Publications

Detailed Information

Responses of Incumbents to Patent Enforcement: An Examination of the Korean Case

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorOh, Jun-Byoung-
dc.contributor.authorPark, Changsuh-
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-27T05:46:07Z-
dc.date.available2013-02-27T05:46:07Z-
dc.date.issued2013-01-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.26 No.1, pp. 73-94-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/81191-
dc.description.abstractDoes stronger patent enforcement stimulate innovation activities? After the 1994 Korean patent reform, a substantial increase in the number of patent applications in the electronics and related equipment industries has been observed. This paper investigates how stronger patent enforcement affected the activities of firm innovation and whether the observed upsurge of patenting propensity is attributable to the increase in innovation activities. The regression results show that incumbents with large fixed capital strategically responded to patent enforcement by substantially increasing patent applications, but not research and development intensity. The results were consistent with the strategic response hypothesis and suggested that the 1994 Korean patent enforcement did not stimulate the innovation activities of firms.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectPatent reform-
dc.subjectInnovation-
dc.subjectStrategic response-
dc.titleResponses of Incumbents to Patent Enforcement: An Examination of the Korean Case-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage94-
dc.citation.number1-
dc.citation.pages73-94-
dc.citation.startpage73-
dc.citation.volume26-
Appears in Collections:
Files in This Item:

Altmetrics

Item View & Download Count

  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Share