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Private Information and Endogenous Entry

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dc.contributor.authorBarcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos-
dc.contributor.authorRubio, Jesus-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T01:21:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T01:21:53Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 16 (No. 4 2003): 491-501en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1306-
dc.description.abstractWe assume an organization made up of a principal and an agent in which the agent privately observes the state of nature. The agent can use his private information to set up a new firm (endogenous entry) with a positive fixed cost. We show that, in equilibrium, there is effective endogenous entry If the cost of entry the agent must bear to establish a new firm is low enough, as the agent has better information about the state of nature than the principal.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectendogenous entryen
dc.subjectPrivate informationen
dc.titlePrivate Information and Endogenous Entryen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.16(4) (Winter 2003)
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