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Folk Theorems in the Negotiation Game with Transaction Costs
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Jihong | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-13T06:32:20Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2010-09-13T06:32:20Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-07 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.23 No.3, pp. 407-419 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/69810 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate
a large number of equilibria and inefficiencies in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen 1995) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are transaction costs (Anderlini and Felli 2001). This paper considers a model of negotiation with transaction costs. It is shown that, in contrast to the aforementioned analyses, full Folk theorems are obtained in our model. | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
| dc.subject | Bargaining | - |
| dc.subject | Repeated game | - |
| dc.subject | Coase theorem | - |
| dc.subject | Transaction cost | - |
| dc.title | Folk Theorems in the Negotiation Game with Transaction Costs | - |
| dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
| dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 이지홍 | - |
| dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
| dc.citation.endpage | 419 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
| dc.citation.pages | 407-419 | - |
| dc.citation.startpage | 407 | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 23 | - |
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