Public-Good Nature of Environmental Conflicts : Individual and Collective Litigations

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorPark, SungHoon-
dc.contributor.authorLee, Myunghoon-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 20 (No. 3 2007): 283-296en
dc.description.abstractIn environmental conflicts where private citizens sue a
polluter, a private citizen’s participation in the fight for
environmental damages is characterized by the public good
nature. We examine how the introduction of collective litigation
and asymmetric reimbursement rule affects each citizen's choice
between free-riding and participation in the collective litigation.
Following a Stackelberg model, we assume that citizens move
first and the firm follows, while each citizen has to state his
environmental damages to the court in the process. Important
findings are as follows: First, in the individual litigation, the
hungriest citizen who most highly values environmental damages
is the only one to participate. Second, in the collective litigation,
all citizens participate, provided the total damages of the
citizens' group are sufficiently larger than the damages of the
hungriest citizen. Third, under certain conditions, introduction of
the asymmetric reimbursement rule enhances the possibility that
all citizens participate in the collective litigation.
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectCollective litigationen
dc.subjectEnvironmental conflictsen
dc.subjectIndividual litigationen
dc.subjectPublic goodsen
dc.titlePublic-Good Nature of Environmental Conflicts : Individual and Collective Litigationsen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.20(3) (Fall 2006)
Files in This Item:
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.