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Equilibrium Inferences from the Choice of Forum
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 1993-07
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.6 No.3, pp. 241-256
- Keywords
- signalling model ; cheap-talk ; two-audience model
- Abstract
- This paper studies a signalling model with two audiences. In which the relationship between the sender and one audience is reverse to that of the sender and the other audience. When the sender chooses a forum after observing his type, the receivers make inferences about the sender's type not only from the message but also from the choice of forum; this influences the equilibrium. We present two models and analyze .the equilibrium, which differ in whether the sender can commit the choice of communication or not.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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