Debating the Politics of Recognition: Rethinking Charles Taylor's Horizon of Recognition

Abstract

This thesis aims to examine Nancy Frasers criticism against Charles Taylor model of recognition, and reconstructs Taylors response to Frasers criticism based on his other works, Sources of the Self (1989) and A Secular Age (2008). This analysis is relevant to contemporary Korean society due to already existing as well as rising claims for recognition. Taylors main claim is that recognition is a vital human need for identity formation. He assumes the dialogical nature of identity, and stresses the existence of horizon in the background of individual identities. On the other hand, Fraser argues that approaching recognition in terms of identity is misleading, and the objective for addressing the problem of recognition must be to achieve equal status of individuals. Fraser criticizes the Taylorian model of recognition for displacing the politics of redistribution and risking the danger of reification. Chapter II examines how Taylor and Fraser theorize the concept of recognition differently. Taylor constructs a historical narrative to explain the rise of the modern notions of equality and difference, and demonstrates how the two values should be pursued. On the other hand, Fraser theorizes recognition from contemporary politics, or folk-paradigm, and stresses that redistribution and recognition must be analytically distinguished. The difference between Taylor and Fraser regarding the relations between recognition and redistribution rises from the way in which the two thinkers theorize. For Taylor, the modern notion of economy is a historical social imaginary. Furthermore, the second chapter reviews Taylors A Secular Age (2008) in order to further examine the various ways in which Fraser and Taylor each construct their theory. By reviewing A Secular Age, this chapter draws out two implications. Firstly, Taylors account on disengaged moral valuation may be interpreted as a response to Frasers criticism, for Taylor questions the fundamental moral valuation beneath Frasers argument. Secondly, even Taylors method of analyzing history cannot be applied one-dimensionally to non-western societies. Chapter III compares Taylors presumption and Frasers corresponding notion, status. Taylor emphasizes the difficulty of recognizing other cultures due to the difference of horizons. He argues that we should presume the good of the other culture prior to studying that culture, since there is no neutral ground to understand other cultures. Fraser, however, argues that guaranteeing equal status to an individual is sufficient, and that recognizing the other in terms of identity risks the danger of reification. This chapter reviews Sources of the Self (1989) in order to see why presumption is crucial in Taylors perspective. The third chapter concludes that Taylor understands identity as a narrative, and this assumes a certain degree of incommensurability. This means that the confrontation of difference in modern society may not be adequately addressed by the framework of status, since there are conflicts of difference which is not limited to status. This thesis concludes that Taylors main argument remains largely unrefuted by Frasers criticism. Taylors opposition against the attempt to address difference on neutral grounds is supported by his strong argument on horizon. He states that social ontologies working as a background for individual identities do not actually exist. Going further, he warns against the modern tendency to belittle the difference rising from separate horizons as well as its tendency to take the disengaged ideal for granted while it is itself a created social imaginary. Therefore, even if Frasers concerns on economic inequalities as well as the problem of reification may be timely, Taylors argument on the politics of recognition remains largely intact, unless his understanding of identity and narrative on modern identity/social imaginary is refuted.