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Contest Mechanism Design with Budget-Constraint Agents : 예산제약 하에서의 Contest Mechanism에 대한 연구
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- Authors
- Advisor
- 김진우
- Issue Date
- 2022
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 대학원
- Keywords
- mechanism design ; affirmative action ; inequality
- Description
- 학위논문(석사) -- 서울대학교대학원 : 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2022.2. 김진우.
- Abstract
- In this paper, I analyzed how inserting of budget constraint assumption makes difference with the results of previous studies on contest mechanism design problems such as optimal contest mechanism design and affirmative action design. When there are some budget-constrained agents, mechanism designers have to think over not only the best way to balance gains (desirable allocation) and losses (wasteful cost) from the contest but also the best way to balance allocation of budget-constrained agents and budget-free agents. Compared to assortative matching mechanism, random matching mechanism and coarse matching mechanism are more likely to balance allocation of budget-constrained agents and budget-free agents well. Since random matching mechanism and coarse matching mechanism make participants waste less resources in signaling, they relieve some problems caused by budget constraints. When affirmative action is implemented, therefore, random matching mechanism and coarse
matching mechanism allow agents with budget constraint problems to win for open seats.
Consequently, more minority people are expected to achieve school seats under random or
coarse matching mechanism.
- Language
- eng
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