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Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chun, Youngsub | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-21T01:12:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-21T01:12:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1996-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.9 No.3, pp. 181-190 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1083 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | bargaining solution | - |
dc.subject | donor gain | - |
dc.subject | Kalai-Smorodinsky | - |
dc.title | Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 전영섭 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 190 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 181-190 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 181 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 9 | - |
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