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Incentive Delegation and Collusion
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2000-01
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.13 No.1, pp. 21-36
- Keywords
- incentive delegation ; anti-trust law ; loss of profits
- Abstract
- In an infinitely repeated duopoly we show the implications of strategic incentive delegation. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. We explain that the presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and the producers in a similar way.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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