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Markets and Banks: A Note on Diamond and Dybvig Model of Banking

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorPark, Cheol-
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-27T03:04:09Z-
dc.date.available2019-12-27T03:04:09Z-
dc.date.issued2016-12-
dc.identifier.citation경영논집, Vol.50, pp. 117-131-
dc.identifier.issn2384-2849-
dc.identifier.other07-000061-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/162956-
dc.description.abstractThis paper points out that in the well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking, the full information social optimum cannot be implemented by deposit contracts once trading among agents is allowed.
The paper is in stark contrast to Jacklin (1987), which shows that equity trading dominates the banking arrangement. By pointing out the flaw in Jacklins analysis, we show that neither the banking arrangement nor the equity trading can improve upon the autarky allocation. The ability of the banking system to create liquidity is shown to depend on the possibility of trades among agents.
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dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the Institute of Management Research and Institute of Finance and Banking of the Seoul National University is gratefully acknowledged.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisher서울대학교 경영대학 경영연구소-
dc.titleMarkets and Banks: A Note on Diamond and Dybvig Model of Banking-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor박철-
dc.citation.journaltitle경영논집-
dc.citation.endpage131-
dc.citation.pages117-131-
dc.citation.startpage117-
dc.citation.volume50-
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