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Optimal Competition Policy for an Oligopolistic Export Industry

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dc.contributor.authorLee, Sanghack-
dc.contributor.authorKim, YoonChul-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-20T01:12:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-20T01:12:49Z-
dc.date.issued1994-10-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.7 No.4, pp. 337-354-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1048-
dc.description.abstractThis paper derives the optimal number of firms for an oligopolistic export industry when firms of the industry interact with each other in factor markets as well as in output markets. The optimal number is derived both for a case of unilateral intervention by an exporting country and for a Nash and a Stackelberg policy equilibria between governments of an exporting and an importing countries. It proves to be an increasing function of the ratio of the slope of an export supply curve to the absolute slope of an import demand curve. The nature of policy game between the governments also affects the optimal number of firms of the industry.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectoptimal number-
dc.subjectBrander and Spencer-
dc.subjecttrade policy-
dc.titleOptimal Competition Policy for an Oligopolistic Export Industry-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor이상학-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor김윤철-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage354-
dc.citation.number4-
dc.citation.pages337-354-
dc.citation.startpage337-
dc.citation.volume7-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.07(4) (Winter 1994)
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