SHERP

Evidentiary Uncertainty and Negligence Rules

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
Authors
Yoo, YoonHa
Issue Date
2006
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 19 (No. 4 2006): 439-467
Keywords
Tort law; Negligence rule; Legal uncertainty
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of evidentiary uncertainty on
people's incentives to abide by rules in the context of negligence
rules in tort law. It demonstrates that i) the comparative
negligence rule is not necessarily superior to the simple or the
contributory negligence rule, ii) an application of lenient standards
of due care under the contributory negligence rule than in
comparative negligence rule would not necessarily restore social
efficiency, and iii) a partial reduction of legal uncertainty would
not necessarily improve social efficiency. These results contrast
previous theoretical literature.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1362
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.19(4) (Winter 2006)
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse