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Executive-Legislative Conflict and Regulation Outcomes: The Case of the U.S. FCC

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Authors
Lee, Jongkon
Issue Date
2016
Publisher
Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University
Citation
Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol.31 No.3 pp. 75-99
Keywords
executive-legislative conflictpolicy stakeholder supportprocedural justicemedia concentration regulationU.S. Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In the context of regulatory decisions, the political conflict between executive and legislative branches has been significant. The relative ideological stances and power resources of federal agencies and Congress determines regulation outcomes. When agencies earn sufficient political support from policy stakeholders by relying on procedural justice, they are able to secure the regulatory outcomes they desire without congressional intervention. Because legislators are highly concerned about their reelection prospects, policy stakeholders political support is an important power resource for agencies. Legislators are likely to embrace regulatory decisions made by agencies supported by policy stakeholders even if they disregard congressional preferences. This article provides evidence for this proposition by reviewing media concentration regulation policies of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.
ISSN
1225-5017
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/100235
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Graduate School of Public Administration (행정대학원)Dept. of Public Administration (행정학과)Korean Journal of Policy Studies (정책논총)Korean Journal of Policy Studies (정책논총) vol.31 no.1-3 (2016)
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