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Group bargaining with representation
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2009-04
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.22 No.2, pp. 245-262
- Keywords
- Group bargaining ; Nash bargaining solution ; Representation ; Delegation
- Abstract
- We study a strategic bargaining model where two groups of
individuals first choose their representatives, who then bargain
with each other using a standard alternating-offer protocol, and
then the shares of the members of a group are determined by a
similar n-person bargaining process within the group. We show
that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome of this
three-stage game when the breakdown probabilities of both the
inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining are small. In
equilibrium, each group selects as its representative an individual
who has the greatest marginal gain from increasing the groups
share.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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