Publications

Detailed Information

An N-Person Bargaining Process with Alternating Demands

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorChae, Suchan-
dc.contributor.authorYang, JeongAe-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-15-
dc.date.available2009-01-15-
dc.date.issued1990-07-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.3 No.3, pp. 255-262-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/897-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze an n-person bargaining game where players alternatingly demand their shares of a pie, and show that the set of perfect equilibria is a singleton if the common discount factor is below a certain cirtical level, and a continuum otherwise.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectbagaining game-
dc.titleAn N-Person Bargaining Process with Alternating Demands-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor채수찬-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor양정애-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage262-
dc.citation.number3-
dc.citation.pages255-262-
dc.citation.startpage255-
dc.citation.volume3-
Appears in Collections:
Files in This Item:

Altmetrics

Item View & Download Count

  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Share