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Credit Rationing with a Moral Hazard Problem
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Jung, Jeeman | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-23T05:00:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-23T05:00:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000-04 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.13 No.2, pp. 165-184 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1205 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines an alternative model of credit rationing when moral hazard is present in the credit market. Two regimes are considered: one with a continuous trading assumption and the other with a restriction on trading. Continuous trading enables one to construct a riskless hedging portfolio and therefore leads to market failure. Under restrictions on trading, however, the entrepreneur of a firm does not undertake an extremely risky activity and the optimal strategy depends on the amount of debt: the larger the amount of debt, relative to the value of a firm's assets, the greater the entrepreneur's incentive to follow a risky strategy. In this situation, credit rationing is beneficial to lenders. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Moral hazard | - |
dc.subject | credit rationing | - |
dc.subject | Continuous trading | - |
dc.title | Credit Rationing with a Moral Hazard Problem | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 정지만 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 184 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 165-184 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 165 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 13 | - |
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