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Monetary Policy under Bounded Rationality
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | Jae-Young Kim | - |
dc.contributor.author | Seunghoon Na | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-19T12:32:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-19T12:32:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012-08 | - |
dc.identifier.other | 000000004684 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/134557 | - |
dc.description | 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2012. 8. Jae-Young Kim. | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper conducts analysis on the effects of monetary policy under bounded rationality
and parameter uncertainty. The model we examined here is New Keynesian IS-Phillips curve of Christiano, Tranbandt, and Walentin (2011). Two assumptions we added are that (i) central bank conducts monetary policy while private agents form forward looking expectations via adaptive learning, and (ii) the central bank has uncertainty about working capital channel parameter in the Phillips curve. Robust control method and Bayesian update algorithm are used to model the central banks behavior to deal with the parameter uncertainty. We examined which induces better outcome between policy under perfect information, robust policy, and feedback (Bayesian) policy. Quantitative analysis shows that robust control policy achieves the best performance among the three policies in discretion whereas it shows the worst performance when commitment constraint is included. Also, performance of the perfect information policy and the feedback policy with commitment outperform that of discretionary policies. | - |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Introduction 5
2 Model 7 2.1 CTW (2011) New Keynesian Macroeconomic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Control under Perfect Information of y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 Determinacy and Learnability Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3.1 Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3.2 Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 Policy rules of Central Bank 15 3.1 Parameter Uncertainty of y as a Kind of Structural Uncertainty . . . . . 15 3.2 Robust Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.3 Feedback Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4 Quantitative Analysis I 18 4.1 Case 1: Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2 Case 2: Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5 Quantitative Analysis II 21 5.1 RandomWalk of y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2 Case 1: Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.3 Case 2: Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6 Conclusion 23 Appendix A 25 A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.3. Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | - |
dc.format | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.extent | 559553 bytes | - |
dc.format.medium | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Seoul National Unversity | - |
dc.subject | Commitment | - |
dc.subject | Feedback Control | - |
dc.subject | Learning | - |
dc.subject | Monetary Policy | - |
dc.subject | Robust Control. | - |
dc.title | Monetary Policy under Bounded Rationality | - |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.description.degree | Master | - |
dc.citation.pages | 47 | - |
dc.contributor.affiliation | 사회과학대학 경제학부 | - |
dc.date.awarded | 2012-08 | - |
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