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Optimal Contracts for Risk Managers
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Jung, Jin Yong | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-23T06:30:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-23T06:30:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.31 No.1, pp. 99-119 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/139635 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study analyzed the principal-agent problem, in which the agent performs risk management tasks, and considered the cost minimization problem of the principal, the objective of which is to design the cheapest contract inducing a target effort. Our results confirm that a one-step bonus contract should be used, which means that a bonus contract is most efficient for the principal in terms of incentive provision. A new condition to justify the first-order approach in our model was also provided. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Risk managers | - |
dc.subject | Risk-reducing effort | - |
dc.subject | Bonus contract | - |
dc.title | Optimal Contracts for Risk Managers | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 정진용 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 119 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 99-119 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 99 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 31 | - |
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