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Price Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly Market
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Mahanta, Amarjyoti | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-30T04:17:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-05-30T04:17:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-04 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.29 No.2, pp. 165-180 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/96654 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Several studies on mixed oligopoly indicate that the ownership
pattern of firms does not affect the equilibrium price. This idea often suggests that ownership is irrelevant. In a mixed duopoly under price competition, firm ownership is irrelevant. This study reveals that ownership is irrelevant in a single publicly owned firm and in any positive number of privately owned firms. However, if two or more publicly owned firms exist, then ownership becomes relevant in a homogeneous good market with a strictly increasing convex cost schedule and a downward sloping demand curve. If firms set the price sequentially and if the lone public firm is a price leader, then social welfare is constantly greater than when the latter is a price follower. The unique price is the competitive price when the public firm moves first in the sequential game. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Mixed oligopoly | - |
dc.subject | Price competition | - |
dc.title | Price Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly Market | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 180 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 165-180 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 165 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 29 | - |
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