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Duration Analysis of CEO Turnovers Using Proportional Hazard Model

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dc.contributor.authorKim, Yungsan-
dc.contributor.authorRyu, Keunkwan-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-22T04:21:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-22T04:21:49Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 11 (No. 3 1998): 243-260en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1134-
dc.description.abstractTo analyze CEO turnovers in large U.S. corporations over the period 1981 to 1990, this paper adopts a minimum chi-square estimation of proportional hazard model. A simple specification test of the proportional hazard assumption is also used. Empirical results indicate that elderly CEOs are more likely to be turned over (retirement effect) and worse-than-average CEOs face a lot higher turnover risk (disciplinary effect). Interestingly, performance is found to have non-proportional effects on CEO turnovers across tenure periods. At an earlier tenure as CEO, only good performance matters, increasing the chance of survival. On the other hand. at a later tenure. only bad performance makes a difference, enhancing the possibility of turnovers.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectchi-square estimationen
dc.subjecthazard assumptionen
dc.subjectChief Executive Officeren
dc.titleDuration Analysis of CEO Turnovers Using Proportional Hazard Modelen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor김영산-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor류근관-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.11(3) (Fall 1998)
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