정리한 글이다. 본 연구는 우선 병자호란 발발 전후 조선의 외교적, 군사적 행보가 우리의 통념과 상당히 달랐음을 논증하였다. 이를 위해, 당시 明의 군사적 지원 가능성과 斥和論 제기의 상관 관계를 살펴보았다. 아울러, 그동안 병자호란의 敗因으로 널리 언급된 山城위주 守城전술 채택의 배경 및 江華島함락의 과정도 재검토해보았다. 이와 같은 성과를 토대로 하여, 임진왜란 때와 달리 明이 조선을 구원해 줄 가능성이 희박하였으며, 淸軍과의 결전시 승리의 가능성이 높지 않다는 사실을 조선의 朝野가 비교적 명확히 인지하였음에도 불구하고 主和論이 배척당하고 斥和論이 강력하게 지지받았던 당대의 知的분위기를 탐색해보았다. 이를 통해, 당대인이 고수하였던 對明義理의 내용과 성격이 과연 어떤 것이었는지 試論的으로 살펴보고자 하였다.
Examined in this article are recent studies concerning the Byeongja Ho’ran(丙子胡亂) war, which dare to adopt new perspectives. Here, they are analyzed by categories from which such individual studies originated or with which their themes could be identified: diplomacy, military, and philosophy. Argued in this paper is that the Joseon government’s diplomatic and militaristic response to the crisis situation right before and after the war was very much different from we think we know today. In the spirit of clarifying, in this paper, examination of the Cheok’hwa argument[斥和論] that was raised at the time is accompanied with an assessment of the possibility of Ming(明) ever deciding to intervene and provide military aid at the time. Meanwhile, why the Joseon government employed a specific defensive strategy which was based upon the defense of mountain fortresses(山城), a strategy which has been usually cited as one of the reasons behind Joseon’s defeat, and how exactly the Gang’hwa-do(江華島) island fell, are all critically reviewed here as well. After such examination, two things become clear: There was little possibility that Ming would try to help Joseon, as they did when the Japanese invaded in the 1590s, again, and the Cheok’hwa argument ‘dominantly’ prevailed even when it was clearly projected by the government as well as leading figures in the society that the Joseon army would not be able to successfully defeat the Qing army when the time came. And based upon this result, it is attempted in this paper to initiate a task trying to achieve adequate understanding of the contents and nature of the Joseon people’s loyalty to Ming at the time.
- Appears in Collections:
- Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies (규장각한국학연구원)규장각규장각 (奎章閣) vol.46/47 (2015)