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Private Information and Endogenous Entry
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rubio, Jesus | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T01:21:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T01:21:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003-10 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.16 No.4, pp. 491-501 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1306 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We assume an organization made up of a principal and an agent in which the agent privately observes the state of nature. The agent can use his private information to set up a new firm (endogenous entry) with a positive fixed cost. We show that, in equilibrium, there is effective endogenous entry If the cost of entry the agent must bear to establish a new firm is low enough, as the agent has better information about the state of nature than the principal. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | endogenous entry | - |
dc.subject | Private information | - |
dc.title | Private Information and Endogenous Entry | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 501 | - |
dc.citation.number | 4 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 491-501 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 491 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 16 | - |
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