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Agency Costs, Management Stockholding, and Research and Development Expenditures

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorCho, Shin-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-16-
dc.date.available2009-01-16-
dc.date.issued1992-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 5 (No. 2 1992): 127-152en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/949-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the relationship between management stockholding and the level of R&D expenditures of a firm. Agency theory implies that a manager is reluctant to undertake R&D projects. Considering that management stockholding generally works to reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers, we can expect a certain relationship between management stockholding and R&D intensity, although the theory fails to predict a monotonous relationship between these two. Empirical results show that R&D intensity rises as the importance of management stockholding increases in the manager's personal wealth. These results are consistent with the agency theory that management stockholding reduces agency problem.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectR&D expendituresen
dc.subjectmanagement stockholdingen
dc.subjectR&D intensityen
dc.titleAgency Costs, Management Stockholding, and Research and Development Expendituresen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor조신-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.05(2) (Summer 1992)
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