Two-Level Games between the Two Koreas -Political and Military Inter-Korean Talks, 2008~2017 -

Abstract

This study analyzes political and military Inter-Korean talks between the year of 2008 and 2017. Based on Putnams Two Level game theory, the winsets of each talks were thoroughly examined. According to Putnam, there are three factors that determines winset size

the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents, Level 2 political institutions, and Level 1 negotiators strategies.

Level 1 refers to negotiation itself and Level 2 is domestic society. In this study, three determinants were modified in the context of reality of Korean peninsula. Level 1 negotiators strategies refer to Level 1 negotiators autonomy, which includes the chief negotiators rank, position, and experience. Level 2 preferences and coalitions were analyzed by specific agendas in each talks. In addition, Level 2 political institutions were set as fixed variable.

In order to do the comprehensive analysis, the graph was introduced putting x-axis as Level 1 autonomy and y-axis as Level 2 preference and coalition. Inter-Korean talks for ten years were located on the graph. This graph shows that Level 1 is more influential than Level 2 in Inter-Korean talks. We also can find that the powerful chief negotiator can enlarge Level 2 winset, so he/she can achieve to make consensus even though when Level 2 winset is very small.